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Abstract 
 
 
 
The present cross-cultural investigation analyzes critically the ideological structures in the 
discourses produced by foreign policy experts about the Iraq war. It explores the discursive 
practices of a presumably powerful group of opinion leaders in two nations/cultures 
bounded by war and hostility. Drawing upon the theoretical stance of CDA and 
Argumentation Theory, the study aims at achieving two goals. First, it attempts to examine 
the contextually-controlled production of the op-ed discourses in the two cultures and the 
discursive decisions guided by the experts´ context models, being the cognitive interface 
between discourse and society (van Dijk 2008).  Second, it seeks to uncover the kinds of 
ideologies that underlie and play a major role in the experts´ performance of argumentative 
strategies in their debate on Iraq. Two corpora, of 30 op-ed pieces each, issued in 
American and Arab newspapers are analyzed in relation to the discursive constructions of 
the Iraq war and the ideological resources sustaining them. The study combines analytic 
tools from Pragma-dialectics, classical rhetoric and CDA, in examining (i) the selection of 
topics and the discursive construction of contextual features, namely setting, participants´ 
identities, roles and purposes and (ii) the strategic maneuverings performed revealing of 
the arguers´ attempt to maintain balance between the dialectical and the rhetorical goals. 
The findings from the cross-cultural study show that the patterns in the discursive practices 
of each group of policy experts indicate ideologically-biased strategies prompted by the 
power positions of their respective nations and their dispositions on the international 
conflict.  
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the discursive strategies used by foreign policy experts in op-ed 
pieces discussing war related policies. The cross-cultural research explores the 
underlying ideologies guiding the discursive and argumentative practices of expert 
groups belonging to two nations involved in an armed conflict. Drawing upon the 
stances of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and Pragma-dialectics, a critical analysis 
was conducted on the discourses of American and Arab op-ed pieces with the purpose 
of examining the ideological structures constraining the discursive constructions of the 
Iraq war performed by the two groups of foreign policy experts as well as the 
argumentative strategies employed in their discussions of the policies and situation of 
the war in Iraq. The ideologically controlled discourse has been critically approached 
from a sociocognitive perspective in which ideologies are regarded as ―the basis of the 
social representations shared by members of a group‖ (van Dijk, 1998a: 8). The 
sociocognitive approach emphasizes the role of cognition in the study of ideology and is 
based on the belief in the cognitive interface mediating discourse and society. The 
current cross-cultural study of op-ed discourses adopts this multidisciplinary approach 
to CDS in the examination of the foreign policy opinion discourses and draws on its 
positions in the study of power, domination and resistance. Pragma-dialectics (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst. 2004) has brought forth a systematic analysis of 
argumentative strategies and some significant insight into the kinds of ideologies 
governing the op-ed pieces in the two cultures. This study hopes to draw more attention 
to the discourse of foreign policy experts as powerful political groups and key 
instruments defining international relations and to contribute with an empirical account 
to the examination of the role of ideologies in the communication processes of these 
leading international political actors.   
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1. 1.  Statement of the problem 
Understanding the world politics in a period of rapid change may result challenging. In 
times of international crisis and war, crucial political decisions and actions take place 
following extensive domestic and international interactions between chief foreign policy 
(henceforth, FP) actors. This complex process takes place within the global conditions 
prevailing at the time of decision making and is the product of many international 
actors´ interactions such as states, groups, individuals and transnational actors.  Indeed, 
these actors manage their conflicts over different interests through processes involving 
debate, argument, disagreement, compromise and cooperation (Bloomfield, 2003: 10). 
Within their discursive practices, the relationships among nation-states and the realities 
of the global system are shaped.  
The op-ed pieces regularly appearing in newspapers offer a major forum for public 
debate. They bring together politicians, government officials, policy experts, and 
journalists to discuss the expediency of particular policies while putting forward their 
opinions about policy actions and decisions. In matters which are hard for the general 
public to access and directly experiment, however, such as foreign policy, an expert´s 
opinion takes a special status, as it helps the public understand what is at stake in 
international relations. Here, the boundary between personal opinions and expertise 
views gets blurred. As a matter of fact, since experts are assumed to possess the right 
skills to evaluate complex political situations, predict their future outcomes, determine 
policy options and offer solutions to problems, their contribution to op-ed sections may 
not be perceived as merely a personal opinion. There is always an added value to this 
contribution owing to their cognitive authority (Wilson, 1990) and their positions as 
knowledgeable people that secure their legitimated power. Indeed, no matter how 
educated citizens/audiences are on their nations‘ foreign relations, they understand the 
need for experts to explain to them the functions of vital decisions which involve such 
complex elements as the character of foreign relations and the intentions of various 
international players and enemies along the estimation of policy options, interests and 
risks. Nevertheless, their interpretation of political and world events become the ―fact‖ 
resource from which citizens and politicians adopt their attitudes and make political 
decisions. The cognitive authority of policy experts is evidenced by one´s acceptance-
as-legitimate of the validity or utility of the authors´ definition, description or 
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explanation of reality (Gieryn & Figert, 1986: 67). The problem lies in that what is 
agreed to be fact is the product not of open debate but of the authority of experts and 
even more, the public is more or less under the cultural or intellectual control of the 
experts (Turner, 2001: 126, italics in original) 
The discourse of FP experts as a powerful political group deserves more scholarly 
attention in CDS, as not only do they offer analysis and assessment to foreign affairs, 
but they also monitor the processes of policy planning, negotiations and executions 
through discursive practices leading to ultimate policy decisions that have important if 
not doomful international consequences. Within these interaction-based professional 
practices, the policy experts also define the terms of the public debate on policy 
positions and very often become opinion leaders influencing the public attitudes and 
decisions. Their opinion pieces issued in print or electronic media reveal how these 
experts operate in media channels to establish debate on controversial and high-
stakes issues and to achieve their goal of mobilizing public opinion for desired political 
actions.  
The circulation of political opinion in the media is widely perceived by scholars in 
political sciences and related disciplines as an essential part of political communication. 
According to McNair, political communication includes all forms of political discourse 
―whether 1) undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of 
achieving specific objectives, 2) addressed to these actors by non-politicians such as 
voters, or 3) maintained about these actors and their activities, such as the one held in 
news reports, editorials, and other forms of media discussion of politics‖ (McNair, 
2011: 4). At first sight, an op-ed piece falls under discourse type three identified by 
McNair, as it is generally categorized as the expression of opinion and criticism to 
policies and political actors as part of the democratic duty of holding politicians 
accountable. Nonetheless, it may rather belong to type one, since it is open for 
politicians to participate and also to political actors disguised under the label of 
columnists whose ―opinions are social, institutional or political‖ (van Dijk, 1998b: 22) 
In democratic political systems, publishing political opinions aims at conducting a 
debate that seeks to engage the citizen into the political decision process based on the 
deliberative model offered by the system. As Habermas sustains, ―the deliberative 
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paradigm offers as its main empirical point of reference a democratic process, which is 
supposed to generate legitimacy through a procedure of opinion and will formation 
(Habermas, 2006:  413). Even though it belongs to a public sphere (in the Habermasian 
sense), the op-ed in practice is reserved to the elite, at least to those who are eligible to 
participate in political debates based on their recognized status as experts in political 
matters. Van Dijk argues that the elites control or have preferential access to the major 
means of public communication (1993: 179). Even more, in any type of political 
communication in the media, access is much more critical when, in Habermas´ words 
different social actors struggle for access to and influence on the media.  
Those actors enter the stage from three points: Politicians and 
political parties start from the center of the political system; 
lobbyists and special interest groups come from the vantage point of 
the functional systems and status groups they represent; and 
advocates, public interest groups, churches, intellectuals, and moral 
entrepreneurs come from backgrounds in civil society.  
(Habermas, 2006: 417) 
Deliberation on political decisions guarantees the application of democratic principles 
and offers the politicians the opportunity to cultivate public support for political 
negotiations. In fact, politicians use the media to address their citizens in order to state 
their political aims, put forward their policy decisions and get to defend them. Citizens‘ 
participation is supposed to be brought together after a complex process of opinion 
formation through political actions such as voting. Because public opinion is important 
in democratic political systems and may affect the shaping of the state policies, the elite 
take advantage of the mass media channels to cultivate public support for negotiations 
and ―sustain different loyalties towards distinct political communities‖ (Sampedro, 
2011: 432).  
In the case of authoritarian regime, however, the situation is extremely different. 
Political communication is monopolized by the ruling person or group who tends to 
exclusively administer its instruments for the promotion of its decisions.  In the current 
age of political ethical imperatives of international relations, these regimes attempt to 
maintain a politically correct communication and make use of the same media supports 
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used in democratic societies in order to shed democratic facade on their monolithic 
political behavior. Decision-making is often performed by the regime´s small circle; 
hence citizens usually have no real or fake participation in the deliberation process. Like 
all political communication tools, publishing opinion pieces is part of the politicians 
work and their spokesmen engaging in explaining their decisions to the public assuming 
their inherent righteousness.  
The difference in political communication practices between democratic and 
authoritarian societies creates hence different paradigms in which political opinions are 
produced in the press and points to major cultural and contextual differences between 
the two types of political systems in conducting political debate in the media. However, 
the production of American and Arab op-ed piece discourse is not only constrained by 
two different political systems, but also by two crucial macro contextual conditions. The 
first is the environment of world politics which defines the relationships among nations 
and the amount of power they internationally enjoy.  The second condition is the critical 
bilateral relation America and Arab states uphold within the growing ideological 
conflict over interests, threats and world views and which are perpetuated in the Iraq 
war and other conflicts in the Middle East.      
This opens up for a number of questions. First, it would be quite interesting from a CDS 
perspective to see FP communication practices within this context of the armed conflict 
issued in mass-circulating newspapers which create communicative situations involving 
global readership and conditions bolstering up an internationally wider public sphere. 
Second, the FP opinion pieces are often credulously regarded as a democratic forum 
open for free policy debate and as used by columnists acting as social critics of 
politicians´ views and decisions. These assumptions are highly questioned not only for 
the alleged ―link between the policy experts‘ views, the editorial stands of the media 
outlets and the processes of policy actions (Page, 1996: 21), but also for the 
repercussion of these opinions on the collective mind of nations, namely their 
perceptions of national interests, their positions from international issues and their 
actual political actions. Third, as a communicative situation, the debate on FP issue in 
the press has an indirect relation with discourse which is maintained by a ―cognitive 
interface‖ (van Dijk, 2009: 64) and that the study of discourse requires attention to the 
makeup of these mediating mental mechanisms. Based on these views which are in line 
6 
 
with the axiomatic belief of Constructivism – one of the major theories in international 
relations- that ―the international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures 
which give meaning to the material world (Adler, 1997:319), researchers still have a 
long way to go in the interdisciplinary exploration of how social cognition impinge on 
the discourse of policy makers and its impact on world politics.  
The complex design and product of the policy actors´ interactions need to be addressed 
within cognitive theory paradigms and to take into consideration the complex global 
macro-context defined by international relations´ actors, the bilateral relations of their 
state-nations and their power positions in the global arena. The cognitive groundwork 
for debates on FP  along with its manifestation in discourse are noteworthy for critical 
analysis mainly by taking into consideration different cultural perspectives and practices 
pertinent to the dynamics of global relations. In fact, there is much to explore in this 
political media discourse type and further interesting revelations may be achieved in 
comparing the political opinion production not only of two different political systems, 
but also of two political groups holding conflicting and inimical relations within a 
complex international order.     
 
1. 2. Purpose of the Study 
To claim that a ―political problem exists only if political groups say it exists (Kristol, 
1979) may sound an exaggeration even for those adopting a critical approach in their 
investigation of human behaviors. However, when the momentous decisions made by 
powerful foreign policy elite do not only affect the common national interests, but the 
common fate of entire peoples and nations, their behavior deserves not only critical 
inspections but also an active political posture. Policy decisions and actions involving 
war and peace maintain people all over the globe alarmed. They are certainly the 
product of the decision makers‘ deliberative practices and negotiations as well as their 
struggle over power positions. In these influential discursive practices the attention was 
drawn in the current research work, mainly to the cross-cultural dimension of these 
practices, in an attempt to understand how the differences in the nations´ power 
positions and in their ideologically governed perceptions of the course of events shape 
the discursive and argumentative strategies of these social groups.  
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Many variables are involved in the negotiations processes undertaken by foreign policy 
experts in their communicative practices including their contributions to policy debates 
in op-ed pieces. Foreign policy experts tend to work within a collective enterprise 
shared mainly with the extended community of policy makers, including -ideally- 
citizens, and based on more or less common (and different) national and historical 
heritage. The political dispositions of these policy makers stem from all the surrounding 
cognitive setting of their professional practices: their socially shared cognition, such as 
their values, attitudes, beliefs, collective identities, political cognitions (goals and 
values) and ideologies, among other elements constituting the ground for their 
behaviors. These dispositions are reflected in the op-ed pieces they publish and the 
argumentative practices they undertake to justify, legitimize, authorize, or condemn 
policies but more dangerously to put to actions crucial political decisions with fateful 
political consequences. This thesis was especially motivated by interest in the power of 
the argumentative work of FP experts and its sociocognitive backdrop as indicative of 
their political and ideological agendas. As a powerful elite, their discourse has generally 
been investigated in CDA scholarship as part of the political or elite discourse (van 
Dijk, 1993; 1995), but little has been explored in the depth of their culturally and 
ideologically constrained reasoning processes.  
CDA has always been interested in examining the discourse of powerful social actors 
mainly those working in the political domain. Remarkable theories have been developed 
from the research dedicated to political discourse in its various institutional settings 
both at the state domestic level (see Chilton 2004; Chilton & Schaffner, 2002; van Dijk, 
2002; Wodak, 2009) and within the domain of foreign policy (Chilton 1985; 1996; 
Musolff, 2004). Yet, relatively little attention has been paid to the argumentative 
discourse of FP actors (see Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012) and mainly to those 
working in the backstage (to use Wodak´s (2011) term). Opinion leaders in general 
deserve more attention as they interpret and disseminate political messages for the 
public to help them understand complex political issues. However, in the domain of 
world affairs, these leaders are politically purposive people, even if some of them are 
not perceived as such, and the upshot of their business is undeniably immense. Their 
social impact or abuse might not be recognized as crucial as that of politicians, who 
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have always dominated the attention of CDA scholars and have been perceived as the 
actual political actors. FP experts as opinion leaders undertake a crucial role in the 
political arena and exercise significant influence on the international relations 
maintained between different nations and the key policies regularizing these relations.  
 This cross-cultural critical study aims to explore and contrast the ideologies underlying 
the discourses of the foreign policy (FP) experts in the American and Arab op-ed pieces 
discussing the Iraq war during the period referred to as ―the Surge‖ in the time period 
between late 2006 and September 2007. More specifically, the study focuses on two 
issues in the discourses of the experts groups in the two cultures: 1) the ideological 
dimension of the decisions made by the experts in their discursive constructions of the 
debate on Iraq, namely their selections of topics, their definition of context and their 
expression of the purposes in actions, and 2) the ideological strategies underlying the 
argumentative practices, more specifically the reason that could explain the kinds of 
strategic maneuverings they perform and the role of their power positions in the 
international conflict and group shared cognitions in the discursive choices they make. 
The study draws on the stance of CDA and the work of van Dijk (1998a) on ideological 
discourse, his sociocognitive approach to the study of the elite discourse role in 
reproducing ideologies of dominance or resistance and his theory on context. The 
analysis and evaluation of the op-ed argumentative strategies and the characterization of 
the nature of the debate maintained among FP experts are based on the systematic 
Pragma-dialectic method developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) and 
draws, more specifically, on the notion of strategic maneuvering which may be regarded 
as a powerful analytic tool for the study of ideologies in argumentative discourse.  
 
1. 3. Research Questions  
The interest in the discourse of FP experts in the op-ed pieces started with the 
uncertainty with which this kind of discourse may be classified in the common lay 
understanding as well as from an academic and formal perspective. The paradoxical 
character of this discourse lies in the fact that while it is probably regarded as subjective 
and personal, it also reflects an expert position bearing all the assumptions of authority 
and informed knowledge that is normally credited to these people. The current research 
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project endeavors to study and contrast the ideological structures in the discursive 
practices of foreign policy experts in two cultures bounded by bilateral relations 
characterized by hostility and warfare. The study seeks to critically explore the strategic 
construction of the experts´ discourses in each culture and to uncover the kinds of 
ideological resources they draw upon in this practice. In order to achieve these goals, a 
series of questions is addressed. 
1. What strategic choices do FP experts in the two cultures make in their discursive 
construction of the debate on Iraq?  This question focuses on the discursive choices 
of the op-ed authors and their ideological backdrop. Three sub questions are 
addressed under this main question: 
1. How do their selections of topics reveal their ideologically motivated goals and 
decisions?  
2. How do they enact the construction of context in discourse?  
3. To what extent do their argumentative moves indicate ideologically driven 
decisions?  
2. What kind of conditions for argumentation does the context of FP op-ed pieces 
create?  Here attention is paid to the constraints created by context, mainly 
ideologically ingrained practices, that shape the argumentative and discursive 
choices made by the FP op-ed authors.  
To answer these questions an integrated framework was set up to critically analyze the 
FP discourses and argumentation in the two groups of op-ed corpora. The discursive 
constructions would help reveal the strategic choices enacted by the experts and their 
ideological groundwork assisted by their social cognition, and probably determine 
whether this groundwork is primarily professional, political, and national or a 
combination of these.  
 
1. 4. The debate on the Iraq War 
The opinion pieces under study were published between late 2006 and September 2007 
during the period known as the ―Surge‖ and they discuss the US military policies in Iraq 
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and its counter-insurgency strategies. The main focus in this debate was the US Security 
plan, launched in January 2007 by President Bush who officially dubbed it ―The New 
Way Forward‖. The plan aimed primarily at an increase in the number of American 
troops in Iraq in order to provide security, contain violence and continue the 
reconstruction project undertaken since the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.  
The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with the main aims to knock down the regime of 
Saddam Hussein, free the Iraqi people from dictatorship, establish democracy and help 
the country into its reconstruction. The US troops were supposed to stay until a 
democratically elected Iraqi government could effectively run the country and establish 
peace and security. However, instead of achieving the claimed objectives of bringing 
peace and democracy, the sectarian division in Iraq aggravated the situation and the 
Bush Administration remained incapable of dealing with the ascending violence and the 
rising costs of war.  
Opponents of President Bush along with public opinion were highly critical of the 
administration mismanagement of the war and wary of the high death tolls in troops and 
the excessive costs of the war. Earlier in 2006, the escalating ―sectarian‖ violence in 
Iraq provoked even more negative reactions to the US intervention as well as both 
domestic and international calls for retreat. Even more, many of the previous war 
supporters turned into critics of Bush ineffective strategies and called for troops‘ 
withdrawal from Iraq before the looming defeat.  
The state of extreme violence in Iraq was allegedly triggered by a sectarian strife 
between the Sunni and the Shiite leading to a state of ―civil war‖ in the country. This 
assumption which is widely accepted internationally and even considered to be a fact is 
not shared by most Arab media mainly those from independent sources. In fact, there is 
a clash between Americans and Arabs in their perspectives and opinions about the 
evolution and the circumstances of the rising violence in Iraq. The American and 
international mainstream debates revolved mainly around the belief that sectarian 
conflicts and ethnic strives for power was slowing down the democratization and peace 
process and therefore, making it difficult for coalition forces to withdraw from the Iraqi 
territory. The Arab prevalent positions on the other hand, primarily focused on blaming 
the U.S. presence and colonization for the rise of a sectarian conflict and refused to 
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consider the conflict a case of ―civil war‖, but rather a product of the US occupation and 
policies. There was, of course, a certain divergence of opinions among Arab political 
experts and mainly among those supporting the official positions of their governments 
and protecting their interests. Some of these were fully in favor of the US intervention 
and presence in Iraq and believed in its role to prevent terrorists from creeping into their 
countries. 
While in most U.S and international media the political and public debate about the 
policies in Iraq turned by and large into a debate on whether the US troops should leave 
or stay the course in Iraq, in the Arab World, however, the public debates in many 
countries were generally focused on the disastrous outcomes of the US occupation and 
the worries about the fate of the whole region. Even though opinion leaders were 
divided between those supportive and those skeptical of the US mission in Iraq, the 
massive media coverage of the daily killings horrified the public opinion and reinforced 
its anger and negative attitudes towards the US. The media coverage of the Iraq war the 
world over identified the situation as an international crisis, as the increase in violence 
gave way to more terrorism threat and more insecurity in the world. Within this 
wavering situation, the foreign policy experts offered the international community 
diverse assessments through a internationally circulating media channels. Their op-ed 
pieces regarded as a contribution to the international debate on the US policies in Iraq, 
may be perceived by critical scholars in various disciplines, for instance CDA (Wodak, 
2009), Constructivism (Wendt, 1999), to name only a few, as having a crucial role in 
the bilateral relationships (and tensions) maintained between the two sides of the 
conflicts. Policy experts involved in the debate on Iraq do not only explain and justify 
their own positions on Iraq but their discourses also shape the international 
understanding and assimilation of such a complex political situation as war.   
The current cross-cultural study explores and at the same time contrasts the discourse of 
American and Arab FP experts. The two groups have been referred to in this thesis as 
cultural groups. By this reference, the cultural dimension of their difference is 
considered in the sense used by Bourdieu (1990) and as ―habitus‖ or more precisely as 
―structure of the mind characterized by a set of acquired schemata sensibilities, 
dispositions and taste‖ (Scott & Marshall, 2009). Furthermore to justify the expediency 
and validity of contrasting the US (a country) with the Arab world (many countries) the 
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thesis draws on definitions from the field of International Relations (IR) to categorize 
the two expert groups as belonging to two nations rather than belonging to states. 
Kegley & Blanton (2011: 11) define… 
A state as a legal entity that enjoy a permanent population, a well defined territory 
and a government capable of exercising sovereignty, whereas a nation is a 
collection of people who on the basis of ethnic, linguistic or cultural commonality, 
so construct their reality as to primarily perceive themselves to be member of the 
same group which define their identity  
Based on this understanding, the two FP groups are examined within the underlying 
frameworks of their respective nations and cultures: the American and the Arab. 
 
5.  Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, in chapter 
2 the key concepts of the thesis are introduced and a review of the most relevant 
research work is reported. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first one starts with 
a summary of the main theories related to the notion of ideology in discourse and then 
gives an outlook on its role in political and media discourse within a review of major 
research work from various disciplines. The second part of chapter 2 focuses on the 
argumentative dimension of discourse. It is devoted to outlining the major premises in 
contemporary argumentation theory and some of the critical approaches in the analysis 
of argumentation in media and political discourses.  
Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical frameworks of the current research study, first by 
outlining the major theoretical tenets of CDA and particularly the socio-cognitive 
approach adopted by van Dijk and then by introducing Pragma-dialectics, its method 
and analytic tools for the study of argumentative strategies. This is followed by an 
explanation of how these research frameworks are made relevant to the main research 
questions, namely the exploration discursive decisions prompted by ideologies such that 
the selection of topics, construction of context and the performance of particular 
argumentative strategies. The final section expounds the advantage of combining the 
13 
 
socio-cognitive approach and Pragma-dialectics in the study of opinion leaders´ 
discourse and its underlying ideologies.  
In chapter 4 the methodology adopted in the study of the op-ed discourses is outlined. 
After reiterating the purpose of the study, the main research questions and sub-questions 
are advanced. Following this, a description of the data is presented, including the 
criteria for selection and the formation of the two corpora, the American and the Arab, 
along an exploration of the institutional conditions for the production and a description 
of the authors´ profiles. The final section provides a detailed account of the research 
method and various steps pursued in handling the data. It starts with explaining the 
preliminary analysis carried out which is based on the Pragma-dialectical model. Then, 
it moves to the combined analytic tools used in the examination of discursive 
constructions and decisions, from CDA and rhetorical theory. The final part indicates 
the way strategic moves are handled in the discourse with the use of the notion of 
strategic maneuvering along the four critical stages of the Pragma-dialectical model.   
Chapter 5 focuses on the macro-context relevant in the production of the argumentative 
discourse of the op-ed pieces within the two cultures under study. The chapter aims to 
follow a relatively new research trend in Pragma-dialectics in which the possibilities for 
strategic moves are explored in light of institutional conventions set up for the discourse 
an argumentative activity type. The exploration prepares for a more informed 
interpretation of the strategic maneuvering enacted by discourse participants. The 
conventions creating the preconditions for strategic moves in op-ed discourse are 
explored, including the institutional purposes of the different participants, and then a 
characterization of the op-ed activity type based on the ideal model of critical 
discussion. The final section explores the mindsets of participants as one of the major 
precondition for strategic maneuvering. The nation-state political orientations play a 
major role in creating the participants´ commitments and constrain the main material 
starting points for their argumentative exchanges.      
 
Chapter 6 and chapter 7 present and discuss the findings from the cross-cultural analysis 
of ideological structures in the discourses of op-ed pieces. Chapter 6 presents the 
findings from the analysis of FP experts´ discursive construction of the Iraq issue in the 
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two op-ed corpora. By drawing on the CDA sociocognitive approach, the focus is 
placed on the selection of topics and on the construction of contexts. In topic selection, 
the semantic macro-structures, the macro-speech acts, the stases and the oratory types 
are identified along with the disagreement spaces from which arguers select their 
positions. The discursive construction of context is explored in the schematic categories 
of setting and participants. Finally, the discursive construction of purpose in actions and 
the arguers´ modes of representing social actions are examined based on the framework 
proposed by van Leeuween (2008). Chapter7 reports the findings from the analysis of 
ideologies in the argumentative strategies of the op-ed discourses while drawing on the 
notion of strategic maneuvering put forward by Pragma-dialectics. The findings show 
the kinds of strategic maneuvers identified in the four dialectical stages and the 
ideological motivations behind the performances of each cultural group. The final 
section focuses on the cases of maneuvering derailments, namely the occurrences of 
fallacious moves and role of ideologies in their production.  
Finally, chapter 8, the conclusion, summarizes the main findings and contributions and 
discusses directions for future research.    
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CHAPTER 2: IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION IN THE MEDIA 
 
2. 1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the main concepts in focus in this thesis, namely ideology, 
political discourse in the media and argumentation and provides a review of some of the 
most prominent research studies related to these key notions. Adopting a CDA approach 
to the study of ideology in the discourse of FP experts in newspapers implies 
recognizing the multidisciplinary dimension of the research object and the importance 
of the insights that could bring about the multifarious theories from philosophy, 
cognitive theories, political and international relations theories, among others, to the 
critical endeavor. 
 
 Studying the ideological structures manifest in the strategies and the discursive 
practices of political groups acting within the mass media needs an understanding of 
how ideology, argumentation, political and media discourse are defined in the social 
sciences and what kinds of relationships are typically established between them. Indeed, 
the undeniable relationship between these various notions is certainly due to a number 
of reasons. First, FP discourse, as a type of political discourse, is commonly mediated 
by the mass media as is the case for the op-ed pieces under study. Both the media and 
the political institutions jointly constrain the discursive practices of the op-ed authors 
and shape their roles in discursively constructing political public opinion. Besides, the 
authority of FP experts grants them the opportunity to be opinion leaders in matters 
related to international relations and to enjoy both social and institutional power. 
Second, FP discourse in the op-ed is an argumentative discourse, one that is based on 
the discussion of policy-related issues along with the evaluation and/or the proposal of 
policy decisions. Consequently, theories on argumentation are regarded crucial in this 
study. Third, social interactions, including policy debates, involve the exchange of 
opinions, attitudes and the use of facts and reasonable evidence. This leads us to the 
area of the socially and culturally-shared cognition. In other words, the arguments are 
typically derived from the collection of beliefs, values and knowledge which rely on the 
belief systems members of a given social group assume and share in their culture. Based 
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on the interconnectedness of these notions and their relevance in the study of the FP op-
ed discourse, these are explored in the section below within the general frameworks of 
social sciences and particularly in relation to the discipline of critical discourse analysis.  
 
The review is divided into two parts. The first part examines ideology as a central 
concept in the study and then explores the contributions of the most influential works 
carried out on political discourse in the media and the role of ideologies in shaping them 
and in building their argumentative character. The second part is devoted to the state of 
the art of argumentation theory and to the most crucial notions relevant for critical 
analytical approaches 
 
2. 2. The concept of ideology 
One cannot proceed with defining the notion of ideology without taking into 
consideration the variety of disciplines from which it is approached. This means that a 
definition of ideology should be multidisciplinary, drawing from theories of cognition, 
social psychology, sociology and discourse analysis. The notion of ideology was first 
used by the rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy in the late 18
th
 century to denote the 
‗science of ideas‖. This notion has acquired a more pejorative sense in the philosophical 
tradition and become recognized as a ‗false consciousness‘. Ideological studies in the 
social sciences have taken as a starting point Marx‘s critical notion of ideology as ―the 
systematic distortion of social reality, of illusions perpetrated in order to sustain unjust 
and inhuman economic, social and political orders‖ (Marx & Engels, 1976: 52). In line 
with the Marxist views, Gramsci defined ideology as ‗a conception of the world that is 
implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of 
individual and collective life‘ (Gramsci, 1971: 328). Within his influential work in 
sociology, Mannheim (1936) examined ideology with more extensive research 
perspective and not focusing exclusively on its relevance to politics. He criticizes 
Marx's notion that ideologies involve the conscious intention to distort reality, and 
considers ideology to have ―no moral or denunciatory intent."(238). The Marxist views 
have widely been challenged by post-Marxism and post-structuralism scholars, 
particularly Foucault who argues ―the trait of distortion in ideology presupposed some 
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notion of ‗truth‘ beyond discourse‖ (Foucault, 1991: 60), while truth is the product of 
social interaction.  
 
For Althusser (1971), ideology exists in actions rather than being the product of 
representations in the mind. Building on the work of Jacques Lacan and attempting to 
refine the Marxist interpretation of ideology, he sustains that ideology is a structure (with 
no history) that always manifests itself through behavior. Althusser (1971) examines 
ideology within the social and political institutions which he coins them the ―Ideological 
State Apparatuses‖. He argues that individuals (and groups) internalize and act in 
accordance with these state ideologies that are sustained by a ―Lacunar Discourse‖ 
consisting of ―a number of propositions, which are never untrue but suggest a number of 
other propositions which are‖ (1971: 95). The essence of this practice is what is not told, 
but suggested. In more recent philosophical debates, ideology remains a hot central issue 
for theorists, for instance, those interested in understanding how ideologies contributed 
throughout history in shaping the human rationality and in equipping power politics with 
―idealism‖ to hide their hegemony (see Vietta, 2012). With the revolutionary theoretical 
insight from neurosciences and cognitive psychology, the concept starts to lose its 
negative charge and to be open for more elaborate interpretations. Indeed, philosopher 
and social theorist Žižek contends that ideology ‗regulates the relationship between the 
visible and the invisible, between the imaginable and the non-imaginable, as well as 
changes in this relationship‘ (Žižek, 1999: 55). He also argues that the critique of 
ideology must be sustained in order to contribute successfully to ‗every emancipatory 
struggle‘ (Žižek, 2008: 682). 
 
Cultural studies, which focus on the investigation ―of ideas, attitudes, languages, 
practices, institutions and structures of power,‖ (Grossberg et al., 1992), see that the 
media and other institutions formulate the dominant ideology. In his extensive work on 
culture, media and ideology, Hall offers an analysis of the signifying practices of the 
mass media from the perspective of Marxist culturalist theory inflected through 
Gramsci‘s theory of hegemony, and an Althusserian conception of the media as an 
ideological state apparatus largely concerned with the reproduction of dominant 
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ideologies (Hall et al., 1978). Furthermore, he argues that the media appear to reflect 
reality whilst in fact they construct it. For Hall, the mass media do tend to reproduce 
interpretations which serve the interests of the ruling class, but they are also 'a field of 
ideological struggle' (Hall 1996: 40). In the last two decades, critical studies of media 
and their impact have grown within many disciplines and have taken part of the 
intercultural negotiation and condemnation of power and hegemony reproduced through 
discourse (see Fishman, 1980; Said, 1997; Chomsky, 1988 and 1992). 
 
Most recent work on ideology in the social sciences reflect a value-neutral approach in 
which ideology refers indiscriminately to any belief system, any configuration of ideas 
and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of functional 
interdependence (Converse, 1964: 206). Larrain (1979) admits that ideology may be 
conceived in negative or positive terms and that to this extent one can talk of ideologies 
as the opinions, theories and attitudes formed within a class in order to defend and 
promote its interests. Larrain (1994) offers an analysis of the debate about ideologies in 
the context of the dialogue between Western thought and the third world and their 
conceptions of each other exploring at the same time the notion of cultural identity. Hall 
(2000) defines ideology as those ―images, concepts and premises which provide the 
frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and make sense of some 
aspects of social existence‖ (Hall 2000: 271). Ideologies, indeed, define the relationships 
between members of a society, members of a culture and also their relationship with 
others societies and cultures.  
 
In politics, ideology acts as an organizing device as well as a rationalizing device (Jost 
et al 2009).  Indeed, political and other belief systems, such as ideologies, are seen as 
assisting people in the belief that they have value in a meaningful universe providing a 
sense of existential security (Greenberg et al. 1997). Even more and the context of 
international relations in times of war, this rationalizing device has an existential 
motive. According to Jost et al. (2009), research shows that mortality salience, being the 
awareness of threats (war, conflicts and crime), ―appears to produce greater patriotism 
and hostility towards critics of one‘s nation‖ and (…) a stronger preference for 
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aggressive responses to individuals and groups who are perceived as threatening to the 
cultural worldview‖ (Jost et al., 2009: 320). Moreover, political ideologies in particular, 
have a rationalizing device that is ―system justifying‖, which have the power of 
supporting the social order status quo (p. 321). 
 
2. 2. 1.  The study of ideology in discourse  
Ideology as the basis of the social representations of groups has always been a central 
notion in the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a research program or as more 
recently referred to as Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) in its struggle of tracing the 
dialectic relationship between text and process. Drawing on a variety of theoretical 
traditions ranging from Western Marxism to critical theories (Habermas, 1975; 1989) 
who dominated most social theorists‘ views by considering ideology as a ―form of 
systematically distorted communication‖ (Habermas, 1989), CDA approaches have 
shared the fundamental aim of critical analysis of raising awareness regarding the 
strategies performed through discourse to create, maintain and reproduce unbalanced 
relations of power between social groups. The weight that ideologies have in the 
creation of social systems is stressed by the most prominent CDA scholars as a modality 
of power relations tied to the problem of legitimacy in class societies (Fairclough 2008: 
134).  
The early work in the critical linguistics approaches referred to ideology as ―a systematic 
body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view‖ (Kress & Hodge, 1979: 6). 
Later works started to recognize the complexity of such a notion and the fact that 
ideology is inherently contradictory, where ―contradictions come from the process of 
struggle‖ (Hodge, 2012: 5). It has often been stressed that ideologies find their clearest 
expression in language at its different levels: at the lexical-semantic level and at the 
grammatical-syntactic level (e.g. Hodge & Kress, 1993). Numerous researchers have 
studied the semantic and pragmatic levels to detect ideologically relevant aspects in 
discourse. Harris (1994) shows that ideological processes in court operate both at the 
propositional level (such as choices of modality and choices of lexical items) and at the 
pragmatic level (interactive rules with regard to speaker rights and the use of particular 
speech acts). Van Dijk (1998a, 2006) examines some of the discursive structures that 
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typically exhibit underlying ideologies. These are more likely to exist in semantic 
meaning, general schemata such as argumentation and style, rather than morphology and 
syntax (2006: 42). Most scholars agree that the analysis of ideological discourse should 
rely on social context and meaning since struggle in discourse is struggle over meaning 
and over the representation in language of the real world of production (De Goede 1996)  
 
Fairclough (1995) assumes ideology to be often connected with class power and 
domination. Thes views are inspired by Gramsci´s belief that ideologies are ‗tied to 
action, and judged in terms of their social effects rather than their truth values‘ (Gramsci 
1971: 324). Within the same line, the discourse historical approach has treated ideology 
within the process of analyzing the relationship between discourse and identity, 
discrimination, knowledge, power, institutions, etc. Fairclough & Wodak (1997: 258) 
argues that since CDA sees ―discourse -language use in speech and writing- as a form of 
social action‖, discursive practices may have major ideological effects- that is, they can 
help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between social classes‖. Van Dijk 
takes a sociocognitive perspective and defines ideologies as the ―fundamental beliefs of 
a group and its members‖ (2006: 7). He adds that it is a form of self- (and other) 
presentation that summarizes the collective beliefs and hence the criteria for 
identification for group members. For van Dijk (1998a), ideologies are representations 
of who we are, what we stand for, what our values are, and what our relationships are 
with other groups, in particular our enemies or opponents, that is, those who oppose 
what we stand for, threaten our interests (van Dijk, 1998a: 276). In this sense, an 
ideology is one of the basic forms of social cognition that at the same time define the 
identity of a group and hence the subjective feelings of social identity (or belonging) of 
its members (Van Dijk 2006: 18 emphasis in original).  
 
Most CDA researchers recognize the importance of the lexis as a basic level in the 
analysis of ideological discourse before proceeding to other dimensions of texts. A 
lexical analysis allows for a shift from lexicon to meaning, that is, to the semantic level. 
Opinion statements are ideologically controlled propositions which are first detected 
through the very selection of lexical items (van Dijk 1995). The ideological semantics 
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underlying such lexical selection follows a rather clear strategic pattern characterizing 
in-groups and their members in positive terms and out-groups or enemies in negative 
terms. Hackett &Zhao (1994) inspected explicit choices of nouns, verbs and adjectives in 
op-ed texts written about the protesters against the Gulf War. Lexical choices helped 
frame these protesters as the enemy. Additionally, lexis is the primary support for the 
analysis of the ideologies organization in terms of groups‘ self- schemas and the 
examination of patterns of polarization.  
 
From a cognitive linguistic perspective, ideologies are generally recognized as socially 
shared representations and viewed as cognitive structures organizing knowledge about 
the world. Cognitive approaches to the analysis of discourse in the media offer added 
insight into the link between language and ideological implications. Lakoff (1992) 
analyzed the metaphors of war in the US media following the Gulf War in1991 and 
identified strategies used to justify war on both moral and pragmatic grounds (470) and 
invoking on frames or scenarios that would, through the use metaphors, obscure realities. 
Lakoff (1992: 462) assumes that understanding complexities and abstractions, including 
international relations, requires the extensive, unreflective use of a system of metaphor. 
In the same line, a number of interesting studies examined the metaphors of war used in 
the media coverage of wars (e.g. Pancake, 1993) and found out that the WAR IS A 
GAME metaphor, among others, may be responsible for American people‘s acceptance 
and support for the war.  It was not until very recently, however, that the work on 
Cognitive linguistics (CL) and CDA have been put together to approach ideologies in 
discourse by a number of researchers who urged for incorporating the study of the 
conceptual processes that underlie thought into the analysis of discourse from a critical 
perspective (See Nuñez Perucha 2011). Studies on ideology from this interdisciplinary 
approach devoted attention to cognitive structures such as metaphor and image-schemas 
and their impact on reproducing ideologies of consensus and resistance (see Charteris- 
Black 2005; Goatly 2007; Hart 2014; Hart & Lukes 2007; Nuñez Perucha 2004). This 
research trend has consolidated the CDS approaches with its cognitive theoretical 
insights on the study of abuse and manipulation in political, media and gender 
discourses.   
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2. 2. 2.  Ideology in political and media discourses 
Political discourse as defined by Wilson (2007: 398) is ―concerned with formal/informal 
political contexts and political actors, that is, inter alia, politicians, political institutions, 
governments, political media, and political supporters operating in political 
environments to achieve political goals‖. Political discourse should be defined by its 
functions, according to van Dijk 2008: 176), that is ―by who speaks to whom, as what, 
on what occasion and with what goals‖. According to Schäffner (1996), political 
discourse, as a sub-category of discourse in general, can be based on two criteria: 
functional and thematic. It fulfills different functions due to different political activities 
and it is thematic because its topics are primarily related to politics such as political 
activities, political ideas and political relations. As politicians are widely believed to use 
language for their own ends, political discourse commonly focused on the way 
politicians use the linguistic system and rhetorical means to influence voters. Indeed, 
language does not merely convey the political message, but creates for the listener a 
cognitive environment from which any interpretation is manipulated (Edleman 1978).  
Political discourse analysis has recently generated remarkable research works drawing 
on a variety of approaches, namely discourse analytic (Faiclough & Fairclough 2012; 
Van Dijk 2002; Wodak 2009), pragmatic (Wilson 1990), cognitive (Charteris-Black 
2005; Chilton and Lakoff 1995; Lakoff 2008) and a combination of these (Chilton 1985, 
2004; Chilton and Schaffner 2002; Goatly 2007; Musolff 2004). Most work in critical 
approaches address a number of issues which are closely associated with political 
practices and realities such as the issues of power, discrimination, and the representation 
of social groups and the construction of identities, among others. Indeed, CDA 
particularly focuses, as van Dijk (1997: 11) puts it, on ―the reproduction of political 
power, power abuse or domination through political discourse, including the various 
forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance‖, 
which is reflected in research on institutional political discourse and rhetoric (Bloomaert 
2005; Richardson & Wodak 2009; Wodak 2009). There is equally a growing interest in 
the (socio) cognitive aspect of political practices namely the role of ideologies, values 
and cultural ―knowledge‖ in shaping political actions. Political ideologies are ―the basic 
belief systems that underlie and organize the shared social representations of groups and 
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their members‖ (Van Dijk 1997: 17), and, hence they constitute the basis for the 
political discourse practices.   
 
 Media discourse refers to ―interactions that take place through a broadcast platform, 
whether spoken or written, in which the discourse is oriented to a non-present reader, 
listener or viewer‖ (O´Keeffe 2011: 441). The media offer a public space for the elite to 
expose their views, hence hegemonic ideology, according to Gitlin (1978), is 
reproduced in the media through media practices that stem from the ways journalists are 
socialized from childhood and then trained, edited, and promoted by media. Gitlin 
focuses on the struggle between the media, which uphold the dominant ideology, and 
groups out of power, which contest the ideology. He maintains that the media balance, 
absorb, marginalize, and exclude to manage opposition or turn it into a commodity 
(Gitlin 1978: 56). Furthermore, Van Dijk (2006: 28) explains that media ideologies of 
journalists similarly control their ways of writing or editing news, background stories or 
editorials. In other words, ideologies not only may control what we speak or write 
about, but also how we do so.   
 
Research on political and media discourses as a kind of public discourse has interested 
scholars from various disciplines in the social sciences, inspired by the influential works 
of some of the most prominent social theorists such as Jurgen Habermas (1962, 1975) 
and Bourdieu along with ancient and contemporary political philosophers, namely 
Aristotle, Confucius, Dewey and Foucault, among others. Bourdieu (1991) claims that 
media networks are part of the political landscape, because they compete with one 
another to capture the same audiences, they become ―mirror images of one another‖ 
(Bourdieu 1991: 72). There is, indeed, a growing interest in political discourse in the 
media is due to its recognition as a complex phenomenon. Lauerbach and Fetzer (2007) 
uphold that this kind of discourse is at the same time institutional, media, and mediated 
political discourse.  
 
 As institutional discourse, it differs from everyday conversation in being 
subject to institutional goals and procedures. As media discourse it is 
24 
 
different from other types of institutional discourses by being, above all, 
public discourse addressed to a mass media audience. This sets it apart from 
the discourse of other institutions, such as medicine, the law, or education. 
As mediated political discourse, it is the outcome of the encounter of two 
different institutional discourses – those of politics and of the media. Just 
what constitutes the goals and purposes, subtypes, genres and discursive 
practices of this hybrid discourse, is the question pursued in political 
discourse analysis.     auerbach & Fetzer, 2007: 14)  
 
Edelman (1976) used the term ―symbolic politics‖ to refer to such discourse in the mass 
media, as an attempt to distinguish the instrumental –or production- dimension from the 
expressive-presentation- dimension of politics. However, and based on Chilton & 
Schaffner 2002 views, any type of politics is done through language and, thus, 
symbolically constituted. 
 
In any case, it is important to recognize the role the media play in the public 
understanding of political events, and most of its related discourse and the crucial 
notions of representation or construction and interpretation. In fact, the dominant 
presence of the media in political arenas and their privileged access to them may be 
interpreted, according to van Dijk (2008: 53) as a manifestation of political power. Due 
to certain constraints such as limited space and readership, the media tend to reduce 
complex political processes to brief spotlight or images (Wodak, 2011: 18). By the same 
token, political actors reinforce their power within the public spaces offered by the 
media, since the media institutions provide them, according to Wodak (2011) with a 
―front stage‖ kind of political practice. These institutions assume the role of offering the 
public authoritative voice that will speak to them directly. Fairclough stresses the 
mediating and constructing role of the media by arguing that political discourse ―is 
mediated by institutions which in turn, position readers and writers, speakers and 
listeners in different positions of power and knowledge‖ (1989: 36). When writers are 
viewed as an authority in their field of knowledge, such as FP experts, they enjoy even 
more powerful positions in society, as they ―are not democratically accountable, but 
they nevertheless exercise authority-like powers over questions of true beliefs‖ (Turner, 
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2001: 128). They equally play a role in the transition of concepts of control, which flow 
directly through discursive strategies and by repetition (De Goede, 1996).  
 
Researchers from various disciplines who have looked at the relationship between 
media and ideology have mainly pointed out at such notions as power, access, influence 
and manipulation. Indeed, elite groups such as politicians, journalists and writers who 
are in control of most influential public discourses play a special role in the 
reproduction of dominant knowledge and ideologies in society (Van Dijk, 1993). The 
elite are also identified as the ―opinion leaders‖ and their roles in influencing public 
opinion is widely recognized (see Weimann 1994; Holsti 2006). The discourse of the 
powerful elite has been explored from various research disciplines ranging from 
conversation analysis (Greatbatch, 1998; Hutchby, 2006), socio-pragmatics (Fetzer 
2004); cultural studies (Allan, 1998), structural discourse analysis (Bell, 1991) to CDA 
from both a socio-cognitive (van Dijk, 1993) and discourse practices perspectives 
(Fairclough, 1998), and also from a discourse- historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 
2009). The critical approaches to discourse analysis have developed with a special 
interest in media and political discursive practices of the elite and their representation of 
(other) social groups as responsible for violence and deviance. The studies share a 
concern with the role of language in the construction of social relations, in particular 
those of unequal distribution of power and discrimination.  
 
From the perspective of communication and political sciences disciplines, the focus has 
been on the way these elite people set the agenda in public debates and frame the issues 
for the general public. Agenda setting research typically aims at establishing 
correlations between findings about issues addressed, namely what the media focused 
on and the audience reception of them. However, the study of how some key political 
debates are structured and defined throughout an extended range of media channels is 
limited, despite the fact that it represents a resourceful tool to explore and contrast 
political belief systems at a national level. More typically, the connections between the 
elite ideologies and their agenda setting have focused on the local political ideologies of 
a social environment, such as liberal or conservative influences on framing debates and 
topics. Since setting the agenda is an exercise of power (Reese, 1991: 310), research on 
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elite agenda setting may take up the aim of exploring belief systems of powerful nations 
as they are enacted by their elites. 
 
The discursive practices of the elite such as their agenda setting have been regarded 
crucial in CDS. Indeed, selecting news and debates topics may powerfully reflect the 
nature and the implication of the discursively strategic practices of powerful political 
actors (Fowler, 1991; Hackett 1991). Furthermore, picking a topic for discussion does 
not mean that the participants are willing to solve their conflicting views on certain 
issues, but more importantly it points to their motives for undertaking this effort in the 
first place, mainly dictated by political interests and institutional routines (see 
Fairclough, 1992). In most political and cultural contexts, the elite exercise of 
argumentation is perceived in the same respect, as a need for resolution of conflicts over 
political and social groups‘ interests and a struggle to gain or to maintain power. 
Through their discursive strategies, experts reproduce their political visions in the media 
and enact the goals for their anticipated actions (Van Dijk, 2000). The examination of 
topic selection strategies particularly aims at uncovering the political and the 
ideologically governed goals of the elite and the impact of their most crucial discursive 
practices and decisions. 
The types of journalism which have most attracted critical studies are the news reports 
and news stories along with the implication of news styles for the media business and for 
society. Interesting explorations of the semantics and the discourse structures of news 
pieces have yielded a rich insight on the language of news in its various channels (Bell, 
1991; Scollon, 1998; van Dijk, 1988). Some studies offer a cross-cultural exploration of 
news discourse and hence give insight into, for instance, the notion of agency in news 
texts and its connection to ideological and rhetorical realizations in discourse (Marín 
Arrese, 2002). However, until very recently, little research has been devoted to the 
examination of opinion articles in editorials and op-ed sections in CDS (see Hackett& 
Zhao, 1994; van Dijk, 1995; Hidalgo Downing, 2006). The complexities of opinion 
discourse has been, however, the focus of interest in a number of research works 
interested in evaluative language (Martin & White 2005; Bednarek, 2006) computational 
linguistics (Asher et al. 2008; Somasundaran et al. 2008) and cultural studies (Shi-xu, 
2007). Furthermore, compared to the amount of space dedicated to political discourse in 
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its institutional setting such as political speeches, interviews and press conferences, little 
CDA attention has been given to the op-ed piece as a genre pertaining to political actors 
(see Wilson et.al., 2012). Analyses are rather framed under the general studies of media 
or elite discourses in general (see Chouliaraki, 2000; Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk, 1993; 
1998).  
The discourse of foreign policy has not been of particular interest to critical discourse 
analysis theorists even though it has been part of their research product as a political 
discourse potentially carrying inequality, manipulation and struggle. However, some 
interesting insight has been provided by a number of scholars, namely Chilton (1996; 
1998: Chilton & Lakoff, 1995) with pioneering work on discourse in foreign policy 
context and conflicting and war settings. From a Poststructuralist stance, building on 
Foucault (1991) and Laclau & Mouffe (1985), Hansen (2006, 2012) proposes a 
methodological framework for the study of foreign policy and its constitutive 
relationship with the notion of identity. This approach investigates how policymakers 
address the public as an attempt to ―institutionalize their understanding of the identities 
and policy options at stake‖ (Hansen, 2006: 1). Certainly, Hansen has been inspired by 
research insight from political sciences and more particularly International Relations 
and foreign policy studies; along with many important others (see Fischer & Forester, 
1993). Her work opens up new questions for CDA scholars and invites them to see 
more into the discursive practices of foreign policy people and their potential to define 
the world order and the fate of humanity in times of conflicts. Not only notions such as 
identity, manipulation, ideology are relevant here to this political discourse type, but 
also, opinion, expertise and argumentation, as they are crucial aspects of foreign policy 
discourse in particular.   
 
2. 2. 3.  Ideology in the opinion discourse 
Van Dijk (1998b: 29) defines opinions as ―evaluative beliefs‖ and a special form of 
mental representations which acquisition, usages and functions are social, and their 
expression often discursive. He believes that any satisfactory theory of opinions should 
be located in the triangle that relates cognition, society and discourse. Opinions are 
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typically used, expressed, acquired and changed by discourse in communicative, 
interactional contexts (van Dijk 1998a; van Dijk, 1998b).  
Typically, when people are giving their opinions, they are not claiming to make reports 
of internal states, but they are arguing on matters of controversy (Billig 1991). In his 
extensive work about ideology and opinions Billig (1991) explains that in taking stances 
on controversial matters, speakers will be engaged in an inherently complex and 
rhetorically dilemmatic business. They will be presenting their opinions‘ as ‗theirs‘, but 
they will also be arguing for those opinions; as such they will be criticizing rival 
opinions, and justifying their own. In this rhetorical business, they will not merely be 
declaring their own ‗subjectivity‘ but will be implying that their position is ‗better‘ than 
the counter-views (Billig 1995: 164). 
 
 In his more recent version of the study of ideology, van Dijk (2006)) hypothesizes that 
within the group, ―typical group opinions and attitudes may also be taken for granted, 
and therefore no longer asserted or defended, and since these group opinions are social, 
we also prefer to associate them with social memory‖ (2006: 14).  Opinions are mental, 
whereas much of their acquisition, uses and functions are social, and their expression and 
reproduction often (though not always) discursive. That is, opinions are mostly formed 
within contexts of social interaction in general, and through text and talk in particular.  
Opinions production and consumption may certainly be examined by applying an 
ideological discourse analysis framework. According to van Dijk (1998a: 7), ―ideologies 
are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its members‖. Opinions statements involve a 
great deal of knowledge management because, in many cases, they rely on knowledge 
resources to persuade and manipulate. In his study of the concept of beliefs, van Dijk 
(1998a: 19) identifies properties of opinions within their comparison to knowledge: 
Though he subsumes both notions under the general category of beliefs, he argues that 
knowledge is relative to socio-culturally shared commonsense or scientific truth criteria 
or verification instances, whereas opinions, are generally defined as those beliefs that do 
not pass the test criteria of knowledge. That is, they may be beliefs some people have but 
which are false, or more generally beliefs about which we or others may disagree (van 
Dijk 1998a: 20).  
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In a growing information society in the post modern life, where the reach of journalists 
and columnists opinions to readers is bound by political power, ideology should be 
examined taking into consideration at the same time its various institutional, cultural and 
political manifestations. Various question addressed in political theories, mainly from 
Constructivism also need to be inspected from a CDA perspective. Issues like the 
interaction of political actors in the international environment and the shaping of state 
identity (Wendt, 1996) deserve more attention, for instance, from research lines such as 
the sociocognitive approach to collective identities (see Koller, 2012). Cultures, 
however, may have a shared ―Common Ground‖, as well as shared norms and values, 
but not a generally shared ideology. Western- and Non-Western, Christian and Muslim 
cultures would be defined in terms of political or religious ideologies, rather than as 
"cultural ideologies". Contrary to what is commonly assumed, van Dijk (2006: 8) claims 
that ―in the same way as ideologies need not be negative, they need not be dominant‖. 
Hence, in the present study, structures of both ideologies underlying the Arab opinions 
and the American one will be analyzed and referred to as ideologies in a primary phase 
regardless of the degrees of power or argumentation strength each writer holds.  
It is a crucial endeavor, though, to attempt to discern the traits of the ideologies of all the 
writers in this study, even though knowledge about the involved institutions´ ideology 
maybe sometimes (but not always) of a help. Writers from the same culture and from the 
same newspaper may adhere to different groups of opposed ideologies and interests. 
Besides, considering the authors´ political practices within the field of foreign policy, the 
manifestation of ideology may be easier to discern in the construction of cultural and 
national identities. Indeed, identity is a property of international actors that generates 
motivational and behavioral dispositions (Wendt, 1999: 244) and provides the basis of 
the policy makers´ narratives on national interests.  
 
2. 3. Argumentation analysis in Argumentation Theory   
Opinion pieces published in newspapers, like editorials and commentaries, are 
argumentative kinds or modes of discourse. An opinion piece - whether an individual op-
ed or a column – is meant to promote a point of view by argument. It seeks to win people 
over to a particular viewpoint or opinion. Therefore, the strength of the argument is the 
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key factor in determining the effectiveness of the piece.  Iedema et al. (1994) affirm that 
both the print and broadcasting media are the sites where a great number public 
disagreements and challenges are waged, and are the public spaces where debate is 
promoted to settle social or political disputes.  Disputes, according to Plantin (2002: 360) 
can be ―staged (…) in highly institutionalized situations (in court, in houses of 
parliament), as well as in spontaneous everyday situations (family arguments), as vile 
propaganda as well as in the most noble educational or scientific activities‖. Hence, 
argumentation is found in many discourse genres which explain the interest of the most 
diverse academic fields in its research and the fact that it has even become a discipline of 
itself.  
The most important advances made in contemporary argumentation theory are owed to 
two influential but distinct works both published in 1958, that of Perelman and Obrecht-
Tyteca and that of Stephan Toulmin. The appearance of the New Rhetoric written by 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca marked a new era in the study of argumentation mainly 
in Europe. The authors´ critical positions towards logic-based theories and the 
traditional separation between rhetoric and dialectics inspired most of the influential 
informal-logic philosophers and argumentation theorists, namely Johnson and Blair 
(1994), Anscombre & Ducrot (1983) and their theory of ―argumentation in Language¨, 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1990) and Walton (2007). The theory of New Rhetoric 
does not propose a methodology to argumentation analysis but attempts to give a 
different perspective from which the analyst should depart. Indeed, it urges to tackle 
arguments and detect them prior to any established schemas of analysis and to paying 
due attention to audience in argument interpretation given the role their play in the 
argumentative process. In fact, for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the most important 
rule of rhetoric is to adapt the discourse to the audience as what crucial in 
argumentation is its particular audiences and not the universal audience assumed by 
logicians. The New Rhetoric is regarded innovative in its rejection of the traditional 
separation between discourses acting on the will (rhetorical) and those acting on the 
reason (dialectical), arguing that their use depends much on what effect they aim to 
have on their particular audience. 
The task of the philosopher, inasmuch as he is addressing a particular 
audience, will be to silence his audience's particular passions in order to 
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facilitate the "objective" consideration of the problems under discussion, 
the speaker aiming at a particular action, to be carried out at an opportune 
time, will, on the contrary, have to excite his audience so as to produce a 
sufficiently strong adherence, capable of overcoming both the 
unavoidable apathy and the forces acting in a direction divergent from 
that which is desired  
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 47) 
This entails that the New Rhetoric addressed and tried to prove what, nowadays, seems 
common assumption. Indeed, it argues that depending on the goals of the arguer and the 
role the arguer wants the audience to play, this audience is conceptualized in different 
ways. This view of the audience is linked to the theory criticism for positivist position 
and its search for absolute truth, rejecting thus, the belief in a ―universally accepted 
objectivity, of a reality binding on everybody‖ (510). Furthermore, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca explicitly rejected absolutism prevalent in argumentation evaluation 
while they have never been attributed any relativist position on the matter.     
In his book the Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin developed what he named the 
―practical argument‖, a different type of argument which instead of focusing only on the 
inferential function of argumentation explores the justificatory function. In other words, 
whereas theoretical arguments make inferences based on a set of principles to arrive at a 
claim, practical arguments first find a claim of interest, and then provide justification for 
it. Toulmin is also known for his work on the notion of argument structure. He proposed 
a model of six interrelated components for analyzing arguments which are the following: 
a claim, grounds for the claim, a warrant that connects the claim to the grounds, backing, 
rebuttal, and qualifiers. The first three elements ―claim,‖ ―data,‖ and ―warrant‖ are 
considered as the essential components of practical arguments, while the second triad 
―qualifier,‖ ―backing,‖ and ―rebuttal‖ may not be needed in some arguments. There have 
been many revisions to the Toulmin model, however it is still the one widely used for 
argument analyses. Walton & Krabbe (1995) have extended Toulmin‘s work by 
distinguishing a number of primary discourse types of argumentation, namely persuasion 
dialogue (critical discussion), negotiation, inquiry (scientific research investigation), 
deliberation (means-ends discussion) and eristics (quarrel). 
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An argument is defined as ―a connected series of statements or propositions, some of 
which are intended to provide support, justification or evidence for the truth of another 
statement or proposition‖ (McKeon, n.d.). This commonly referred to type of definition 
reflects the traditional approaches to argumentation and their focus on propositions and 
their truth rather than on the communicative aspect within which arguments are 
produced or on their function. Arguing in contemporary and current theories is more 
perceived within its social and communicative context. For Walton (2007) an argument 
is a social and verbal means of trying to resolve, or at least contend with, a conflict or 
difference that has arisen between two parties engaged in a dialog by eliciting reasons 
on both sides. Arguing is commonly understood as having two different meaning: 
arguing as to give reason, which can be constructed with a singular or plural subject and 
is followed by ´that´ clause, hence presumed to be a monological activity, and arguing 
as to have a disagreement, which refers to a vast domain of interaction and is a 
dialogical activity. This distinction between the two types of activities is probably due 
to the polysemous meaning of the term ―to argue‖, but does not support effectively the 
claim about dialogocity in one sense and the lack of it in the other.  Indeed, whether in 
written or in spoken contexts, the activity occurs in a socio-cultural environment and 
implies the presence of some audience. Arguing consists of addressing this audience by 
constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising arguments for the 
purpose of reaching a shared rationally supported position on some issue (Johnson 
2000).  Accordingly, arguing is considered a rhetorical activity (Plantin, 2002: 356), as 
persuasion is widely seen as its ultimate goal. 
 
Even though argumentation seems easy to recognize in any everyday social discursive 
context, there are considerable differences in the way this notion is regarded across 
academic disciplines. Van Dijk (1980: 118) argues that argumentation is a 
superstructure of discourse, that is, the textual schemata that organize and represent the 
conventional forms that characterize a specific discourse genre. For such reason, he 
rejects the view that argumentation is a speech act (van Dijk, 1992: 246) as it is claimed 
by the Pragma-dialectic theory which defines argumentation in terms of a complex 
speech act treated as part of a discussion aimed at resolving a dispute. Indeed, viewed 
pragmatically, van argumentation according to Eemeren, Grootendorst (2004:1) is ―a 
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verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the 
acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions 
justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint‖.  Within the French 
argumentation theories influenced by Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca and later on 
Ducrot, discourse itself is regarded as intrinsically argumentative, drawing in this 
respect on the work of Grize (1990: 40) postulating that to speak is to act upon an 
addressee by modifying (or strengthening) his representations of the surrounding world. 
Accordingly, Amossy (2006) proposes a theory based on the assumption that 
argumentativity pervades and partly regulates all verbal exchanges, claiming that it is a 
constitutive feature of discourse. Even though, he does not share this notion of 
argumentativity, Van Dijk (1992) asserts that a theory of argumentation is a sub-theory 
of a more embracing theory of discourse, and ―that properties of argumentation are 
inherited from more general properties of discourse‖ (245). Argumentation can be 
confronted through both written and oral discourse, which may occur in a large variety 
of (institutional or private) settings. This heterogeneity, in Plantin´s views, must be 
taken into account in the constitution of corpora for argumentation analysis, as well as 
―facing complex data, coming from a variety of social or intellectual fields for 
interdisciplinary case analysis‖ (Plantin, 2002: 360). 
 
2. 3. 1. Argumentation analysis in media and political discourse  
Whether in broadcast or print mass media, argumentation may be found in many media 
genres, mainly in those involving social and political issues, such as commentary, 
opinion pieces and debates. Indeed, media debates are typically aimed at bringing 
opinions into a public space for discussion, thus contributing to the construction of the 
link between the citizenship and the sphere of decision makers (Burger, 2006). There is 
a notable increasing interest in these public and political debates, hence in 
argumentation, in recent research studies in the social sciences which are supported with 
a vast literature of theories from philosophy, logic and communication to sociology, 
psychology and pragmatics. Analyzing argumentation in political and media discourse 
requires awareness of the most influential theories and analytic tools developed within 
argumentation theory discipline (Toulmin, 1958; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 
2003; Walton, 2007), as well as those in pragmatics (Johnson, 2000; Wilson, 1990). 
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These theories provide some useful methods and analytic tools to assist a more 
systematic analysis of an argumentative text, and have inspired and assisted the work of 
a number of recent studies in discourse analysis (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; van Rees, 
2007; Ihnen &Richardson, 2011; Greco Morasso, 2012) 
 
Media argumentation ―is a powerful force in our lives (…) and can mobilize political 
action, influence public opinion, market products and even enable dictator to stay in 
power‖ (Walton, 2007: 5). By "media argumentation", Walton means the familiar types 
of argument found in publications, movies, and broadcast media, which are aimed at a 
mass audience that has limited opportunities to respond (hence excluding the new media 
from his theory). Walton (2007) develops a theory for media argumentation analysis 
named ―Persuasion System‖ in which he identifies the structures of media arguments 
and how they interact in context. Central to this theory is the claim that media 
argumentation works based on the simulative reasoning used by the participants. 
Simulative reasoning helps arguers ―judge how the audience is thinking, what their 
commitments are, what inferences they are likely to draw, and generally, how they are 
likely to respond‖ (Walton, 2007: 353). With this system Walton attempts to show how 
argumentation is typically structured in the media context and what kind of schemas and 
strategies are characteristic to this activity type. He distinguishes two classes of media 
argumentation. The first is ―direct‖ argumentation where arguments are based on the 
commitment of the audience, for instance the appeal to pity or fear kind of argument 
schemes. The second class of media arguments is referred to as the ―indirect‖ type. In 
this type, the arguer must first figure out a plausible account of what the respondent‘s 
commitments are likely to be, or at any rate how they can be plausibly portrayed. Then 
he must work with these data using an argumentation scheme to try to influence the 
audience (p. 330).  
 
Some of the research works in linguistics particularly focusing on argumentative media 
discourse is the one carried out within the Australian Functional Systemic School.  
Iedema, Feez & White (1994) propose a typology of media argumentation meant to 
guide analysis. They identify at least three sub-types of journalistic argument genres, 
those of Media Exposition, Media Challenge, and Media Discussion. The first two 
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differ in that Media Expositions simply argue for a proposition, while Media Challenges 
argue by refuting a counter position. Media Discussions differ from both in that they 
merely tell us about the different views available and convincing the readers is not at 
least explicit. In the Challenge type of argumentative texts the writer usually 
summarizes the position he/she wants to challenge, then proceeds to offer a counter-
argument. Iedema et al. (1994: 9) recognize this type to be more reserved to opinion 
sections than any other genre, as this exactly where writers do not try to preserve any 
institutional intonations of objectivity, but rather adopt a more persuasive and 
conversational forms.  
 
Not only do politicians such as candidates for political office or government officials 
use political arguments but also media pundits, academics and also citizens in ordinary 
interactions about political events. Zarefsky (2008: 318) argues that political 
argumentation is ―about gaining and using power, about collective decision-making for 
the public good, about mobilizing individuals in pursuit of common goals, about giving 
effective voice to shared hopes and fears‖. For Van Dijk (1997: 29) argumentation is a 
typical superstructure of textual schemata which systematically organize of political 
discourse through structures and strategies. Some of the CDA approaches which have 
traditionally focused on political discourse as a discourse of power and emphasizing the 
notion of representation, seem now to shift attention to its argumentative nature arguing 
that analysis of discourses should be subsumed within analysis of argumentative genres 
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).  Nevertheless, determining the way the structures 
and strategies characteristic to political argumentation does not seem a simple task for 
argumentation theorists. According to Zarefsky, for instance, not every kind of political 
argumentation is problematic for analysis, but rather the larger and more open-ended 
sense of political argumentation is the most challenging, namely the sorts of 
―disagreements and predicaments that engage entire political units, societies, or 
cultures, and that are addressed either by representative bodies or by a loosely structured 
and ongoing circulation and modification of ideas and standpoints‖ (2008: 318). The 
concern about defining the boundaries of political discourse argumentation is shared 
among argumentation scholars, as they recognize the complexity of such discourse type 
and the difficulty to characterize in general terms the structures and the strategies of its 
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argumentation (Morris and Johnson 2008; Tonnard 2008 and Ieţcu- Fairclough 2009). 
In fact, what is challenging in political argumentation is the fact that political actors 
have the opportunity to appeal to different audiences, to choose the subject which best 
suits their goals, to appeal to opposing values and systems of beliefs, while freely using 
figures and tropes. In sum, political domain seems to allow people to argue in a way 
that makes it difficult to mark the precise boundary between their sound strategic 
behavior and their fallacious one (Morris and Johnson 2008: 285).  
 
Political argumentation in the media has been regarded in CDA approaches as a crucial 
factor in the reproduction of power abuses in discourse, even though argumentative 
patterns has not been particularly the main focus of political discourse analyses, at least 
not in the work of the main theorists of CDA. Argumentation has been commonly 
approached as part of (groups) discursive practices (Fairclough 1992: 71) or as a kind of 
discursive strategy  in the discourse-historical approach, that is typically used to 
establish positive-Self and negative-Other representation (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 44), 
or as an ideological discursive strategy (van Dijk 1998a).  More recently however, and 
focusing not only on the pragmatic and interactional dimension of discourse but also on 
the role of cognition in discursive processes, argumentation started to gain much 
attention in a number of notable research works such as that of Atkin & Richardson 
(2007), Hart (2012, in press), Oswald (2011) and Ihnen & Richardson (2011). This 
innovative research carried out on argumentative strategies and their effects on 
discourse calls for more synergy between a number of crucial theories in cognitive 
linguistics and argumentation in CDA research. Furthermore, Fairclough and Fairclough 
(2012) have recently proposed a new approach for analyzing political discourse which 
views ―political discourse as primarily a form of argumentation, and as involving more 
specifically practical argumentation‖(p.16 emphasis in original). This approach focuses 
on political deliberations where politicians make policy choices and decisions about 
how to act in response to circumstances and goals. They argue that analysis of political 
discourse should center upon practical argumentation (p.17). This initiative may 
probably open up for more theorizing and more interest in argumentation in general 
within the CDA different approaches even though the work is recognized or rather 
criticized for being  ―particularly influenced by Pragma-dialectics‖ (Finlayson 2013: 
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316). However, this is not probably an issue for the theory, but instead the fact that it is 
restricted to the analysis of the deliberative kind of political discourses ignoring in 
effect the other equally common argumentative types such as the judicial among others.  
 
2. 3. 2. Analysis of argumentation: basic concepts 
It is widely recognized that modern approaches to argumentation are inspired by the 
ancient disciplines of dialectics and rhetoric and the work of classic scholars such as 
Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. Even though Classical approaches focused on limited 
types of discourse such as the syllogistic and monological ones and was basically 
interested in examining logically-oriented fallacies, some of the main notions related to 
arguments construction and analysis remain relevant for modern theories and may offer 
guidance to argumentation studies. Current theories agree that argumentation is based 
on reasoning mechanisms which are believed to respond to some set of common norms 
for their construction, such as reasonableness which is associated with a ‗‗critical 
rationalist‘‘ philosophy taking as its guiding principle the idea of critically testing all 
claims that are made to acceptability (van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2012: 34). 
There is also a generally shared assumption that an argument is ―a set of statements 
(propositions), made up of three parts, a conclusion, a set of premises, and an inference 
from the premises to the conclusion (Walton 2009: 2). Moreover, an argument can be 
supported by other arguments, or it can be attacked by other arguments. Studying 
argumentation typically consists of carrying some basic tasks which, depending on the 
approach adopted, may differ in their procedures. These tasks are: identification, 
analysis, evaluation and invention. Invention is more concerned with pedagogy and 
teaching how to construct new arguments that can be used to prove a specific 
conclusion, but it offers the analyst insightful tools on argument composition. Below, 
the focus goes to some of the analytic procedures and the definition of its most 
important and relevant concepts, namely arguments schemes, topoi and fallacies.  
  
Both identifying and analyzing arguments involve understanding the reasoning process 
of the arguers. Regardless probably of the method or approach adopted, they are 
concerned with implementing a number of operations necessary for analysis and 
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evaluation. The most important operation is to locate the basic components of an 
argument. The first task would be to find implicit premises or conclusions in an 
argument that should be made explicit (Walton 2009: 1) which should help evaluate the 
argument properly. Implicit premises are very common in argumentation and they are 
omitted as they are assumed to be intuitively inferred by language users. Such missing 
assumptions are traditionally called enthymemes. Finding implicit premises in Pragma-
dialectics is part of the reconstruction task that has to be carried out by the analyst and 
through which implicit premises are added to each argument to make evaluation easier. 
Once the argumentative text is reconstructed and the parts are identified, the analysis 
may proceed according to the goals set and to the method adopted in this endeavor.  
 
Another crucial operation is to examine the construction of this reconstructed 
argumentation, mainly argumentation structures and composition. Argumentation 
theorists have regarded the study of argumentation structures as a key point in the 
analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse (Snoeck Henkemans, 2001; Walton, 
1996), in which arguments are inspected in terms of their organization and the 
relationship between arguments. As for argumentation composition (the nature of the 
claim´s support), it is important for any method to determine whether the argument fits 
a known form of argument, i.e. ―argumentation scheme‖ and to identify the kind of 
reasoning pursued (loci) and/or the types of evidence resorted to (topoi) which may be 
helpful in arguments interpretation and evaluation. Once arguments organization is 
determined, evaluation as a final operation is carried out. Evaluation involves 
determining the soundness of an argument by raising critical questions about it and 
making judgment based on some established logical or other normative or social 
criteria.   
 
Examining the arguments´ structures, schemes and premises is commonly carried out 
for the purpose of evaluating arguments´ coherence and soundness. Nevertheless, the 
critical stance adopted in the current study, definitely finds the analysis of schemes and 
topoi insightful for tracking ideological structures in discourse, since it elucidates the 
sources of arguments construction and helps identify the building blocks of arguments, 
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namely the premises on which arguments stand. According to van Dijk´s socio 
cognitive approach, ideologies- as systems of basic social beliefs- may exhibit in 
virtually all structures of discourse, but they may be more typical for some structures 
than others. Among the most typical discursive structures to carry ideology is 
argumentation. Hence, argumentation is considered to bear powerful signals of the 
underlying ideological structures in discourse, given the link between standpoints and 
shared group attitudes (Van Dijk 2006: 57). Consequently, arguments building blocks 
may be considered significant indicators of ideological belief structures expressed in 
discourse, as they represent a reflection of the reasoning system of an individual which 
in turns stems at least partly from a socially shared cognition.  
 
Argument schemes, topoi and loci 
The notions of scheme, topoi and its Latin translation loci, which for some scholars, 
may refer to the same things and, for some others, refer to different concepts, have been 
central in argumentation theories. While topoi was a notion used by Aristotle in his two 
books Topics and Rhetoric and translated by Cicero as loci, argument schemes emerged 
in 1960s and has become a crucial notion in modern argumentation theories. Argument 
schemes refer to the recurrent patterns of reasoning in arguments. The way these notions 
are currently used by different theories reflects the particular perspective regarding the 
relation between logic and pragmatic aspects of argumentation (Walton & Macagno, 
2006). Schemes are commonly recognized as originating from topoi or loci, the 
precursors of the modern theories and models on human argumentative patterns, which 
some researchers even contend that they (topoi) are the forerunners of arguments 
schemes (Kienpointner, 1986; Rubinelli, 2009).  
 
Argumentative reasoning patterns or the notion of schemes were first used by Hastings, 
who categorized schemes into three groups: semantic procedures (as arguments from 
example, definition or classification), causal connection (as arguments from signs, cause 
or circumstances) and arguments supporting either semantic or causal conclusions 
(arguments from comparison, analogy and testimony) (Hastings, 1962: 55). A little 
later, Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1969) presented a long list of arguments schemes 
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which they classified in two main categories: arguments by associations (arguments 
which attempt to bring separate elements together such as analogy) and arguments by 
dissociations which entail some level of differentiation. Currently, most argumentation 
scholars bring into play schemes in their theories. Walton (2007: 26) defines 
argumentation schemes as ―premise-conclusion inference structures that represent 
common types of arguments used in everyday discourse as well as in special contexts 
such as those of legal or scientific argumentation‖. Walton identifies a long list of 
commonly employed schemes from which one may highlight the most prominent ones 
namely, those arguments from expert opinion, practical reasoning arguments such as 
those appealing to fear or pity,  and arguments from values, to name only a few.  
 
Within similar pragmatic approaches to argument schemes, the pragma-dialectical 
approach distinguishes three (main) types of argumentation each having their scheme of 
argumentation: argumentation based on causal relations, argumentation based on 
comparison or a relation of analogy and argumentation based on symptomatic relation 
(Eemeren van et al, 2007: 137). In causal argumentation, the argument is presented as 
the cause of the standpoint or the opposite the standpoint is the cause of the arguments. 
Eemeren van & Grootendorst (1992) define this scheme type as ―an argument which is 
presented as if what is stated in argumentation is a means to, a way to, an instrument for 
or some other kind of causative factor for the standpoint or vice versa‖ (Eemeren van & 
Grootendorst, 1992: 97).  In analogy schemes, argumentation is presented ―as if there 
were resemblance, an argument, a likeness of parallel, o correspondence or some other 
kind of similarity between that which is stated in the argument and that which is stated 
in the standpoint‖(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 97). This argument scheme is 
commonly used to generalize a particular judgment, to predict something, to appeal to 
the rule of justice or to appeal to the principal of reciprocity. Symptomatic 
argumentation is the type of argumentation which is presented as if it is an expression, a 
phenomenon, a sign or some other kind of symptom of what is stated in the standpoint 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 2). When reconstructing arguments though, the 
analyst should examine the whole arguments structure in order to decide for a 
symptomatic scheme since the mere expression of symptoms such as saying ―X is 
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characteristic of Y‖ may be simply descriptive and may not in fact be used for any 
argumentative end.  
 
Topoi and Loci in search of the common places  
 
Within rhetorical invention, the topics or topoi are basic categories of relationships 
among ideas, each of which can serve as a template or heuristic for discovering things to 
say about a subject. This and its significance in the analysis of argumentation is owed to 
Aristotle, but the fact that he did not define this notion resulted in conflicting views 
about what topoi exactly are. A topos (singular of topoi) literally designates a ―place‖ in 
Greek, which is frequently translated as ―commonplace‖ to refer to a location or space in 
art where a speaker can look for ―available means of persuasion‖ (Kennedy 1991).  The 
term topoi was translated to Latin as loci and was picked up and exploited by Cicero 
(Roman philosopher) as categories or logical ways in which a rhetor can relate thought 
and ideas together. In modern application of argumentation theories, the notion of topoi 
(and loci) has been used to refer to two different phenomena: 1) the place where to locate 
arguments patterns, reflecting types of reasoning or 2) the place from which arguments 
are built, such as common ground concepts and ideas which support an argument. Hence, 
topoi are either a ‗place‘ where arguments can be found or a pragmatic procedure (van 
Eemeren et al. 1996: 38). In the current study, the two meanings of this notion are 
exploited as analytic tools for the study of the argumentative strategies of FP op-ed 
authors. In order to avoid confusion, the Latin term for topoi, loci, is used to refer to the 
first meaning -a place to locate arguments- and the word topoi is used to refer to the 
second meaning- a place from which to build arguments-. Further explanation is given 
below on topoi, while trying to maintain the same delineation of the two uses of the term 
by using two distinct terms.     
The loci which are the location under which the different arguments fall are also referred 
to in rhetorical theories as the Topics of inventions. Modern theories of argumentation 
adapt this notion to their studies of the arguments schemes. A locus is a category or a 
logical way in which a rhetor can relate ideas and thoughts together. Aristotle divided 
these topics into two categories: the ―common‖ more general and the ―special‖ which are 
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related to the three branches of oratory judicial, deliberative and ceremonial. Table 2.1, 
below, illustrates the list of common and special topics (loci) proposed by Aristotle and 
used in the analytic process of the current data corpora. 
   Common loci Special loci 
-Definition: genius/ species  
-Division: whole/part, Subject/adjunct 
-Comparison: similarity/difference, degree  
-Relationship: cause/effect, antecedent/ 
consequence, contraries, contradictions 
-Circumstances: possible/impossible, past 
fact/future fact,  
-Testimony: authorities, witness, 
documents, law, the supernatural, etc. 
- Judicial : justice (right)/injustice (wrong) 
 
- Deliberative: the good, the unworthy, the 
advantageous, the disadvantageous 
 
- Ceremonial: virtue (the noble), vice (the 
base)   
Table 2.1. Categories of argument loci (topics of invention) adopted from Rhetoricae 
(2003)  
ccording to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), loci are ―premises of a very general 
nature‖ or ―headings under which arguments can classified‖. Furthermore, they argue 
that… 
Aristotle made a distinction between the loci communes, or ―common places, 
which can be used indiscriminately for any science and do not depend on any, 
and the special topics, which belong either to a particular science or a particular 
type of oratory. Originally, then, loci communes were characterized by their 
extreme generality, which made them available for use in all circumstances. 
But the degeneration of rhetoric…[leads] to the unexpected result that 
oratorical expositions aimed against luxury, lust, sloth, and the like, after 
endless repetition in school exercises, were classified as commonplaces 
   (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 83-84) 
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The second meaning of topoi is concerned with the content of arguments and to how 
argumentation is constructed from premises. Topoi in this case are those premises 
(concepts) which support a claim but do not need justifications themselves because they 
are regarded as common ground by the social community. As ―places‖ (literal translation 
from Greek), systems or construct arguments, topoi are the common themes or the 
warrants in syllogistic reasoning (Aristotle, 196:16). Topoi play a ―guarantee function‖ 
for arguments (De Pater, 1968), as they provide arguers with the means they need to 
connect their premises with their conclusions or claim (see Zompetti, 2006). They are 
regarded as the issues pertaining to an argument and include the most commonly used 
forms of arguments, specifically, the ―generally accepted opinions as those commend 
themselves to the wise‖ (Walton 2010a: 135). This is the sense of topoi that has been 
exploited in CDA, mainly in the Discourse Historical Approach (Reisigl & Wodak 2001; 
van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Van Dijk (2007) describes topoi as the common sense 
reasoning typical for specific issue analysis of typical content-related strategies used in 
arguments for discrimination. They are those arguments which become standardized and 
publicized. Van Dijk (2006: 58) identifies topoi and fallacies as somehow crucial kind of 
arguments to the analysis of ideological discourse structures. 
 
Fallacies 
Most argumentation theories focus on identifying fallacies in their evaluation of 
arguments. A standard definition of fallacy is that it is an argument that seems valid but 
it is not (Hamblin 1970: 12). Johnson (2000: 56) defines fallacy as ―an argument that 
fails to provide adequate logical support for the truth of its conclusion, yet appears 
convincing or persuasive in some other way‖. These kinds of definitions have been 
widely criticized for not covering all types of fallacies, as in such case a fallacy is 
commonly regarded from a logical perspective and identified as a mistake in reasoning. 
Within this logico-centered tradition, arguments are assessed for their validity. 
However, contemporary argumentation theories have come to recognize a wider range 
of fallacies and become concerned not only with the validity but also with soundness or 
cogency of arguments as in informal logical or pragmatic approaches. Fallacies may 
include any type of mistake or may not even be arguments and they cover any discourse 
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move which ―damages the quality of argumentation‖ (Van Eemeren 2001: 21). Within 
this perspective, Johnson defines a fallacy as ―an argument that violates one of the 
criteria/standards of good argument and that occurs with sufficient frequency in 
discourse‖ (1987: 246). Studies of fallacies in argumentation and informal logic have 
mainly taken a normative approach, as Walton (2010b: 160) affirms, by seeing fallacies 
as arguments that violate standards of how an argument should properly be used in 
rational thinking or arguing. These standards are widely identified as relevance, 
sufficiency and acceptability (Tindale 1999: 164). Pragma-dialectics sees a fallacy as a 
violation of the rules for critical discussion which are stipulated in the ideal model as 
norms for the resolution of the difference of opinion.  
 
Argumentation theorists have proposed various ways of categorizing fallacies. The most 
common distinction made is that between formal (related to deductive reasoning) and 
informal (related to inductive reasoning) fallacies. Formal fallacies display a logical 
mistake, while informal fallacies may appear as valid forms of reasoning and still are 
considered unacceptable. Fallacies are also commonly grouped according to the 
consequences they generate or the type of appeals they make and are classified into the 
following categories: relevance, ambiguity and presumption.  
 
Arguments that commit fallacies of relevance rely on premises that are not relevant to 
the conclusion such as weak analogy and those which generally rely on irrelevant 
appeals, such as appeal to (irrelevant) authority ad verecundiam, appeal to pity ad 
miserecordiam and appeal to fear. Irrelevant arguments are also those that attack the 
person (instead of the argument) ad hominem, and make a distorted, misrepresented or 
exaggerated version of the opponent´ s position, as in the Straw man fallacies or red 
herring in which irrelevant topics is used in order to divert the attention from the 
original one.    
 
Ambiguity arises generally from a vague or imprecise use of language which causes 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the argument. Fallacies of ambiguity all 
involve confusion, such as in the fallacy of equivocation where a word or phrase is used 
to evoke two distinct meaning, or the fallacy of amphiboly which is the use of two 
sentences which can be interpreted in multiple ways with equal justification. These 
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types of fallacies usually result in misunderstanding caused by incompatible definitions 
and different interpretations.  
 
Arguments that commit fallacies of presumption contain false premises, and so fail to 
establish their conclusion. False dilemma, false cause, complex questions and begging 
the question fallacies are perhaps the most commonly examined. A fallacy of false 
dilemma is committed when there is an attempt to force a choice, typically by 
presenting two options as unique while they may actually be part of a wide spectrum of 
choices. False cause fallacies occur when one erroneously attempts to establish causal 
correlation between events simply because they occur in succession as in Post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacies (literally ―after this, therefore because of this‖) or non causa pro 
causa (literally ―no cause for a cause‖), the fallacy of making a mistake about the 
ascription of some cause to an effect. The complex question kind of fallacy is 
committed when a question contains a presupposition, a proposition presuming 
something is true while it that has not been proven or accepted (at least by participants). 
Finally, begging the question is a fallacy where the conclusion to be proved is included 
in the initial premises of an argument and taken as evidence of the claim.   
 
2. 4. Summary  
This chapter reviewed the theories on the notions of ideology and research on political, 
media and argumentation discourse relevant to the analysis of the op-ed ideological 
discourse in the American and Arab newspapers. These areas are considered relevant for 
both a comprehensive understanding and a systematic analysis of FP discourse in the 
media from a critical and cross cultural perspective. Ideological structures manifest 
themselves powerfully in argumentative discourse and mainly in political discourse 
where communication has an existential function aiming at gaining, maintaining or 
challenging power and authority. In order to critically analyze the discursive strategies of 
the op-ed authors as a particular political group type, the current study draws both on the 
theory of argumentation and on the interdisciplinary CDA perspective on ideological 
structures in political discourse. The need to combine these theories is regarded 
necessary simply because the insights offered by argumentation theory are believed to 
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adequately complement the critical analysis of ideology in political discourses. In the 
following chapter, the two main theoretical frameworks of the study are presented along 
with an argument for the benefit of bringing them together in a cross-cultural study of 
the ideological strategies in the debates of FP experts´ within the media channels.   
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CHAPTER 3: CDS AND PRAGMA-DIALECTICS IN THE STUDY OF OP-ED 
PIECES 
 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the theoretical framework guiding the present cross cultural study 
of the ideological structures underlying the discourses of FP experts in op-ed pieces. By 
combining CDS with Argumentation Theory, this research work draws upon van Dijk´ s 
sociocognitive approach to the study of ideology and context (1998, 2008), the analytic 
framework proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008) and Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004) as a method for argumentation analysis to explore the discursive 
practices of two groups of Foreign Policy (FP) experts and opinion leaders debating the 
Iraq war in the US and in Arab countries.   
The current cross-cultural research on FP op-ed discourses relies on the 
multidisciplinary character of critical discourse studies mainly advocated by the socio-
cognitive approach and attempts to combine a number of relevant theoretical 
frameworks estimated to be useful in tackling specific research points. Indeed, the study 
draws on analytic frameworks proposed by van Dijk and van Leeuwen while exploiting 
the systematic analytic tools proposed by Pragma-dialectics and rhetoric. From a critical 
discursive analytic stance, a special attention is paid to argumentation, and to the need 
for argumentation theory to assist the analysis and evaluation of the argumentative 
discourse of FP experts in op-ed. Pragma-dialectics is believed to be compatible with a 
critical stance, as its pragmatic perspective based on Speech Act Theory is shaped by 
the belief that language is a social practice and ―partly matches the goals of discourse 
analysis, where discourses are seen as `corpus wholes´ and studied in terms of their 
structures‖ (Oswald 2007: 152). Besides, Pragma-dialectics offers a systematic method 
along with analytic tools for inspecting argumentative strategies which usefully prepare 
the ground for its critical analysis. This Chapter presents an outline of the general 
features of the theoretical frameworks employed in the study followed by an account of 
the specific ways these theories are relevant for the various research questions. 
Accordingly, this outline attempts to explain how these frameworks inform both the 
analysis of the arguers´ discursive decisions -topic selection, context and the way they 
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recontextualize some social practices- and the analysis and evaluation of their respective 
ideological argumentative strategies. Finally, the last section argues for the benefits of 
bringing the socio-cognitive approach and pragma-dialectics together and discusses the 
assumptions they share in the study of discourse within its communicative dimension.  
  
3. 2. CDS and the sociocognitive approach 
In his extensive and invaluable work in Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), Van Dijk 
proposes a sociocognitive approach to the study of the way discourse (re)produces 
social domination and injustice. By doing so, Van Dijk urges a multidisciplinary 
orientation within CDS which accommodates an ―explicit study of structures of text and 
talk with an analysis of their social and cognitive contexts as a basis for problem-
oriented critical discourse analysis‖ (van Dijk 2006: 161). Crucial to this approach is the 
relationship between discourse, cognition and society. This entails the approach‘s 
special interest in the sociocognitive interface of discourse, that is, the relations between 
mind, discursive interaction and society (van Dijk 2009: 65). Building on the work of 
Van Dijk & Kintsch (1983) on discourse strategies, and major cognitive theories of 
discourse processing mechanisms, the approach takes up the concept of mental model as 
a crucial element in any discourse comprehension or production processes to explain 
how language users subjectively represent events along with their social interactions in 
discourse. This approach examines the relations between these cognitive phenomena, 
namely the processes of discourse production and comprehension and socially shared 
beliefs on the one hand and discourse and societal structures on the other hand. 
Accordingly, Van Dijk argues that the study of relevant knowledge, ideologies and 
other socially shared beliefs is central in defining many of the properties and social 
functions of discourse. Likewise, both these cognitions and the discourses based on 
them need to be studied in relation to the relevant structures of institutions, groups, 
power and other aspects of society and culture. This approach urges for focusing 
concurrently on linguistic, cognitive, social and cultural aspects of text and talk in 
context to be carried out from a critical, socio-political perspective  
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Cognition, understood as the set of functions of the mind, such as thought, perception 
and representation (van Dijk 2009: 64) may present a powerful explanation of the 
discursive practices of language users. Van Dijk pays special attention to the interplay 
between social cognition and discourse, where cognition is considered a fundamental 
component in the society, discourse and cognition triangle forming the sociocognitive 
approach to CDS. The cognitive mechanisms involved in mental representations and in 
the processes of discourse production and comprehension are regarded as the interface 
between discourse and society and the very element mediating their relationship. 
Central to this approach is the notion of mental models and theories of reasoning in 
cognitive sciences (Johnson-Laird 1983, 2004; Garnham and Oakhill 1996). Below, the 
outline of the theory of mental models explains their relevance to discourse processing 
along the role they play in connecting social actions to discursive actions.  
 
The sociocognitive approach to the critical study of discourse relies on the theory of 
mental models in its account of the link between societal and discourse structures. 
Mental models are cognitive representations of external reality (Jones et al. 2011) that 
form the episodic memory of individual people and organize their understanding, 
interpretation and subjective definition of social situations. A basic premise in this 
theory is that the cognitive processes and representations taking place in the Short Term 
Memory are mental models constructions. The models are believed to be individuals´ 
subjective construction of specific events by drawing from the Long Term Memory 
which is composed of Episodic Memory (the stored results from information 
processing) and Semantic Memory (the stored socially shared information). These 
complex cognitive processes embodied in mental models are the representation of 
specific events and are believed to be dynamic and ongoing in any social and 
communicative event.  They act as the reference point of basic social practices such as 
discourse comprehension and production. Language users draw on the mental models 
they constantly construct for events and experiences in their communications.  
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3. 2. 1. The sociocognitive view of ideology  
When establishing the theoretical foundations of the notion of ideology within CDS, 
Van Dijk takes cognition as a basic notion in defining such a versatile concept. He 
argues that ideologies form the foundation of the social beliefs shared by a social group 
and that they ―are represented almost as axioms of a formal system, consisting of a 
more general and abstract social beliefs that control or organize the more specific 
knowledge and opinions (attitudes) of a group" (van Dijk, 1998a: 151). Ideologies are 
defined as the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group (van 
Dijk, 1998a: 8).  Inspired by the work of Cognitive scientists and related disciplines, 
Van Dijk contends that the mind or at least some of its parts such as memory, ―is a 
storehouse of beliefs (…) (which) may be constructed, stored, reactivated, organized in 
larger units and such processes take place in the accomplishment of all cognitive 
tasks‖(van Dijk, 1998a: 21). Ideology, as a system of socially shared beliefs, is part of 
the complex composition of the human cognition and the study of which should account 
for a cognitive dimension. 
As a kind of belief system, ideologies, van Dijk (2006: 118) argues, need some kind of 
organization in order to be used and acquired. They have a general schema consisting of 
some basic categories defining the self-identity of the ideological group as follows:  
1. Membership devices (gender, ethnicity, appearance, origin, etc.): Who are we?  
2. Actions: What do we do? 
3. Aims: Why do we do this?  
4. Norms and Values: What is good or bad?  
5. Position: What is our position in society, and how do we relate to other groups?  
6. Resources: What is ours? What do we want to have/keep at all costs?  
 
These categories defining ideologies may be perceived in discourse more precisely 
through its contextual construction. Indeed, van Dijk contends that ideologies 
contextually control variable discourse structures such as meaning. Context is regarded 
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as the individual cognitive construct of participants in a given communicative event that 
is based on -among other components- the belief systems shared by this individual´ s 
group, which in many cases may be identified as ideologies and in other cases only as 
cultural common ground knowledge.    
Within this perspective, van Dijk (2002: 24) affirms that political discourse and its 
properties are controlled by one or more underlying ideologies, possibly through more 
specific (but still general) social attitudes and by context models (as subjective mental 
models) of the communicative situation. Therefore, critically analyzing political 
discourse from a socio-cognitive perspective involves detecting in text and talk the 
expression of ideologically-based opinions from the collection of socially shared 
opinions (van Dijk 2002: 25). Furthermore, the analysis of ideological strategies in 
discourse should consider the organization of ideologies in terms of groups‘ self- 
schemas and the examination of patterns of polarization.  
In ideological terms, the polarization schema defined by the opposition between us and 
them suggests that the social groups construct an ideological image of themselves and 
others in such a way that generally we are presented positively whereas they are 
represented negatively (Van Dijk, 2006: 44). Thus, us is generally self-evaluated as 
holding better values that are particularly relevant to us, whereas they are perceived as 
‗bad‘ in the process of social comparison. In this line of reasoning, the strategy employed 
for the construction of the discourse for ideological communication typically consists of 
four moves: 
1. Express/emphasize information that is ‗positive‘ about us. 
2. Express/emphasize information that is ‗negative‘ about them. 
3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is ‗positive‘ about them. 
4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is ‗negative‘ about us. 
These four moves constitute the well-known ‗ideological square‘ which performs a 
specific role in the contextual strategy of positive self-presentation and its out-group 
counterpart negative other-presentation (Van Dijk 1997). In this connection, the notion 
of the ideological square provides insight into the study of the contextual strategies in the 
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op-ed discourses of American and Arab FP experts and in signaling the different 
ideological frameworks guiding the production of their opinions about the war in Iraq. 
  
3. 2. 2.  Ideology in discursive constructions: topic choices and context models  
3.2.2.1. Topic choices: semantic macrostructures  
Van Dijk emphasizes the importance of examining topics as a major step in identifying 
ideologies in discourse structures mainly from a sociocognitive perspective. Ineed, 
topics represent the semantic macro-structures which reveal the discourse global 
meanings. He argues that the notion of macrostructure not only refers to the various 
notions of global meaning, such as topic, theme, or gist, but it should a also ccount for 
the ―various cognitive aspects of discourse processing at this macrostructural level: 
production, reading and comprehension, storage in memory, retrieval, reproduction, and 
hence recall and recognition of textual information‖ (van Dijk, 1980: 10). This means 
that in order to plan, execute, control discourse in production, a macro-level of 
processing must be postulated. Semantic macro-structures are also characterized in 
terms of propositions, where ―the notion of macro or globle structure is of course 
relative and may be defined only with respect to local structures‖ (van Dijk, 1977a: 
101, italics in original). Macro-structures are obtained by semantic mappings 
(transformations) applied to the local, sentential meanings of the discourse. These 
mappings are called macro-rules. (see van Dijk, 1977a; 1980). 
 
The multidisciplinary orientation of this theory which accounts for a sociocognitive 
interface in discourse, that is, the relations between mind, discursive interaction and 
society, maintains that topics as ―thematic structures are (mentally) selected from event 
models providing a speaker‘s definition of the situation‖ (van Dijk 2000: 100). In other 
words, the selection takes place within the subjective representation of events or 
situations which form what is referred to as a semantic mental model. Van Dijk urges 
for the priority of examining topics in a critical analysis upholding that since they are 
―mostly intentional and consciously controlled by the speaker, they express the overall 
`content' of mental models of events and perhaps most importantly, they represent the 
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meaning or information most readers will memorize best of a discourse‖ (van Dijk 
2009: 68).  
Political elite select topics based on their ideologically controlled definitions of the 
situation, which are derived from the mental models they construct of events. These 
constructions are largely believed -in cognitive theories- to stem from personal 
interpretations of events monitored by socially shared beliefs and attitudes.  
 
3.2.2.2. Discursive construction of context in the sociocognitive approach 
The notion of context has been revised in the sociocognitive approach and also 
considered as emblematic in CDS. Van Dijk argues that discourse and society are 
mediated by context models which stand for the ―cognitive device that is able to 
represent the relevant structures of the social situation, both locally (micro) as well as 
globally (macro), and that at the same time is able to control discourse‖ (van Dijk 2009: 
73).  He defines context models as ―specific mental models, represented in episodic 
memory‖ which function is to adapt discourse to the social situation and to guarantee its 
appropriateness. Van Dijk contends that ―the combined cognitive and social dimensions 
of the triangle define the relevant (local and global) context of discourse‖ (van Dijk, 
2009: 65, italic in original). This explains their control of discourse structures and their 
definitions of the genre and style of text and talk in general.  
 
Context models are a type of mental models, which are defined as ―the cognitive 
representations of our experiences‖ (italics in the original, van Dijk, 2009: 61). 
According to this theory and with relevance to discourse processing, these models are 
language users´ mental construction of ―the events texts are about, that is, the situation 
they denote or refer to‖ (p. 58) and exerts control. Mental models provide a ―starting 
point‖ for the production of discourse: if people represent situations in subjective 
mental models, these mental models at the same time form the basis of the construction 
of the semantic representation of the discourses about such events‖ (van Dijk 2008: 59). 
However, language users not only create or update models of events or situations they 
talk about, but also those models of the communicative event in which they participate. 
Consequently, ―as mental constructs of relevant aspects of social situations‖ (van Dijk 
2006: 165), the arguers´ context models examined in the current corpora are their 
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definitions of the Iraq war situation and issues as discursively produced in the 
discussions. 
As a specific type of mental models, context models have a relatively simple schematic 
structure with the following basic categories:  
 Spatiotemporal Setting 
 Participants 
o roles, identities and relationship between participants 
o knowledge 
o goals and intentions 
 Communicative social actions 
These schematic categories of the cognitively constructed models reflect a socially 
oriented approach to discourse analysis in which discourse is part of complex social 
events. Hence, societal structures such as setting and participants´ positions and 
relations are subjectively defined along with cognitive structures such as knowledge and 
beliefs.    
 
Context schematic category of Setting  
As a schematic category, Setting refers to the construction of place and time in the 
context models of events. The focus here has been limited to the examination of 
arguers´ definitions or constructions of space /place with the aim of finding out where 
the Surge debate, as a communicative situation, is construed by the two groups of 
political experts. The concern is the pragmatic dimension of place, which is the 
interpretation of the arguers´ sociopolitical, cultural or geographical place in relation to 
the event constructed. Taking into consideration the fact that the foreign policy experts´ 
Surge debates are mediated by the newspapers in which their op-ed pieces are 
published, these debates are assumed to be controlled by models conditioned by the 
physical properties of newspapers as a public media space. Hence, they are expected to 
be contextualized by participants, namely, the experts as writers, and, the public as 
audience, within the setting of the media support itself. Moreover, most of the 
newspapers from which op-ed pieces are selected score high circulation rates 
internationally and their columnists are expected to address international audience. 
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However, an initial examination of the contextual manifestations in the corpora 
discourse structures makes ostensible the arguers´ tendency to locate the communicative 
event not exactly within the boundaries of the newspaper but within a general public 
debate on Iraq Surge. Some arguers do not seem to consider participants in this debate 
to be the international audience presumed by newspapers´ conditions. This variation in 
the scope of debate participation may have an immediate impact on the construction of 
space, since the inclusion and exclusion from participation determines the position of 
participants and their interpretations of the space in which the communicative event 
takes place.   
 
The variety in the models´ space setting expressed in discourse may not be surprising 
for some political communications types which are generally monitored by the media 
and do not maintain an ―actual‖ direct interaction with the public but, instead, tend to 
simulate ―directness‖ by other means. Since op-ed arguers, as any political actors, 
typically seek to win the hearts and minds of the public, they are hence inclined to 
produce context models which move them the closest possible to the public. While in 
―direct‖ political public spheres, such as parliaments, press statements, or TV 
interviews, the physical context property of the space may qualify as dominant feature 
in the participants´ models construction, in the case of our written political debate, the 
print media space seems to have blurry boundaries and offer the participants the 
opportunity to imagine a relevant setting for their interaction. This could explain the 
reason why the policy op-ed authors in the current study attempt to keep their written 
contributions synchronized with an ongoing political set of contributions in diverse 
channels. The two discourse domains (politics and media) overlap and intertwine and 
hence create a hybrid situation from which participants tend to subjectively construct 
their models depending on their positions, goals or even on the situation properties itself 
such as the institutional norms and professional raison d‘être. Based on these 
preliminary assumptions, discourse is examined to determine the kinds of spatial setting 
the two arguers groups seem to construct for this debate.  
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Context category of participants 
Participants are a central category in the context model schema, as they are ―the 
defining components of social situations‖ (van Dijk 2009: 65).  They are the ones who –
through cognitive mechanisms- subjectively construct the relevant aspects of a 
communicative situation while processing discourse either in production or 
comprehension. Processing is crucial for the effective communication of participants 
and so are the positions they take in this social situation, namely the way they self-
define, interconnect and go about establishing consent and settling their differences. For 
a given communicative situation, according to Van Dijk, participants generally 
construct in their context models the relevant social actors‘ identities, mainly self 
identity and their roles and relationship with others.  
The Constructions of self are regarded central in participants‘ context models. Self is 
construed on the basis of personal experiences represented in episodic memory (Van 
Dijk 2009). Self is a personal but socially based construct hence the op-ed authors very 
probably possess some common features which they enact in their context models as a 
representation of their identities. They share the same condition of being involved in a 
communicative situation that is based on their expertise in the field as the supposedly 
―official‖ reason why they are invited to contribute to public debate in a given 
newspaper. Consequently, they would perhaps explicitly choose to enact the identities 
that are consistent most with their respective institutional or political conditions which 
could be constructed from a number of contextual properties such as the very 
publication of the opinion piece and the display of the authorship in the byline usually 
listed below the article. Indeed, the general expert identity should be jointly interpreted 
by all discourse participants owing to the universally shared and perhaps abstract 
knowledge of who experts are and what roles they have when they publish an informed 
opinion about some political issues in the international arena. Nevertheless, there is 
more in the models of the op-ed discourses than this specific construction of self (as 
experts). In fact, the op-ed discourse as any political discourse is generally controlled by 
a complex model of self identity which politicians aim to make relevant and potentially 
compelling for their target audiences despite their substantial variety. Given the fact that 
there is a political intent behind the opinion contributions of these foreign policy 
experts, exploring the construction of self and of others in the current text corpora 
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should help determine the social and political identities that are being acted out in the 
arguers‘ models. More notably, not only may the construction of identity reveal some 
patterns specific for each different cultural group, but also possibly clarify the arguers´ 
standing in a public space where it is hard to tell an analyst´s ―objective‖ opinion from a 
(subjective) political opinion or the boundaries between objective policy analysis and 
political posturing.  
Participants´ roles and relationships are as crucial as identity in the construction of the 
participant‘s model schema, since the very structure of Self is realized through a process 
of definition of one´s and others´ positions in the interactional event. Furthermore, 
language users discursively represent goals of the communicative event´ s participants –
of self and others- by referring to the actions they instantiate. Goals or purposes are 
defined by van Dijk (2008: 81) as ―mental representations of the desired consequences 
of an intended (planned) activity‖. This means that purposes allocated to participants´ 
actions whether of self or others are part of the context model participants construct of a 
given social or communicative situation. Hence in text, these expressions of purposes 
are certainly controlled by ―cognitive‖ related categories in language users´ context 
models, namely goals, knowledge or ideologies. 
 
3. 3. Discourse as recontextualization: a CDA analytic framework 
Within the same discipline of critical discourse studies, and very much attuned to the 
sociocognitive perspective of discourse, the current study draws on the work of van 
Leeuwen and his theory on discourse viewed not only as an act of representation but 
also as an act of recontextualization of social practice. Van Leeuwen (2008) proposes an 
analytical framework for the study of discourse whereby discourse is conceived as 
social cognition, that is ―as socially constructed knowledge of some social practice 
developed in specific social contexts and in ways appropriate to these contexts‖ (p. 6). 
The central assumption in this framework is that all discourses recontextualize social 
practices. Recontextualization is a process by which elements of social practice such as 
participants and their eligibility conditions, actions, and performance modes among 
others, are transformed in discourse. For Van Leeuwen, with this recontextualizing 
principle, discourses are used as resources for representing social practices in text. 
However, they ―not only represent what is going on, they also evaluate it, ascribe 
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purposes to it, justify it and so on, and in many texts these aspects of representation 
become far more important than the representation of the social practice itself" (Van 
Leeuwen 2008: 6). Recontextualization is a process in which the following 
transformation occurs: substitution, rearrangement and addition. Van Leeuwen 
identifies those elements added to recontextualize social practice basically as repetition, 
reactions, purposes, legitimations and evaluation. The current work draws on the 
analytic tools proposed in this framework to examine the construction of purposes in 
discourse as part of the transformation mechanisms employed in the process of 
recontextualization of social practices.    
 
The discursive construction of purposes, according to Van Leeuwen´s theoretical 
framework (2008), is based on the belief that some social actors recontextualize or 
transform actions into purposeful by adding an element of purpose to them. Van 
Leeuwen takes the view that a social action is not inherently purposeful, but rather 
―constructed, interpreted and negotiated in discourse‖ (2008: 124). Constructing this 
additional element for actions is based on information constructed from mental models 
(instantly retrieved during communication) on participants, their roles, status and hence 
powerfully points to the social cognition they are associated with, namely values, 
attitudes and ideologies.  
Van Leeuwen recognizes three main ways with which language users construct 
purposes for actions in English. These are the goal-oriented, the means- oriented and the 
effective action kind of construction. Each of these purpose constructions when chosen 
reveals the way social actors are positioned in discourse and their degree of control on 
the actions or activities represented. This is mainly realized through the way actions are 
represented and the kind of relationship established with their agents, depending for 
instance, on whether they are objectivated or nominalized, among other factors. In most 
cases, the effect of these constructions may be discursively suggestive of ―the 
distribution of power in concrete social practices‖ (van Leeuwen, 2008: 135) and may 
(or not) point to another level of discursive construction namely, legitimation of social 
actions.   
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In the goal-oriented type, actions are explicitly constructed as purposeful and their 
actors are ―discursively empowered as intentional agents- as people who can decide to 
and then succeed in, changing the world, whether in minor or major ways, or as people 
who can set a goal and then determine, autonomously, how to achieve it‖ (2008: 127).  
It is essential that the action and its purpose have the same agent and is typically 
formulated by an explicit purpose clause with ―to‖, ―in order to‖, etc. The following 
example from the corpus data illustrates this type of purpose construction:  
(1)   The US invaded Iraq in order to secure a permanent military base in the Middle 
East, former US president Jimmy Carter argued. (Nassar 2007, Al Ahram)  
There are also specific goal-oriented constructions, such as the precaution kind of 
construction consisting of a purpose of preventing something from happening or from 
being done (realized with hypotactic clause with ―in case‖, or because otherwise‖) (see 
example 2 below). Another specific strategy is referred to as ―the preparation‖ where 
purpose is to be prepared for something (with ―ready to‖).  
(2)  They hunt Shiite death squads in Baghdad to keep them from rounding up 
random Sunnis (Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post)  
The means-oriented construction actions are objectivated and represented as a means to 
an end with built-in purposes. The purposeful actions may belong to two categories: the 
instrumental and the technological action. In the instrumental type, the action becomes 
either a method (as in example 3) and human agency is preserved, or a means to achieve 
a purpose (as in example 4).  
(3)  By de-authorizing the original use-of-force resolution this year, we would put a 
stop to the President's failed strategy (Clinton & Byrd, Daily News) 
(4)  Amending the bill to de-authorize the war would do exactly that. (Clinton & 
Byrd, Daily News) 
The technological types construct purposes as built in actions which are nominated or 
realized by means of a process pronoun. There are three sub-categories in this kind of 
constructions: use (―can be used to‖ or ―is useful for‖), function (typically realized by 
identifying clause as in X is something to do Y) or potentiality (actions as having the 
potential for serving a purpose, with verbs like ―facilitate‖, ―allow‖, ―help‖, etc.)   
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Finally, the effective type which emphasizes the outcome of actions, constructs actions 
as having purposes coming about as effects. Social actors, in this construction, are not 
fully in control of the action (do not plan them), and the purposes are represented as not 
theirs. There are two subcategories of this type: 1) result, where the purposeful action 
enables or causes the actions of other people, 2) effect, (as in example 5) in which the 
purposeful action is itself agent or initiator of the purpose action.    
(5)  The Security Council and the civilized world should rearrange their priorities 
from the bottom up, from the earth to the space, so that internationalization will 
not be falsification in the name of the US (Kseibati, Dar Al Hayat)  
 
3. 4.  Pragma-dialectics: a method for argumentation analysis  
Pragma-dialectics is a prominent argumentation theory developed by Frans H. van 
Eemeren and his colleagues at the University of Amsterdam during the last three 
decades or more. This theory views argumentative discourse as an exchange of verbal 
moves ideally intended to resolve a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 
1999: 480). This exchange is interpreted with an ideal model referred to as a critical 
discussion, which is both dialectical and pragmatic. The dialectical dimension of this 
model assumes a methodical exchange of the argumentative moves between two or 
more parties for the purpose of resolving their difference of opinion. The pragmatic 
dimension regards these moves as speech acts performed in specific situations and 
contexts. Pragma-dialectics offers interesting analytic tools for critical discourse studies, 
as it offers a systematic method for analyzing not only the structural but also the 
strategic dimensions of argumentative discourses.  
Pragma-dialectics draws on research insights from both normative/formal logic models 
and empirical socially oriented discourse analysis. According to this theory, the 
normative idealization combined with findings from empirical descriptions makes the 
study of argumentation a branch of what is referred to as ―Normative Pragmatics‖ (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 10). Pragma-dialectics stresses the importance of a 
multidisciplinary orientation in argumentation studies that relies on the expertise of both 
analytically minded philosophers and the empirically minded linguists and social 
scientists, especially those engaged in discourse analysis and communication studies 
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(pp. 40-41) and hence argues for equally employing standardization and observation 
analytic tools resulting in a systematic approach to the critical analysis and evaluation of 
argumentative discourse in practice.  
Argumentation in Pragma-dialectics is considered a purposive act taken up as a rational 
means by language users to convince others to accept their claims. The theory ascribes 
to the view that acceptability relies on reasonableness where rationality and 
reasonableness are viewed from the anthropological stance as dynamic, relative and 
culture-bound concepts. Reasonableness is also viewed from a critical perspective in 
Pragma-dialectics which explains the proposal for a discussion model with rules for 
rational discussants. Pragma–dialectic adopts a critical-rationalistic view of 
reasonableness where the validity of arguments is based on two criteria: problem 
validity and inter-subjective validity, according to which ―reasonableness need not be 
universal (...) but depends on human judgment and is related to a specific group of 
people at a particular place and time‖ (p. 17). This assumption is in line in a sense with 
the sociocognitive approach to CDA, since the notion of reasonableness is based on 
group consensus and on what is considered true and acceptable, reasonableness, thus, 
could be considered knowledge. For pragma-dialectics, maintaining social knowledge-
based reasonableness is a dialectical aim which is considered an important context 
construct of participants in the discussion. Knowledge within a communicative event in 
the sociocognitive approach is a crucial context category which is subjectively and 
cognitively constructed by participants. What is dialectically reasonable thus could be 
what is socially and cognitively shared by a group and eventually shaping their 
cognition and controlling their discursive and social practices. 
Four principles are at the core of the research object of Pragma-dialectics and these are 
functionalization, externalization, socialization and dialectification. They are referred to 
as ―Meta theoretical‖ principles and represent the foundation for integrating the 
normative and the descriptive dimensions into the study of argumentation. According to 
Pragma-dialectics, these principles should be taken as methodological guidelines for an 
argumentation theory which aims at providing an accurate framework for the analysis 
and evaluation of argumentative discourse and texts. The functionalization principle is 
based on the assumptions that argumentation is a purposive act advanced in reaction to 
or in anticipation of a difference of opinion and aimed to resolve a disagreement. 
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Functionalization is realized in pragma-dialectics by considering the ―verbal 
expressions used in argumentative discourse and texts as speech acts and specifying the 
conditions for identity and correctness that apply to the performance of these speech 
acts‖ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 54). The analysis of the speech acts 
performed in the text and their functions makes possible to determine the 
communicative and interactional purposes the utterances serve in resolving the 
difference of opinion. Determining these purposes is not concerned with the 
psychological or internal dispositions of language users, but the positions their express 
or externalize. Externalization, as a second principle, focuses on language users´ 
commitments as they are externalized in, or can be externalized from, the discourse or 
text (p. 54).  By examining the kinds of obligations explicitly or implicitly created from 
the use of certain speech acts in a specific context, language users´ commitments such 
as acceptance or challenge are determined and accounted for as externalized, thus 
becoming public and making part of a communicative process. The third theoretical 
principle in pragma-dialectics is socialization and focuses on the interactional context of 
the argumentative exchange. This principle proposes recognizing the different roles 
played in the interaction and the positions adopted by the parties involved with regard to 
the resolution of the difference of opinion. Analytically, roles and positions are 
identified within the interactional functions fulfilled with the different stages of the 
critical discussion. This means that the meaning to be attributed to the speech acts 
depends on the positions activated by the involved parties´ interaction and the resolution 
stage they are at. Finally, the fourth theoretical principle is dialectification and is 
concerned with the rules to be adhered to in the performance of the speech acts in the 
argumentative exchange and ideally aiming at the resolution of the difference of 
opinion. These rules come together to represent a dialectical discussion procedure which 
in turn systematically indicated the structure of the process of resolving a difference o 
opinion (p. 57).  
 
3. 4. 1. The model of critical discussion  
The op-ed pieces constituting the current study corpora are examined from the pragma-
dialectical perspective using the ―critical discussion model‖ the theory proposes for the 
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analysis and evaluation of argumentation (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). 
Pragma-dialectics starts with the assumptions that speakers or writers engage in ―a 
critical discussion‖ for the purpose of resolving a difference of opinion and delineates 
an ideal model aimed at facilitating the systematic assessment of argumentation. This 
model indicates the different stages involved in an ideal process of a difference of 
opinion resolution. By advancing a standpoint, two or more people engage in an 
argumentative process through which they have to reach settlement over the 
acceptability or not of this standpoint. In this process, the acceptability of the claim has 
to be tested by following a dialectical procedure in which the parties: the protagonist 
(the one advancing the standpoint) and the antagonist (the one casting doubt on it) seek 
to decide whether the standpoint is defendable in light of critical reactions (p. 58).  The 
dialectical procedure in the critical discussion focus on the speech acts leading to the 
dispute resolution rather than the formal relations between parts of argumentation units 
as it is commonly used in traditional approaches. The model of critical discussion has 
two functions: 1) heuristic, as a guide in the identification and theoretical interpretation 
of every element in the argumentative exchanges, and 2) critical, as a standard in the 
evaluation of argumentation.  
Ideally, a critical discussion proceeds in four stages in order to resolve the difference of 
opinion. These stages are distinguished analytically as follows (Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004:  59-62):   
 The confrontation stage,  where the two parties identify a difference of opinion  
 The opening stage, where the parties establish starting point for the discussion 
and agree upon the rules and the propositions they can use in their 
argumentation. 
 The argumentation stage, where the protagonist defends his/her standpoint by 
putting forward arguments to counter the antagonist‘s objections or doubt.  
 The concluding stage, where the discussion parties evaluate to what extent their 
initial difference of opinion has been resolved and in whose favor. 
 
The model of critical discussion is not only applicable to the face- to-face argumentative 
exchange type but also to the written type such as in the op-ed pieces under study. An 
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op-ed piece coming about as a monologue, according to van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(2004) is a ―specific kind of critical discussion‖ where the audience as the antagonist 
takes an implicit role and the writer as a protagonist attempts to counter the antagonist‘s 
(potential) doubt (p. 59).  
 
Pragma-dialectics takes the identification of participants´ communicative roles as an 
important step in the analytic method of argumentation. In a typical communicative 
situation (critical discussion), argumentation participants may take the roles of either 
protagonist (the one who advanced a standpoint) or antagonist (the one(s) who 
expresses doubt about the validity of the protagonist´ claim) depending on their 
positions in respect to advancing argumentation. In a face to face argumentation then, 
participants may normally take turns on both roles if they interactively engage in 
argumentation exchanges on a specific issue. As for the written argumentation type, the 
writer, by default, takes up a protagonist role and assigns the audiences an antagonist 
role. Despite the assumed dialogical nature of this communicative situation, indirectness 
gives the protagonists in this case the freedom to initiate claims, defend them and to 
conclude without ―real‖ interruption or intervention from the communicative event´s 
participants. Such is the case of the op-ed arguers, who by performing their protagonist 
role; they define the roles of other participants which they typically choose to construe 
as mere antagonists in a position of doubt. Antagonists in positions of doubt normally 
require the protagonists to corroborate their claims with reasonable argumentation while 
antagonists who take the role of opponents generally hold a counter-position and 
potentially advance counter-argumentation. On the whole, one expects the authors of 
op-ed pieces to assign their audience the role of anatagonits with doubt. This kind of 
role distribution decision is naturally more interaction-friendly, as it supposes less 
confrontation challenges and it better supports their communicative endeavor.    
 
Whatever the discussion type is, it is crucial to pragmatically characterize the speech act 
at each critical stage, that is, the moves that are performed in the different stages for the 
purpose of resolving the difference of opinion. Along with the identification of 
discussion stages and the moves relevant to each critical stage, a reconstruction of 
argumentation is realized for the purpose of identifying unexpressed statements or 
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premises and facilitating the reorganization of the critical stages according to the 
Pragma- dialectical ideal model.  
3. 4. 2. Method and tools for argumentation analysis  
Pragma-dialectics as a theory of argumentation proposes a systematic method for 
critically analyzing argumentative discussions which the current research study of 
foreign policy op-ed pieces argumentation draws on. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(2004) present the theoretical foundations of Pragma-dialectics and the analytic methods 
they put forward based on them and explain the essential tools to use for a systematic 
and normative analysis of any type of argumentative exchange. The method for 
analyzing and evaluating argumentation is outlined in this section first by indicating the 
main analytic procedures, namely obtaining an analytic overview after reconstructing 
the discussion, and second by describing the means supporting the evaluation of the 
strategic maneuvering efficiency of arguers, namely by characterizing the activity type 
and surveying the degree of compliance with the critical rules established by Pragma-
dialectics.   
 
The Reconstruction 
After determining the different stages of the critical discussion, a pragma-dialectical 
analysis of argumentation proceeds with a reconstruction of this discussion. The 
reconstruction is aimed to identify the process parties have followed in their attempt to 
resolve their difference of opinion. Its function is to ―reveal as clearly as possible, 
without paying attention to any sidetracks or detours, which route is followed to fulfill 
the purposes of arguers and eventually bring about an analytic overview of all the 
discourse elements that are relevant in to the resolution of a difference of opinion (van 
Eemeren& Grootendorst 2004: 96). Reconstruction involves the use of procedures 
aimed at placing the focus exclusively on language users‘ argumentative purposes and 
coming as follows. First, the analyst examines the points at issue and the procedural and 
material points of departure chosen. Second, he or she identifies the arguments whether 
explicitly expressed or left unexpressed and determine their schemes and overall 
structures. Third, a transformation is realized to the text applying different transposition 
means. This transformation consists of making necessary deletions, additions, 
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substitutions and permutations in the text. Deletion is the removal of irrelevant parts of 
the discussion. Addition consists of the inclusion of the relevant parts made implicit by 
the arguer like the unexpressed premises or standpoints. Substitution corresponds to 
replacing vague formulations by clear ones while permutation is rearranging parts of the 
text that best bring their relevance to the resolution process. These transformations yield 
a reconstructed critical discussion allowing for a basic requisite for the analysis and 
evaluation of the argumentative exchange. This requisite is the analytic overview.    
 
Analytic Overview  
The analytic overview constitutes the basis for any pragma-dialectically approached 
critical evaluation of the argumentative discourse and is adopted to do the following 
(after Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: 118):   
 Clarify the difference of opinion at issue and the positions of the participant(s) 
 Identify the premises which serve as the starting point 
 Identify arguments and criticisms which are implicitly or explicitly advanced  
 Determine argument schemes employed 
 Recreate the argumentation structure constructed  
 Identify the conclusion reached 
 
This list consists of the different points to be accomplished in the analytic work which 
should guide towards a more methodical assessment of the argumentative endeavor 
under study. These procedures represent the basic aspect of the argumentative analysis 
that would be reinforced by the normative scrutiny of the argumentative discourse 
moves and strategies and the inspection of the arguments structures and schemes. 
Indeed, it aims at substantiating the critical function pragma-dialectics hopes to achieve 
in its systematic inquiry of argumentation. A crucial and meticulous task to do to 
implement the complete analytic list involves the identification of the line of arguments 
in a critical discussion (schemes or loci), the arguments´ interconnectedness (structures) 
and strategies (strategic maneuvering). The evaluation of these mechanisms should help 
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clarify the soundness or fickleness of arguments and their normative assessment 
according to ten rules of critical discussion.  
 
3. 4. 3. Argument Evaluation  
After analysis, argumentation is evaluated for soundness and for the congruity of its 
strategic layout. This means that it must be checked for logical and pragmatic 
inconsistencies. Fallacies along with standardized types of arguments, referred to as 
Topoi, may be identified and discussed in terms of their significance in the reproduction 
of ideologies in discourse. A fallacy is widely recognized as a mistake in reasoning; an 
argument that fails to provide adequate logical support for the truth of its conclusion yet 
appears convincing or persuasive in some other way Johnson (2000: 58). Under the 
Pragma-dialectical framework, however, fallacies are not considered to be exclusively 
logical errors. Instead, they are seen as wrong moves in argumentative discourse.  A 
fallacy in the pragma-dialectical approach is defined as a speech acts that counts as a 
violation of one or more of the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren et al. 2009: 
20). Consequently, this approach (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1992, 2004) 
considers fallacies a hindrance to the resolution of a disagreement and the specific 
nature of each fallacy depends on the exact manner in which it interferes with the 
resolution process. In order to evaluate argumentation in Pragma-dialectics, 
argumentation should be scrutinized and fallacies identified according to the rules for 
critical discussion.  
Rules for a critical discussion  
The pragma-dialectical model specifies ten rules participants in an argumentative 
discussion have to abide by and accept inter-subjectively in order to argue effectively. 
These ten rules have been discussed in various works mainly, Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans (2002: 182-183) and Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (2004) and have even been extended to fifteen rules. These rules represent 
a heuristic tool for the reconstruction of argumentative discourse according to the 
critical discussion model and assist the analyst in the evaluation of arguments. In their 
book presenting a comprehensive view on Pragma-dialectics, Van Eemeren and 
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Grootendorst (2004) devote a whole chapter entitled ―Code of conduct for reasonable 
discussants‖ on illustrating and explaining the ten rules arguers need to observe in order 
for their argumentation to be acceptable. The violation or non-violation of these rules is 
regarded to be instrumental in the pragma-dialectical critical evaluation of arguments. If 
argumentation participants prevent the reasonable resolution of the difference of 
opinion, they are considered then as violating these rules. Violations of the discussion 
rules are considered as fallacies. Recently, and with the pragma-dialectics more 
extended focus on argumentative strategies, infringing the normative process of 
argumentation through fallacies is regarded as a derailment of the strategic 
maneuvering. The ten rules for a critical discussion are illustrated in the discussion of 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 187-196) as follows:  
1- Freedom Rule:  Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or 
from casting doubt on standpoints. Violation of this rule typically occurs in the 
confrontation stage by placing limits on the standpoint or by restricting a party‘s 
reaction such as by threat (argumentum ad baculum fallacy) or appeal to pity 
(argumentum ad misericordiam), or by attacking the other party character or 
credibility (argumentum ad hominem).       
2- Burden of proof Rule:  A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if 
asked by the other party to do so. In a non-mixed difference of opinion, as it is the 
case of opinion articles, only one party puts forward a standpoint, so according to 
the Pragma- dialectical approach there is only one party who has anything to 
defend.  
3- The Standpoint Rule:  A party‘s attack on a standpoint must relate to the 
standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party. This rule may be 
violated when the standpoint attacked is not the standpoint originally put forward 
by the protagonist.  
4- Relevance Rule: A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing 
argumentation relating to that standpoint. Violation of this rule typically occurs in 
the argumentation stage and may be of two types: irrelevant argumentation (such 
as distorting the opponents‘ standpoint) and non-argumentation (the recourse to 
persuasion through emotion (ethos and pathos).  
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5- Unexpressed premise Rule: A party may not deny a premise that he or she has left 
implicit or falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed 
by the other party. Violating this rule may occur during argumentation stage and 
involve exaggerating the unexpressed premise or denying it. Checking arguments 
with respect to this rule means a deeper study and knowledge of the socio-
political context in which they are produced.  
6- Starting point Rule: A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted 
starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point. In 
practice, explicit agreements about starting points are rare: parties normally 
operate on the assumption that they share certain starting points. When the arguer 
acts as though a certain proposition was accepted as starting point when, in fact, it 
is not the case, there is certainly a violation of this rule. A commonly used 
strategy to make this use hard to perceive is done by presenting the controversial 
proposition as a presupposition.   
7- Argument scheme Rule: A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively 
defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate 
argumentation scheme that is correctly applied. Violation of this rule occurs 
during the argumentation stage leading to fallacies such as the populist fallacy 
(claiming standpoint should be accepted because many people agree with it), the 
secundum quid (making hasty generalization), the argumentum ad consequentiam 
(when confusing facts with value judgment), the post hoc ergo propter hoc 
(reasoning that one thing is true because it precedes the other), the slippery slope 
fallacy (arguing that adopting a certain course of action will inevitably be going 
from bad to worse without having any proof of that) and finally a fallacy referred 
to as False Analogy is one which erroneously applies analogy aimed as argument.  
8- Validity Rule: A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are 
logically valid or capable of being made logically valid by making explicit one or 
more unexpressed premises. The pragma-dialectical theory does not consider the 
violation of this rule as the most important of the fallacies due to the belief that 
invalid reasoning is not the most important cause of failure to reach a resolution of 
a difference of opinion. Two common faulty ways of reasoning are affirming the 
consequent and denying the antecedent; these are invalid counterparts of the 
modus ponens and modus tollens types of reasoning.  
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9- Closure Rule: A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put 
forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense of the standpoint 
must result in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint. In the case 
of written argumentation (non-mixed), the protagonist may not conclude his/her 
antagonists‘ standpoint to be false only because they did not show the opposite, as 
in practice, the antagonist‘s standpoint is not defended (yet). If the protagonist 
makes such a claim in the concluding stage, he/she commits the fallacy of 
concluding that a standpoint is true because of the opposite has not been 
successfully defended (argumentum ad ignorantiam).  
10- Usage Rule: A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or 
confusingly ambiguous. The other party in turn must interpret the other party‘s 
formulations as carefully and accurately as possible and should not deliberately 
misinterpret them. The rule is set to avoid and minimize misunderstanding which 
may obstruct their mutual effort the resolve the difference of opinion.  
The critical discussion rules play an important role in the analysis and evaluation of 
argumentation as they systematically sustain the decisions on the validity or 
acceptability of arguments. Investigating argumentation normatively in a critical 
discussion is useful for the evaluation of the strategic performance of arguers, namely 
their strategic maneuverings. The present study of op-ed pieces argumentation draws 
upon the Pragma-dialectics notion of strategic maneuvering in the analysis of the 
ideological structures in the opinion discourse on FP. The notion of strategic 
maneuvering is thus characterized in the following sub-section.  
 
 
3. 4. 4. The notion of strategic maneuvering  
In their attempt to bridge the traditional gap between dialectic and rhetoric in the study 
of argumentation, van Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999) introduce the theoretical concept 
of strategic maneuvering. Strategic maneuvering is defined as the ―efforts arguers make 
in argumentative discourse to reconcile aiming for rhetorical effectiveness with 
maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness‖ (Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006: 
383). Hence, the notion is taken up as a connecting point between the dialectical 
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purpose of the arguer and his/her rhetorical aims. The integration of strategic 
maneuvering into the theory is due to Pragma-dialectics‘ eagerness to extend the 
traditional normative-logical approach of evaluating arguments by creating standards 
for reasonableness that have a functional, rather than a structural, focus. An argument is 
evaluated in terms of its usefulness in moving a critical discussion toward resolution 
rather than concentrating on the relationship of premises to conclusions as it has been 
traditionally the case in argumentative analysis research. Strategic maneuvering is the 
―methodical designs of moves, or ‗blue-prints‘, for influencing the result of a particular 
dialectical stage to one‘s own advantage, which manifest themselves in a systematic, 
coordinated and simultaneous exploitation of the opportunities afforded by the 
(dialectical) stage (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485-486). 
Maneuvering can occur at any stage of the critical discussion, and this explains the 
reason why the rhetorical aims of the participants in the discourse are presumed to take 
place according to the dialectical stages. The study of strategic maneuvering consists of 
a systematic integration of a rhetorical insight into a dialectical framework of analysis.  
Indeed, strategic maneuvering indicates the way arguers handle the opportunities 
presented to them along the discussion stages to achieve their rhetorical goals. As Van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999:  484) explain:  
 
Each stage in the resolution process is characterized by a specific 
dialectical aim. As the parties involved want to realize this aim to 
their best advantage, they can be expected, to make strategic moves 
that serve their interest best. The dialectical objective of a particular 
discussion stage always has a rhetorical analogue. And since the kind 
of advantages that can be gained depends on the dialectical stages, the 
presumed rhetorical objectives of the participants must be specified 
according to stage.  
 
Three levels of strategic maneuvering, topic potential, adaptation to audience and 
presentational devices, are distinguished in Pragma-dialectics for analytic purposes 
while in practice it is believed that they act together and synchronize to realize the 
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argumentative goals of the argumentative discussion participants. These levels are 
outlined below.  
 
Three levels of strategic maneuvering  
Argumentative strategic maneuvering operates in discourse by making an appropriate 
choice from the ―topical potential‖ presented at each dialectical stage, producing the 
most adequate adaptation to the ―audience demand‖ and putting together effective 
―presentational devices‖.  
The first level of maneuvering is concerned with the Topic Potential of a particular 
critical stage in the discussion. This involves choosing topics from the ones available 
depending on the argumentative goals at each stage. At the confrontation stage, the aim 
is to make the most effective choice among potential issues for discussion –restricting 
the disagreement space in such a way that the confrontation is defined in accordance 
with the speaker´s or writers´ preferences (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 484). By 
choosing or dismissing a particular topic the arguer opts for a specific line of defense of 
his/her standpoint. This ―involves a selection from the available loci that best suits the 
speaker or writer‘‘ (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005: 30). Loci or literally ―places‖ to 
find arguments, which are also referred to as topics of invention in traditional rhetoric 
and sometimes schemes in contemporary argumentative work stand for a method 
humans use to store items related to the same topical area for future retrieval. The 
selection from available loci fulfills the dialectical duty of confronting opponents within 
some norms and the rhetorical aim of fashioning the discussion issue and its focus 
according to one´s interests. At the opening stage, arguers strive to establish the most 
beneficial starting points for their discussion by selecting the kinds of assumptions 
which strengthen consensus and generates agreements with their interlocutors.  At the 
argumentation stage, the most favorable loci for the defense of the standpoint advanced 
are selected; hence, some commonly used and socially established topoi acting as an 
ally in the strategic line of defense are typically adopted. At the concluding stage, 
topical potential is employed in getting the best outcome for the resolution process. 
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The second level of strategic maneuvering relates to the effective adaptation to audience 
demands. This maneuvering is typically realized through the attempt to create empathy 
or ―communion‖ with the audience at each dialectical stage. At the confrontation stage, 
the arguers seeking effective adaptation to audience demands tend to avoid evoking 
unresolved issues and would probably agree with the audience‘s potential concerns. At 
the opening stage, the starting points are established in accordance with the audiences‘ 
values, beliefs and expectations about how things should be approached and resolved. 
As it is generally hard, if not impossible, to satisfy a large audience it is typical for 
arguers to make disagreement over values look like disagreement over facts.  At the 
argumentative stage, arguments may be supported by premises which are easy to agree 
with and accept by the audience. Finally, at the concluding stage, arguers may frame the 
audience difference resolution decisions as having high affinity with theirs, projecting 
by this strategy a prominent resolution to their own favor.    
 
The third level of strategic maneuvering consists of making the most effective use of 
presentational devices appropriate for each dialectical stage. This involves the way 
moves are formulated and how they are assigned a presence. The use of rhetorical 
figures is strategically crucial as they have the potential according to Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca of ―bringing about a change of perspective‖ (1969: 119) (quoted in 
van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485). Based on most rhetorical theories, what is said 
and how it is said are viewed as one and only divisible for analytical purposes (Burton, 
2007; Kennedy, 1980). This may be noted in the continuity between the topics of 
inventions (as basic categories of relationships among ideas) and the figures of speech, 
which have sometimes been used to refer not only to means of expression, but to 
strategies of argument (Rhetoricae, 2003). Commonly employed figures for 
argumentative purposes such as conciliato (adopting opponents´ arguments to support 
one´s position) and rhetorical questions assist the adaptation to audience strategic 
maneuvers by creating a sense of consensus with audiences. These figures, among 
others may be exploited based on the requirement of each critical stage, for instance at 
the opening stage reinforcing the starting points, say by rhetorical questions and 
establishing the basic assumptions which prepare for the argumentative stage.  
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3. 4. 4. 1.  Strategic maneuvering throughout the critical stages 
These three levels of strategic maneuvering typically operate together in a single 
argumentative text as to achieve the goals of the arguer. The identification and analysis 
of these strategies may be carried out separately for each of the four critical stages. In 
fact, once a stage is identified in a given discussion, it becomes easier to determine the 
arguer‘s dialectical goals, as they can be interpreted based on the critical stage 
functions. For instance, the confrontation stage is the stage where the arguer 
externalizes a standpoint and his/her goals are interpreted as advancing a position for 
defense. Examining the maneuvering strategies in each stage hence involves estimating 
how the arguer´s dialectical motives are being coordinated with the rhetorical and 
persuasive goals within the whole critical discussion. The analysis of strategic 
maneuvers across the stages generally proceeds as indicated below.  
 
Maneuvering at the Confrontation stage  
Confrontation is the dialectical stage in which the issues at the origin of the conflict are 
identified. Arguers establish their difference of opinion by advancing their standpoints 
and contextualizing their positions. Building the issue in the confrontation stage is 
crucial for arguers. Indeed, they have to place their views within the disagreement space 
they believe it belongs to and even though in some cases this remains implicit, they 
definitely set the stage in some way. The dialectical aim of advancing standpoints goes 
hand in hand with the rhetorical aim of gearing audience towards accepting this 
standpoint. To attain these aims, arguers maneuver strategically essentially by making 
the most effective choice among the potential issues for discussion, efficiently adapting 
this choice to the audience and optimally presenting them. The topic choice is strategic 
in essence and reflects the decision made about what is worth discussing and what is not 
and the way the chosen issue is crystallized for the audience. Furthermore, sometimes 
arguers resort to the use of some specific strategies in order to maximize their 
persuasive chances by, for instance, evading the task of presenting a clear definition of 
the difference of opinion. Such strategies are more widely used in written 
argumentation, where the protagonist is the only one to present the positions of all the 
participants in the discussion (some of which may be real opponents). It is expected that 
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by reporting the views of others and mainly of one‘s opponents, one tends to charge the 
wording with an inevitable distortion of the actual positions existent.  
Strategic maneuvering at the opening stage  
In the opening stage, the participants decide to resolve the difference of opinion; hence 
they determine their points of departure and agree upon the rules of the discussion (van 
Eemeren et al, 2002: 25). This means that in this stage, common assumptions are 
established by the participants as starting points or as the accepted rules for 
argumentation process.  This consists of reminding participants of the ideas which are 
agreed upon by everyone. The agreement is supposed to be shared and accepted by 
participants in the discussion, though in the case of written argumentation the 
protagonist is the one who decides which issues are considered assumptions and which 
others are to be argued for or against. Equally important in this stage is that the roles of 
the protagonist and antagonist are assigned in a mixed discussion. In the case of 
written/supposedly non-mixed discussion these roles are assumed to be distributed in 
this manner: the writer is the protagonist advancing a position and is obliged to defend it 
and the audience is the antagonist since they are in a position of doubt. However, if the 
protagonist is advancing a claim which is already of received widely by rejection the 
audience in this case may hold the position of active antagonists (not only of doubt) but 
of holding a counter argument and the discussion in this case is to be considered a 
mixed one. Some specific strategies used in favor of the protagonist are creating a broad 
zone of agreement which means that constructing antagonists as agreeing with some 
issues or doing the opposite: creating a ―smokescreen‖ and represent issues as highly 
polemical as possible.  
 
Strategic maneuvering at the argumentative stage  
Determining the maneuvering strategies at the argumentative stage means identifying 
which strategic ―line of defense‖ is pursued from the available potential of arguments 
that suits the party best in the dialectical situation at hand (Van Eemeren, 2010: 96). 
This consists of examining the standpoint(s) and the status topoi or loci associated with 
it (them), namely the type of argument (scheme) and the content of the premises that are 
used in the argument in order to track down the range of topical options available at a 
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certain point in the discourse. This has a role similar to that of loci in the classical 
rhetorical doctrine of invention. For Van Eemeren topical potentials are aggregates of 
options for maneuvering strategically and they differ from loci in the fact that ―so far no 
ready-made system to choose from exists and that choices generally have to be made 
from relatively open and fluid categories of possibilities‖ (2010: 98). This implicates 
that the analyst should rely on the discussion content and his/her knowledge of its 
context and activity type constraints in order to locate the arguer´ s maneuvers.  
 
Strategic maneuvering at the concluding stage  
The dialectical function of the concluding stage consists of determining the outcome the 
discussion which ideally is based on the aim to resolve a difference of opinion. In the 
case of an op-ed piece, the outcome in practice is not established within the discussion 
space, but deferred to research institutions on public opinion and to the institutions´ 
estimation of the impact the claim has on audience/citizens political attitudes and 
actions. However, the arguer as the active participant in this communicative event 
usually takes the initiative to close the debate with moves that enhance his/her position 
by, for instance, presupposing the audience acceptance of his resolution process or 
restating the proposal to ensure favorable reception. These strategic moves should be 
explored as they consist of the routes pursued by the arguer in the positioning of the 
proposed position.   
 
Derailment of strategic maneuvering  
Strategic maneuvering is believed to derail if the arguers mishandle the balance to be 
maintained between their goal to persuade and their commitment to the dialectical 
norms.  Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2006) contend that since the ―derailments of 
strategic maneuvering always involve a violation of a rule for critical discussion; they 
are on a par with the wrong moves in argumentative discourse designated as fallacies 
(387). A fallacy is widely recognized as a mistake in reasoning; an argument that fails to 
provide adequate logical support for the truth of its conclusion yet appears convincing 
or persuasive in some other way Johnson (2000: 58). Under the Pragma-dialectical 
77 
 
framework, however, fallacies are not considered to be exclusively logical errors. 
Instead, they are seen as wrong moves in argumentative discourse. A fallacy in the 
pragma-dialectical approach is defined as a speech acts that counts as a violation of one 
or more of the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., 20: 2009). Consequently, 
this approach (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; 1992; 2004) considers fallacies a 
hindrance to the resolution of a disagreement and the specific nature of each fallacy 
depends on the exact manner in which it interferes with the resolution process. 
 
3. 4. 4. 2.  The analysis of strategic maneuvering in critical discussions 
 
In order to determine the strategic function for every argumentative move in a given 
discourse unit, the analysis must be substantiated by four parameters: results, routes, 
constraints and commitments. These parameters should be considered as indicated by 
van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2006: 385) for the following purposes:  
 
(1) The results that can be achieved by the argumentative move so to explain the kind 
of outcome aimed for by this kind of strategic maneuvering 
 (2) The routes that can be taken to achieve these results by identifying the 
reasonable options are available when making the argumentative move so to 
explain the choice made by carrying out this particular kind of strategic 
maneuvering. 
(3) The constraints of the institutional context. This consists of identifying the 
conventional preconditions that the strategic maneuvering must meet in this type 
of discourse. 
(4) The mutual commitments defining the argumentative situation. These involve 
taking into account the actual argumentative situation in the discourse and 
determining how strategic maneuvering must respond to it. Recognizing the 
mutual commitment sets defining the argumentative situation generally requires 
information provided from parameter 3.   
 
With the support of these four parameters considered during analysis the strategic 
function of a particular type of maneuvering can be interpreted and its realization in a 
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certain combination of topical choice, audience orientation and presentational design 
can be explained.   
 
Pragma-dialectics draws on notions from argumentation theory and classical rhetoric in 
the analysis of strategic maneuverings and the evaluation of argumentation in general. 
Indeed, part of the basic tasks in the analysis of strategic maneuvering involves 
identifying the argumentative text oratory type and its stasis. These notions are useful in 
determining the strategic function of topic selection and may indicate the arguer‘s 
underlying ideological motivations for making certain decisions. The selection of topic 
as a strategic level of maneuvering is explored in Pragma-dialectics not only within the 
micro strategic moves of the critical discussion but also within the macro-rhetorical 
moves by examining the selection of standpoints from a disagreement space and the 
choices of oratory type and stasis.   
 
Topic selection as a strategic move 
 
In Pragma-dialectics theory, the selection of topic is considered one of the three levels 
within which discussion parties maneuver strategically within the four-stage critical 
discussion. According to van Eemeren (2010: 96), ―topic selection has to do with the 
viewpoint, angle or perspective from which the arguer selects the argumentative move 
or moves he makes in strategic maneuvering‖.  Hence based on this assumption, topics 
function in a similar manner as topoi in classical rhetoric seen as pointers to certain 
means the orator can use to solve a problem of choice and strategically fulfill rhetorical 
goals. Strategic maneuvering is a notion that explains how arguers attempt to reconcile 
two different aims: achieving ―rhetorical effectiveness and maintaining dialectical 
standards of reasonableness‖ (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006: 383). Pragma-
dialectics has been criticized for regarding advancing argumentation as simply oriented 
towards the ideal goal of resolving a difference of opinion by arguing that "otherwise 
we become intellectually isolated and can ultimately even end up in a state of spiritual 
and mental inertia" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984: 1). More recently, however, 
and with the notion of strategic maneuvering, Pragma-dialectics has started to link the 
resolution goal with the arguers´ benefits or interest and to recognize that this resolution 
process may be pursued with strategies controlled by their underlying ideologies. 
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Hence, arguers tend to ―select materials from those available according to what they 
believe best advances their interests‖ (Tindale, 2009: 43). Among the main notions 
Pragma-dialectics consider in the analysis of topic selections strategies are the 
disagreement spaces, the oratory types and stases.  
 
 
Disagreement spaces 
By selecting topics from available choices Pragma-dialectics points also to the notion of 
disagreement space. A disagreement space consists of ―all the commitments and 
understandings required for an utterance to take on its discourse function. These are 
virtual standpoints that can be called out for explicit argumentation‖ (Hample, 2001: 
135). Pragma-dialectics uses this concept in the analysis of strategic maneuverings 
realized at the confrontation stage of an argumentative text, as it clarifies the arguer‘s 
decisions on topical choices. Hample affirms (2001: 136) that the notion of 
disagreement space is ―all that needs to be filled in for a full analysis‖, referring here to 
an argumentation analysis based on pragma-dialectics which elucidates the notion as 
follows:  
Among the materials available to a participant in an argumentative 
discussion is the discourse itself and the surrounding context of practical 
activity. From these two components it will always be possible to infer an 
indefinitely large and complex set of beliefs, wants, and intentions that 
jointly compose the perspective of one‘s partner. Any component of this 
perspective may be ‗called out‘ and made problematic within the discourse, 
if it has any sort of relevance to the underlying purpose of the exchange. 
When this occurs, the problematized element functions as a ‗virtual 
standpoint‘ in need of defense. Any reconstructible commitment associated 
with the performance of a speech act can function as a virtual standpoint 
when it is in fact reconstructed and challenged by an interlocutor. The entire 
complex of reconstructible commitments can be considered as a 
‗disagreement space,‘ a structured set of opportunities for argument.  
 (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993:  95) 
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Based on these Pragma-dialectics´ assumptions, a particular standpoint is a selection 
from a particular disagreement space which in turn is a collection of the entire ―virtual‖ 
standpoints related to a given issue. However, as van Eemeren & Garssen argue 
―whether to expand around one of the potential points of disagreement is a matter of 
strategy, for not all disagreements need resolutions‖ (2008: 17). This means that by 
deciding which perspective of the space is worth discussing, arguers leave evidence of 
their intentions, priorities in their political agendas and more importantly of their 
ideological positions. Even though arguers may apparently have the freedom to choose 
their topic of discussions, their selection in practice is bounded by the range of topics 
available for debate. Of course, this does not imply that they have the obligation to deal 
with some topics, but rather suggests that the advancement of a certain position 
generates other particular positions and that the collection of reactions constitute the 
limit of the positions involved in the debate, at least within some temporal and spatial 
debate boundary. Arguers may control the disagreement space by requiring attention to 
the standpoints they raise and establishing them as more relevant than others for 
discussion or even by preventing -whether intentionally or not- other possible points 
from being raised.  
In the current study, the agendas setting strategies are regarded as similar to 
topicalization strategies in critical discourse studies. Therefore, by examining semantic 
macrostructures, rhetorical goals and categorizing them based on their recurrence in 
each corpus, each elite group agendas are located. Both topicalization and goals, 
indicating agenda setting practices, are useful in evaluating the arguers´ ideological 
discursive decisions which they make through acts of selection, hence omission or 
exclusions, prior to the act of arguing itself. It is also insightful to attempt to see what 
topics each group of experts from two opposing sides of the conflict make most 
prominent. These decisions are believed to reflect the ideological background from 
which they are made and the kinds of motivations feeding them.   
For Pragma-dialectics, as for most modern theorists, classical rhetoric has been an 
important source of inspiration and a starting point in the development and exploration 
of systematic sources for evaluating the selection of argumentative moves  Indeed, one 
of the five canons of rhetoric, ―invention‖, is concerned with studying the common 
categories of thought from which orators select their ―ideas‖. In invention, special 
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topics are referred to as ―the places to find things‖ and are identified also as kinds of 
causes. Identifying the kinds of causes or issues exhibited before the audience to judge 
may give another dimension to the analysis of arguers‘ constructions. The rhetorical 
perspective to topic selection proposes two main analytical approaches; the first is the 
oratory type or rhetorical genre of the speech and the second is the stasis.   
 
The oratory types 
Oratory, or the art of public speaking, is for Aristotle a genre of rhetoric. According to 
classical rhetorical theories this argumentative genre may belong to one of three 
branches: judicial, deliberative or epideictic. In the judicial type of argumentation, 
arguments are advanced to defend or accuse opponents based on their actions. Within 
the deliberative kind participants need to come to a compromise about an issue, so 
arguments aim at justifying decisions and solutions. Finally, in the epideictic oratory, 
arguments are meant to evaluate the character of some opponents (whether participating 
or not in the communicative situation), namely to praise or to blame them. Both judicial 
and epideictic types of oratory have the purpose of criticizing and evaluating issues, 
events and people, whereas the deliberative type rests on the aim of reaching a solution 
to an issue, so it is inclined towards future actions and relies on analysis and prediction.  
 
The Stasis or finding the issue 
Identifying the stasis of an argumentative speech is concerned with finding the different 
possible perspectives and options for issue identification.  It is an analysis necessary for 
understanding how one will attempt to resolve an issue and form a conclusion. In order 
to examine the perspectives from which arguers may handle a general topic or issue and 
to recognize them as ideological strategies realized by these choices and selections of 
topic, one may make the following speech categorization so as to find out how arguers 
approach these topics. If the arguers make conjunctures in their discussion of the Iraq 
war, say by imputing fault in their opponents´ acts or charging them with offence, and 
then their topics are referred to as conjectural. When they attempt to define or redefine 
issues and facts as a form of contesting intended participants in the debate, this form of 
topic selection belongs to the definitional stasis type. However, if they engage in 
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defending or denouncing positions about already raised issues within the debate, their 
approach is identified as qualitative. Finally, when they decide that any resolution to the 
conflict of positions towards an issue should be translated to another entity for a more 
adequate judgment, the stasis is translative.  Given the fact that the status (or position) is 
a sort of a design of the discourse strategy or line of argument, determining this design 
may represent an efficient resource to the understanding of the discursive and 
argumentative ideological strategies which motivate the arguers´ choices when bringing 
an issue to discussion. 
Pragma-dialectics encourages the study of contextual features of argumentative 
discourse for a more effective analysis of strategic maneuvers (to substantiate parameter 
3 and 4).  Context is crucial when looking at a pragmatic dimension of discourse and 
awareness of it affects local and macro interpretations. Therefore, Pragma-dialectics 
proposes the analysis of the argumentative ―activity type‖ in order to determine the pre-
conditions for strategic maneuverings. This consists mainly of investigating the 
institutional aims and conventions which could condition the strategic moves in a 
particular argumentative exchange.  
 
3. 4. 5. The study of argumentative activity type in Pragma-dialectics 
To be able to systematically describe the argumentative dimension of particular 
practices, van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2005) introduced the concept of argumentative 
activity type, to distinguish between particular institutionalized communicative 
practices in which argumentation plays a prominent role. The need to give a 
comprehensive account of communicative activities has encouraged researchers to look 
more closely at the environment of these events, more specifically, as Levinson 
sustains, at their ―structures‖ (Levinson, 1992: 70; italics in original). As a specific 
category of Levinson‘s activity types, argumentative activity types are, likewise, 
controlled by rules and conventions that are adapted to advance the realization of the 
goals that the arguers have as they engage in argumentative interactions in a more or 
less formal institutional context.  
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 Pragma-dialectics calls for the necessity of examining the activity type and the 
importance of the contextualized pragmatic analysis of discourse. This decision to link 
argumentation to its milieu is a reaction against the long and influential tradition of 
some disciplines such as logic and formal dialectics which by focusing on developing 
valid argumentation overlook the environments in which argumentation is generated 
and hence disregard the account of pragmatic provisions for the productions of 
arguments and positions. The aim is to give due consideration to the macro-context in 
which the communication takes place, namely the institutional purpose of holding such 
an activity and the norms and conventions that shape the participants‘ practices and 
precondition their maneuvering strategies. The characterization of the argumentative 
activity type generally determines the discourse domain of the activity, its genre 
(negotiation, deliberation, adjudication, mediation, etc.) and the institutional point it 
aims to realize in society (van Eemeren, 2010: 139). It then establishes the kinds of 
institutional conventions which constrain the strategic maneuverings of participants 
along the four stages of the ideal critical discussion.  
The constraints on the discourse establish preconditions for strategic maneuvering in the 
sense that they create particular opportunities for and limitations on strategic 
maneuvering. The type of interaction or activity influences the kind of standpoints 
advanced in a discussion, who will participate in the discussion, which means they use 
to reach their dialectical and rhetorical goals, and what rules the arguers must comply 
with (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005, 2006; van Eemeren, 2010). To give an 
argumentative characterization of op-ed piece, for instance, one needs to take into 
account how the resolution process develops in that particular communicative practice, 
and compare this with the ideal model. In this comparison, the following four focal 
points are taken into account, which correspond with the four stages of a critical 
discussion: the initial situation (confrontation stage), the procedural and material 
starting points (opening stage), the argumentative means (argumentation stage), and the 
outcome of the discussion (concluding stage) (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005, 2006; 
van Eemeren, 2010: 146). Based on these four points, the argumentative discourse in 
op-ed pieces can be systematically analyzed. 
Characterizing the activity type, according to Pragma-dialectics, facilitates the 
reconstruction of the argumentative exchanges and reconciles the institutional rules and 
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conventions with the ideal pragma-dialectic rules for reasonable argumentation. Indeed, 
for pragma-dialectics many features of argumentation may remain incomprehensible to 
an analyst without due contemplation of contextual conditions: 
The pragmatic grounding of argumentation in broader 
conversational activities is quite common. Arguments are frequently 
performed through speech acts other than simple assertives, and the 
argumentative force they have depends on the characteristics of the 
speech events in which they occur. Likewise, the standpoints that 
get expressed and taken up for argument have their sense and 
relevance established by the purposes of the activity in which they 
occur.  
(van Eemeren et al., 1993: 94)  
 
Based on these assumptions, the analysis of argumentation moves needs wider 
resources than the arguments themselves in order to identify the strategies which highly 
reflect the arguer´s rhetorical motives. Mohammed (2009) rightly points out, that ―the 
integration of institutional considerations into the analysis of argumentative exchanges 
is essential for an empirically adequate account of these exchanges‖ (171). Since 
communicative practices are context dependent, they are thus determined by a number 
of institutional preconditions. It is very useful to examine not only the set of primary 
preconditions for strategic maneuvering ―which are as a rule official, usually formal and 
often procedural, one should  also distinguish secondary preconditions, which are as a 
rule unofficial, usually informal and often substantial‖ (van Eemeren, 2010: 157). 
Indeed, it is necessary to situate the analysis and evaluation of argumentative strategies 
in the macro-context of the ―communicative activity type‖ in which the maneuvering 
occurs (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009: 2).  
 
By exploring the macro-context, background information is made available as a source 
of justification for argumentative analysis. This general background information 
includes knowledge of certain general rules, conventions and regulations that are 
instrumental in understanding the function of strategic moves (van Eemeren, 2011: 
145). Indeed, the pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation procedures start with 
identifying the function of the argumentative moves by determining how a particular 
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kind of speech acts creates certain sets of commitments for the participants from 
culturally shared resource of facts and values, which are mainly maneuvered with as 
starting points for the discussion and as premises for the arguments (see van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser 2006: 385, on the parameters for determining strategic functions of moves).  
  
The importance of contextualization lies in the fact that strategic maneuvering for 
pragma-dialecticians takes place in the real multi-varied communicative practices of 
people rather than an idealized critical discussion. The notion reflects the functioning of 
actual argumentative exchanges in genuine communicative situation. Therefore, 
determining the kinds of institutional norms and conventions as the preconditions 
necessary for carrying out certain strategic maneuvers should contribute to a more 
effective analysis of the strategic routes pursued by arguers. This endeavor is carried out 
in Chapter 5 where a characterization of the activity type of op-ed pieces issued on FP 
issues is advanced within the discussion of strategic maneuvering constrained by the 
experts´ different mindsets and the professional and ideological environments in which 
they operate in each culture.   
 
3. 5. The socio-cognitive approach and pragma-dialectics: common assumptions 
After expounding the theoretical frameworks informing the current research study, this 
section is aimed to account for the common assumptions these theories share and for the 
benefit of bringing them together in the current study of argumentative discourse. The 
two approaches agree on many basic theoretical issues despite the apparent differences 
they have and which are probably due to a difference in their research goals and focal 
interests. Pragma-dialectics specializes in argumentative discourse and picks up the 
traditional philosophical theories on argumentation in order to adapt them to the more 
contemporary research needs by integrating a pragmatic dimension into the traditional 
and purely dialectal approaches. The sociocognitive approach, by contrast, extends its 
focus to all discourse and text types, as is the case with most CDS approaches, and pays 
specific attention to the discursive practices of social group members, mainly those 
delineating (power) abuses. However, these two approaches have more in common than 
one can perceive at first glance. The most crucial common features are related to the 
multidisciplinary and the critical stance they both adopt in the analysis of discourse, 
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their emphasis on the pragmatic and interactional dimensions of discourse in their 
approaches and their agreement on the importance of the notions of context and 
relevance in the interpretation and the evaluation of the argumentative discursive 
practices of language users.   
   
The two theories apparently have different outlooks on some basic concepts. Pragma-
dialectics has very often defined argumentation as a ―complex speech act‖, something 
that may clash with the understanding of the main approaches to discourse studies. For 
the socio-cognitive approach, argumentation cannot be regarded as a speech act but 
rather as a superstructure of discourse. Superstructures are defined as the global 
structures that characterize a discourse type and depict its typical ―schematic nature: 
They consist of conventional categories, often hierarchically organized, that assign 
further structure to the various levels of discourse‖ (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983: 236). 
Disagreement over this basic concept may be considered fundamental despite the fact 
that van Dijk in some earlier work did view speech acts as characteristic of some 
discourse types, arguing that ―one of the bases for distinguishing different types of 
discourse such as narratives, argumentations, poems or advertisements, is the possibility 
of assigning one, simple or complex, macro speech act to the production of such a 
discourse‖ (van Dijk, 1977b: 243). The two positions, however, may not be 
incompatible but, probably, simply refer to argumentation from different perspectives, 
the semantic and the pragmatic. Indeed, van Dijk defines superstructures in relation to 
the semantic dimension of discourse postulating that they ―are schemata for 
conventional text forms; knowledge of these forms facilitates generating, remembering, 
and reproducing macrostructures (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983: 54), therefore, they are 
regarded here in schematic terms and not necessarily in a pragmatic or interactional 
way. Viewed pragmatically and from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, that is, as a 
critical discussion, the study of argumentation accounts for the specific properties of 
interaction such as the social relations between participants, while the study of grammar 
and style specifically focuses on form, and semantics focuses on meaning (van Dijk, 
2007). One may possibly argue, thus, that argumentation, or more precisely an 
argumentative exchange, points to a strategic implementation of a complex speech act 
(as in Pragma-dialectics), which participants perform purposefully and display within an 
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appropriate discourse ―superstructure‖ or schema (as in the sociocognitive approach) 
recognizable as argumentation.   
 
The sociocognitive approach to the critical study of discourse stresses the crucial role 
played by human cognition in discourse and regards it as the interface between social 
structures and discourse. For this reason, for van Dijk the major current theories of 
argumentation in general including pragma-dialectics delineate the ―neglect of a 
systematic theory of persuasive discourse that goes beyond the somewhat haphazardly 
chosen discourse properties (…), as well as the lack of a detailed cognitive processing 
theory‖(van Dijk 1990: 173). The lack of a cognitive dimension in argumentation 
theories makes the analysis then incomplete and the critical endeavor inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, pragma-dialectics despite this condition does not cast out insights from 
other disciplines that may be favorable for a more comprehensive study of 
argumentation. Indeed, van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004) argue that even though 
"there is no need to have a detailed knowledge of all cognitive processes that play a role 
in the interpretation of a discourse in order to be able to carry out an analysis based on 
externalized textual characteristics, (…) some insight into these processes, can of 
course, deepen the analysis‖ (p. 74). This assertion does not only indicate the method´ s 
recognition of the significant contribution of other research approaches to the 
advancement of argumentative studies, but also to the adoption of an interdisciplinary 
approach. Indeed, and as it has been mentioned in the above section on pragma-
dialectics, the theory combines normative idealization with insights emerging from 
empirical and socially oriented discourse analysis. This interest in the social dimension 
of discourse keeps it in tune with the sociocognitive approach which is particularly 
attentive to the ways discourse (re)produces social domination and injustice. The 
sociocognitive multidisciplinary approach to discourse draws on various theoretical and 
methodological tools from different disciplines, particularly the social representation 
theory (Mascovici, 2000) and cognitive theories (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; van 
Oostendorp & Zwaan, 1994; van Oostendorp & Goldman, 1999) in order to incorporate 
a detailed study of structures of text into an analysis of their social and cognitive 
contexts (van Dijk, 2006). 
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Under this context, both theories regard the contributions of other research disciplines 
as an advantage for a more grounded critical effort. Definitely, the critical mission 
undertaken by the sociocognitive approach is undeniably central in its long enterprise 
within the critical tradition of the problem-oriented CDS. The pragma-dialectical theory 
assumes a critical stance in the evaluation of argumentation and adopts a critical- 
rationalistic view on reasonableness drawing on work of the philosopher Karl Popper 
(1972). In spite of the fact that pragma-dialectics proposes an analytic framework which 
may have a heuristic or a critical function, the latter is prevalent in the research projects 
undertaken mainly in the late years owing to the growing interest in argumentative 
strategies and in uncovering the participants´  intentions and purposes behind them.      
One of the most prevailing common grounds in the two theories is their interest in 
discourse as a communicative event and their focus on the naturally occurring language 
use by real language users. Van Dijk defines discourse as a form of verbal interaction 
between participants (1997: 2). This definition, though it applies to any discourse type, 
is consistent with the pragma-dialectics view of  argumentative discourse as ―a verbal 
activity which takes place by means of language use (and) a social activity which as a 
rule directed at other people‖ (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 2). Furthermore, van 
Eemeren and his colleagues reject the strictly logical approaches which focus on 
argumentation as a product and urge for the study of argumentation as a discourse 
activity which occurs as part of natural language activities and has specific 
communicative goals. The two approaches, thus, agree that discourse should be viewed 
as an interactional activity within a communicative event and acknowledge the 
importance of the pragmatic dimension to discourse in the interpretation of the 
participants´ discursively strategic moves. 
These common assumptions on discourse as a communicative event and its pragmatic 
dimension have generated more or less comparable results in the progress of the two 
approaches theoretical framework. These results may be interpreted through their 
growing interest in context as a fundamental analytical level in the study of discourse. 
Despite the huge difference between the two theories on how this concept is defined- 
due to the sociocognitive breakup with the traditional definitions of contexts and the 
foundation of an innovative cognitive based theory- their special interest in context 
points to their engagement with the problems of ordinary language and their belief that 
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critical analysis is inconclusive without due consideration of contextual conditions. 
Pragma-dialectics´ interest in the rhetorical aspect of discourse consolidates the 
importance given to ordinary language use of argumentation and its strategic dimension 
(with the notion of strategic maneuvering). The theory extension to enclose the study of 
the strategic dimensions of argumentation allows for a more practical treatment of 
fallacies and more concern with the rhetorical motivations of arguers and their 
intentions and goals in adopting certain strategic routes. Therefore, context is integrated 
in the study of argumentation through the characterization of the activity types by 
identifying the institutional goals and rules which should precondition strategic 
maneuvering. This context is viewed as an ―objective, material reality‖ (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004: 11), which Van Dijk criticizes by arguing that contexts are not 
‗objective‘ or ‗deterministic‘ constraints of society or culture at all, but subjective 
participant interpretations, constructions or definitions of such aspects of the social 
environment (2006: 163). Hence, the characterization of the activity types involves the 
study of those social situation properties affecting interaction, while the sociocognitive 
approach looks at context as the participants´ subjective representation of the relevant 
aspects of situations and society which directly interfere in the mental processes of 
discourse production and comprehension (p. 163)  
 
3. 6. Summary  
This chapter introduced the main theoretical frameworks within which this research 
work was grounded, and these are the sociocognitive approach and social actor 
approach from CDS and the Pragma-dialectics from argumentation theory. The main 
tenets of these theories have been discussed. This was followed by an outline of these 
frameworks´ theoretical positions from the main concepts focused on this study: topics, 
context purposes and discursive strategies and their contextual conditions. The socio-
cognitive approach proposed by van Dijk was outlined in relation to relevant notions in 
this study. Indeed, his theories on ideology (1998a) and context (2008) constitute the 
main theoretical foundation of our study of the discourses of experts in op-ed pieces. 
The main axioms of this approach lies in the cognitive interface between discourse and 
society. Discourse and social structures are believed to be meditated by human 
cognition where the notion of mental models subjectively constructed by individuals is 
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key to understand the mechanisms involved in the discursive practices of social actors. 
Discourse is monitored by these mental models which equally intervene in the 
construction of context. The context and mental models individually and subjectively 
construed by participants extensively draw on socially- shared cognition, namely 
beliefs, culture and ideologies.  
All CDA approaches call for considering the multidisciplinary dimensions of discourse 
and the use of relevant methodologies to critically investigate various discursive 
practices in society. Pragma-dialectics was considered a valuable option in the study of 
the op-ed pieces argumentative discourse as it offers systematic analytic tools for the 
study of argumentative discourse and takes into consideration its pragmatic and 
communicative dimension which may be approached from a normative and descriptive 
perspective. Pragma-dialectics, as theory and method for argumentation analysis (Van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; 2004), views argumentation as ideally taking shape in a 
critical discussion in which argumentation aims at the reasonable resolution of a 
difference of opinion. The ideal model as a critical tool represents an instrument for the 
argumentation analyst when deciding about the communicative functions of speech acts 
and provides a standard for argument evaluation (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 
36). The ideal model of a critical discussion distinguishes four stages involved in 
resolution of the difference of opinion: confrontation, opening, argumentative and 
concluding stages.  
 
Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999) introduced notion of strategic maneuvering to bridge 
the gap between dialectic and rhetoric. Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts 
arguers make in argumentative discourse to reconcile aiming for rhetorical effectiveness 
with maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness (Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006: 
383). The theory urges for the study of the macro-context of each specific discourse as 
an argumentative activity type. Pragma dialectics, the argumentative moves and their 
functions are inspected in the light of the institutional preconditions constraining 
discursive practices. The final section of the chapter was devoted to explaining the 
motivations behind combining CDA and the socio-cognitive approach with Pragma-
dialectics in the study of the ideological structures in the argumentative discourse of 
foreign policy experts in the American and Arab op-ed pieces.   
91 
 
CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLGY 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
Chapter three outlined the major research frameworks the current research work draws 
upon in the cross-cultural analysis of ideological structures in the foreign policy 
experts´ media discourses. This chapter provides a detailed description of the 
methodology employed in the study which is organized as follows. Following this 
introduction, Section 4.2 presents the data, namely, the two op-ed corpora, the 
American and the Arab, the criteria for their selection. The section also outlines some 
preconditions for strategic maneuvering in op-ed argumentation in the two cultures, 
namely the newspapers´ participation norms and conventions for the submission of op-
ed pieces and the arguers‘ professional or political affiliations.  Finally, section 4.3 
outlines the method designed for the study and provides a detailed description of the 
analytic tools and the research procedures.  
 
4. 2. The data  
4. 2. 1. Data selection and collection procedure 
To examine and contrast the FP op-ed discourses in these two cultures in conflict, it has 
been important to establish a comparable set of criteria for data selection. First, all texts 
are opinion articles exclusively retrieved from sections referred to as: ―Op-ed‖ (opposite 
the editorial page), ―Columns‖ ―Commentary‖ or ―Opinion‖ depending on the way each 
paper names the section in which an article states a FP expert opinion produced by a 
regular columnist or a guest contributor about current international events. Second, the 
op-ed topics revolve around the issue of the ―Surge‖ in Iraq and more specifically, the 
so called ―New Way Forward‖ American policy implemented from late 2006 up to 
September 2007, the date in which General Petraeus –the Commander-in-chief 
deployed in Iraq to control the insurgency- was scheduled to report to Congress. The 
third criterion is that the selection of newspapers is based on their circulation ranking as 
of the 2007 newspapers circulation figures. This means that only op-ed pieces from the 
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top ten newspapers scoring highest in circulation were selected. Some correlation is 
conventionally established between scoring high in circulation and enjoying wide 
readership and prestige among news institutions. This condition is relevant at least for 
American and Arab media. This criterion is observed in order to limit the study to those 
op-ed pieces supposedly written by the top brass people in foreign policy matters and 
that they are published in newspapers with the highest national and international reach, 
hence those regarded as the most influential channels on public opinion.  
 
A total number of sixty op-ed pieces were selected from ten American and ten Arab 
newspapers with three op-ed pieces from each newspaper. They were retrieved from the 
―opinion‖, ―Op-ed‖, or ―columnists‖ sections of their electronic version, i.e. those 
which are made available for access through their official websites. Some of the texts 
were electronically collected from a website called ―Opinion Source‖ dedicated to 
bringing its customers ―national and world opinion‖ (cited from Opinion Source 2007). 
The site offers a free opinion article roundup through email membership and almost 
total access to full text articles. The op-ed pieces selected expose opinions and analyses 
of the Iraq war in the time period between late 2006 and September 2007. The sixty op-
ed piece data were arranged into two corpora (an American corpus and an Arab corpus) 
each consisting of thirty op-ed pieces. The Arab corpus exclusively includes English 
version articles, since these are meant to reach wider readership than in Arabic and they 
reflect the Arab FP experts positions intended to be expressed within an internationally 
shared debate space. The texts in the two corpora display an average length of 900 
words per op-ed piece. This amount is considered to be manageable by the researcher 
for conducting a detailed critical analysis of discursive strategies taken up by FP experts 
discussing the Iraq war. Table 4.1 and table 4. 2 below outline the data sources namely 
the American and Arab newspapers, which sump up to 20 newspapers (ten for each 
culture group. Three articles have been selected from every publication.  
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Table 4.1.  Top rated US papers in circulation. Source: Audit Bureau of circulations 
figures for 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2. Top rated Arab papers in English. Source: World Association of 
Newspapers. Circulation Reports 2007 
Newspaper/  Ranking   Place of Publication Circulation figures  
1. USA Today  Virginia 
2,528,437 
2. Wall Street Journal N.Y  New York City 
2,058,342 
3. New York Times, N.Y. New York City 
1,683,855 
4. Los Angeles Times  
Los Angeles, CA 
915,723 
5. New York Post  New York City 
724,748 
6. The Daily News –NY New York City 
718,174 
7. Washington Post Washington, DC. 
699,130 
8. Chicago Tribune Chicago, Ill 
566,827 
9. Houston Chronicle Houston, TX 
503,114 
10. The Boston Globe  Boston, MA 
477,425 
Newspaper/  Ranking  Place of Publication  Circulation figures  
1. Asharq Al Awsat Saudi/ London 248.482 
2.  Al Hayat Lebanese/London 234,000 
3.  Arab News Saudi/Riyadh 110,000 
4.  Gulf News 
United Arab Emirates 91,980 
5.  Al Ahram Egyptian/ Cairo 75.317 
6.  Azzaman Iraqi/ Baghdad 75.000 
7. Al Masry Alyoum Egyptian/Cairo 50.000 
8.  Arab Times Kuwaiti/Kuwait 34.000 
9.  Yemen Times Yemeni/ Sanaa 20.000 
10. Jordan Times  Jordanian/ Amman 15.000 
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The following subsection summarizes the main aspects related to the production of 
foreign policy opinion pieces in newspapers. These are concerned with describing 
institutional conditions, mainly the requirements set by the twenty newspapers for op-ed 
submissions, the professional and political profiles of the authors in the corpora and the 
institutional norms under which they operate.  
 
4. 2. 2. The authors´ profiles and their institutional goals 
Research was carried out on the arguers in the two data corpora in order to examine 
their respective professional background and political affiliations and to reach an 
essential understanding of the rules they go by in their activity. The following graph, 
(Figure 4.1) indicates findings from the inquiry undertaken on the authors´ backgrounds 
and the kinds of institutions they work for in both the American and the Arab corpora.  
 
 
  Figure 4.1. The professional profiles of the op-ed authors in the two data corpora  
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As indicated in the graph, there is a significant difference between the two op-ed 
corpora in the participants‘ profiles. The most striking one is the rate of arguers working 
for think tanks in the American corpus. This dissimilarity between the two groups may 
denote cultural differences between the US and the Arab countries in terms of the state 
of the art of foreign policy debate participation. Indeed, whereas more than half of the 
arguers (53.3%) in the American corpus are think tank pundits, only 13.3% of the 
arguers in the Arab corpus work for any such institutions. This implies that the opinion 
section in US newspapers tend to be highly exploited by experts who work for what are 
referred to as policy institutes, which are organizations that perform research and 
advocacy and focus on addressing political questions of national and international 
interest.  
In the Arab corpus, there are 6/30 analysts who are regular contributors for the opinion 
section on international affairs and 10/30 are guest contributors who in most cases are 
university professors. Indeed, international relations experts in Arab countries may be 
more commonly employed by news or academic institutions rather than by research 
institutes such is the case for American experts.  
 Another noteworthy difference between the two corpora is the involvement of Arab 
newspapers´ editors in the foreign policy opinion pages. This phenomenon is quite 
peculiar since the very reason for having an op-ed section in a newspaper - with op-ed 
being ―the opposite the editorial‖ page - is to display a perspective different from 
editorials which should have a reserved space in the publication. This is inexistent in the 
American op-ed corpora as newspapers publications make clear the difference between 
experts´ opinion contributions and their own editorial views.    
Regular columnists and opinion contributors hired by the newspapers have their share 
among both the US and Arab newspapers expert opinion cultures. Some newspapers 
tend to exclusively publish the opinions of only one columnist, usually proclaimed by 
the newspaper as the expert on international affairs related to some region or geographic 
area (e.g. the Middle East). This has been the case for the USA Today and New York 
Post from which the same expert is included more than once in the corpus due to this 
kind of institutional practice. Indeed, op-ed columnist Ralph Peters, a retired military 
officer and strategic analyst, is the only author of foreign policy-related issues and 
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seems to monopolize the opinion sections in both newspapers. Some other columnists 
are renowned for being regular analysts in the most prestigious newspapers all over the 
world. They are syndicated columnists and have established their own reputation 
through strong political views which proved popular over the years, such as Thomas 
Friedman (NY Times) and Charles Krauthammer (Washington Post) who have earned a 
highly regarded authority status on policy issues and are often consulted on extremely 
controversial and heated global issues. Other foreign policy experts are invited based on 
their knowledge in foreign relations, but more importantly sometimes on the privilege 
of holding first hand experiences in the matter through their trips to the battle fields in 
Iraq and their personal acquaintance or direct access to the facts. This institutional 
precondition is overtly declared by the Washington Post or Al Ahram.  
 
A number of op-ed authors in the two corpora may be recognized to exercise what is 
widely known as ―advocacy journalism‖. Even though most contributors to the opinion 
sections are not considered journalists, some do share the journalists profile in terms of 
the frequency with which they participate in media debates and the weight of their 
contributions and degree of their involvement in public debates. This kind of experts 
generally named ―pundits‖ may have different affiliations, but in the US they generally 
work for policy institutes, more known as Think Tanks. They seek to promote an image 
of themselves as one guided by the ideals of objectivity and public service and aiming at 
raising awareness, generating public debate, influencing public opinion, promoting 
policy and changes around specific issues.  
 
4. 2. 3. The institutional conditions in the two corpora 
The institutional conditions of the current data corpora along with the general 
institutional rules and conventions constraining FP experts´ debates in the media are 
expected to establish the preconditions for the discursive strategies and decisions 
undertaken by the experts in the policy debates and inform our interpretation of the data 
analysis (Chapters 6 and 7). These assumptions are based on the Pragma-dialectics´ call 
for the need to examine the institutional rules or conventions in each activity type and 
determine the kinds of opportunities or constrains they may create for the 
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argumentation/discussion participants when they strategically maneuver to maintain 
balance between their dialectical and their rhetorical goals. Such norms may be 
regarded as crucial conditions for the discursive construction of the political debate and 
particularly influential of the argumentative and pragmatic strategies adopted by the 
debate participants. Exploring the institutional preconditions for the productions of the 
op-ed pieces is as important as investigating the mindsets of the debate participants and 
the identification of the sociopolitical environment in which they operate. Both should 
provide essential insight and guidance to the interpretation of the kinds of cognitions 
interfacing their discursive practices and political actions.  This section presents the 
information made available by the various institutions involved in the production of the 
op-ed corpora under study, namely the criteria established by the newspapers for op-ed 
submission, the mission statements of the policy institutes, as in the institutions´ 
websites and the goals of the relevant political parties.    
 
 4. 2. 3. 1. Newspapers´ criteria for FP op-ed submission 
The newspapers´ conditions are the guidelines or norms explicitly expressed by the 
newspapers or implicitly recognized from their respective editorial standards and 
orientations as conditions for op-ed admission for publication. Tracking the rules 
established by the ten newspapers institutions in each culture group helps to clarify the 
boundaries under which the op-ed discourses were produced and delineates one of the 
most important contextual clues on their respective ideological inclinations.  
 
Guidelines for writing and for editorial acceptance of op-ed articles for publishing vary 
from an institution to another and more importantly from a culture to another. In the 
current data corpora, very few institutions make their opinion submission guidelines 
public or make other related rules visible in their websites. Indeed, most institutions in 
the two groups, especially the Arab ones, do not make their norms or selection criteria 
accessible to the audience. Three out of ten American newspapers expose their editorial 
conditions for opinion submission to their readers and these are the USA Today, the New 
York Times and the LA Times, while other newspapers either require readers to 
subscribe in order to learn about any editorial norms such is the case for Wall Street 
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Journal or do not disclose such norms to the public. As for the Arab corpus, only one 
newspaper, Al Ahram, states the prerequisites for op-ed admissions. All of the above 
mentioned newspapers in the two cultures articulate more or less the same aim for 
publishing FP op-ed pieces. They all emphasize the newspapers´ commitment to 
offering a space for the world‘s top experts and practitioners from international affairs, 
global defense and national security areas to give insights into breaking global events 
and emerging trends. This practice is implicitly assumed by the remaining number of 
media institutions in the American and Arab corpora, as could be deduced from the 
biographical information usually provided on the op-ed authors denoting expertise in FP 
related careers. Information on the authors is usually included in the byline displaying 
their political or professional positions or the field of their exceptional experience. 
 
Most media institutions openly disclaim any link between the contributors´ views and 
their own views even if they seem to allude to their guests´ objective handling of 
political issues despite the label ―opinion‖ label bearing of personal and subjective 
touch. Some institutions are inclined to publish an op-ed that disagrees with their own 
editorial views such is the case for the LA Times and New York Times. The LA Times, 
for instance, asserts that ―the page itself has no ideological bent or political agenda; we 
want to provide the broadest possible range of opinions — from the left, from the right 
and, we hope, from authors whose politics are much harder to pigeonhole‖. This policy 
may be appreciated in the three opinion pieces selected from this publication which are 
produced by experts exhibiting opposing positions over the policies to adopt in Iraq 
(related to different political party ideologies). Alternatively, some newspapers seek to 
attract readership by ―clashing opinions‖ relying on authors´ ―ingenuity‖ (New York 
Times), provocative style or by ―stimulating some kind of intellectual engagement with 
the subject‖ (LA Times). Other invite expert guests to offer solutions to highly 
controversial and heated global issues not only based on their expertise in FP but more 
importantly sometimes on the privilege of holding first hand experiences in the matter 
through their trips to the battle fields in Iraq and their personal acquaintance or direct 
access to the facts. This institutional precondition is overtly declared by some papers 
such as the Washington post or Al Ahram Weekly.  
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The three Arab newspapers with the largest circulation surprisingly follow an 
unexpected policy in publishing opinion pieces or columns about world current issues. 
Indeed, in Asharq Al Awsat, Dar Al Hayat and Arab News largely known as the most 
widely read papers in the world, four out of nine opinion pieces are written by editors or 
chief editors, something considered contradictory and atypical in worldwide journalistic 
standards, since the editors´ opinion is commonly produced in the editorial section. This 
is a peculiar phenomenon for the three newspapers which presumably enjoy the highest 
circulation rates and an international prestige as Arab media sources. They are 
published and distributed in London and many other major Arab and European capital 
cities. Both Ashraq Al Awsat and Arab News are among the huge media networks 
owned by the Saudi Kingdom Holding and funded by one of the richest Arabs in the 
world, namely Al Waleed Bin Talal, while Dar Al Hayat which is considered a rival 
paper to Asharq Al Awsat, is the property of Prince Khalid Bin Sultan. Definitely, they 
are all owned and controlled by Saudi royal family members, a regime notorious for its 
censorship - mainly since the 1990s – and for the prosecution of newspapers and 
journalists in many Arab countries for any unfavorable coverage of Saudi affairs (World 
Audit, 2011).  
 
4. 2. 3. 2. Think tanks´ mission statements and politicians´ goals 
The rules and conventions constraining the op-ed pieces are not typically uniform and 
not only depend on the media institutions but also on the types of institutions and 
professional setting to which the experts are affiliated, namely political parties, think 
tanks and academic institutions. This sub section hence explores the norms established 
by the policy institutes, first in the American then in the Arab corpus.  Think tanks turn 
out to be the very institutions in the two corpora which explicitly state their goals in 
producing the FP op-ed pieces. Even though not all think tanks provide equal 
opportunities for access to their norms for the general public, the rules and norms may 
in some cases be (informally) appreciated and interpreted from the discursive postures 
and behaviors of the FP practitioners.  
Since more than half of the experts in the American corpus are employed by policy 
research institutions (think tanks), the mission statements of these major think tanks 
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were examined in order to learn about the key goals of the institutions for which a good 
majority of American authors in this corpus work. Below, Table 4.3 displays the most 
prominent op-ed pieces authors´ associated institutions and a summary of the 
assignments they undertake as research institutions. These missions are stated in their 
respective websites and list the main tasks and concerns of the business they undertake.    
Think tank / expert  General mission Foreign policy mission/agenda 
Brookings  
 
Michael O‘Hanlon   
conduct high-quality, independent 
research and, based on that research, to 
provide innovative, practical 
recommendations 
secure a more open, safe, prosperous 
and cooperative international system 
The Institute for the Study 
of War 
Kimberly Kagan  
advance an informed understanding of 
military affairs through reliable research, 
trusted analysis, and innovative education. 
improve the nation‘s ability to execute 
military operations and respond to 
emerging threats in order to achieve 
U.S. strategic objectives 
Center for Strategic and 
International Studies CSIS 
Edward Luttwak 
provide strategic insights and bipartisan 
policy solutions to help decision makers 
chart a course toward a better world. 
dedicated to finding ways to sustain 
American prominence and prosperity as 
a force for good in the world 
Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR)  
Max Boot 
be a resource for its members, 
government officials (…) other interested 
citizens  
help better understand the world and the 
foreign policy choices facing the United 
States and other countries.  
takes no institutional positions on 
matters of policy 
Heritage Foundation 
 
Peter Brookes 
formulate and promote conservative 
public policies based on the principles of 
free enterprise, limited government, 
individual freedom, traditional American 
values, and a strong national defense. 
promote America´s role in the role in 
the world  
―Because of its dedication to the 
universal truths of equality and liberty, 
this country has a responsibility to 
uphold the cause of freedom abroad‖ 
 
Forum of International 
Policy 
Brent Scowcroft 
strive to add their voice to public debate address humanitarian intervention 
The Hoover Institution 
Steve Huntley  
generate and disseminate ideas directed at 
positive policy formation (…) converting 
conceptual insights into practical policy 
initiatives judged to be beneficial to 
society 
dynamically point the road to peace, to 
personal freedom and to the safeguards 
of the American system. 
International Crisis Group  
Robert Malley  
work on conflict prevention and resolution 
by combining field-based analysis, 
practical policy prescriptions and high-
level advocacy  
assist policymakers determine how best 
to handle Islamist terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, impunity for international 
crimes, trafficking in arms and drugs 
and problems associated with conflict-
prone states.  
Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies  
Clifford D. May  
provide cutting-edge research, 
investigative journalism and public 
education - transforming ideas into action 
and policy. 
help free nations defend themselves. 
MIT Center for 
International Studies  
Barry P. Posen  
conduct research in a wide range of 
international subjects, among them 
international relations, security studies, 
and international science and technology. 
bridge the worlds of the scholar and the 
policymaker  on issues related to 
military tactics and interventions, inter-
state conflicts, sub-state violence 
(terrorism, insurgency and civil war)   
Table 4. 3. American think tanks´ mission statements and specific FP statements  
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In spite of their political diversity, the list of the mission statements produced by the 
think tanks in foreign policy displays a common goal- which is shared by virtually all 
institutions. This goal is the institutions´ dedication to carrying out public debate on 
foreign policy projects and decisions. The reason behind the consensus about this goal 
is their commitment to holding themselves responsible in society for the 
accomplishment of democratic principles. Their responsibilities expressed in different 
ways such as ―dissemination of information and analysis, ―promoting constructive 
debate‖ and ―clarifying world issues‖ certainly share the same feature, that of being a 
knowledge resource for citizens. Consequently, this goal seems to be shedding on their 
participation in the debate a sense of interest-free condition. In fact, being mostly non-
profit and research oriented organizations probably exonerates them from a 
straightforward adherence to profit industry.  
The audience of a FP debates (or the public) may more easily recognize the features of 
the politicians‘ duties than the work of FP experts in policy institutes or elsewhere. 
Indeed, these duties are perceived as political work and closely associated with the 
politician´s party agenda and its creed. Those politicians invited to submit their opinions 
on foreign policy events and issues are expected to faithfully transmit their party´s 
position and decisions on these issues. Even though their positions may equally be as 
scientifically founded as those of professional foreign policy, they are generally 
regarded as inclined by the political interests of the party leaders.   
A highly significant rate in the American op-ed corpus is produced by politicians. 
Indeed thirty percent (30%) of the arguers are political figures from various political 
parties. Officially their opinions do not reflect the newspapers views or positions, which 
is why these newspapers tend to publish to politicians from diverse political parties and 
factions and hence guarantee the popularity and readership for their section. The current 
main disagreement point in the political debates of opposed parties was whether to stay 
in Iraq or to withdraw troops from it. The governing administration of G.W Bush 
partisans mostly call for staying the course in Iraq and continuing the fight to 
accomplish the foremost aim of eradicating terrorism. Politicians like Joseph Lieberman 
Tony Snow fervently support the Surge and the claim for progress in Iraq is easily 
interpreted as a reproduction of the ideological views of the Bush administration and 
their obstinacy for declaring victory in Iraq.  
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In the case of Arab opinion pieces in the media, the activity type undertaken by Arab 
experts seems to observe different rules and conventions which are generally less 
accessible and hard to define for outsiders, but probably easy to interpret from the 
political environment in which they are produced. The fact that 20% of the experts are 
state spokesmen is also revealing as well as the use of newspapers editors to the opinion 
sections. The authoritarian regimes provide a different panorama on the institutional 
rules and norms which may in this case be guessed as abiding by censorship. Analyst 
and guest contributors who are not officially recognized as state spokespeople are also 
suspected to be working under the same institutional conditions of censorship. These 
conditions have been more extensively explored in chapter 4 discussing the mindsets 
constraining the discursive strategies of experts in the Arab culture.  
Apart from the experts directly and overtly working under the institutional rules and 
conventions of their respective governments, there are other institutions which are 
probably indirectly controlled by the authoritarian states. These are academic and 
research institutions such as policy institutes or think tank. This type of institution is a 
newly introduced phenomenon in the current time Arab world. Indeed, it is not until the 
late 2000 that such institutions have started to operate in Arab states and most are 
partnerships or franchises of American most powerful think tanks such as Saban Center 
for Middle East policy property of Brookings institution, the number one most 
influential American think tank and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 
Lebanon. These US linked think tanks are certainly not only expected to be abiding by 
American standards and rigor for carrying policy analyses but also suspected for 
obeying to the US visions and interests of inter-state relations in the Middle East or at 
least that what is widely deemed in Arab public opinion.  
Further research on the current Arab op-ed corpus authors allows us to ascertain that no 
more than 4 authors (13.33% of the total experts) work for some policy institute. 
Indeed, three out of four think tank analysts are associated to the Al Ahram Center for 
Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) Egypt. The Al Ahram, being one of the oldest 
newspapers in the Arab world, has a prestigious position in the Egyptian and Arab 
media, even though working under a system of government control.  
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Think tank / expert General mission Foreign policy mission/agenda 
 Al Ahram Center for 
Political and Strategic 
Studies (ACPSS) Egypt/ 
Galal Nasser  
Amr El Chobaki  
M. H. Khalesi 
focuses on developmental issues of 
the international system, interactive 
trends between Arab countries and 
the international system 
maintains complete independence in 
directing its research activities on 
international and strategic issues 
 
Gulf Research Center 
Akif Jamal  
Conducts objective and scholarly 
research bearing on political, 
economic, security, environment and 
science issues, as they relate to the 
geopolitical region of the Gulf in 
general.  
Looks first at the critical issues for 
each program in the Gulf countries. 
Providing non-partisan, in depth and 
trustworthy research and knowledge 
about the region 
  Table 4. 4. Arab Think tanks mission statements and specific FP statements 
Table 4.4 shows how  the ACPSS (above mentioned) founded by Al Ahram publication 
house proclaims to make an effort to present the public information resources based on 
research studies on various domestic and international issues and following a more up-
to-date state of the art news analysis. The Gulf research center also claims rigor and non 
partisanship in its analysis of the political events, and this rule is observed  in Akif 
Jamal´s op-ed piece to an extent that his contribution may be classified more as a piece 
of news than a piece of opinion as no standpoint may be identified along his opinion 
column.  
 
4. 3. Research method and procedures  
The study of the op-ed discourses adopts a CDA stance for examining the op-ed 
discursive constructions and argumentation strategies by drawing primarily on the 
Pragma-dialectical method and combining it with analytic tools from classical rhetoric 
and also from critical discourse analysis, those proposed by van Dijk (2008) for the 
study of context and by van Leeuwen (2008) to the analysis of discursive construction 
of purposes. Pragma-dialectics assisted in the management of the current study data and 
prepared them for the critical analysis. The research procedures consisted of the 
following steps, as illustrated in table 4.5 below. Based on Pragma-dialectics, in the first 
step a preliminary analysis was carried out. The next step consisted of analyzing the 
discursive constructions decisions of the arguers. This step consisted of examining: 1) 
the selection of topics  and the enactment of context using the analytic tools proposed 
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by van Dijk (2008) and inspecting the construction of purposes following Van Leeuwen 
(2008). The last research step consisted of the identification of the argumentative 
strategies, their evaluation as discourse moves and the inspection of their ideological 
implications. This has integrally relied on pragma-dialectic model and its notion of 
strategic maneuvering.    
Analytic step Procedures 
Step I  Preliminary analysis The critical stage  
Critical discussion reconstruction  
Analytic overview 
Preconditions for strategic maneuvering  
Step II   Analysis of discursive 
construction decisions 
 
Topic selection  
Context  
Purpose in actions 
Step  III  Argumentative strategies  Strategic maneuvering  
Fallacies  
Table 4. 5.  Analytic steps and procedures   
 
4. 3. 1. Preliminary analysis of the corpora  
Following the analytic framework of pragma-dialectics, a preliminary analysis to the 
data was initiated. This consisted of identifying the critical stages of each op-ed piece, 
reconstructing the critical discussions, elaborating an analytic overview and finally 
examining the institutional  
 
The sixty text data corpora were examined taking the single opinion piece as a unit of 
analysis viewed following van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004) as the ―critical 
discussion‖. In each critical discussion, the four discussion stages meant to resolve a 
difference of opinion were distinguished:  1) the confrontation stage commonly used to 
define the difference of opinion between participants; 2) the opening stage involving the 
starting points established by participants and the agreements they established upon the 
rules of the discussion along the propositions to be use in their argumentation; 3) the 
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argumentation stage: in which the protagonist defends his/her standpoint by putting 
forward arguments to counter the antagonist‘s objections or doubt; 4) the concluding 
stage is identified by locating where the discussion parties evaluate to what extent their 
initial difference of opinion has been resolved and in whose favor. After the 
identification of discussion stages, a reconstruction of argumentation is mainly realized 
for the purpose of identifying unexpressed statements or premises and facilitating the 
reorganization of the critical stages according to the pragma- dialectical ideal model.  
 
The analysis proceeded with a reconstruction of the sixty critical discussions making up 
the two data corpora. The reconstruction involved the following: first, examining the 
points at issue and the procedural and material points of departure chosen; second, 
identifying the arguments whether explicitly expressed or left unexpressed and 
determine their schemes and overall structures; third, realizing the necessary 
transformation to each text. This transformation consisted in making necessary 
deletions, additions, substitutions and permutations in the text. Deletion is the removal 
of irrelevant parts of the discussion. Addition is the inclusion of the relevant parts made 
implicit by the arguer like the unexpressed premises or standpoints. Substitution is 
replacing vague formulations by clear ones and permutation is rearranging parts of the 
text that best bring their relevance to the resolution process. Reconstructing the op-ed 
pieces prepared the data for higher level inspections from the different theoretical 
frameworks.  
The analytic overview constituted the basis for a critical analysis and evaluation of the 
discursive construction of the op-ed pieces and their argumentative strategies.  
Producing an analytic overview for each of the sixty op-ed pieces or ―critical 
discussions‖ required doing the following: 1) clarifying the difference of opinion at 
issue, determining the standpoints and the positions of the participants (the op-ed 
authors and their audience); 2) identifying the premises which serve as the starting 
points and assumptions in the discussions, 3) identifying the discussion arguments 
implicitly or explicitly advanced, determining the argument schemes employed and 
categorizing them into their scheme types; and recreating the argumentation structure 
constructed, 4) finally, identifying the conclusion reached. Filling in an analytic 
overview template constituted a very useful research step since it provided a sort of an 
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outline or summary of the most important content of a critical discussion relevant to 
analysis.  
Finally, the focus goes to contextualization in the institutionalized communicative 
activity type. By examining the institutions, we focus both on the professional – here 
foreign policy analysis in the media- and the broader socio-political ideologies relevant 
in both the American and the Arab cultural contexts. Drawing on Pragma-dialectical 
method, the macro-context of the FP op-ed pieces, namely the FP experts´ mindsets and 
their institutional conventions forming the preconditions for the experts´ argumentative 
strategies are explored focusing on three main points. Fist, the institutional point for 
publishing FP op-ed pieces and their discourse domain are discussed. Experts come 
from different professional backgrounds and have different aims, mainly those 
instantiated by their respective endorsing institutions. Second, the FP op-ed piece as a 
communicative activity type is characterized argumentatively by describing the 
distinctive features of the empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical 
discussion in the activity type concerned. Third, the FP experts´ mindsets and their 
nation/states´ political and ideological resources are explored and their role in creating 
the preconditions for strategic maneuvering in each culture is determined. These 
mindsets create the main resources for the experts´ strategic maneuvering with 
audiences´ commitments and for maneuvering with starting points in the op-ed pieces.  
 
4. 3. 2. Analyzing the discursive construction decisions 
This part focuses on answering research question 1 concerned with finding out how the 
Iraq debate was defined by the op-ed authors. More specifically, the focus was on a 
number of discursive constructions which could be highly indicative of the ideologically 
based decisions of the op-ed authors, namely their selection of topics, their definition of 
context and their construction of purposeful actions. Examining the ideological 
underpinnings of the selection of topics in op-ed discourses draws in major part on 
discourse analytic and rhetorical tools while the analysis of discursive construction of 
context and purpose rely consecutively on van Dijk´ s theory of context models (2008) 
and on van Leeuwen´ s framework on the discursive recontextualization (2008). The 
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findings from this analysis are reported and discussed in chapter 6. Research adopted 
the following analytic procedures:  
 
Topic selection  
Based on Van Dijk‘s sociocognitive approach, the selection of topic as a prominent 
discursive construction decision was examined by looking at the op-ed piece semantic 
macrostructure (Van Dijk 2000). This involves locating the macroproposition derived 
from sequences of micro- propositions in each op-ed text. This requires the use of some 
rules for semantic inference for its extraction. This task was monitored in the 
―reconstruction‖ of the texts involving the transformation realized mainly that of adding 
the relevant parts of the made implicit by the arguers such as unexpressed premises, 
presupposed propositions and implicit assertions. In this process, the implicit 
propositions which constituted macro propositions were identified and verbalized: 
Given the argumentative nature of the texts, these macro-propositions making up the 
semantic macrostructures of texts were at the same the macro speech acts indicating the 
arguers´ intended actions in the discourse such as warning, predicting or asserting. They 
were hence the standpoints, the arguers´ main positions in advancing argumentation. 
These standpoints were tackled here from a semantic perspective that is, focusing on 
their semantic content by grouping them under similar themes. They were similarly 
looked at from a pragmatic perspective and they were categorized based on the goals 
realized in producing them. The op-ed standpoints were classified according to their 
goals and their frequencies in the corpora.   
Both the variety of themes and goals are indicative of the scope of the disagreement 
spaces relevant in the debate on Iraq. This means that by classifying texts into similar 
themes, it becomes easier to delineate the range of positions addressed in the debate in 
general and not only those in the corpora, given the fact that the very standpoints evoke 
a number of counter positions. The classification of the semantic macro structures and 
their pragmatic dimensions all support the task of determining from which disagreement 
spaces the standpoints had been selected and which spaces did not take part in the 
debate. This step also allowed contrasting the disagreement spaces in the two arguers 
groups and determining what topics come high in the agenda of each cultural group. 
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The size of the corpora was considered empirically capable of determining the 
ideological explanation behind the arguers´ main decisions in constructing the debate.   
In order to reinforce the conclusions drawn from the op-ed themes and goals on the 
ideological dimensions of topic selections, the standpoints were handled from the 
perspective of classical rhetoric. Two analytic tools were used to inspect the 
perspectives from which topics were dealt with and explain the reason behind these 
positions. The first tools draws on the oratory type theory, according to which the macro 
propositions (or standpoints) in each data corpus were categorized into one of three 
oratory types: judicial (accusations), deliberative (decision making), or epideictic (moral 
evaluation). The oratory types in the two cultural groups were counted and the results 
were contrasted. The second analytic tool used to examine topics was based on stasis 
theory. This task involved finding the different possible perspectives and options with 
which the authors identified the issues for argumentation. Accordingly, the standpoints 
were classified into one of the four types of stases: conjectural (bringing the issue to 
judgment), definitional ((re)defining the issue), qualitative (defending or attacking some 
already contested issue) and translative (deciding the issue should be judged somewhere 
else). Based on the assumption that the stasis is a sort of vantage point from which an 
issue is viewed, determining the type of stasis in each critical discussion (text) offers 
reliable insight on the ideological strategies manifest in discourse and strengthens our 
understanding to the arguers´ motive for making certain topical choices when bringing 
an issue to discussion. 
The collection of these research tools employed to examine the op-ed topics, namely 
identification of semantic and pragmatic macro structures, oratory types and stases were 
used to identify the disagreement spaces from which the topics were selected and reveal 
the patterns in with which arguers in the two cultural groups define and construct the 
debates on the Iraq issue.  
 
Analysis of context models  
The next construction decision examined in the op-ed debate on Iraq is context as ―the 
participants‘ subjective definition of the relevant dimensions of the social situation‖ 
(Van Dijk 2008). Contexts are cognitively constructed mental models and their analysis 
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is concerned with the pragmatic dimension of discourse. The current study focuses on 
two schematic categories of context, namely those of Setting and Participants. In 
setting, text analysis was carried out exploring the pragmatic dimension of place, which 
is the interpretation of the arguers´ sociopolitical, cultural or geographical place in 
relation to the event constructed. Therefore, the texts were coded for those discursive 
structures indicating the arguers´ definition of the debate location. The findings from the 
analysis of the two data corpora were later contrasted.  
The contextual schematic category of participants was examined throughout the 
discourse in order to locate those structures in which the arguers enact their professional 
and political identities and their roles and relationships with other participants in the 
communicative event. Participants´ self definitions are tracked down in those discourse 
properties signaling the arguers´ expression of identities and those types of identities 
were counted and categorized into similar identity type groups. Those discursive 
structures or properties signaling roles and relationships as participants‘ context 
categories were examined in the same way. The pragmatic dimension of the textual 
structures was the focus and those structures in which arguers seemed to enact their 
relationships with others and their roles as participants in the communicative event were 
counted and categorized under similar category groups.    
The research carried out on the arguers´ professional backgrounds and official political 
and ideological affiliations points to the amplitude of opportunities the arguers have in 
terms of political identity owing to their multiple institutional affiliations or the variety 
of their political activities. For this reason, it becomes very interesting to examine their 
context constructions in discourse to determine the discursive choices they make which 
may be controlled by their ideologically biased mental models. Hence despite this 
variety and sometimes complex set of identities to choose from, the arguers seem to 
limit their identity enactment to an easily interpretable/ identifiable one or set of 
identities, probably the one(s) they judge most relevant to the current discussion. 
Therefore, the examination of these identity construction choices allows the recognition 
of the variations in self and the identification of the impact these choices may have on 
the discursive or more precisely argumentative strategies adopted by them.  
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Analysis of discursive construction of purpose in actions  
The next area explored in the debate constructions realized by the op-ed authors in these 
data corpora are the purposive actions. A discursive analysis of how actions and their 
purposes were discursively constructed was carried out based on the framework 
proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). I used the tools proposed in this framework for 
critically analyzing modes of representing the purposes of social actions as they are 
controlled by the arguers´ contextual models and the kind of social cognition they draw 
on in their discursive construction of purposes of these actions and of social practices in 
general. Actions as expressed in the main propositions of each text, namely the 
standpoints and sub-standpoints were examined and categorized into one of three main 
types of actions: 1) the goal-oriented type where actions have explicit agents and are 
activated. Agents in this type are ―discursively empowered as intentional‖ Van Leeuwen 
(2008: 127) 2) the means oriented in which purpose is constructed as ―in the action‖ and 
is generally objectivated mainly by the use of nominalization and 3) the effective type 
which are discursively constructed as results or as not controlled by those who perform 
them. After categorization, a critical interpretation of the results was meant to expose 
any patterns which might be manifested in the discursive constructions of the op-ed 
texts and point to any discrepancies between the two arguers´ groups.    
 
4. 3. 3. Analyzing the argumentation strategies  
The final research stage focuses on answering the second main research question by 
inspecting ideologies within the argumentative strategies employed by the op-ed authors 
in their debate on Iraq. Adopting a critical discursive approach, the analysis was carried 
out on the two text corpora based on the Pragma-dialectic method and mainly drawing 
on the notion of strategic maneuvering. Strategic maneuverings in the corpora were 
identified, classified and evaluated following Pragma-dialectic normative method and 
the dialectic rules it established. The interpretation of ideologies enacted within these 
maneuvers was informed by the research carried out on the FP experts´ institutional 
rules and conventions which might control and precondition the strategic fabric of their 
argumentative discourse. The findings are reported and discussed in chapter 7.  
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Identifying Strategic Maneuverings  
The analysis and classification of strategic maneuvering picks up from the preliminary 
data preparation stage which consisted of identifying the four dialectical stages in the 
argumentative texts (critical discussions), implementing their reconstruction and 
elaborating their analytic overviews. These have been essential steps before proceeding 
to the task of determining the kinds of strategic maneuverings employed by the writers 
and through which they attempted to gear the text towards the most effective results and 
towards resolving the difference of opinion to their maximum benefits. 
At this point, the data were examined for the kinds of strategic maneuvering performed. 
The notion of strategic maneuvering worked as a connecting point between the 
dialectical purpose of the arguer and his/her rhetorical aims. The reason for the 
integration of this notion relies on the fact that the pragma-dialectical perspective 
extends the traditional normative logical approach of evaluating arguments by creating 
standards for reasonableness that have a functional, rather than a structural, focus. An 
argument is evaluated in terms of its usefulness in moving a critical discussion toward 
resolution rather than concentrating on the relationship of premises to conclusions.   
In the process of strategic maneuvering analysis, it was necessary to identify the 
dialectical and the rhetorical goals involved in the various stages of each critical 
discussion (that is each text). The identification of these goals relied on a number of 
analytic tools mainly that of reconstructing the main premises in each discussion.  The 
reconstructed text helped identify the maneuvers used strategically in argumentation. 
This involved: 1) determining the discursive moves pertaining to each critical stage 2) 
identifying the moves which are advanced strategically by the arguers to fulfill their 
rhetorical and dialectical goals, 3) categorizing these moves according to their level of 
maneuvering, that is either as maneuvering of topical potential, adjustment to the 
audience or an attempt to make the best use of presentational devices. These operations 
were realized for each critical stage and strategies were identified as follows.  
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The confrontation stage  
In the confrontation stage, maneuvering was examined basically by linking the 
confrontational topics into the general disagreement spaces from which they were 
selected to see how this particular choice was adapted to the audience as well as how it 
was verbalized.. This was made feasible thanks to the size of the data corpora- being 
sixty texts- which was estimated as sufficient for an empirical study and for tracking 
down the topical choices available to the debate participants. The analysis started with 
examining the collection of standpoints and identifying the background against which 
these positions were adopted. This involved grouping the positions which belonged to 
similar disagreement contexts and points of departure into a topic area. The collections 
of topic areas resulting out of this task gave a basic idea about the boundaries of the 
disagreement space for each group community. In the confrontation stage where arguers 
engage in introducing their positions within the relevant context and background, the 
collection of possible counter positions (referred to in Pragma-dialectics as the virtual 
positions) may be discerned thanks to an extensive inspection of the war debate from 
the data corpora themselves. In the case where an arguer refutes a counter argument, the 
space becomes even easier to determine for the analyst, since the standpoints are 
explicitly advanced against some opposing views hence stated within the discussion 
itself. 
 
The opening stage 
In the opening stage, strategic maneuvering was examined by looking at the way 
dialectical roles are distributed among the argumentation discussion participants and the 
kinds of assumptions established as starting points for discussion. The first task 
consisted of reviewing the analytic reviews elaborated earlier and annotating the roles 
adopted by the arguers and the roles they allocated to the participants. More important 
was identifying the audience addressed and the one(s) who seemed to be excluded from 
participation in the discussion and also detecting cases of manipulations of participants‘ 
roles.  The second task was concerned with identifying the propositions (explicit and 
implicit) that function as starting points and which are meant to be common ground and 
non disputable. These propositions were then classified into themes in order to be linked 
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to the concepts (or values) meant to establish by such strategic choice. The themes 
under which these assumptions were grouped highly reflect the ideological reference 
point of the arguer and the shared beliefs his/her assumptions are drawn from.  
 
The argumentation stage  
In order to identify maneuvers in the argumentative stage, the focus was placed on the 
main arguments in the corpora for the aim to identify the most prominent strategies 
employed in argument invention (location) and disposition (building) according to the 
canon of rhetoric. The strategies examined were those developing the lines of arguments 
known as the loci and they entail finding out how arguments translate into ideas, while 
the analysis of arguments disposition/content involved looking at topoi, being the 
premises taken as common knowledge and employed to provide evidence for 
arguments. In the absence of a theoretical typology for the types of strategic 
maneuverings, the present study relied on the notion of loci in determining the 
categories under which the maneuvers should be classified. This decision was motivated 
first by the belief that ―arguments begin by decisions regarding how to construct and 
present them‖ (Tindale, 2007: 8) and second by the fact that arguments loci are places 
from which arguments can be discovered or invented. They are basic categories of 
relationships among ideas, each of which can serve as a template or heuristic from 
which many individual arguments can be constructed (Rhetoricae 2003). The main 
purpose of this endeavor is to dissect argumentation procedures used by each group of 
arguers and identify the patterns- if possible- involved in their respective reasoning 
processes by looking at the routes they take in developing their arguments and the type 
of support they use in consolidating them. 
 
The concluding stage 
Examining maneuvering in the concluding stages required identifying the moves 
advanced to define the outcome of the difference of opinion resolution process pursued 
by the participants and in this case, determine the author´s appreciations and say on the 
matter. The moves may indicate the authors´ power positions as participants in the 
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debate and the judgment they cast on their own participation and impoliticly or 
explicitly on other parties´ roles and position.   
After identifying the maneuvers at each of the four critical stages (confrontation, 
opening, argumentation and concluding) and determining the kinds of rhetorical goals 
prompting their use, the maneuvers were labeled based on the function of the goals 
pursued in using them. This task was particularly difficult to implement, as Pragma-
dialectics does not offer any typology for strategic maneuvering and instead relies on 
labeling the strategies based on the goals meant to be achieved by such maneuvers. 
These goals were critically approached and linked to the kind of ideological goal 
pursued by the arguers. The two corpora strategic maneuvers were contrasted and their 
ideologically motivated strategic choices were critically interpreted. 
 
Strategic maneuvering derailment 
Finally, strategic maneuvering was evaluated for soundness to detect fallacies, regarded 
as derailment of strategic maneuvering. The argumentative moves were checked for 
logical and pragmatic inconsistencies and fallacies were identified and discussed in 
terms of their significance in the reproduction of ideologies in discourse. In order to 
identify fallacies, argumentation was scrutinized according to the rules for critical 
discussion proposed by Pragma-dialectics.   
 
4. 4. Summary 
This chapter has provided a discussion of the research methodology used in the study. It 
starts with outlining the main research questions addressed and the goals for carrying 
out in this research study. This is followed by an account on the data used for the study 
namely, opinion articles (or op-ed pieces) issued in American and Arab major 
newspaper dealing with the issue of the Iraq Surge during 2007 and the international 
debate on the US policies in Iraq. The section outlines the criteria for data selection and 
collection and the institutional conditions behind their production by providing a 
description of the newspapers´ op-ed submission criteria, the arguers‘ professional 
profiles and the institutional rules under which they work. Information on the conditions 
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for the data production has been regarded useful for the analytic task related to strategic 
maneuvering (see chapter 7), as it sustains the interpretation of strategic maneuvering 
and regards the role of the institutional norms as the main pre-conditions for strategic 
choices in argumentation. Following that, there is a detailed outline of the research 
design and the analytic tools. Based on the two frameworks adopted in the analysis of 
some discursive decisions such as topic selection, context, and purposeful actions 
constructions and the inspection of ideological strategies of FP arguers, the research 
procedures are explained and the steps followed at each stage are stated. The 
methodology relied on the sociocognitive approach (van Dijk, 2008) and CDA as a 
main stance,  pragma-dialectics as an reputable method for argumentation analysis and 
evaluation, as well as analytic tools from classical rhetorical theory (oratory types and 
stasis) and the social actors´ approach proposed by van Leeuwen (2008) and his 
recontextualization of social practice theory on discourse. 
 The overall research endeavor exploited the systematic analytic tools of Pragma-
dialectics and the socio-cognitive insights of CDA in the study of the most influential 
cognitive dimension controlling the discursive patterns (ideology) of two FP expert 
groups in their debate on Iraq. By this procedure, the study comes to its primary 
question and attempts therefore, to see how American and Arab op-ed writers construct 
their respective opinions and what kinds of ideological strategies are used in supporting 
those opinions. 
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CHAPTER 5: MINDSETS AND INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS FOR 
STRATEGIC MANEUVERING IN FP OP-ED PIECES 
 
5. 1. Introduction  
In this chapter, the focus is placed on the conventions applying to communication in the 
institutional contexts of the FP op-ed pieces. As an argumentative activity type, the op-
ed pieces display communicative practices influenced by the participants´ institutional 
conventions and rules. More specifically, the conventions governing the type of 
interaction constrain the kinds of strategic maneuvering conventionally used by the 
participants. In Pragma-dialectics, the characterization of the activity type and of its 
institutional rules as preconditions for strategic maneuvering has become a crucial step 
in the analysis and evaluation of the discourse argumentative strategies.  This chapter 
exploits this analytic tool to examine how the FP experts´ mindsets and institutional 
conventions predetermine the discursive strategies in this particular activity type within 
the two cultures.  
Exploring the contextual conditions such as the institutional purposes, norms and 
conventions that shape the participants‘ discursive practices gives insight into their 
mindsets as the main preconditions for their argumentative strategies. The term mindset 
or the mental states is used here as in social psychology (Gollwitzer 1990, Gollwitzer & 
Bayer 1999), where the concept, originally advanced by early cognitive scientists at the 
German Würzburg School, refers to the cognitive procedures activated by individuals in 
the pursuit of goals related to solving a given task. Exploring the mindsets of foreign 
policy experts engaged in public debates involves, hence, taking a closer look at these 
powerful social actors, at their different professional conditions and aims, at the higher-
level ideological outlooks in which they work such as their nation-states´ FP orientation, 
and, at their views on the culture in conflict with their own. With these kinds of 
mindsets, the experts´ debate on Iraq in 2007 was held. As will be seen in chapters 6 
and 7, these mindsets form the preconditions for their strategic maneuvering and their 
characterization provides insight into the kinds of ideologies underlying the FP experts 
discourses.  
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Section 5.2 discusses the institutional point of FP op-ed pieces and the role of the 
participants´ different perspectives in determining these institutional goals. Section 5.3 
provides a characterization of the op-ed piece on FP as a particular argumentative 
activity type. In Section 5.4 the focus moves to the experts´ mindsets and their 
nation/states´ ideological frameworks as preconditions for strategic maneuvering. The 
foreign policy orientations in the two cultures are explored to identify, with examples 
from the corpora, the institutional conventions constraining the strategic argumentative 
moves and creating the resource for participants´ commitments and starting points in the 
op-ed pieces.  
 
5.  2. The institutional point of FP op-ed pieces  
The op-ed pieces upholding foreign policy debates are governed by the rules and 
conventions of two institutional entities: the media (newspaper) and the political 
organization to which the participants pertain. The set of conventions of the two 
institutions form the constraints preconditioning the participants´ argumentative 
strategies. However, the broad sphere in which the op-ed as a communicative practice 
takes place is the political domain. The institutional point, or rationale, of publishing 
experts´ opinions in the press falls under the general universally-proclaimed political 
communication aim to preserve a democratic political culture. This is very general, 
indeed, and debatable given the fact that politics is a domain of power conflicts par 
excellence. Determining the actual institutional point(s) of the FP op-ed pieces as an 
argumentative activity type requires an examination of the different political institutions 
involved in this communicative activity and the identification of the kinds of 
overarching procedural conventions they work with to produce their argumentations. 
Such diagnosis enhances the identification of the preconditions regularizing the 
argumentative strategies of experts and the ideological structures controlling them.     
In democratic political systems, publishing political opinion aims at conducting a debate 
that seeks to engage the citizen into the political decision process based on the 
deliberative model offered by the system. As Habermas sustains, ―the deliberative 
paradigm offers as its main empirical point of reference a democratic process, which is 
supposed to generate legitimacy through a procedure of opinion and will formation 
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(2006:  413). Even though it belongs to the public sphere (in the Habermasian sense), 
the op-ed is in practice reserved to the elite, at least to those who are eligible to 
participate in political debates based on their recognized status as experts in political 
matters. What is more, in any type of political communication in the media, access is 
much more critical where, in Habermas´ words:   
different social actors struggle for access to and influence on the 
media. Those actors enter the stage from three points: Politicians and 
political parties start from the center of the political system; 
lobbyists and special interest groups come from the vantage point of 
the functional systems and status groups they represent; and 
advocates, public interest groups, churches, intellectuals, and moral 
entrepreneurs come from backgrounds in civil society. 
 (Habermas 2006: 417) 
Deliberation on political decisions guarantees the application of democratic principles 
and offers the politicians the opportunity to cultivate public support for political 
negotiations. Citizens‘ participation is supposed to be brought together after a complex 
process of opinion formation through political actions such as voting. Because public 
opinion is important in democratic political systems and may affect the shaping of the 
state policies, the elite take advantage of the mass media channels to cultivate public 
support for negotiations and ―sustain different loyalties towards distinct political 
communities‖ (Sampedro, 2011: 432).  
In the case of authoritarian regimes, however, the situation is extremely different. 
Political communication is monopolized by the ruling person or group who tends to 
exclusively administer its instruments for the promotion of its decisions. In the current 
age of political ethical imperatives of international relations, these regimes attempt to 
maintain a politically correct communication and make use of the same media supports 
used in democratic societies in order to shed democratic facade on their monolithic 
political behavior. Decision-making is often performed by the regime´s small circle; 
hence citizens usually have no real or fake participation in the deliberation process. Like 
all political communication tools, publishing opinion pieces is part of the politicians´ 
work and their spokesmen engaging in explaining their decisions to the public assuming 
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their inherent righteousness. The FP English edition op-ed piece makes no exception in 
the sense that it is equally monitored to varying extents by the ruling person (people). 
Through this activity, the ruling regime aims at opening up for experts to voice its 
positions on international high stake issues to an international audience. Even though 
there is some slight difference between the political conditions of certain Arab states, 
the role of the ruling regime institutional goals have an essential impact on the 
proceedings of op-ed pieces discourse an argumentative activity type.  
The FP op-ed pieces under study are produced within two different paradigms of 
political communication practices. Different institutional points are developed in both 
democratic and authoritarian societies, and this constitutes one of the major contextual 
constraints for the participants´ discursive strategies. The institutional points of FP op-
ed pieces as an argumentative activity type are also determined by the participants´ 
respective professional perspectives. Indeed, the op-ed pieces´ discourse is constrained 
by the institutional conventions of the media and the political institution from which 
participants make relevant interpretations while putting their maneuvering strategies 
into practice.  
 
5. 2. 1. FP experts with different professional perspectives  
This section examines the main professional profiles of political experts involved in FP 
debates in the media through their contribution in the opinion sections in newspapers. 
The op-ed pieces are commonly written by three different kinds of people: 1) a guest 
expert professionally trained in foreign policy analysis typically working for 
independent policy or research institutes or think tanks, 2) a politician invited 
occasionally for a contribution and 3) a columnist specialized in foreign policy and 
hired by the newspaper to provide political opinion. These experts have different 
professional predispositions and perspectives which may act as crucial variables that 
shape the institutional conventions constraining their discursive practices.  
The foreign policy analyst   
This group identified as the FP analysts and specialized in foreign policy analysis as an 
academic field may have different professional roles depending on the institutions they 
120 
 
serve.  Since the second half of the twentieth century, examining policy issues has 
started to develop into a field of its own, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA, henceforth) by 
providing tools for more practical and systematic approaches to the study of interstate 
relations. FPA, defined as the subfield of international relations that seek to explain 
foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign policy behavior with reference to the theoretical 
ground of human decision makers, acting singly or in groups (Hudson, 2012: 14). Those 
people or groups who specialize in FPA are expected to work within a scientific field 
which is generally based on five goals: assess political situation, explain events, forecast 
future outcome, determine policy options and make decisions (Frei & Ruloff, 1989: 3). 
In order to assess and explain situations, FP analysts are trained to apply systematic and 
scientific tools such as analogy-based conclusions, cognitive mappings in the analysis 
of motives and intentions and systems analysis and their causal relationships based on 
mathematical approaches such as System Dynamics. For the situation forecast task, the 
analysts make use of ―systematic expert judgment‖ (Frei & Ruloff, 1989: 138), cross 
impact and trend analyses among other methods in order to predict future events and to 
enhance the effectiveness of decisions making. Analysts prepare for decisions 
employing econometric models or game theory approaches to problem analysis. The 
final decisions to be made are usually based on decisional matrices and trees.   
FP analysts typically occupy policy consultancy positions in state agencies or work for 
research policy institutes (think tanks). Therefore, not only do they assist policymakers 
in the elaborations of their decisions, but also actively participate in the political 
communication processes necessary to put these decisions to work. The central 
functions they offer to the political institution are their interpretation of events along 
their well-informed judgment and their capacity to take the lead in decision-making. 
This means that based on their expert knowledge, FP analysts may be the first to seize 
the magnitude of some political events and know how to prioritize the handling of 
political issues. According to Frei & Ruloff (1989: 6), it is the task of the analyst to 
―select what is important and relevant out of the huge mass of information and separate 
it from the unimportant and irrelevant‖. Their knowledge is indeed, a key element in the 
processes of international politics practices because their interpretation of events is 
characterized as ―facts‖ which generally become the basis for argumentation activity 
within the processes of decision making and the elaboration of specific policies. Their 
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professional practices, mainly discursive and argumentative strategies whether public or 
private, would thus be controlled by this supposedly ―objective and scientific‖ 
knowledge. This kind of knowledge, as the main asset of the basis of the policy makers´ 
shared cognition, is the product of the work of generations of professional analysts and 
their research and interpretation of politics. Furthermore, the assumption of objectivity, 
politically and culturally shared (at least in the US) reinforces their credibility where 
personal attitudes and judgments may be taken for expertise analysis.   
FP analysts‘ integrated knowledge is the actual definition of the political issues. Before 
getting to political communication procedures such as media debates and opinion 
contributions and within the processes of their research planning, analysts constantly 
engage in setting the agenda for political issues -depending on the culture- and 
arranging the political communicative mechanisms which are put to work to handle 
them. This should be regarded by far the very bottom of the foreign policy-opinion-
iceberg, since these decisions are the ones that should generate the political public 
debate and consequently affect public opinion along with the political communication 
feedback. FP analysts should also employ skillful argumentation mechanisms in order 
to get their decisions through. George (1993: 21) sustains that ―they have the difficult 
task of adapting the available general knowledge of a given strategy or foreign policy 
undertaking to the particular case at hand‖. Definitely, in order to transmit to their 
audience -privately or in a public space- an appealing interpretation of events and a 
convincing view on the most reasonable decisions, they need to argue proficiently and 
extremely convincingly. This task becomes challenging within a very competitive 
political culture.  
The politician  
The contribution of politicians in newspapers with opinion pieces about domestic or 
foreign policies is considered to be one of the many instruments exploited by politicians 
in their political communication strategies. The discourse of politicians is generally 
mediated by media channels through which politicians use instruments such as public 
relations, reportage, advertizing and commentary (opinion pieces) among other means 
to ―influence the decision making process‖ (McNair, 2011: 5).  
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In democratic societies, the politicians´ opinions in the newspapers are associated with 
the politicians‘ duty to involve citizens in the political decisions by adjusting to an 
institutional design based on the citizens‘ exercise of their right to access public 
deliberation of political problems, as they see themselves as members of their political 
community. Whether they are government officials engaging in the promotion of their 
policies or opposition party‘s members assessing the government decisions and 
criticizing them, the politicians invited to contribute in opinion columns help the public 
understand the motives of political decisions. In the same manner, participation in op-ed 
sections tackling foreign policy issues also provides politicians with an opportunity to 
engage the general public into the deliberation processes on policy decisions and to 
spell out the transcendence of these policies in preserving common national interests. In 
practice, the purpose is rather to influence the public opinion and shape it in favor of 
prospective resolutions. Since public opinion is crucial in the process of policy 
implementation, where the citizen may, through the right to vote and alternative 
pressure groups, influence the course of political decisions, political communication 
takes up ―support building‖ as a chief goal. In fact, public opinion research shows (in 
the US) correlation between the politicians´ top foreign policy priorities and the general 
public (Pew Research Center 2007), which may be interpreted to be the creation of 
politicians´ discourse.  
In the authoritarian societies, the politicians‘ opinion piece in newspapers acts as a 
communication tool for the unique political voice of the state. In this type of media 
support, as is the case for any public communication, the political discourse typically 
speaks from a fatherly stance addressing citizens as dependent subjects to explain to 
them the benefits from adopting particular policies. The political system relies on a 
closed circle of actors who deliberate about crucial national and international issues in a 
non public sphere. Opinion pieces are generally used to perpetuate the political views 
and decisions made and legitimate them. In the case of the foreign language edition 
newspapers, politicians take advantage of the international reach the media offers in 
order to do diplomacy and manage international relations. They also use the space to 
promote or justify official attitudes to the international readership and persuade peer 
political figures of their positions and decisions.  
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In spite of the difference between the political systems, writing an opinion piece for 
politicians involves contributing to the debate on foreign policy issues and consolidating 
their public image as policy makers. In both political systems the participants attempt to 
make the most of such a powerful communication instrument (the op-ed piece) to do 
diplomacy and to legitimate their decisions and policies to a wider public. Indeed, 
―news management is one practical solution for governments to strategically 
communicate their messages and use the media to further their political and policy goal‖ 
(Pfetsch, 1999: 2).   
 
The foreign policy columnist 
Political columnists are those people hired by news organizations to write an opinion 
column on national political affairs. Political columnists have also been referred to as 
political pundits mainly if they become popular media personalities, who are ―a loose 
collectivity of journalists, analysts, policy experts, and other specialists who voice their 
special knowledge in public forums‘ (Nimmo & Combs, 1992: 24). The culture of 
political opinion column has developed within the US media channels in the early 
20thC, and adopted later worldwide. Owing to the need to include opposite views and to 
show balance in their editorial stance, some quality papers started to encourage different 
and provocative views on their pages. In domestic and international politics sections, 
columnists are sometimes referred to as pundits, who are considered to be ‗‗the 
interpretative elites of political journalism‘‘ owing to their ‗‗ability to interpret complex 
reality in ways which contribute directly to their readers‘ evaluation of political rhetoric 
and action‘‘ (McNair, 2000:208). Even though this sounds as a quality, interpreting 
events has rather been very often criticized and regarded negatively. Some political 
columnists have even been labeled ―punditocracy‖, since they are regarded as a threat to 
the democratic ideal principles. Some critics define them as a ―tiny group of highly 
visible political pontificators (...) It is in their debate rather than any semblance of a 
democratic one that determines the parameters of political discourse in the nation today‖ 
(Alterman, 1992: 5). Even within a more moderate view on the political columnists, 
McNair considers the column to be ―the highest form of political punditry in press 
journalism‖ (McNair, 2011: 72). Therefore, given the fact that columnists are 
124 
 
professional journalists hired to write opinions, their share in developing the national (or 
international in some newspapers cases) the debate is estimated to be extremely high. 
This entails the power they exercise on choosing topics, framing the issue and 
promoting some common elite interests through argumentation mastery. This is at least 
relevant within the American media culture.  
Rugh‘s (1979) and Hafez‘s (2001) analyses of the Arab press have shown that overall in 
the Arab world the state has managed to maintain control (albeit often indirectly) over 
the press. The result of this overall lack of independence from government has meant 
that media discourses, including FP opinion pieces, are associated with poor credibility, 
and that newspaper readers have generally been skeptical of what they read, assuming 
that there is a bias inherent in the content (Rugh, 1979: 12). However, this is mainly true 
for print media in Arabic addressed to Arab readership (p. 20). The foreign-language 
editions of print media, on the other hand, are widely agreed upon to have a very 
different status, since they are oriented to international readership. Arab media 
institutions develop foreign-language versions of their publications and make them 
electronically available with no charge; presumably to diffuse their political positions to 
the world and to secure foreign and Arab expatriate support. Pintak & Ginges (2008) 
point out that Arab journalists see themselves as having the mission of creating change in 
the international public opinion about Arab nations and the future and welfare of these 
nations.  
All these FP experts have in common that they provide the public with a well-informed 
view on the policy decisions and aim at mobilizing actions to consolidate or challenge 
the proposed decisions. It is within the scope of the professional conditions of these 
participants that the op-ed piece on the FP and global events is produced.  
 
5. 3. The op-ed piece on FP as an argumentative activity type 
The op-ed piece discussing foreign policy serves the institutional goal of advancing an 
expert´s opinion on policy issues that would maintain the debate among decision 
makers and the public and preserve democratic political culture. The effort made by FP 
experts to mobilize public participation on policy decisions and to influence their 
attitudes is achieved within the institutional conventions of this type of activity. To 
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identify the institutional constraints imposed on strategic maneuvering in op-ed pieces, 
the activity type is characterized from an argumentative point of view. This can be done 
by comparing the argumentative practice in this activity type with the ideal model of 
critical discussion and by following four focal points initial situation (confrontation 
stage), the procedural and material starting points (opening stage), the argumentative 
means (argumentation stage), and the outcome of the discussion (concluding stage) (van 
Eemeren, 2010: 146). 
 
5. 3. 1. The Initial Situation  
The initial situation goes in parallel with the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, 
where the participants externalize the difference of opinion. In written argumentation, 
the protagonist (author) expresses a standpoint to which the antagonist (reader) 
expresses at least doubt towards this standpoint. In the argumentative type of the FP op-
ed pieces, the initial situation is that an authoritative arguer has identified policy 
problem of public concern and consequently engages in expressing a ―position‖ on this 
topic on his/her own initiative. This initiative is generally prompted by the institution 
goals meant to be achieved through the author, namely the policy institute or think tank, 
the political association, the interest group or even the media institution. These goals 
depend on each author´s institutional affiliation.  
The standpoints represent the strategic choice of the topical potential made at the author 
personal level and preconditioned by the institutional political agenda. The author 
typically advances a standpoint of either an inciting/prescriptive type or an evaluative 
type. The inciting standpoint is ultimately aimed to rally the reader in support or in 
opposition to a particular policy decision. The evaluative standpoint on the other hand 
seeks to judge the expediency or the legitimacy of policy decisions in order to promote 
or deter action in favor or against them.  In both cases, the institution presupposes that a 
difference of opinion over the acceptability of the incitement or the evaluation may arise 
with the public and works towards the achievement of the goal of eliminating this 
difference of opinion through a planned series of discussions in support of the given 
claim. In this perspective, initiating a standpoint is regarded a collective political 
126 
 
decision carefully structured and implemented by the different members of the 
concerned political or media institution to achieve long-term policy objectives.   
 
5. 3. 2. The starting points 
The starting points in any critical discussion, such as the op-ed piece, are of two types: 
procedural and material. Procedural starting points refer to the discussion rules and the 
distribution of roles in the discussion. Material starting points are a collection of 
propositions about facts and values that can be used in the argumentation. There are 
relatively few explicit regulations concerning the procedural starting points, as most 
practices work with the conventions established over decades during which the op-ed 
piece culture has evolved. One of the main recognizable rules set by the media 
institutions for the discussions is their written form and their asynchronous flow or 
occurrence. This condition entails that discussions are non-mixed (involving non-
interactive audience) and they generate other discussions upon their closure. The 
distribution of roles is established by institutional rules assigning the protagonist role 
exclusively to a FP expert. Only experts in the matter are authorized to participate as 
protagonists and they are expected conventionally to advance argumentation relevant to 
the on-going debate. Observing relevance also entails a certain amount of institutional 
restriction on choice of topics. The presumed doubt or opposition taken up by the 
audience as antagonists is institutionally constrained with the kinds of target audiences 
the newspapers aimed at reaching and to whom the arguer takes the obligation of 
responding by means of reasonable argumentation. Most of these procedural starting 
points remain implicit, except perhaps for some rules set by the media institutions in 
their guidelines for the submission and publication of op-ed pieces. Newspapers 
generally emphasize their preference for a provocative style. This starting point 
typically intervenes as a precondition for the maneuverings made with available means 
for argumentation. More precisely, this institutional convention influences the 
maneuvering strategies at the level of presentational devices (encouraging the use of 
more rhetorical figures and probably allowing certain ―exaggeration‖ including 
derailment to happen). This condition also acts as a freedom card for arguers to make 
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the distributions of roles in the communicative participation the way that most suits 
their persuasive aims.  
On the other hand, the material starting points, involve conformity over facts and values 
relevant for the performance of the communicative and professional practices. In the op-
ed pieces debating FP, the collection of these institutionally established starting points 
are particularly crucial and decisive for the resolution of disagreement between 
participants, as they constitute the very vision created on a particular state of affair or 
problem. This means that a particular understanding of a social situation, for instance, 
an incident, a political negotiation, a policy, an act of terrorism, etc, results in a 
particular vision about this situation (a mental model as in the sociocognitive 
perspective) which later acquires a socially shared interpretation and qualifies as a fact. 
These facts have evaluative interpretation ascribed to them based also on the social 
norms identified as values. The facts and values established by the institutional 
conventions as the starting points for the op-ed piece activity type are not merely 
culturally bounded, but they are also related to each nation-state´s power position in the 
international arena, its position in given conflicts and the essence of its political culture, 
namely the shared political cognition of its policy makers. In the American FP op-ed 
pieces, material starting points are made prominent in argumentative moves establishing 
commitment with targeted American audience, While in the case of Arab op-ed pieces, 
the English language edition is an institutional norm made to the bridge the gap in terms 
of material starting points and assist the establishment of common ground with the 
targeted international or American audience. As in most mediated types of political 
communication, though, the institutionally constrained agreement about material 
starting points in the op-ed pieces generally remains presupposed (Van Eemeren, 2010: 
242). Given the fact that these kinds of starting points represent the most crucial 
institutional preconditions for the strategic maneuvering in the op-ed discussions, they 
are examined in more detail in section 5.4.1 along with the commitment sets, which are 
the fourth parameter to consider when determining the strategic functions of the 
argumentative moves during analysis (See Chapter 3, section 3. 4. 4. 2).  
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5. 3. 3. Argumentative means 
In the argumentation stage of a critical discussion, the protagonist advances 
argumentation to support the standpoint advanced and to overcome the antagonist‘s 
(presumed) doubts. In the context of the op-ed pieces, as in most cases of written (non 
mixed) argumentation, the protagonist exploits the starting points established in the 
opening stage in order to support the claim advanced and prove it to be part of the 
antagonist‘s set of commitments (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984: 165-166). This 
entails that the op-ed piece as an argumentative activity type expounds the 
argumentative means available to participants from their shared knowledge of a given 
political situation including events, interests, threats, opportunities and values, among 
other assumptions serving as the basis for the development of a particular argumentative 
line of defense of the position adopted. A general institutional rule in the op-ed piece is 
the use of expertise knowledge to warranty premises in argumentation. This is clearly 
the most standard precondition for maneuvering strategically, a condition that is put to 
use by arguers in order to mutually commit with audience both at the level of ethics 
(credibility) and content (propositions considered as facts). Indeed, their condition of 
authority in FP matters allows them to combine starting point resources (facts and 
values) and audience commitment to their trustworthiness to resolve the difference of 
opinion. As stated above in the starting point section, these kinds of commitments 
creating the preconditions for strategic maneuvering will be further expounded in 
section 5.4.1. 
 
5. 3. 4. The possible outcome 
In the concluding stage of the discussion, the discussants determine whether the 
difference of opinion is solved and, if so, in whose favor (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
1992). In the FP op-ed pieces, the outcome of the discussion may be established in 
differed setting (time and place) as it is determined by the institution (and members) 
from a set of research studies measuring public opinion reception, experts´ degree of 
popularity and correlation of these findings with the policy decisions and resolutions 
reached. Outcomes are determined roughly following this complex process while in 
practice readers are left to determine for themselves whether the argumentation is 
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convincing or not and whether they will adhere to the proposal and claims and even 
adjust their behavior accordingly (through votes and other means of support to decision 
makers). In the end, the institution might reach agreement with some audience (may be 
measured in funding to think tanks and political organizations for instance), but this 
agreement is not explicitly expressed. Indeed, the institutionally imposed implicitness of 
the discussion puts great constraints on the possible moves in this stage, even though 
experts naturally frame the resolution as positive within the discussion itself. This lack 
of a conventionally established outcome accessible for the audience has weakened the 
popular perception of the actual persuasive power of the op-ed piece and made it hard to 
measure the persuasive impact it possess in comparison to other means of political 
communication. The characteristics of the communicative activity type of FP op-ed 
pieces are summarized in Table 5.1 below: 
Communicative 
activity type 
FP op-ed piece 
Initial situation Anticipated difference of opinion between experts and reader over  
the acceptability of policy actions  in order to promote public  
participation in the political decisions 
Starting points  
(rules, 
concessions) 
Partly codified  
Rules (international relations, laws and facts) regulating the 
argumentative means.  
Practical restrictions on space and time.  
Institution is authority on FP knowledge; institution committed to 
involving the public policy decisions. 
Institution distributes roles and defines the targeted audience fulfills role 
of protagonist; reader implicitly fulfills role of antagonist 
Argumentative  
Means 
Argumentation for the proposed or discouraged course of action based 
on expertise facts in monological op-ed piece.  
Response to anticipated critical reactions by the reader. 
Outcomes Implicit resolution  
by research measuring correlations between policy claims and reader‘s  
reception/public opinion trends 
Possible return to initial situation for reaction from other ―active‖ 
participants. 
Table 5.1. Characterization of the FP op-ed piece as an argumentative activity type 
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5. 4. Preconditions for strategic maneuvering: mindsets and ideological 
frameworks  
This section focuses on the FP experts´ mindsets as preconditions constraining the 
performance of argumentative moves in the current two op-ed corpora. These 
preconditions impinge on the commitment sets managed and exploited by the two 
groups of arguers, as they draw on them as their institutionally and culturally shared 
resources to create material starting points for the communicative discussion. 
Examining the commitments that define the argumentative situation of the strategic 
maneuverings is the fourth parameter employed in Pragma-dialectics to determine the 
strategic function of a particular argumentative move (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 
2009). The material starting points to which participants (presumably) agree upon and 
put to use as commitments in discourse are explored here by looking at the experts´ 
mindsets and the ideologies making up their frame of reference for policy professional 
practices.  
Material starting points create the foundation for any argumentative exchange. They 
consist of the body of knowledge and values institutionally, socially or culturally 
shared, or even a combination of these depending on the argumentative situation. These 
starting points in the op-ed pieces activity type materialize in the institutional point for 
holding debate on foreign policy issues in newspapers (which is generally amounts to 
mobilizing public opinion to promote policies) and impinge on the discursive practices 
conventionally established both generally and specifically for each political cultural 
context. These kinds of starting points make up the participants´ commitments and 
create the basic preconditions for strategic maneuvering.  The next section explores 
these preconditions in the mindsets of FP experts in the two cultures and analyzes 
examples of their manifestation as commitments strategically established in 
argumentative moves.   
 
5. 4. 1. Starting points in international relations and Foreign policy practices 
Foreign policy results from a combination of leadership perceptions and domestic 
politics broadly shaped by the international distribution of power (Sawoski, 2011). The 
institutional environments in the op-ed pieces are defined by the practices of policy 
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actors based on fundamental and axiomatic beliefs on foreign policy making and on the 
state of art of international relations. In the American and the Arab international 
relations culture different factors directly or indirectly affect the way FP actors develop 
and maintain their discursive activities. The ideological foundations and the stances 
adopted by state actors in the bilateral relations between the US and the Arab world 
during various crucial periods leading to the war on Iraq are relevant elements in the 
construction of ―facts‖ and ―values‖ socially shared in the two cultures. Determining the 
kinds of facts and values developed within the macro-context of the op-ed activity type 
in both cultures help determine the kinds of starting points and commitments 
strategically established by the arguers in their argumentative moves.    
 
Governments‘ choice of policies, especially in democratic societies, definitely reflects 
the kind of ideologies behind the choice. Understanding the mindset behind the foreign 
policy debates as situated within a wider international relation context requires looking at 
how the foreign policy practices within a certain society or culture are managed by 
complex mechanisms involving, among others, the historical development of the 
country´s international relations, the institutional environment defining these relations 
and the mental paradigms within which they operate. Foreign policy actors behave 
within shared goals ―rooted in the pursuit, protection, and promotion of their states´ 
interests‖ (Dorff, 2004: 5), governed by the dynamics of key international relations and 
behaviors. Indeed, the set of ideals and values that define how the state should behave 
internationally makes up the kind of political ideology or ideologies monitoring the state 
behavior. As Quinn rightly puts it:  
what matters in deciding a nation´s foreign policy is not the material reality of the 
international environment, but the intellectual framework with which policy 
makers approach the environment (…) and the very activity of defining the 
national interest, and judging what it demands in terms of policy, is itself bound 
up in the mechanism of ideology 
 (Quinn, 2010: 23).  
This account is compatible with a socio-cognitive approach and seems to situate the 
study of FP practices within a constructivist approach. The socially shared cognition in 
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FP plays a crucial role in the actors´ practices. This means that foreign policy makers 
act within the shared interpretations of their states´ relations which are the product of 
the historical events and circumstances and the outcome of domestic political 
negotiations, conflicts and reconciliations leading to consensual decisions and the 
formation of a common interpretation of interests. In other words, the body of 
knowledge they draw upon in their discourses is based common historical conditions, 
common national reality and destiny and common interests.  
As far as the specific institutional points, namely those aims related to specific cultures, 
it is important to take into consideration the specific aims of the various media, research 
and political institutions involved in a given debate and aims associated with each 
cultural group, the American and Arab. Indeed, as an argumentative activity type, op-ed 
pieces have their culturally-bounded institutional point. A broad-spectrum aim of FP 
op-ed pieces is the mobilization of public opinion, while in the US there are more 
publicly stated aims, such as to educate, inform, advise the public, etc. (See Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2.3. on the institutional goals in the current corpora). In the Arab context, a 
different common aim may be deduced from fact of using English version as a media 
vehicle for the op-ed pieces. This choice indicates a specific audience targeting 
motivated by specific institutional aims. Targeting at the international and American 
audience in the Arab English-version op-ed pieces fulfills the institutional aims of 
seeking arbitration in the international community to resolve the conflict with the US 
within the Arab region.  
The next section discusses the foreign policy orientations of each of the US and the 
Arab World. Examining a nation-state´s FP orientation consists of determining the way 
its foreign policy elites view the world and their nation´ s role in it (See Hermann, 
1980). The section starts with presenting the US general FP orientation and the one 
developed towards the Middle East some of which are related to the Iraq war and the 
number of policies implemented in the region. This is followed by an account on the 
Arab World FP orientations, at least those adopted by those Arab states regarded as 
influential players in the region. This cross cultural examination of FP mindsets as the 
resources from which the current discussions´ starting points are created will guide the 
analysis of the arguers‘ commitments as manifested in their argumentation strategies.  
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5. 4. 2. The US foreign policy orientation  
FP discourse in the US and more particularly discourse in the op-ed pieces published 
during the Surge is constrained by the US foreign policy general orientation and the 
orientation it adopted in its relations with the Middle East. The Iraq war debate 
presupposes three policy notions: interventionism, leadership and self-defense. These 
constitute major axiomatic beliefs socially-shared in the American political culture and 
constraining the argumentative practices of political leaders in general and those dealing 
with foreign relations in particular. These beliefs open up for the exigencies - situations 
that demand actions (Bitzer 1968) - addressed by decision makers and brought about for 
collective resolution. These three notions are expounded below with more details, first 
by outlining the circumstances of their development and then by delineating their 
characteristics as core principles in the American Foreign policy culture.  
America´ s 21
st
 century foreign policy orientation has grown from its relatively recent 
conception of its national interests. Americans chose to adopt separatist consensus from 
the balance of power system in Europe during the centuries which followed its 
independence. However, with its economic, territorial and military growth in the 
twentieth century and the external imperatives for more expansive policies after World 
War I, the US shifted attention towards a policy of global engagement. The new vision 
promoted by both presidents Roosevelt (1901-09) and Wilson (1913-21) and sustained 
by most subsequent US leaders insisted on the necessity for the US world role in 
expanding its values of freedom and liberal capitalism and that its growth into a great 
power legitimates its intervention into the affairs of other nations. Schonberg (2003: 6) 
argues that it was not just the changing international and domestic environments at these 
pivotal junctures that affected policy, but also the ―national ideology‖, the culture and 
worldview specific to the United States, its leaders and policy-makers. Betts (2005) 
contends that the different FP schools which have vied for control of US policy since 
1972 seemed quite different in principle, but less so in practice. These schools have 
often converged on similar initiatives for different reasons. Betts believes that the 
differences in substance are less than the differences in tone and style. He emphasizes 
that the clashes among schools of thought in the US ―do not yet translate into a 
significant difference on the question of whether the United States should exploit its 
primacy in global power in the post-Cold War world (Betts, 2005: 5). The US legitimate 
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right to intervene in foreign affairs becomes axiomatic among FP leaders and experts 
and hence functions as a material starting point and a shared commitment in the culture 
of public debates on FP.   
A number of international relations scholars, likewise, sustain that the US policies with 
their apparent changes in the late two centuries have kept the intellectual legacy of the 
past most of which are based on the belief of American potential to be a guide to the 
world to universal values such as freedom, democracy and liberal economy (see Cox, 
2005; Quinn, 2010). Based on this central belief, the US has interpreted its 
interventionist policies positively as based on leadership, power and responsibility. Its 
policies are geared to achieving the ultimate goal of maintaining world peace and 
security by promoting and teaching its moral values, as the ideal universal values (this 
last point is further discussed within values). The adoption of interventionism and 
leadership support the naturalization of the third notion: Self-defense. Indeed, the three 
notions are interconnected and owe their justification to the American political values 
(discussed in this chapter, Sub-Section 5.4.2.1).  
The US- led coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, and accomplished its mission of 
toppling the Saddam regime. The mission, dubbed ―Operation Iraqi Freedom‖, claimed 
to aim at freeing Iraqis from dictatorship, but also was part of the US ―fight against 
terrorism‖ taken up after the 9/11 terrorists attack. Indeed, Americans adopted an 
interventionist foreign policy that is based on the pursuit of self protection against 
possible outside aggressions. This is often referred to as ―Preventive War‖, though its 
initiators claim it was a preemptive war (an attempt to defeat a perceived inevitable 
invasion). The preventive war is initiated under the belief that future conflict is inevitable 
and aims at shifting the balance of power by strategically attacking before the balance of 
power has a chance to shift in the direction of the adversary. Because of the speculative 
nature of preventive war, in which the adversary may or may not be a future threat, 
preventive war is considered an act of aggression in international law. Some advocates of 
aggressive wars have argued them to be justified as Preventive. Arguments can be very 
controversial as they are in effect arguments as to whether those wars were justified or 
not. Just- war thinking, Staub (1989) argues, is widely influential. It specifies what 
makes a war acceptable. It must be fought against enemy forces not unarmed civilians 
and for self defense not conquest. However, foreign policy discourse have created 
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common consensus with its rhetoric on the threats to the US nation, which is one cannot 
wait until an enemy actually strikes, it is necessary to prepare for war when others have 
hostile intentions.  
The Iraq war was conducted in the context of a US foreign policy referred to as ―the 
National Security Strategy‖ (NSS) issued by the Bush administration in 2002. This 
strategy was the outcome of the reactions on the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US and 
judged in some literature as a turning point in US foreign policy history and had ―a 
dramatic impact on the US outlook‖ (Cox 2005: 17). This strategy is based on four key 
principles. First, the US should act preemptively to prevent terrorists‘ attacks. This 
becomes the central concept of the NSS in the popular mind to which is linked the issue 
of non-state actors which are principally Islamic terrorists. Second, there is an absolute 
righteousness in American values, based on universal liberty and capitalism and that 
America has the destiny to inspire the world towards the fulfillment of these values, as 
in one of Bush´s inaugural address in 2001: ―America remains engaged in the world, by 
history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom‖. Third, it is 
important for great powers to cooperate with the US which means that they should 
respect the legitimacy and inevitability of the US power and its role in the world. Fourth 
and in line with the previous principle, the US is committed to building its military 
power to protect Americans and allies from enemies and is assumed to maintain a 
power-hard hegemony globally and beyond challenges. These principles of the National 
Security Strategy have been central in the process of the US policy decision making 
during the crucial years of the Iraq occupation, and they are, in Quinn´s words, 
―connected to one another and are mutually supportive components in a cohesive 
ideological edifice‖(Quinn 2010: 160).  
The public debate undertaken on the Iraq issues aiming at gaining the support of public 
opinion took place within the boundaries of the NSS as an overarching policy even 
though the NSS was not, of course, approved of by all American political factions. 
Indeed, the harsh criticism the Bush administration received along the years following 
the invasion (including 2007) was mainly related to its war mismanagement and tactical 
errors. The core principles in NSS above mentioned were not really questioned, but 
critics rather deplored the arrogant manner and the messianic tone adopted by the 
president and his team which they judged to hurt the image of America and to blur its 
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true political intentions and credibility. Furthermore, the alleged change in the US 
foreign policy which is supposedly crafted by this administration was possible to carry 
forward only on the basis of some connection to the preexisting ideological framework 
in the US foreign policy. The NSS was, in fact, anchored in the principles which evolved 
during the beginning of the twentieth century with new domestic conditions and 
interests, along some international circumstances paving the way for America´s decision 
to gradually move away from the long era of the Founding Fathers´ isolationism to more 
global engagement in the international affairs. These conditions have impinged on the 
US FP behavior and geared its current orientation towards world leadership and 
interventionism. Next, the core US principles shaping the experts´ mindsets are outlined 
along with the discussion of their manifestation in some maneuvering cases in the 
American corpus. The account on these FP principles may be helpful for explaining how 
the institutional tenets of the current foreign policy are deeply engrained in its 
argumentative discourses and its logic.  
 
5.4.2.1. Core principles in American FP and constrains on the argumentative 
moves 
The core principles outlined below constitute the set of constraints governing the 
argumentative situations in the op-ed pieces discussion of the Surge in 2007.  Based on 
Bitzer´s designation of the kinds of constraints affecting any rhetorical discourse (Bitzer 
1968), these constraints constitute the shared ―knowledge‖ and values of participants 
and the commitment sets upon which arguers draw in their strategic maneuvering. 
These core principles feed one another and constitute the basic schema of the current 
policy orientation of the US. They also reinforce the internalization of the notion of 
mission and duty within the American basic public and shared understanding of its 
actions. The constraints are discussed along with some examples from the corpus.   
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Figure 5.1. Main US FP constraints (opportunities) for strategic maneuvering in op-ed 
discourse 
 
As shown in the figure, the core FP principles constraining argumentation in op-ed 
debates start from common US moral values and the belief of their universalism. This 
commitment motivates the faith in the US virtues and capability to lead the world. This 
uncontested position as global leader and the World superpower grants the US the right 
potential to define its interests and to identify threats (advanced by those who go against 
universal values). Along its moral and material ―Engagement‖ with the world as a 
leader, the US intervenes in other territories to protect or to defend interests and values 
using policy instruments as its main resources. A sense of mission is then born and 
becomes the endoxa in the US public debate and an opportunity on which experts 
establish their commitments while maneuvering strategically.     
 
Political and moral values as starting points  
American political values, such as liberty, democracy and liberal capitalism, have 
constituted the core principles of the political culture since the creation of the US as a 
nation. In recent decades, these political values have become essential components of 
US moral values 
Universalism  
Global 
leadership 
Superpower 
Interests 
 Threats 
Interventionism 
preemptive war  
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policy 
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the American FP rhetoric sustaining the new direction it has taken. Indeed, core 
principles and values have started to support the argument for the shift from 
isolationism to the post World War II policy of interventionism, officially referred to as 
Engagement. Key US presidents from then on have framed foreign policy as a fight for 
American values and an indispensible component of the US role in the world (Chollet 
and Lindberg 2008: 169). After the NY terrorist attack, the Bush administration heavily 
drew on these values to describe the attack as an attack to Americanism, and as a 
struggle between good and evil. The FP rhetoric based on American values also 
emphasizes the US exemplary role in preserving human rights, regarded as American 
ideals. Indeed, the US has the oldest continuous constitutional tradition of judicial 
enforcement of written bill of rights in the world today and that nowhere in the world 
are civil liberties more robustly debated and defended in public and in court (Moravcsik 
2005: 147). Yet, The US is widely accused of using human rights to justify military 
exploits that are regarded as legally dubious and morally odious (Ruggie 2004, Steiker 
2005).  
Officially and within the mission statement elaborated in the US Department of state, 
the US takes responsibility for securing the spread of these values around the world, 
declaring that ―The United States uses a wide range of tools to advance a freedom 
agenda‖ and to ―promote democracy as a means to achieve security, stability, and 
prosperity for the entire world‖ (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, n.d.). The 
use and emphasis on these values is believed to be inspired by national identity. 
McCartney (2004: 400) argues that national identity relies on ―an ideological 
construction of the nation that insists on the global relevance of the American project‖. 
The Scholar believes that the FP in the US is very much connected to its nationalism, 
one that builds its essence not from ethnic or religious, historical common heritage but 
celebrates its belief in common human values.   
American arguers in the current op-ed corpora use the audience´s commitment to the 
American moral and political values to their advantage. Indeed, this is values are both 
exploited and implicitly and explicitly in all the discussions (30 pieces). The 
manifestation of these kinds of commitments in strategic moves is illustrated in the 
example below. The move has been used as an explicit material starting point in the 
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opening stage of an op-ed piece by Clifford May in support of the Bush ―staying the 
course in Iraq‖ decision.    
(1)  Americans liberated Iraqis from Saddam Hussein and gave them the right to 
vote. (Clifford May, Houston Chronicle)  
 
The example stands for an assumption established explicitly within this proposition. 
The assumption is a maneuvering performed to remind the audience of common belief 
on the US reason for waging the war and to establish it as a starting point for the 
discussion. The starting point presupposes that American behavior with Iraqis is 
supported by the values of freedom and democracy and their universalism. These values 
are the commitments defining the rhetorical situation and they are the elements with 
which the function of strategic moves is determined (van Eemeren 2010).  
The American FP reflects an ideological interpretation of both the nation and its place in 
the world, one, in McCartney´ s words, ―that posits that the United States enjoys 
universal significance because it is an archetype of virtue and the locomotive of human 
progress‖ (2004: 401). The use of values in FP is due to the ―increasing cynicism and 
doubt over government and politics at a domestic level, leading to party divisions and 
often public discrediting‖ (Chandler 2003: 299). An ethical foreign policy posture can 
be a powerful mechanism for generating a sense of political purpose and mission and 
provide a moral framework which can project a sphere of agreement and consensus 
within Americans.  
 
Leadership and interventionism   
Today´s US global leadership is sustained by a belief, shared by the main US political 
actors, in the US responsibility and role maintaining peace by teaching its moral and 
political values to other nations, acting as a mediator in conflicts and a model for all 
developing nations. The US foreign policy decision makers share the assumption that 
the US acts based on American benevolence and willingness to support people´s around 
the globe and protect their interests and needs. They also believe that the spread of 
American political values such as freedom, democracy and liberal capitalism should 
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guarantees universal prosperity and peace. Not only during the NSS periods which 
characterized G. W Bush stances, but also more recently under Obama´s government, a 
central claim among foreign affairs officials has been that the ―US has created a safer, 
more stable, and more prosperous world for the American people, their allies, and their 
partners around the globe than existed prior to World War II (Defense Strategic 
Guidance, 2012). Agreement on the universal validity of the American political values 
has characterized the US strategic defense departments for almost a century now in spite 
of the differences between major political parties. This is, indeed, sustained in this 
legendary speech by Woodrow Wilson in 1917:  ―We shall fight for the things which we 
have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy (...) for the right and liberties of 
small nations, for a universal dominion of right‖. (Wilson, 1917) 
Whether it is a strategy promoted by Wilson, Roosevelt or post cold war presidents, it 
would similarly point to common assumptions in the US international relations in the 
recent era. FP strategies have developed around common goals which place faith in the 
spread of American values and practices as the only path to a universal peace in the long 
term (Bush´s second inaugural address January 2005). This premise in the American 
foreign policy tenets has been central in the US development of the ideological edifice 
supporting the course of its political decisions throughout the last decades. Nevertheless, 
the promotion of leadership and the pursuit of interventionism has been largely perceived 
and interpreted as imperialism and has been referred to by scholars and intellectuals as a 
strategy of power control. As shown in the next example, the righteousness of the US 
leadership and interventionism is not put into question by this critic of the Bush 
administration mismanagement of the war calling for troop withdrawal. Harold 
Meyerson draws on the socially shared commitment (of his audience) to the US 
leadership and its right to intervene. The example illustrates how this commitment is 
paradoxically exploited as a premise in a standpoint urging for retreat from Iraq.  
(2)  There are, after all, civil wars and civil wars. In the carnage that followed the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, it was chiefly the genocidal aggression of Slobodan 
Milosevic's Serbian nationalists that needed to be checked, and in time U.S. 
forces and their allies did just that. But the slaughter in Iraq is the work of many 
hands on both sides of their religious divide. (Harold Meyerson, Washington 
Post) 
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Fervent critics of the American foreign policies (Bricmont, 2007; Chomsky, 2003; Said, 
1997), affirm that the US claimed leadership and interventions are aggressions against 
other nations and act as a façade behind which the US carries out its imperial policies. 
However, no matter how these policies, rooted in the belief in the primacy of the US 
moral values and in its imperative role in the world to maintain peace, have been framed, 
their choice and promotion have prepared for a universally discernible fact. The US´ 
possession of the most sophisticated FP instruments. Policy decisions over the last 
decades have grown into a set of conditions shaping the ideology and global orientation 
of the US strategies. The development of the US policy instruments, mainly its military 
power, which have been set up to provide practical policy solutions and to organize 
policymaking, have become highly relevant in its foreign policymaking practices and 
consequently in the construction of its discursive apparatus.  
 
Military Policy instruments  
Foreign policy debates and deliberations take place within a common sense created by 
the above mentioned situation: historical circumstances, mindsets and more importantly 
power. Since the US foreign policy in its recent era has focused on the construction of a 
military power (heavily with the Regan Rearmament era) to achieve its key objectives 
such as international cooperation, diffusion of American values of freedom and 
democracy and the safeguarding of the world peace, accordingly, the policy has 
equipped itself with hard power. Hard power, based on the use of military and economic 
means, is translated into institutional terms and systematized in order to be easily 
managed. The National Security Strategy explicitly stated that the United States must 
maintain a huge military system and the ability to project power quickly worldwide, in 
order to face ―the growing technological sophistication of Third World 
conflicts‖ (National Security Council, 2002). Power is the stipulation that establishes 
and designs the institutional fabric of all related FP actors´ activities including the 
discursive one. It is the potential which invents a more powerful account of ideology, 
namely ―policy instrument‖ ideology as it is argued by Sylvan & Majeski (2008) in a 
critique of the simplified, mainstream definitions of ideology in foreign policy, mainly 
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that of Hunt (1987), which they criticize as ending up explaining very little about most 
phenomena in foreign policy (Sylvan & Majeski, 2008: 1). 
Foreign policy instruments such as diplomacy, economic aid plans, treaties and military 
strategies are tools designed to resolve specific problems. These instruments, which 
have developed into templates or model plans judged to be efficient over generations of 
trial and usage, are supposed to provide the practitioners with a platform for generating 
adequate solutions necessary to solve policy problems. Policy instruments related to 
military machinery are in a sense the implementation of the most crucial segment of 
foreign policy practices. Generally, instruments are defined as the ―organizations 
capable of carrying out specific activity sequence, typically put together from bits and 
pieces of preexisting policy instruments in order to devote greater resources to, or to 
concentrate more efficiently, on solving particular policy problems‖ (Sylvan & Majeski, 
2008: 5). In this sense, strategies for intervention, nation building or disaster relief, for 
instance, come ―prepackaged with their own built-in tasks‖ which makes the ideologies 
behind them a matter of ―organizational and activity-sequential‖ phenomena linked to 
automated institutional behavior (Sylvan & Majeski, 2008: 5). This leads to the 
assumption that policy instruments, as institutionally organized tasks may represent a 
powerful precondition for policymakers´ discourse activity. The discursive practices are 
guided by the conditions available for actions and justifying decisions hence relies on 
the readymade logic offered by the instruments. The fact that foreign policy in the US 
has for decades argued for the military supremacy and has established it as central in its 
vision and practices may be sustained by organizational conditions which paved such a 
mindset. Along with the military policy instruments, persuasion instruments have 
developed over time to sustain and reinforce them, which is why policymakers´ 
―rhetoric consistently emphasizes a martial outlook for foreign policy which have 
become as a dogma‖ (Wittkopf et al., 2008: 76). This account of the core approach to 
US policies is intended to help explain how the institutional tenets of the current foreign 
policy have been shaped into a worldview spectrum within which argumentation on 
foreign policy issues is maintained and their problems are discussed. It is probably 
unfeasible for the involved players to conceive the issues outside the spectrum, simply 
because it has become deep-seated over the years through which the country designed 
its world leadership.  
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The role of FP experts´ mindsets shaped institutionally along with the US policy 
orientation and ideologies is crucial in determining their performance of strategic 
maneuverings. This orientation may be summed up in three basic principles. The first 
principle is the belief in the universality of the US values, specifically freedom, liberal 
capitalism and democracy. The second is the US role in promoting these values all over 
the world to maintain peace and security. These two principles reinforced by strong 
nationalist sentiments legitimate the US interventionist policies. The third is the use of 
military policy instruments which organize policy decision making. It is based on these 
assumptions that most institutions and decision makers in the foreign policy discipline 
define their missions. Indeed, whether experts have conservative or liberal ideals in 
handling foreign affairs, their ―American values can translate into a moral core that both 
sides can rally around‖ (Chollet & Lindberg, 2008: 1). This worldview overlaps with 
the specific aims and conventions of political institutions and the discursive activity 
they undertake and more particularly constrain the strategic maneuvering of FP debates 
participants.   
 
5. 4. 3. The Arab States foreign policy orientations 
The op-ed pieces written by Arab FP experts and issued in the English version Arab 
newspapers are also constrained by the Arab states´ foreign policies orientations and 
mainly their relations with the US and other major world powers. These constraints 
shaping the mindsets of Arab opinion leaders in the foreign language press are explored 
in this section and their manifestation is discussed within some examples from the 
current Arab op-ed corpus.  
Technically, one can speak of FP orientation only at the level of a single nation-state. 
The Arab world officially composed of twenty two states cannot possibly display a 
single or unified policy, in spite of the widely spread perception of a common destiny in 
the Arab world. The countries are of disparate conditions, both domestically such as 
their resources and wealth, their social fabric and political structures and internationally, 
in their regional relations, their economic and their military capability and mainly the 
nature of the relations they hold with the great world power. However, given their 
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highly shared historical and cultural conditions, these states are geopolitically treated as 
one unit.  
The FP orientations described in this section only concern those Arab states relevant in 
the present study. These states are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, 
Syria, Jordan and Yemen (For more details see corpus description Chapter 4). Apart 
from Iraq –directly affected by the US occupation- and Syria -renowned for its overt 
hostility to US and Israeli policies in the region- the remaining states work under 
authoritarian regimes with more or less strong economic and diplomatic relations with 
the US. Although there is an undeniable difference between these states in the nature of 
their relationships with major policy players in the Middle East namely the US, Europe 
and Israel, they share many features mainly confined by their relatively similar power 
positions in the world as third world and postcolonial Arab nations.  
The institutional aims preconditioning the op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity 
type are controlled by three main conditions. First, the op-ed specific institutional aims 
emanate from a more macro-contextual political aim, known as ―Omni-balancing‖ 
pursued by most state leaders in the region. This condition is overarching and generates 
the other two conditions. Second, opinion leaders contributing in the English edition 
newspapers´ op-ed pieces are in most cases states´ spokesmen. Even though there are 
some notable exceptions, the authoritarian political system prevailing in these states 
exploits the media as a channel to promote their views to domestic and foreign public 
and as a policy instrument of diplomacy and political communication in times of crises 
and conflict (signaled by the choice of English as a medium for communication). These 
aims are in turn constrained by the international debate on the FP issue under 
consideration. The internationally-oriented interaction (as opposed to domestically-
maintained debates in Arabic), is addressed to a wide-ranging audience and is based on 
goals specifically set for this purpose. The third condition is related to common 
―national‖ values and sentiments characterizing the opinion leaders´ political discourse. 
These values are generally activated in international communicative contexts, within the 
mechanisms of self perceptions and positioning. They underscore the weak position of 
Arabs as adversary in the international crisis (Iraq war) and generate an ideological 
stance of resistance and antagonism. These conditions constraining the resources Arab 
FP experts draw upon in their op-ed pieces to seek their antagonists‘ commitments and 
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to establish as starting points for their discussions are illustrated in Figure 5.2 below and 
then explored later in more detail with examples from the corpus.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Institutional conventions and mindsets constraining maneuvering in the 
Arab op-ed pieces 
 
The Arab states, in particular the authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
the Gulf states perform a foreign policy, known as ―Omni-balancing‖ (David, 1991), 
aiming not only at deterring external threats but also ―legitimating the regime at home 
against domestic opposition and mobilizing economic resources abroad‖ (Hinnebusch & 
Ehteshami, 2002: 15). Most of these regimes domestically face the challenge of the 
contradiction between their need to synchronize with local demands for autonomy from 
the West as a basic solution for economic growth and their need to maintain substantial 
economic and diplomatic relations with foreign powers (the US and Europe) for 
security purposes. The press in these regimes is generally categorized as a ―mobilization 
press‖ ordained to ―work out a moral system of authority in order to establish as much 
as possible different solidarities and identities (…) so that the new leadership will 
acquire legitimacy‖ (Rugh, 2004: 29). This situation complicates the foreign policy 
roles of these states in key issues, chiefly in the way they define their own state 
identities and their positions towards both neighbors and great powers. The policy 
certainly creates high challenges as well as opportunities for opinion leaders to exploit 
in their communicative practices. However, more importantly, it creates a situation of 
Omni-balancing 
Reconciling domestic public opinion 
with international exigencies    
Diplomacy 
 Policy instrument 
Human values  
Arabism  
Nationalism and patriotic 
sentiments  
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duplicity that hinders the common and genuine consensus that values normally reinforce 
in policy orientations.    
 
In the corpus under study, 20% of the op-ed pieces are issued in Saudi Arabian 
newspapers. However, counting the Saudi- funded newspapers this increases to 40% 
which means that nearly half of the corpus data are constrained by the same institutional 
conventions. Saudi Arabian FP op-ed pieces are undoubtedly regulated by the regime. 
The wealthy authoritarian family (or clan) regime, infamous for the lack of freedom of 
speech, has established in the last two decades a strong media empire, where it 
possesses the major Arab news and entertaining networks in many Arab countries such 
as Lebanon, Jordan, Emirates, etc. This has been regarded as a tool to control 
information flow about the regime and to naturalize its policies both internally and 
externally by creating a more favorable image. The official political discourse faces the 
challenge of two contradictory situations, which it deals with by ―Omni-balancing‖. The 
first is that the regime seeks to "appease domestic opinion and enhance legitimacy by 
indulging in anti-imperialist rhetoric" (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2002: 15), as it does 
not want to be accused of being a US client in the internal and Arab public opinion. The 
second is the regime need to preserve the strong relations it maintains with the US and 
their privileges based on strategic military and economic cooperation and strengthened 
by signed pacts/conventions to protect foreign investments in the region.  
 
Omni-balancing constrains the mindsets of those opinion leaders who under these 
circumstances freely engage in condemning the US policies and in framing them as 
policies of repression and assault. Under the cover of freedom of speech, the regime 
gives free reign to such practices, but do not endorse them in its official public 
communication in part to preserve the good unilateral relations with the US and also to 
dissociate itself from opinion leaders and give the impression that their opinions are 
impartial and independent. These preconditions are made prominent in the following 
maneuvering strategy enacted in the confrontation stage in an Al Sharq Al Awsat op-ed 
piece (example 3). The author, Hussein Shobokshi, identifies the Neoconservatives as 
liable for crime (for deception and lies) despite his loyalty (and business connection) to 
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the Saudi family who in turn maintain excellent relationships with President Bush and 
his team. In pragma-dialectical terms, this maneuver proves to be preconditioned by an 
institutional opportunity (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009).  
  (3)  Today the mulberry leaves fall one after another in a flagrant, shameful manner 
that reveals the lies and deception by a group of the Neoconservatives in their 
stupid proposal on the "benefits" of liberating Iraq – this is what they labelled 
their military adventure -- and how that would lead to the birth of a new Middle 
East generation. (Hussein Shobokshi, Asharq Al Awsat) 
This political situation establishes for Arab FP experts and columnists some of its most 
influential, though unofficially stated- institutional rules and conventions. Similar 
ideologically- bounded institutional conditions even apply to experts in Gulf States, 
Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Syria. Whether the political system reigning in those states is 
Islamic or secular, the authoritarian regimes resort to omni-balancing and double 
standards to manage the situations. The op-ed pieces offer for these regimes a platform 
for their diplomatic relations, even though most of this work is kept private among state 
leaders. Communication in internationally circulating media establishes debate with the 
international community, a wide public mostly empowered by democratic systems and 
able to change the course of crucial political events.  With this mindset and orientation 
Arab experts adaptation to the audience is managed. Adapting to the audience is one of 
the three levels of strategic maneuvering in which the protagonist attempts to create 
communion with the antagonists or even gratify them. For this purpose, the Arab op-ed 
authors, with diplomacy in mind, show to the audience their adherence to political 
values of freedom and democracy as a strategy to secure credibility and gain the 
audience trust. The maneuver also attempts to take advantage from the audience 
commitment to these values and establish them as starting point in their respective 
discussion. In the following extract (example.4) from an op-ed piece issued in 
Azzaman, Najah Ali in a confrontational maneuvering describes the Iraqis´ enthusiasm 
for establishing democracy in Iraq. The strategic maneuvering categorized as an 
adaptation to audience draws on the commitment of the international readership to 
universal values to incite their sympathy with the vulnerable Iraqis in their position of 
betrayed people. The appeal to democracy as a universal value attempts to create 
communion between Iraqis and the international community in their embracement of 
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this value and their hope in the US´ role in achieving it. This strategy implicitly invites 
the international community to mediate in the conflict between the US and Iraqis.  
(4)  Most Iraqis, among them those who had signed up to the U.S. project and those 
who supported it had hopes that George Bush‘s nice promises of establishing a 
democratic system that will be unique in the Middle East will be materialized. 
But the winds did not blow the ‗democratic‘ way. (Najah Ali, Azzaman)  
Other cases of maneuvering constrained by the institutional call to use op-ed pieces an 
instrument for diplomacy manifest themselves in the arguers´ focus on the US 
perspective and interests. The targeted audiences in most of these cases are the 
American citizens addressed as powerful decision makers in the US FP processes. 
Example (5) illustrates the adaptation-to-audience strategic maneuvering through which 
arguer Raghida Dergham established the US supremacy and interest as a prerequisite for 
solutions to the Iraq problem.   
(5)  (…) it is possible to render the withdrawal useful, so that the US can re-occupy 
the driver's seat, reshuffle the strategic deck, and see itself, the only superpower, 
retain its standing. (Raghida Dergham, Dar Al Hayat)  
 
The arguer´s proposal for solution places the US interests and benefits at the center of 
the standpoint. The position is made attractive to American audience in general by 
drawing on US ideals, namely leadership and supremacy and enhancing the persuasive 
appeal of the proposal to withdraw from Iraq.     
 
Within these constraints, the Arab political debaters struggle in their endeavor to 
influence the public opinion and seek to establish their credibility. Other than the 
diplomatic aspirations managed with the American and the international audience 
through op-ed pieces, Omni-balancing brings about Arabism as a prominent resource 
for values. Indeed, the strategy is typically encouraged by the regime in order to dismiss 
any suspicion of its compliance with the US occupation of Iraq. Opinion leaders 
maintain their nationalistic oratory, initially geared to their citizens, with international 
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audience probably as self identification strategy and a demonstration of a cultural and 
moral communion between Arabs. Their ideological references lie somewhere between 
the two major ideological poles: secular Arabism and Islamic fundamentalism. After the 
decline of any hope to create an Arab nation or at least union to strengthen the Arab 
position in the world, nationalists´ enthusiasm started to weaken leaving more room for 
political Islam to take over. However, the aspiration to a unified Arab nation capable of 
confronting foreign assaults – the essence of the pan Arabism- has always survived in 
the mind of Arabs mainly during crises times. This longing to a common nation in the 
sense of the ―imagined political communities‖ (Anderson, 1991: 6) has definitely 
influenced Arabs´ attitudes and reactions to the recent events. Pan Arabists have always 
reproved the US and the West in general for their imperialistic behavior and regarded 
their policies in the region as suppressive of the Arabs ambition to achieve real 
independence and growth.  
 
Arabism as a nationalist ideology has strongly shaped the Arab identity within 
international relations at least in the popular sense. Nevertheless, the political scenes in 
the region include quite diverse ideological orientations which in practice serve their 
economic and local (immediate) power interests. Drawing on these values in op-ed 
pieces qualify as a strategic maneuvering, regardless of the specific aims and intentions 
of each arguer. The maneuvering may be used as a self identification strategy intended to 
re-position Arabs within the debate and make justice to them by exposing to the world 
their positive values. It may also be interpreted as a smokescreen strategy encouraged by 
the regime for purely diplomatic reasons. In fact, drawing on values in political discourse 
represents a wining card in diplomacy and showing dignity and pride may enhance 
positive international reception of the arguers´ standpoints and their proposals to solve 
the US-Iraq and ―Arab‖ conflict. The state leaders in authoritarian regimes promote these 
practices as a moral edifice for their internal and external legitimacy. In example (6) 
below, the arguer, Sabry Shabrawi, uses Arabism as a main resource for developing his 
argumentation line. The strategy also draws on the audience commitments to universal 
human values of pride and dignity in order to delineate the situation of Arabs as victims 
of world powers´ oppression.  
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(6)  The stance of the US and Israel was manifest in their support for dictatorships 
and repressive governments in the Arab world, slighting Arab pride and dignity, a 
basic value in Arab culture and a significant element of the Arab mindset (…)  
King Faisal is recorded to have said following the 1967 War: "we can forgo 
luxury and live in tents, eating milk and dates before we allow strong nations to 
push us around." 
 
The example above mentioned is an argument from authority to support the claim that 
Arabs are dignified and proud people and that they cannot tolerate the humiliation 
caused by the US occupation. The premise from authority is a case in point of the 
hypocrisy of the regime (King Faisal´s citation) and the pretence of its spokesmen (op-ed 
author). Mere observation of the family flamboyant lifestyle, their domestic policies of 
repression, the denigration of its Saudi citizens and the violations of basic human rights 
(Human Rights Watch 2013 World Report), indicates the double standard policies 
adopted by Arabia. These policies create constraints on the strategic maneuvering of 
Arab FP experts and precondition their argumentative practices.      
 
5. 5. Summary 
The chapter presented a brief account of the mindsets with which FP experts in the US 
and in the Arab world approach the Iraq issue and expose it publically for debate. Based 
on Pragma-dialectics, the macro-contexts of the FP op-ed pieces are explored in the two 
cultures in order to identify the kinds of institutionally-constrained preconditions that 
apply to strategic maneuvering in op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type. 
Pragma-dialectics draws on the notion of activity type and urges for the characterization 
of the argumentative practices preconditioned by institutional conventions and aims. 
Institutional aims are derived from the empirical practices of conventionalized types of 
argumentative discourse and are expressed in terms of their contribution to social and 
political processes (Van Eemeren 2011). Exploring these aims in the context of the 
current corpora seeks to trace the influence of extrinsic characteristics of argumentative 
discourse basically those derived from its context-depended institutional aims.  
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The chapter initiated with an examination of the institutional point of FP op-ed pieces in 
general and the role of the participants´ different perspectives in determining these 
institutional goals. Three experts´ professions were described: the FP analyst typically 
serving in think tanks, the politician of occasional contribution and the FP columnist. 
Their different professional perspectives create different institutional conventions which 
accordingly constrain their discursive practices. Section 5.3 provided a characterization 
of the op-ed piece on FP as a particular argumentative activity type. In this section, the 
institutional argumentative practices in this activity type were assessed in relation to the 
ideal model of critical discussion. The last section focused on the preconditions for 
strategic maneuvering in the American and the Arab cultures. More specifically, it 
looked at the participants´ mindsets and their nation/states´ ideological frameworks 
constraining the resolution process and influencing the maneuvering performed in the 
op-ed pieces. Discussion of the professional mindsets in each culture as constraints for 
maneuvering was coupled with examples.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE IRAQ DEBATE IN THE 
OP-ED PIECES  
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the analysis of FP experts´ discursive 
construction of the Iraq debate in the American and Arab op-ed pieces issued between 
late 2006 and September 2007. Based on the sociocognitive approach of CDA, the 
analysis focuses on some crucial aspects involved in the contextually-controlled 
strategic production of the op-ed discourses, namely the arguers choices related to their 
selection of topics and their construction of contexts. In the processes of their discursive 
production, arguers make choices from the mental models they construct of the war 
events, and, these choices, reflected in context models, enable them to produce their 
discourse in such a way that it is ―optimally appropriate in the social situation (van Dijk, 
2009: 7). The first strategic construction in discourse examined is the selection of topics 
and issues addressed in the debate. The semantic dimension (semantic macro-structures) 
is analyzed in order to determine both the disagreement spaces from which arguers 
select their positions and their goals behind these choices. Topic selection is also 
explored from a rhetorical perspective by identifying the stases and the oratory types of 
discourses. The second issue examined is the arguers´ discursive contextual 
construction of setting and some aspects of participants´ category such as identities and 
roles. The third choice examined is the discursive construction of purpose in actions and 
the arguers´ modes of representing social actions in the Iraq problem. The three 
analytical levels were chosen for their potential in revealing the choices arguers make 
when discursively constructing the Iraq issue. The analysis of choices forming the 
arguers´ stances and goals hopes to delineate the ideological foundations on which they 
are mapped.  
 
6. 2. Discursive construction choices in topics  
In any argumentative setting and,  more particularly, in the context of the current 
political Iraq war debate corpora, the kinds of topics selected for debates do not only 
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point to the range of issues raised for discussion, but also to their significance for the 
debaters and,  probably, to their purposes for choosing them. Political actors generally 
select those topics identified as problems and spell them out with the aim of resolving 
them or inciting action to deal with them. Selecting topics for public debates is a 
political decision that reflects the political group interests and it is definitely governed 
and controlled by their ideologies. The section presents the results from the analysis of 
topic selections where the focus lies in identifying the semantic and the pragmatic 
macro structures as well as determining the stasis and oratory types of the topics based 
on the rhetorical account. These findings allow for both determining the disagreement 
spaces from which the arguers selected their topics (the limits of the group debate in 
each culture) and identifying the goals of their issue framing.    
 
   
6. 2. 1. Semantic macrostructures 
The analysis of semantic macrostructures in the current corpora was carried out through 
discourse reconstruction, a Pragma-dialectics´ analytic tool that employs semantic rules 
of inference to identify discourse semantic (and pragmatic) macrostructures. 
Reconstruction involves examining the points at issue and carrying out a transformation 
process after which the relevant parts of the discussion were made prominent, especially 
implicit propositions. By identifying the semantic macro structures the main purpose, of 
course, is not to merely determine the topics (a semantic dimension of analysis) but, 
more importantly, attempt to explain how these topics reflect the ideologically biased 
contexts from which the arguers make their discursive construction choices.       
 
The results from data analysis point toward the difference between the American and 
the Arab arguers´ approaches to the Iraq issue in its much contested Surge period.  
Indeed, the standpoints reconstructed from the critical discussions show a common line 
within the same corpus set and denote the kinds of disagreement spaces from which the 
arguers tend to select their topics.  Table (6.1) displays the main topics selected by the 
American arguers and the points chosen for discussion from these topics.   
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Semantic macrostructures/ topics % Positions adopted  % 
Withdrawing troops from Iraq 73.3 The US should not withdraw troops 
from Iraq 
46.6 
The US should withdraw troops 
from Iraq  
6.6 
There are alternative solutions to 
Iraq war  
20 
Decision-makers in the Iraq issues 16.6 Politicians are manipulative 10 
Politicians are incompetent  6.6  
Morality in the Iraq war 6.6 US troops are innocent 6.6 
The situation in Iraq  3.3 The situation in Iraq is dreadful  3.3 
Table 6.1. Semantic macrostructures in the American corpus and positions related to 
each topic 
 
As table 6.1 indicates, four topics have been identified as semantic macrostructures in 
the American op-ed corpus, which shows that there is a clear trend in the arguers´ 
choices. Indeed, up to 70% of the discussions were advanced around finding the right 
solution to the Iraq deteriorating situation. This high percentage indicates that this was 
the most important issue in the corpus and probably in the public debate on Iraq in the 
US, hence constituting the main disagreement space from which the experts´ positions 
were taken. The second most important topic is found in a relatively smaller percentage, 
in 20% of the pieces, and is related to decision-makers handling of the Iraq issue. The 
third topic is concerned with moral issues in the war and is only raised in 6.6% of the 
corpus, while only 3.3% seem to be interested in the fourth topic on the diagnosis of the 
situation in Iraq.     
Finding a solution to the Iraq problem, as the number one topic in the semantic 
macrostructures in the American discourse corpus, hints to a hot issue in the Iraq 
debate. After four years of occupation in Iraq, the situation was alarming because of the 
escalating violence and the US forces remained unable to control the situation, nor to go 
on with its mission of reconstructing Iraq´ s infrastructure and assist the birth of its 
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democracy. Therefore, solving this problem was highest in the FP experts´ agenda as it 
was crucial for the US global reputation. Around this main topic more than two third of 
the experts selected their views which have been divided into three different positions. 
On top of the list was the call against the US troops´ withdrawal from Iraq, taking up 
almost half of the topics discussed (46.6%) as opposed to only 6.6% calling to withdraw 
troops from Iraq. The sum of 53.3% of the arguers´ choice of this topic hints to the 
controversial positions among the American political elite on whether to withdraw the 
troops or stay the course in Iraq, while 20% of the experts suggest solving the situation 
through other policies and decisions. The three positions adopted around this topic 
illustrate the debaters´ eagerness to make the right policy decisions and to promptly 
resolve the Iraq policy crisis. The examples below from the finding-solutions topic 
illustrate the controversy. While examples (1) and (2) show standpoints advanced 
against withdrawal from Iraq, example (3) calls for leaving Iraq.  
(1) There is enough good happening on the battle field of Iraq today that Congress 
should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008. (O´ Hanlon and Pollack. 
New York Times) 
(2)  We are not really in Iraq for Iraq´ s sake now, but for our own. (Ralph Peter, NY 
Post)  
(3)  It is time for the waiting to end and to our troops to start to come home (Byrd 
and Clinton, The Daily News)  
The second topic identified in the corpus is covered by only 20% of the arguers who 
deal with the performances of politicians in matter of Iraq policy decisions. This is the 
second disagreement space, and it points to the FP experts´ concern with the efficiency 
of US policies in Iraq. Within this space, the positions either go around politicians´ 
manipulations of facts, as example (4) shows, or around the Bush administration‘s 
incompetence in dealing with violence in Iraq and the consequences of their poor 
behavior on the success of the US mission, as in example (5) below:  
(4)   Our military is now being employed for political purposes (Ralph Peters USA 
Today)  
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(5)  Bush is still counting on a miracle that will allow him to jerk the Iraqi 
government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki around to his way of thinking and 
operating (Cragg Hines, Houston Chronicle)  
 
The third topic in our corpus, which is concerned with moral issues in the Iraq war, 
points to a different disagreement space related to the justice of conducting the war on 
Iraq. It is surprising to find very few op-ed pieces with semantic macrostructures related 
to this disagreement space in the corpus, as only 6.6% chose to advance positions 
around this ethical issue, while the international public opinion was highly suspicious of 
the US intentions from invading and occupying Iraq and also from its troops´ conduct 
with civilians. As example (6) shows, however, the positions taken from this space are 
supportive of the troop‘s behavior in spite of the increasing international condemnations 
of the US occupation and the impact of the troops´ scandal on the Abou Graib tortures.  
(6)  Second-guessing how Marines should act under hostile before the facts are 
known is not only unfair, but dishonors the immense courage required to survive 
in the midst of such an incommunicable experience (Kathleen Parker, Chicago 
Tribune)  
 
The fourth and last topic in this corpus is about the situation in Iraq, a disagreement 
space that is represented here only in 3.3% of the pieces in the corpus. In this space, the 
arguments are expected to go around how the predicting future condition of the war 
from the analysis of current situation. The disagreement in this space may arise due to a 
difference towards facts and their sources, amount of access to these facts and the 
methods used in the diagnosis.     
In the Arab corpus, there are five topics around which discussions have been raised. 
These topics indicate the kind of disagreement spaces from which the arguers selected 
their standpoints. The next table displays findings from the analysis of the semantic 
macrostructures in the Arab Op-ed discourse corpus. 
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Semantic macrostructures/topics % Positions adopted  % 
The US actions in Iraq (morality) 46.6 The US is responsible for the Iraq 
disaster /crimes 
43.3 
The world is the US accomplice in 
the crimes committed against Iraq 
3.3 
US agenda in Iraq 23.3 The US has hidden agendas in Iraq 23.3 
Withdrawing troops from Iraq 20 There are alternative strategies to 
Iraq issue 
13.3 
Americans should act against their 
politicians to solve Iraq 
6.6  
The situation/policy in Iraq  6.6 The US policy is going to fail   6.6 
The US decision makers  3.3 Bipartisan decisions are hard to 
implement 
3.3 
Table 6.2.  Semantic macrostructures and positions related to each topic in the Arab 
corpus 
 
As Table 6.2 indicates, 4.6% of the op-ed pieces in the corpus discuss the US actions in 
Iraq from a moral perspective. The topic does not cover a specific policy as the one then 
employed in Iraq (named Counter-insurgency). Instead, it is related to the US policies in 
general in Iraq and in the Middle East, as part of an overarching policy in the region. 
The second most discussed topic is the US agenda in Iraq and is selected by 23.3% of 
arguers. The third topic is that of finding solutions to the Iraq issue. Within this kind of 
disagreement space, 20% of the arguers discuss the most efficient policies and decisions 
which could save Iraq from an eminent disaster. The fourth topic is related to evaluating 
the situation in Iraq and predicting its future course. Finally, 3.3% of arguers select the 
topic of decision makers to assess their behavior from an efficiency perspective.  
 
The highly exploited disagreement space shown in the results on semantic 
macrostructures´ analysis indicates the arguers´ apprehension of the US actions in Iraq. 
The pieces concerned with the morality of the Iraq war amounting to almost half of the 
corpus (46.6%) belong to the disagreement space related to the question of justice in 
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conducting the war on Iraq. In this space, the Arab positions were mainly related to the 
way the US implemented its policies particularly the actions of the US forces and their 
role in the expansion of terrorism. This is illustrated in Example (7) below: 
(7)   The U.S. removed one dictator and replaced him with scores of other dictators 
and Iraqis have to obey all of them (Najah Ali, Azzaman)  
The second topic covered by 23.3% of the op-ed pieces is related to US agenda and 
mission in Iraq. In this space, the disagreement goes on the credibility of the US 
intentions and the character of the operations it was carrying out there. This theme of 
trust is widely covered across Arab media networks through extensive political debates. 
The debaters‘ positions were divided between those who see the US forces as essential 
in the fight against terrorism and in preventing it from reaching other Arab states and 
those questioning the US intentions in Iraq and its motivations behind the Iraq 
―reconstruction‖ mission. Example (8) illustrates the selection of this topic. 
(8)   I believe that there are some undisclosed reasons for the launching and 
continuation of the war despite the knowledge that Iraq did not possess any 
weapons of mass destruction or never posed a threat to the United States. 
(Hassan Tahsin, Arab News)  
Finding solutions, as a third topic of discussion, points to a different disagreement 
space, covered in the Arab corpus by 20% of the arguers. This is the same number-one 
space in the American FP debates in our corpus and definitely a hot issue in the US 
public debates during the ―counter-insurgency‖ policy in 2007. From this space, the 
disagreement goes around bringing forth the right and most pertinent policy to save 
Iraq. FP experts discussed the US policy and their views diverged on whether to 
continue this policy, which only needed time to produce satisfactory results (in the 
views of some experts), or to change the course of actions and find other options to stop 
the disaster. In the current corpus, the positions selected from this space are only those 
proposing a change of plans, which means no case supports ―counter-insurgency‖, as 
example (9) below indicates:  
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(9)  The success of Bush's new agenda in Iraq and the wider Middle East depends on 
whether it can be realized without necessarily engaging in another war with Iran 
or Syria (Asghar Kazemi, Syria Times)  
The op-ed pieces dealing with this topic reveal the Arab experts´ belief in their more 
perceptive estimation of the situation and their more pertinent perspective when it 
comes to solving policy issues in their region.  
The fourth and relatively small amount of macro structures (6.6%) related to the US 
policy in Iraq belongs to a disagreement space involved with evaluating the efficiency 
of the policy according to technical standards. The space is also shared by US experts 
who seek to assess a present FP situation as a means to predict a future situation or as a 
basis for future decisions. This kind of topic is normally picked up by foreign policy 
analysts; those experts who are professionally trained to elaborate their assessment from 
research and analysis and based on scientifically testable data and methods. The 
objective-like stance typically characterizing this kind of perspective is manifested 
through the use of policy analysis (neutral) language, as shown in example (10) below:  
(10)  Lately, the Middle East witnessed a number of important political, diplomatic 
and military developments which are worthy of research and analysis as they 
may well be the beginning of new policy issues in the region. (…) The recent 
developments are as follows: (…).  (M. Akf Jamal, Gulf News) 
These findings about topics may lead to the conclusion that the two groups have drawn 
on topics from different disagreement spaces. While the main disagreement space from 
which American arguers seem to select most of their topics (73.3%) is that of putting 
together efficient solutions for the crisis, almost half (46.6%) of the Arab arguers make 
their topic selection from a space related to the US invasion, occupation and military 
actions and policies in Iraq. This divergence in disagreements points to the fact that 
these two elite groups hold different kinds of apprehensions towards such a complex 
political issue, hence they have incongruent goals for advancing their respective 
argumentations.  
The analysis of the semantic macro-structures of the op-ed discourses yielded insightful 
results on the strategies of topic selection and the reasons why they are adopted in the 
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discursive construction of the Iraq issue. Contrasting the two groups of arguers helped 
determining the differences between each group strategies and explaining the reasons 
behind them. The semantic analysis helped identify the disagreement spaces from which 
topics were selected in each cultural elite group and examine their scopes. It also 
pointed to the goals meant to be achieved by the discursive construction and reflected 
the arguers´ most crucial contextual construction (aims). A discussion of these strategies 
is presented below. 
As the results showed, the American arguers in the corpus focus on the topic of finding 
solutions to Iraq, which is identified as a monopolizing disagreement space in this 
debate. Discussing this issue in a public space is part of the deliberative character of 
political decisions in a democratic system and denotes the experts´ engagement along 
with the citizens in the process of policy making. From a different space, other arguers 
in the same corpus focus on criticizing the performance of the politicians in charge of 
the Iraq decisions. The two disagreement spaces are different in that the first is on 
policy making and the second is on accountability. However, the same function has 
been appreciated from raising these two topics, namely that of calling to action, since 
promoting a policy, the first case, and reproaching politicians for policy 
mismanagement, the second case, may both be interpreted as a call to take political 
action. Calling to action, which is the discussion goal in 90% of the cases, points to the 
nature of the political practices of these arguers (including their discursive practices). 
The arguers are highly involved in FP decision making and they mostly aim at 
motivating the public to take political actions. Even more, it could indicate that the 
arguers are, indeed, the decision makers, on whom FP and the course of the Iraq 
situation in particular depend. This leads to the conclusion that no room seems to be left 
for other disagreement spaces to be addressed, discarding from debate such topics as the 
US occupation to Iraq or goals in Iraq.     
In the Arab corpus, the topics raised for discussion differ from those raised in the 
American corpus in that they focus more on accountability than on providing solutions 
for the Iraq crisis. Indeed, up to 70% of the argumentations advanced around two topics 
(US crimes and US agenda) share the same goal of denouncing the US policies in Iraq 
by alleging their offenses and hidden agendas. Both topics are meant to expose the US 
actions in Iraq as criminal and as deviating from the benevolent image it is trying to sell 
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to the world, alleging that its mission is driven by imperialistic ambitions rather than the 
intention of rebuilding Iraq as the US officially claims. These arguers aim at holding the 
US accountable for its actions and policies through their public debate in the 
international space: They probably hope their voice could reach and change the US 
public opinion and the voters‘ decisions. Hence, by choosing these topics the arguers 
engage in an action of protest, as a form of contention to the US policies in their 
regions. Protest seems to be the only political opportunity left to this group in their 
attempt to take part in the international debate and make effect on public opinion. 
By choosing these specific topics, the arguers seem to achieve their aims from 
participating in the debate on Iraq. While the American arguers here are decision-
making- oriented FP experts, the Arab arguers come out as protest-oriented. Each group 
of experts certainly derives its orientation and stance from the kind of national power 
their states hold in the international order. Power refers, as in political sciences, to 
―a measure of influence or control over outcomes, events, actors and issues in 
international relations. The qualification of a state position in the world is measured 
from its weight, significance, or its (geo) political power or potential (Kegley & 
Blanton, 2011).  American experts´ topic selection reflects the kind of power position 
they enjoy, as masters of the situations, while Arab experts´ topics apply to a weaker 
position in the system and more specifically in the context of the Iraq conflict. The 
decisions involved have the most effect on audience reception and understanding of the 
Iraq issue. More importantly, they may even shape public and international opinion and 
influence the collective attitudes and political actions affecting the course of events in 
this internationally critical conflict situation 
 
6. 2. 2. Classical rhetoric perspective on topic selections 
The rhetorical account contributes to our critical analysis of the choices made by 
arguers in their discursive construction of the Iraq issue by explaining the connection 
between the ways arguers find issues for discussion and their ambitions for making such 
decisions. The focus is not of course on the aboutness of discourses (as in semantic 
macrostructures) but rather on the situation created by the arguer for these topics to 
develop. Two levels of analysis were considered. The first was concerned with locating 
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the oratory types designed to optimize the purpose of the speech of the op-ed 
discussions and the second focused on determining their stases or their approach to 
problem identification.  
6. 2. 2. 1. The oratory types 
The oratory types of the speeches were identified while carrying out the discourse 
reconstruction of the two op-ed corpora.  Each op-ed piece in the two data corpora was 
classified into one of the three oratory types: judicial (or forensic), deliberative or 
epideictic. Below, the categorization results for each data corpus are displayed and the 
ideological implications of these choices on the construction of the political debates 
about Iraq are discussed. 
 
American data oratory types analysis 
As can be seen from the findings in Table 6.3 below illustrating the distribution of the 
three different oratory types in the American corpus, up to 2/3 of the op-ed pieces topics 
are handled from a deliberative perspective, while 26.6% of the pieces are epideictic 
and focus on assessing policies and politicians. Only 6.6% are judicial types of oratory 
devoted to judge policies or actions as just or unjust. These findings show a clear 
inclination of this group of arguers towards deliberation as the decision making kind of 
argumentation. 
Oratory types % 
Deliberative 66.6 
Epideictic 23.3 
Judicial 10 
Table 6.3. Distribution of oratory types in the American corpus 
 
A topic approached from a deliberative perspective orients arguments to the future and 
towards the advantages/benefits of making a particular decision. Deliberative rhetoric is 
regarded as ―the most pragmatic kind of rhetoric‖ (Heinrichs 2008: 30), as it is 
illustrated in the two examples below. In example (11), the arguer attempts to dissuade 
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the audience (particularly Congressmen) from deciding to withdraw troops from Iraq 
(using ―we should not), hence calls them to give an opportunity to the counter 
insurgency policy to continue, by listing all the success it was achieving. In example 
(12), the arguer encourages the audience to wait (give the policy a chance to prove its 
efficiency), as an only way to decide. The topic is oriented to the future state of the Iraq 
issue.   
 (11)  But we should not allow individual atrocities to obscure the larger picture. A 
new campaign has just begun, it is already yielding important results, and its 
effects are increasing (Kimberly Kagan, The Wall Street Journal)  
 
 (12)  The only way we will know for sure whether the tide can be turned is to 
continue the policy and wait. (Michael Totten, Daily News)  
 
The choice of the very topic of finding a solution to the Iraq issue indicates a choice to 
make a decision. Whether arguing for withdrawing from Iraq or for staying the course 
to let the policy continue, the arguers who explicitly adopt a deliberative perspective 
make it clear they are supporting a future decision.  
Most of the remaining op-ed pieces go about evaluating the actions of the people related 
to the Iraq endeavor.  Indeed, around 23.3% of the topics are epideictic types of oratory, 
where arguers engage in blaming or praising people (politicians, opponents, soldiers, 
enemies, etc.) for their behaviors or their performances in relation to the Iraq issue. 
Many op-ed pieces focus on key decisions makers such as opponent politicians and 
blame them for their wrong doing or even more depreciating them for their immorality. 
Some epideictic op-ed pieces have a directive macro-act, as the ones calling for action. 
Still, their focus on judging the past performances of politicians, characterized by the 
use of the past tense and the focus on values, make them epideictic. In example (13) 
below, the arguer refers to the immoral behavior of politicians contemplating staying in 
Iraq. Even though the illocutionary force is interpreted as an urge for action (most 
probably a change in public opinion), the oratory focuses on blaming politicians for 
using troops to gain power. The behavior is seen from a moral power perspective, as an 
unpatriotic act. The call to action hence is not approached as a deliberative by 
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attempting to convince audience of the advantage of a decision, but it is rather taken 
from a moral perspective making the speech an issue of values and morality.      
(13)  We owe that much to our troops. They don't face the mere forfeiture of a few 
congressional seats but the loss of their lives. Our military is now being 
employed for political purposes. It's unworthy of our nation. (Ralph Peters, USA 
Today)  
 
Much less still is dedicated to the judicial kind of speech (only 10%). This means that 
there are very few arguers in this corpus who engage in making charges and in 
discussing the innocence or guilt of the people involved in the Iraq issue or in assessing 
the war policies and actions for the purpose of bringing to justice their actors, as 
example (14) shows. 
(14)  We gave them a civil war? Why? Because we failed to prevent it? (Charles 
Krauthammer, Washington Post)  
In this sequence of moves, while the arguer attempts to obtain a reaction from his 
audience (by means of directive speech acts of questions), he is definitely seeking to 
refute the accusations made to the American troops of allegedly provoking a civil war in 
Iraq. However, defending the US positions and actions against international accusations 
is inconsiderable in the American corpus. Indeed, the experts in this corpus show little 
interest in issues of justice or the lack of it of past actions of US actors, whether these 
actions are related to policies implemented in Iraq and the consequences caused by them 
or to the occupation itself as the one responsible for the high death rate. Ignoring the 
judicial approach clearly points to the fact that US actions in Iraq are not subject to guilt 
or innocence at least for the arguers in our corpus. The massive preparatory rhetoric 
legitimizing the war on Iraq, as a war to protect America from terrorism and to liberate 
Iraqis from despotism, has boiled down into the naturalization of occupation in the 
American public opinion to the extent that there is no need after four years of the 
invasion to approach such issues again.      
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Arab data oratory types analysis 
 The findings from the rhetorical analysis of the Arab op-ed corpus are illustrated in 
Table 6.4 below. Exactly half of the op-ed discussions are epideictic oratory type, which 
means that Arab arguers in this data corpus are keener on advancing criticism over the 
actions and characters of opponents than on proposing solutions to the Iraq problem. 
The 26.6% of arguers approaching the issue from a judicial perspective consider the 
justice or injustice of certain policies and actions and make charges or accusations 
accordingly. Only 23.3% focus on the choice to make to solve the Iraq problem, thus 
relatively few arguers participate in deliberation process by proposing policies and 
arguing for their implementations 
 
Oratory types % 
Epideictic 50 
Judicial 26.6 
Deliberative 23.3 
      Table 6.4. Distribution of oratory types in the Arab corpus 
Hence, even though research about this corpus arguers´ institutional and professional 
profiles revealed that almost 50% are political analysts who are expected to assess 
political situations and propose solutions and decisions, the results from their oratory 
type analysis inform us that they are more engaged into criticism and more determined 
to raise their audience awareness on the magnitude of their American opponents‘ 
actions than in the role of the analyst who directs audience to decision making. Example 
(15) illustrates the case of a political analyst choosing to approach the topic of troops 
withdrawal from an epideictic angle, not exactly to advance any direct position on the 
decision but rather by means of discrediting the ―decision-maker‖ bush) through blame 
and accusation  
(15)  The historic reference (Bush warning from the Vietnam fate if troops were to 
withdraw from Iraq) is at best another display of Bush‘s ignorance and at worst a 
deliberate attempt to distort the truth. (Al Harthi, Arab News)  
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6. 2. 2. 2. The Stasis or finding the issue 
In stasis analysis, the key points of disagreement raised in argumentation are examined. 
The stases allow us to determine the central kind of question the discourse addresses, 
which can be often established owing to the very choice of the topic. Since the stasis 
describes the logic inherent in the development of an issue, it powerfully hints to the 
conditions making the arguers choose the topics and further clarifies their goals from 
these choices (See examples below). The standpoints advanced for discussion in the 
American and Arab op-ed corpora have been analyzed and classified into one of the 
four stases.  
 
 
American op-ed Stasis  
 
Table 6.5, below, displays the distribution of stases in the corpora and their sizes in 
relation to the different topics raised for discussion. After classifying the American data, 
the results indicate the dominance of the translative type of stasis in this corpus, where 
more than half of the topics are approached from an action plan perspective. The use of 
this type of the stasis exclusively occurs with those arguers selecting the topic of 
withdrawal from Iraq. In the second place comes the qualitative stasis with a little above 
a quarter of the corpus (26.6%) approaching their topics from an evaluative perspective. 
Both conjectural and definitional stases have been employed by the arguers with 
relatively smaller degree, specifically 10% in each case.  
 
Topic/Status Conjectural Definitional Qualitative Translative Total 
Withdrawal from Iraq 3.3 6.6 10 53.3 73.3 
Decision-makers for Iraq 3.3 3.3 10 0 16.6 
Moral issues 0 0 6.6 0 6.6 
The war situation 3.3. 0 0 0 3.3 
Total stases 10 10 26.6 53.3 100 
Table 6.5. Stasis of standpoints/positions in the American corpus  
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The considerable amount of arguers´ use of the translative stasis simply denotes that 
they seek action from the selected topics. The translative stasis asks the question of 
―What decisions should be made? This choice may be interpreted, as above stated, as an 
indication that a high number of arguers assume the existence of a problem, agree on its 
nature and on its quality and that they only seek taking action in its respect. Hence, by 
choosing to talk on withdrawal from a translative perspective, they presume a few 
things, namely that the current order in Iraq exists, (there is an activity), it belongs to a 
specific nature (a mission), and it is already qualified (as enduring trouble), and that 
what matters is the action to take in order to solve it. In this case, whether the activity is 
good or bad is not the issue, even though along the deliberation on decision, evaluation 
is usually provided but in this case as supportive argumentation for the claim, but not 
exactly as the main essence given to the topic. This stasis is illustrated in example (16) 
bellow, where the statement on the existence of a policy and what it is doing (presuming 
its nature (mission) and its quality (good) are to establish a starting point for the 
arguer´s position. This positions (as one of the main components in the semantic 
structure of the text) is then advanced posing a question of action, in which the arguer 
asserts there is a choice to make in Iraq.  
 
(16)  There, the battle of Baghdad is now under way.  A new commander, Gen. David 
Petraeus, has taken command, having been confirmed by the Senate, 81-0, just a 
few weeks ago. And a new strategy is being put into action, with thousands of 
additional American soldiers streaming into the Iraqi capital. Congress thus 
faces a choice in the weeks and months ahead. Will we allow our actions to be 
driven by the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq--or by the unchanging 
political and ideological positions long ago staked out in Washington?   What 
ultimately matters more to us: the real fight over there, or the political fight over 
here? (Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street Journal) 
The arguer here chooses to talk on withdrawal, by spotlighting the decision to be made 
as the most important things in focus in the issue. As the rhetorical question he asks 
show, his position arises from his anger on the politicians´ disagreement on the issue 
that in his view is an obstacle for the progress of the policy.  Argumentation then may 
devote a great deal to the criticism of politicians (which it actually does) and to the 
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consequences of their ideologically based conflict, an argument chosen to discredit 
counter- positions (that calling for withdrawal).  The main question posed however, is 
on the right action to choose, that of the translative kind of stasis.  
The next example (17) is taken from an op-ed that shares the same disagreement space 
as example (16) on the withdrawal from Iraq. The op-ed has been classified as a 
deliberative type of oratory, that is, one that is geared towards the future and is calling 
for action. However, the stasis in this op-ed is conjectural rather than translative (as it is 
the case for the majority of the deliberative kinds). The question posed is not the action 
to take, but rather is to accept a fact, namely the existence of Al Qaeda as a main threat. 
The call to action in this op-ed piece is the macro speech act, as it is interpreted from the 
sequence of specific acts, but it remains implicit in the text. 
(17)  Al Qaeda is in Iraq, intentionally inflaming sectarian hostilities, deliberately 
pushing for full scale civil war. They do this by launching attacks against Shia, 
Sunni, Kurds and coalition forces (...). Five weeks ago, I came into a village near 
Baqubah with American and Iraqi soldiers. Al Qaeda had openly stated Baqubah 
was their worldwide headquarters (...). Anyone who says Al Qaeda is not one of 
the primary problems in Iraq is simply ignorant of the facts. (Michael Yon, Daily 
News) 
After making a conjecture (identifying Al Qaeda as responsible for civil War), the 
arguer devotes argumentation to proving the existence of a problem (conjecture), rather 
than assuming it already does and focusing on its bad consequences (qualitative) or 
moving forward to taking actions against it (translative). However, it seems that by 
choosing this initial kind of stasis, the arguer has been capable of going from there 
through the rest of the stases (define the problem, evaluate it and then translate it) the 
way he wishes to. This is what he actually does by choosing conjecture.      
 
In example (18), the arguer grants the topic he selects (troops´ withdrawal) a qualitative 
stasis. The main question posed is related to values, as the stasis is based on criticizing 
and blaming politicians even though, the aim is to change audience´s position on 
withdrawal,. By qualifying the decision to withdrawal as a crime, he places justice at the 
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heart of the issue, while the call to action (audience opinion change and action) comes 
about as secondary.  
 
(18)  Even as our troops make serious progress against al-Qaeda-in-Iraq and other 
extremists, Congress - including Republican members - is sending the terrorists 
a message: "Don't lose heart, we'll save you!" (…) for purely political reasons - 
next year's elections - cowards on Capitol Hill are spurning the courage of our 
troops on the ground. (Ralph Peters, New York Post) 
The arguer here does not attempt to convince the audience on the advantages of staying 
in Iraq against the bad consequences of leaving, as decision making typically proceeds. 
He chooses to make it an issue of justice by takes judging withdrawal as criminal, 
making in the process his position (staying in Iraq) the only right option rather than a 
proposition (as it would be in a translative stasis) subject to justification and defense.  
 
Arab Op-ed Stasis  
As indicated in the results reported in Table 6.6, up to 60% of the stases chosen to 
approach the topics in this corpus are qualitative, bringing the issue from values 
perspectives. This kind of stasis is highly present in those op-ed pieces related to the 
actions of the US in Iraq topics. In the second position, 20% of the op-ed topics are 
taken from a translative, action- oriented stasis, most of which belong to the topic of 
withdrawal from Iraq. Finally, the distribution is equal between the two stases of 
conjectural and definitional with relatively low amount 13.3 for each.  
 
Topic/Status Conjectural Definitional Qualitative Translative Total 
US actions in Iraq 0 6.6 40 0 46.6 
US agenda in Iraq  10 3.3 10 0 23.3 
Withdrawal from Iraq  0 0 6.6 13.3 20 
Situation in Iraq 3.3 3.3 0 0 6.6 
Decision makers 0 0 3.3 0 3.3 
Total stases 13.3 13.3 60 13.3 100 
Table 6.6. Stasis of standpoints/positions in the Arab corpus 
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As can be seen from the data in table 6.6, almost 2/3 of the qualitative stasis found in 
the Arab corpus op-ed are related to the topic of US actions in Iraq (the most frequently 
selected topic), while the remaining 1/3 is distributed over the US agenda, withdrawal 
and decision makers topics. Judging the US actions and policies are the number one 
topic stasis. In most cases and by choosing this stasis, the arguers focus on the 
condemnation of the US actions, while presuming they are recognized (international 
audience knows the actions are taking place) and also defined (presuming it an 
occupation even though very often engage in defining it). This may be perceived in 
example (19) below where the arguer talks on the US action and policies in Iraq as 
crimes. 
(19)   Frightening people becomes a justification for an ongoing war. As long as 
victory over international terrorism is impossible, the only justification for the 
persistence of a condition in which American soldiers are killed daily is 
terrorism in itself. (Jihad el-Khazen, Al-Hayat)       
 
Another case in point from the qualitative type of op-ed pieces comes below in example 
(20) where the arguer selects the topic of the US actions from a justice perspective, by 
asserting the devastating effects of the policies conducted by the Bush administration.  
(20)  The overall demonstration effect has been one of imperial arrogance: awesome 
but incompetent superpower waging unwinnable colonial war, unable to stamp 
down resistance to its occupation, flouting international law, grossly violating 
human rights, while making hollow claims about promoting democracy (Adel 
Safty, Gulf News) 
As for those op-ed pieces related to the topic of the US hidden agendas, stasis is equally 
distributed between the qualitative kind and the conjectural. The difference in stasis 
hints to a difference of the questions posed on the topic. While conjecturing the US has 
hidden agendas presumes that the audience does not recognize it as a fact and that the 
arguer from this perspective is drawing attention to its existence (as illustrated in 
example (21), the qualitative perspective adopted on the same topic (hidden agendas) 
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points to an already established controversy and to the fact that the arguer pleads justice 
(as in example 22): 
(21)   Although Washington will never admit it, its troops are in Iraq because of oil. 
Oil is at the heart of the political and social struggles across the region. Iraq has 
the world's second largest oil reserves (…). Despite immense losses, Democratic 
pressure and the Baker-Hamilton proposals, Washington has no intention of 
withdrawing from Iraq. (Galal Nassar, Al Ahram)  
(22)  Does anyone seriously believe this is possible at this stage or at any point in 
future? Instead of calling a spade a spade, the US media are turning to analyzing 
and assessing the scenario, as if Washington ever had any intention to leave Iraq, 
and how it is planning to quit the chaotic country. (Musa Keilani, Jordan Times)  
In example (22), the arguer puts the blame on the media (and also on the Bush 
administration in other chunks of the discussion) accusing them of confusing the public 
(and his intended audience very probably) by talking about withdrawal while Bush, he 
asserts, has no intentions of leaving Iraq (as he has hidden agendas there). The main 
stasis in the op-ed piece takes assertions to a level of evaluation rather than simply 
limiting the question of identification of problem or contesting its definition (these two 
actually occur at some point of the discourse, as sub stases).   
The classification of the op-ed pieces into the stases reveals a significant difference 
between the American and the Arab approaches in the corpora in selecting their topics 
from the Iraq issues. The graph below contrasts the findings from the stasis analysis of 
the two corpora.  
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          Figure 6. 1. Contrasted stases in the American and Arab op-ed discourses  
 
Figure 6.1 shows that the American arguers focus on action by choosing the translative 
stasis. In this type of stasis, the question typically asked is:  what should be done about 
the problem? The Arab arguers, on the other hand, focus on values and justice by 
choosing the qualitative stasis. This stasis asks the ―what-is-the quality-of-the-
problem?‖ kind of question. This is significant in terms of how arguers in the two 
corpora make presumptions on the problems raised in the Iraq issue. As the stases have 
a hierarchical relationship, the questions would be posed in sequence, that is, starting 
from the conjectural (did something happen), moving to the definitional (what is its 
nature?) then to the qualitative (is it good or bad?) and finally getting to the translative 
stasis (what should we do about it?). Asking a higher level stasis question, for instance 
the translative one, presupposes that agreement has been reached on lower stases, 
namely presuming something has happened, consensually defined and judged. 
Therefore, the focus on the translative stasis in the American corpora entails that the 
arguers project a sense of agreement on all the questions from which the issue could be 
handled and take them as settled by engaging in discussing action. However, in the 
Arab corpora, and with the majority of arguers, up to 60%, adopting the qualitative 
stasis, the focus is on evaluation and on seriousness of the matter. This means that the 
question of whether the issue is good or bad is not settled for them and that the heart of 
the issue when picking their topics is to appraise the situation from a justice starting 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
Conj Def Qual Trans 
American 
Arab 
173 
 
point. The next two sections present in more details findings on stasis analysis for each 
cultural group.   
 
The divergence obtained from stasis theory analysis, thus further explains the two 
groups‘ highly unequal perspectives on the situation in Iraq and more importantly their 
respective socio-political status or positions in the Iraq conflict reflected in this very 
public debate about the issue. The translative stasis points to the American arguers 
concern with resolution, which is indeed enabled by their positions as commanders of 
the Iraq situation and the actual decision makers in the global context. For most of them 
resolving the public crisis caused by the deterioration of the situation in Iraq is a priority 
as a practical approach to the issue rather than accountability. Hence, most of these 
arguers take settled/assumed many aspects of the issue, (or at least that is what they aim 
for) by not making them the forefront questions posed in their discussion. Conversely, 
most Arab arguers in the corpus focus on justice when bringing their issues to debate 
and, by their qualitative stasis approaches, they highlight their role as plaintiffs against 
the US alleged crimes and aggressions.  
 
After examining topic selection as one of the main choices made by arguers in their 
discursive construction of the Iraq issue, the focus is shifted to exploring some of the 
arguers´ context categories manifest in their discourse and how they could reveal 
underlying ideological structures probably inherent in the discursive practices of their 
respective political and culturally different groups.  
 
6. 3. Contextual discursive constructions of the Iraq issue 
This section presents the results from the contextual analysis of the op-ed discourses of 
the two cultural groups of FP experts. The analysis focused on constructions constrained 
by the experts´ context models (van Dijk, 2008). Two schematic categories of contexts, 
setting and participants were explored in the way they seemed to control the discursive 
constructions of the Iraq war in the two corpora and attempted to determine the 
ideological basis of such context models. These categories, as part of the structure of 
context models, are significant instances‘ of the arguers´ ―definition of the relevant 
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aspects of the communicative situation‖ (van Dijk, 2008: 118). From these context 
categories, attention was devoted to some sub schematic categories, namely space 
(setting), identities and roles (participants). The main aim was to contrast the two 
cultural groups´ contextual constructions of political debate characterized by their 
respective ―nations´‖ involvement in the armed conflict.   
 
6. 3. 1. The construction of the debate space (Setting)                
 
The critical look at the discourse structures of the opinion pieces in the two corpora has 
given some insight into the variety of place-related discursive construction that are 
contextualized by the arguers. The analysis explored the three types of places 
potentially contextualizing the discourses: the interpersonal, social, and the 
geographical. The findings from the analyses of context construction point to 
considerable differences in the patterns characterizing the definition of the 
communicative space for each cultural group.   
 
6.3.1.1. Constructions of place/space in the American op-ed corpus 
The spaces constructed in 93.3% of the op-ed pieces in the American corpus are 
predominantly a geographical type, i.e. the one providing a sociocultural dimension and 
identity to the space in which the communicative episode takes place (van Dijk, 2009: 
51). Indeed, as most arguers contextualize their discussions within the op-ed space as a 
public space created to debate FP issues concerning the US interests with the American 
public, they take the US territorial space as a reference point in their contextual 
constructions. Despite the different approaches and their overlapping with interpersonal 
and social spaces constructions, this geographical space construction remains dominant.  
The context becomes national and even loaded with national sentiments (such as 
patriotism) through different discourse properties like narration, lexis and deixis. The 
construction is, for instance, perceptible from the recurrent use of pronouns (Us vs. 
Them) and deictic expressions like here and there, which apart from indicating identity, 
they create the boundaries to the spaces of communication. In example (23) Lieberman 
makes clear where the communicative event takes places by the following discursive 
construction of place: 
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(23)  The current wave of suicide bombings in Iraq is also aimed at us here in the 
United States, to obscure the gains we have made. (Joseph Lieberman, 
Washington Post) 
 
Some other arguers make the space a national one by reference to the national positions 
from the US policies (whether as opponents or allies), while making little reference or 
inclusion of international participation in the debate. In example (24), as Scowcroft 
talks about the debate in Iraq, it becomes clear that the debate is about choices and 
decisions. This creates a kind of place/space exclusively American, where non-
Americans are not addressed, hence not expected to participate.   
(24)  The report accomplished a great deal (…) it helped catalyze the debate about our 
Iraq policy and crystallize the choices we face. Above all, it emphasized the 
importance of focusing on American national interests, not only in Iraq but in 
the region. (Brent Scowcroft, New York Times)  
  
Moreover, they completely draw on national beliefs and values and seem to ignore the 
international audience positions or the Iraqi one (as directly involved in the conflict). 
This is semantically realized by reference to American voters, American political 
opponents and policy consequences on the American interests. The policy success or 
failure is perceived as having consequences only (or chiefly) on Americans. This is 
illustrated in examples (25) and (26), where Clark and Lieberman consecutively refer to 
Americans as the addressees and consequently demarcate the contextual space as 
relevant only for US citizen.  
 
 (25)  Instead of cutting and running or staying the course, it is time for us to begin to 
redeploy. But how can we do this and improve our prospects for success? 
(Wesley Clark, USA Today)    
 
(26)  I understand the frustration, anger and exhaustion so many Americans feel about 
Iraq (...), but we must not make another terrible mistake now. (Joseph 
Lieberman, Wall Street Journal)  
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These references (among other discursive manifestations) have a pragmatic impact on 
the interpretation of context, as the very exclusive presence of American character in all 
the features of the Iraq issue makes it by default exclusion of non-American participants 
in this issue. It seems that being the protagonists in foreign policy debates (Iraq among 
other Middle Eastern issues), American experts are not actually aware of the 
participants other than American audience, despite the fact the newspapers have 
international reach. This is may of course be due to their goals from taking up media 
channels to advance their argumentation on political issues. These goals obviously do 
not consider other than peer citizens to address and convince, certainly the kind of 
audiences allowed to participate in the processes of decision making. With the 
American public being the only target audience, the space to construct for the debate 
remains within national bounds. 
  
These constructions of space are definitely ideologically biased contextual 
constructions, since they draw on socially shared beliefs on a common geographical 
space demarcated by a common national destiny. For these arguers, the debate on Iraq is 
assumed to be exclusively American, as it involves American policies and decisions to 
be made by Americans according to American standards. These kinds of contexts 
further illustrate the US international position in the global relations as a powerful actor 
in this conflict and that its decision makers involve only the American public in the 
debates on FP decisions. And even though the debate is open to international audience, 
these latter are outsiders, acting as mere viewers of the democratic process, but are not 
invited in. There are some exceptions, however, where arguers seem to be willing to 
address a wider audience and choose to include international participants in the debate, 
as illustrated in examples (27) and (28), by construing participation location (of self and 
others) in a way that makes it possible for international audience to see the debate as 
taken outside of the US territory, as if maintained at a international space:     
 
(27)  What troubled me about this statement--a commonly heard criticism of U.S. 
involvement in Iraq--is that those who say such things seem to forget the good 
U.S. arms have done in imposing democracy on countries like Japan and 
Germany, or Bosnia more recently (Bob Kerry, Wall Street Journal)  
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(28)  For the United States, the world is now, as a result of the Iraq war, a more 
dangerous place (...) The U.S. has probably not yet fully woken up to the 
appalling fact that, after a long period in which the first motto of its military was 
"no more Vietnams," it faces another Vietnam. (Timothy Garton Ash LA Times)  
 
 
In example (27) the speech act as request makes it clear that the writer´s stands at an 
American location but invites ―outsiders‖ to comprehend his position/views. This 
proposition points to a context constructed in an international (geographical) setting and 
not exclusively American. Equally, example (28) illustrates a construction of place 
inclusive of international participants, since reference to the US makes it clear that the 
writer communicative space is not inside the US but wider and  his vantage point is 
possible interpretable as looking from outside to the situation. These were the only 2 
cases where writers locate themselves and their participants pragmatically outside the 
geographical space of the US and contextualize the debate internationally, as almost all 
the op-ed discourses are realized at homeland setting.    
 
 
Apart from this geographical space constructions realized by different discursive means, 
as above mentioned, which generally characterize national territorial boundaries to the 
discourse, there are two cases where the models insert other aspects into this context 
schema in an interesting way. The first one is an op-ed piece written jointly by Robert 
Byrd and Hilary Clinton, where the arguers defend their position for troop withdrawal 
from Iraq and initiate their discussion addressing (implicitly and as typically inferred 
from op-ed texts) the public as audience. The arguers explicitly address President Bush 
as it is illustrated in example (29) from their op-ed piece:  
 
(29)  This is not the fight Congress authorized Mr. President. If you want to continue 
to wage this fight, come to congress and make your case. Otherwise, bring our 
troops home. (R. Byrd and H. Clinton, Daily News)  
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This move not only converts President Bush to a participant, but also converts the 
spatial setting into a direct political confrontation space. This is done by drawing on 
contextual properties affecting other aspects of text such as the use of direct speech and 
the imperative. The use of ―come to Congress‖ as a directive may indicate a 
professional and political kind of relationship which determines the place in which the 
speaker and hearers stand. Construing a context based on a direct face-to-face 
confrontation with a political opponent may intentionally and strategically guide all 
participants to join in at a conventional-like political speech space, such as those 
accommodating politicians‘ dialogues or any type of institutional political debates.  
 
In the second case, Joseph Lieberman addresses through his op-ed piece his colleagues 
at the Congress in a direct mode, hence contextually construct the debate at a political 
event space. This is may be seen from example (30). 
 
(30)  I appeal to my colleagues in Congress to step back and think carefully about 
what to do next. (Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street Journal)  
 
 
By reproducing contextual elements of political speeches, Joseph Lieberman´s 
construction of a space where politicians tend to make appeals for political decisions or 
missions. This type of context construction may function as a guide for the audience to 
eventually process discourse in the way desired.  
 
 
The discursive contextualization of Iraq 
 
Iraq as the object of debate is of course at the heart of the semantic dimension of the op-
ed pieces in the corpora under study, as the data are specifically selected based on the 
Iraq topic criterion. However, pragmatically speaking and in relation to the 
contextualization of space in the discussion, the representation of Iraq seems to present 
a peculiar context case. For Americans in general, Iraq is the battlefield. In most of the 
op-ed pieces then, it is ―there‖ or ―over there‖. This distance confirms that the space of 
communication is ―here‖, i.e. in ―our‖ land (the US) as opposed to the outside space 
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―there‖ within which ―we fight‖ to protect ourselves and our interest. But the fact the 
troops and interests and the battlefield are ―there‖ makes this kind of space closer 
somehow to participants in the communication, mainly because of ―American‖ presence 
―there‖. The shortening of distance from Iraq is realized when some arguers speak about 
achievement in Iraq and use the inclusive ―we‖. What is accomplished in Iraq is 
constructed as a common action realized in the name of Americans and with their 
support and that is why success is to be collectively celebrated in the same way as 
failure is deplored. This is illustrated in the two examples below, where Tony Snow 
(31) and Kim Kagan (32) endorse military action (of killing enemies) as realized by the 
collective ―we‖ as Americans 
 
(31)  We´ve killed and captured two thirds of its (Al Qaeda) senior leadership. (Tony 
Snow, USA Today)   
 
(32)  This is war, and the enemy is reacting. The enemy uses suicide bombs, car 
bombs and brutal executions to break our will and that of our Iraqi allies. 
(Kimberly Kagan, Wall Street Journal)  
 
In example (33), however, Joseph Liebermann does not exactly put emphasis on 
military actions as the actions implemented by all Americans, as in the above mentioned 
examples, but locates himself within the US territory by explicit ―deictic‖ features of 
―here‖ against ―there‖ in Iraq, and at the same time bringing Iraq or the battle field 
closer by inviting audience to look at it. The move encourages the visualization of Iraq 
and the construction of proximity towards it, as an observable location.  
 
(33)  What ultimately matters more to us: the real fight over there, or the political 
fight over here? (...)  If we stopped the legislative manoeuvring and looked to 
Baghdad, we would see what the new security strategy actually entails and how 
dramatically it differs from previous efforts. (Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street 
Journal) 
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One case however, makes a different contextualization by speaking from Iraq, from the 
battlefield. This construction does not mean that the communicative space is definitely 
Iraq, for both the arguer and the readers should be always aware that the newspaper 
space is the actual space for the op-ed discourse, but speaking from Iraq makes the Iraqi 
territorial space closer and emotionally friendlier. 
 
(34)  Viewed from Iraq (...) the political debate in Washington is surreal. We are 
finally getting somewhere in Iraq. (M. O´Hanlon and K. Pollack, New York 
Times)   
Below, example (35) illustrates a narration which affects the construction of context. 
The participants stand of course at an American location (the newspaper op-ed space), 
while Iraq ―there‖ is made closer and vivid from the description. The battlefield is 
constructed as ―close‖ to the communicative space. Certainly, the strategy is used to 
emotionally bring closer Iraq and distance the audience from the political debate in 
Washington on the verge of taking the decision to leave. This strategy is employed in all 
the op-ed pieces arguing against withdrawal.    
(35)  I stood there, amid the crushing stench of death; (...) I can still smell the rotting 
corpses of those children. (Michael Yon, Daily News)  
The results from the analysis of American arguers´ discursive construction of space turn 
out to be significantly indicative of the ideological bias controlling their contexts. 
 
6.3.1.2. Constructions of place/space in the Arab op-ed corpus 
 
The results from the analysis of Arab arguers´ discursive construction of space show the 
lack of a significant pattern in the data. There is hardly an explicit manner which may 
point to the spatial contextualization of the discussion, even though based on the 
inferences that could be made from the macro-speech acts, one can perceive that most 
discussions are held within an international geographical setting. The constructions 
probably implicitly draw on the contextual properties provided by the newspapers as a 
social space for their debates on the Iraq issue. Being English editions destined for 
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international audience, the contextual space is highly presumed to be an international 
space for FP debate. Therefore, space is not explicitly defined in discourse and is 
mainly left to interpretation from the whole pragmatic meaning of the op-ed. Most Arab 
arguers however, do implicitly gear space construction towards one location or another 
through various discursive moves. Some op-ed pieces invite themselves to be located at 
an American space; others distance themselves from the US territorial space, but remain 
within international contexts, while the rest seem to situate their discussions within the 
geographical space of the Arab world.  
 
Those who choose to move to an US territory realize their constructions by different 
means such as assigning recipient roles to American people, warranting arguments from 
sources or authorities they trust and drawing on their norms and values, besides the use 
of some deictic expressions to consolidate even more an interpersonal space within the 
American national boundaries. The extracts below (36) and (37) from 2 op-ed pieces 
illustrate this type of context construction.   
 
(36)  Here is war veteran Senator Chuck Hagel, of Nebraska, the heart of conservative 
America, strongly objected to President Bush's policy (Hussein Shobokshi in 
Asharq Al Awsat, Columnist) 
 
(37)  The only justification for the persistence of a condition in which American 
soldiers are killed daily is terrorism in itself. This does not only represent my 
opinion. In fact, Admiral Michael Mullen, who was chosen by George Bush to 
be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in Congress that there is no 
military solution in Iraq and the only way out is national reconciliation. (Jihad 
Al Khazen Dar Al Hayat, columnist) 
 
Arguers as in the above illustrated cases contextualize their discourses in an American 
space by drawing on American sources in premising the arguments advanced and 
mainly by using them to substantiate and even validate their moral assessments of the 
US policies in Iraq. Indeed, there is a surprisingly high rate of arguments from authority 
based or relying on the opinion of American political figures. This is definitely a 
rhetorical strategy intended to the American people as political actors capable of 
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changing the course of policies. The strategies and goals powerfully control the 
construction of other categories also by limiting the debate setting to an American 
space.  
 
In the following extract from op-ed piece by Raghida Dergham, the setting is defined 
through fore fronting the American benefits and leadership, which could easily hint to 
the arguer´s construction of an American setting for the discussion, where Americans 
would feel the most adequate to fit in the setting as targeted audiences.   
 
(38)  It is possible to render the withdrawal useful, so that the US can re-occupy the 
driver's seat, reshuffle the strategic deck, and see itself, the only superpower, 
retain its standing. (Raghida Dergham, Dar Al Hayat)  
 
With this reference to the US as beneficiary from policy decisions in Iraq, the arguer in 
example (38) foregrounds the US interests and makes them seem to be the most 
important thing to protect in this conflict. By doing so, she risks the exclusion of Arabs 
from participating in her discussion as it seems and takes it to an American 
geographical space with all its emotionally-loaded meaning of space by this very 
construction. The discursive representation of the Iraq situation automatically hints to a 
model that clashes with the prototypical Arab modeling of Iraq debates since their 
shared cognitions on US actions perhaps schematize negative attitudes and may not 
possibly have the goal of addressing Americans for the purpose of showing them the 
ideal way to succeed in Iraq or to regain their world leadership. Therefore, Arab 
audiences may clearly recognize that they are kept out of this communicative situation 
by the very context structure of this op-ed discourse, and that its cognitive-based 
categories, such as goals and shared knowledge (and values) are the ones which act on 
the construction of other categories such the debate space and permissions to access it.   
 
Some arguers who harshly criticize Americans ―indiscriminately‖ (not differentiating 
authorities from citizens) make it clear that they do not pretend to debate the Iraq issue 
with them, but rather to address an international audience for arbitration and assign the 
role of judge to them on their actions in Iraq or even construing them as victims of the 
US alleged assaults. Some examples of this adjustment of participants and their location 
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are listed below in examples (39) and (40) in which arguers seems to exclude 
Americans from the debate by referring to political actors as Americans (the American 
people in general) while probably intending to mean the US politicians or forces. This is 
coupled in (39) with the use of irony in the expression ―very noble of them‖. In example 
(41) the arguer position the international audience as judge for the atrocities committed 
by occupation authorities and allowed by the United Nation   
 
(39)  When the Americans decided to build a wall around Al-Adhamiyah in Baghdad, 
they claimed that their main concern was to protect the inhabitants. Very noble 
of them, but was this the real reason? Are the Americans interested in protecting 
Al-Adhamiyah, or in protecting other areas from fighters based in Al-
Adhamiyah? (Galal Nassar, Jordan Times)  
 
(40)  The American discourse contains disturbing oversimplifications, (…) where all 
that is required is the removal of a ruler and the emancipation of a group from 
the chains of suppression, and then the Arab world will become a democratic 
paradise. (Tariq Alhomayed, Asharq Al Awsat) 
 
(41) When terrorism has universities, crime turns into a profession, mutilation 
becomes heroism, the humanity of a people is humiliated with the occupation 
rifles, (…) the innocents are driven to tents and the poor go astray over oilfields, 
can any Iraqi, Arab or Muslim be blamed if the Security Council and its major 
players are accused of racism and discrimination? (Zouheir Kseibati, Dar Al 
Hayat) 
 
After inspecting and contrasting the two op-ed sets, one may conclude therefore, that 
some cognitive categories related to shared social cognition such as beliefs and values 
and knowledge may be responsible for the construction of the debate spatial setting. The 
findings showed that most American and some Arab arguers construe Americans as 
main audience and participants and locate the debate within an American space by 
drawing exclusively on American shared cognitions hence ignoring or negating the 
place/existence of other participants.  By alienating some audience from participation or 
engaging others in it, arguers set the boundaries of a communicative situation that the 
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newspapers have left open and blurred hence an opportunity for the participants to 
subjectively (re)define them in accordance with their intentions.   
 
6. 3. 2. Contextualizing participants´ identity in the Iraq debate   
The focus in this section is on the way the op-ed arguers discursively construct 
participants as a central category of the context models controlling their discourse on 
Iraq. More specifically, the section presents findings from the context analysis of the 
identities enacted by the arguers in the two corpora and the ways their roles and their 
relationships with others are defined. The analysis of the arguers´ definitions of 
participants, as a major category in context models, seeks to determine the differences 
in the kinds of choices made by the experts in the two cultures and the ideological 
structures underlying their subjective construction of the debate on Iraq.   
 
The analysis of op-ed writers´ construction of identity was carried out to determine the 
types of (Self) identities most articulated in the debates whether the social, the 
institutional, the national or other and to identify the relational construction of Self, that 
is, identity constructions through a process of differentiation (in a Poststructuralist 
sense). The identities expressed by the arguers in the two cultural groups have been 
examined, categorized and then their occurrences measured across the corpora. In cases 
where the arguers activate a multiple-identity context model, the very identity which is 
consistent and remains highlighted throughout the critical discussion is categorized as 
the main identity. In some cases, two or more identities are equally and powerfully 
present in the discussion and probably in the context model the arguers are creating, and 
exceptionally in these cases, both identities as displayed are counted as main. Identity 
constructions were categorized based on the way they were signaled, namely either 
through style such as the display of facts and the absence of evaluative language or by 
means of referential expressions, lexical choices and deictic expressions such as ―I‖, 
―we‖ or forms of address such as ―Mr. President‖. The findings from the analysis of 
each expert group´s construction of identity are displayed in the two (separate) sections 
below.  
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6.3.2.1. Identity constructions in the contexts of American FP experts  
 
Table 6.7 below displays the findings from the discursive analysis of the contextual 
construction of the self as the central identity enacted by the arguers in their debates on 
the Iraq situation.  
Self identity  Specific Self  % 
Professional  Politician (decision maker) 23.3 
FP analyst 33.3 
Political critic 26.6 
War correspondent  13.3 
Social  Social critic 20 
National  Patriot  70 
War combatant 30 
    Table 6.7. The arguers´ enactment of the Self in the American corpus 
 
The American arguers in this corpus predominantly construe a national identity (in the 
sense of ―imagined community‖ (Anderson, 1991), which they generally tend to 
combine with another identity or a mixture of several identities. Indeed, in 70% of the 
op-ed pieces, the arguers emphasize their national self which seems to concur with the 
professional or social self (or selves) while remaining an essential component of the 
complex contextual construction of the constructed self. The contextualization of the 
national identity is manifested in two ways: through the exaltation of American political 
ideals and through the celebration of martial values. The two approaches are often 
combined and together may hint to more elaborate national identity constructions.  
 
Those arguers eulogizing the American political ideals such as freedom and democracy 
typically emphasize not only the singularity of these ideals as political principles proper 
to American people, but also their universality and the national duty to spread them in 
the world. Once these arguers instigate the American identity as a prominent self, one 
may recognize the kind of socially shared cognition they draw on, namely their 
Americanism. Americanism, as a nationalism rooted in the defense of political ideals 
(Kazin et. al., 2011: 12), is articulated here through recurrent reference to political 
values as a way of self-categorization and of connecting the speaker´s self with the most 
collectively concerted self in the community. Americanism is made prominent in a 
number of cases through a compilation of discourse features such as narratives and 
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deixis, which, as in Billig´s terms (1995: 11), ―continually point to the national 
homeland as the home of the reader‖. These contextually controlled discourse 
structures, among others, appeal to national sentiments and patriotic values, and 
together offer a clear definition of the arguer´s identity throughout the single op-ed 
piece. This contextualized American self is illustrated in the following examples where 
the arguers, in the two examples (42) and (43), defend the strategy in Iraq by reminding 
the audience of the common values as the goal pursued from launching the war.  
 
(42)  We must remember that our forces in Iraq carry America´s cause, the cause of 
freedom, which we abandon at our peril. (Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street 
Journal)  
  
(43)  It has inspired a growing number of Iraqis to fight al Qaeda. That vindicates the 
president´s faith in liberty as a common inheritance of mankind. (Tony Snow, 
USA Today)   
 
The construction of self as American is, in some cases, the major identity projected 
throughout the discussion, mainly in those discussions meant to contrast the US position 
with that of its enemies and to justify the call to troops´ permanence in Iraq.  
 
Those arguers celebrating martial values also create a national type of self that is very 
much connected to Americanism. Boasting of military power, battlefield efficiency and 
acclaiming martial values, such as honor, nobility, bravery, and self-sacrifice are 
invoked of course in times of war when the state is in conflict with others. They equally 
point to a context model featuring a patriotic identity. Being patriotic is not only 
identifying oneself with the nation, as in nationalism, but it also involves social 
conditioning and acting in support of a state´s decision and actions (Rothi et al., 2005: 
136) especially when the state is involved in war. The most typical instances of these 
constructions are realized through reference to the battlefield. Therefore, military 
actions and achievements (hence failure or success) are represented as executed by the 
whole national community of Americans and even soldiers and US forces are more 
commonly referred to as a national common asset, as in ―our fighting men‖ and ―our 
solders‖. Furthermore, in 30% of the pieces, the arguers even activate a war combatant 
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Self which highly influences the communicative situation as whole and contextualizes 
participants and other categories as highly involved in the battlefield. This kind of 
contextualization is realized in the description of the fight in Iraq by using inclusive 
―we‖ to illustrate the operations implemented and the goals achieved. Indeed, military 
actions are mostly described as a collective kind of actions that symbolize the nation 
and involve inevitable patriotic sentiments acting as a moral apparatus in support of the 
confrontation with the enemies. Example (44) and (45) show the inclusive ―we‖ and 
―our‖ in the description of the fight that contextually and jointly with other discourse 
structures construe the arguers as involved in the fight and as highly patriotic 
individuals.   
 
(44)  We have killed or captured two thirds of its (Al Qaeda) senior leadership (…) 
but it remains committed to killing Americans. (Tony Snow, USA Today)   
 
(45)  The valor of our enemies never surpassed that of our troops (Ralph Peters, USA 
Today) 
 
In the process of defending their positions for or against the strategy put in place in Iraq, 
many arguers use the soldiers and troops as a means to emphasize their patriotic 
identity. The two examples below illustrate construction of a patriotic self through the 
narrative on troops´ bravery and their sacrifice. By choosing this kind of narratives, 
arguers give prominence to a source of national pride and hence construe themselves 
contextually as celebrating patriotic sentiments. Example (47) equally shows how 
columnist Krauthammer enacts a Self that is inevitably made patriotic by representing 
the actions of American troops in Iraq as venerable. The portrayal of the troops´ bravery 
and sacrifice obviously point to the arguer´s attempt to underscore his/her patriotic Self  
 
(46)  There, the battle of Baghdad is now under way (…) a new strategy is being put 
to action with thousands of additional American soldiers streaming into the Iraqi 
capital. (Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street Journal)  
 
(47)  Thousands of brave American soldiers have died trying to counter, put down and 
prevent civil strife. (Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post) 
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This kind of model, consequently, construes Americans as the exclusive participants in 
the debate as it is structured by categories made only relevant to such audience such as 
the activation of socially (or nationally)-shared cognitions, with mental associations 
symbolizing the love of nation, such as the vision of soldiers risking their lives in the 
battlefield. Despite the newspapers´ (and op-ed piece) international reach, some foreign 
policy experts seem to target only national audience by the very fact of enacting a 
patriotic Self as the main identity. This is highly expected in political discourse 
produced in a context of war, as patriotism is ―probably the sentiment to which political 
leaders most frequently appeal when seeking to mobilize the country for important 
national effort‖ (Nincic & Ramos, 2012: 374). 
 
The national identity is also recognizable in its manifestations characterized by an ―us‖ 
and ―them‖ construction and the special focus on American values, norms and interests 
as the shared and most cherished resources of a social (national) group. This implies 
that they create the national Self by acts of differentiation from the outsider ―Other‖, 
which makes this type of identity construction a relational one. The use of different 
devices such as ―we‖ and ―our‖ is juxtaposed with that of ―them‖ and ―their‖ which 
makes this national Self created particularly as a polarization strategy, serving at the 
same time to contrast participants actions for moral evaluation. The following are a few 
typical examples from the American experts´ discussions.    
 
(48)  We did give the Iraqis a unique chance to build a rule of law democracy (Ralph 
Peters, USA Today).  
 
(49)  We will still be the greatest power on earth, indispensable to other regional 
states (Ralph Peters. USA Today)  
 
(50)  No Surge can work unless we have a moral Surge that delegitimates suicide 
bombers‖ (Thomas Friedman, New York Times) 
 
The use of ―we‖ as Americans in the three first examples occurs in the framework of the 
Self interaction with the ―Other‖. In (48) and (50) Americans are constructed within 
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their relation with Iraqis or Arabs, while in (49), the national Self is seen grandiose in 
terms of its role and relationships with other nations. In all these cases, the use of 
presuppositions and the heavy polarization implicitly constructs the Self (American) as 
possessing assets which are inexistence for the ―Other‖. The writer refers to the lack of 
morality in the Arab character to justify why Americans were having trouble with 
winning the war. This may not be the object of controversy within the communicative 
situation of the debate, since the imagined participants may agree or disagree with these 
views, which is becomes a semantic issue, while they are induced to interpret the 
expressive speech act as a boast. Indeed, characterizing oneself in superlative terms 
creates two situations: 1) the audience is constructed as sharing the same virtues, hence 
as being exclusively American and the effect is to celebrate the pride collectively, or 2) 
the audience is inclusive of international participants who are reminded of these virtues 
but do not share them, hence excluded from celebrating the pride. Given the fact that the 
arguers are inevitably aware of newspapers international reach, they most likely create 
the second situation. Such an identity construction projects a swaggering posture due to 
the assumption of exclusively possessing such attributes as power and morality. 
Discursive structures involving these kinds of polarizations point to a contextualized 
self highly biased by Americanism and centered in the pride of adhering to it. The 
contextual construction delineates a kind of identity which is typically received in the 
communicative situation as arrogant and cast as uncooperative and ostentatious.  
 
These arguers hence underline a deliberate disregard of the international audiences as 
potential participants in the communicative event. In spite of the US foreign policy 
discourse emphasis on the international benefit from the war on terrorism, the 
contextual set up of self in the discourse leaves the international audience out of 
participation, while creating an exclusively American contextual environment. This 
choice goes against the claim that staying in Iraq was mainly driven by the aim of 
protecting the international community from terrorism. These arguers probably do not 
perceive the ―practical‖ use of engaging international opinion, the way they perceive 
immediate benefit from changing the domestic opinion. Knowing that these experts are 
elite groups involved, in various degrees, in the state key political decisions shaping the 
US foreign policies, they are in a sense the reflection of how ―the state moulds mental 
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structures and imposes common principles of vision and division‖. (Bourdieu, 1994: 7, 
italics in original).  
 
The national identities are contextually construed in more complex manner when 
mingled up with other identities such as the professional or the social. As indicated in 
table 6.7, almost a quarter of the American arguers in the corpus (23.3%) construe a 
political identity by foregrounding their decision making characters. The politician 
identity is normally enacted by people holding office or those in opposition, and 
discursively made explicit through a politician style or reference to the power position. 
However, in this corpus, this type of political identity is enacted not only by in-office 
politicians, but also by some think tank pundits or even columnists some of whom are 
military veterans or retired politicians. In example (51) Bob Kerry, a think tank pundit 
and a retired politician performs the politician identity (Democrats) while activating his 
nationalistic/patriotic Self. Kerry argues that the US intervention in Iraq is a moral duty 
for Americans and that the decision to withdraw is a cowardly decision, typical adopted 
by Democrats, he says. As a Democrat, he implies that this position hurts the image of 
his party as Americans see it as an act of cowardice and lack of patriotism.  
 
(51)  With these facts on the scales, what does your conscience tell you to do? If the 
answer is nothing, that it is not our responsibility or that this is all about oil, then 
no wonder today we Democrats are not trusted with the reins of power. (Bob 
Kerrey, Wall Street Journal) 
 
Enacting a decision maker Self is not surprising knowing that those who waged the war 
in the first place, engaged in it and created policies and machinery to implement it, are 
the American. Signaling this identity as prominent Self points to a context structure 
centered in their role in shaping the international political order. This should also 
confirm the reason why they participate in this debate through the op-ed communication 
channel. The debate represents one of the opportunities they should employ as a 
political communication space, probably not necessarily to discuss and deliberate 
foreign policy issues with the public (as a democratic practice), but simply to explain, 
justify and promote their decisions and to legitimately gain their electorate‘s support. 
Moreover, the analysis revealed that decision makers´ identity in most cases is 
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performed explicitly through setting category construction (the Congress, political 
meetings, etc.) or by some speech acts indicative of authority such as in example (52 
from the piece written by Senator Joseph Lieberman and the way he addresses audience. 
 
(52)  I appeal to my colleague in Congress (Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street Journal) 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in all the instances where the politician identity 
is activated, the arguer takes peer decision makers (politicians) as opponents and hence 
assigns to the audience the role of judge. By this choice, arguers possibly attempt to 
reconstruct a political debate setting with characteristics taken from political 
organization spaces such as deliberative assemblies or the Congress, hence replicating 
these setting properties in the contextual construction of their op-ed discourses. This 
debate context features categories such as an elite environment with authentic political 
participants and ―direct‖ audience.  
 
The discourse of those who enact an analyst identity is likewise controlled at the level 
of style and register (as part of the characterization of genre/or text types according to 
Van Dijk, 2008: 152), which makes it more formal, less evaluative and more factual 
than the politician style. Generally speaking, analysts are expected to provide a 
technical assessment of a conflict and recommend the best resolution channels, while 
their opinion is supposed to be free from moral judgment at least in the simple common 
understanding of the general public. Still, political analysis mixed with political 
posturing is likely to produce a political discourse that is chiefly controlled by the 
political identity of the arguer. A high proportion of American arguers do combine 
policy analysis discourse with political discourse which are different in genre and 
content. The discourse of policy analysis is characterized by technical lexis such as 
situation assessment (based on inferential statistics, systems analysis, forecast (Frei and 
Ruloff, 1989), whereas political discourse involves taking explicit political posture 
(endorsing political parties) to bring forward policies. The Self identity constructed in 
their model does not seem to be defined as that of the analyst any more. Indeed, it shifts 
the analyst identity from its feature frame as objective, impartial and neutral to create a 
complex identity that exploits some characteristics of each identity to depict a combined 
Self, probably one which would more relevantly fulfill the arguers‘ aims of his/her 
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current discussion participation. For instance, examples (53, 54, 55) taken from the 
same op-ed piece, illustrate how two analysts, Michael O´Hanlon and ken Pollack, who 
explicitly project their professional self on the context (in example 54) and at the same 
time make prominent their presence and participation in the battlefield. They 
discursively construct a complex identity featuring the war correspondent (example 53), 
the policy advocate and politician (Democrat) (example 54) along with the patriot, 
realized through an analysis-free style and an emphasis on a value/moral-based 
narrative (example 55), unmistakably indicative of a political discourse.   
 
(53)  Viewed from Iraq, (...), the political debate in Washington is surreal.  
 
(54)  As two analysts, who have harshly criticized the Bush administration‘s 
miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw.  
(55)  We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little 
about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in 
projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.  
(Examples from O´Hanlon and Pollack, New York Times) 
 
The policy critic enacts a professional identity characterized by a critical stance that 
underlines the role as an appraiser of the foreign policy degree of efficiency. Only 
26.6% of American arguers engage in a more morally-oriented level of policy analysis 
than the simple unbiased, objective assessment of the policy analyst. With this type of 
identity, the arguers draw on the hybrid combining the expert/analyst and the political 
actor (whether decision maker or opponent), to oscillate between two different discourse 
styles and genres in accordance with their needs. Furthermore, this identity is enacted 
by those arguers who combine the politician with the national self and engage in 
warning audience from the consequences of persisting in a failed policy. This complex 
outline of the self is mostly enacted within op-ed pieces issued in the newspaper with 
ranking highest in circulation rates such as the USA Today, Wall Street Journal and 
New York Times. It is also worth noting that in newspapers with lower circulations, 
such as the Boston Observer, arguers are more likely to exclusively display a policy 
critic identity, rather than a hybrid, creating a different kind of discourse which is less 
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ideologically biased, draw less on Americanism and projects a more discernible 
professional self.    
 
Other arguers who seem to construct overlapping identities tend to enact the social critic 
professional identity and mingle it with other identities mainly the national one. They 
endorse this identity based on its function which is social criticism and the moral 
assessment of social behavior. The identity is intrinsically construed so as to highlight 
the role of the participant in the communicative event as ―the initiator of the public 
learning processes‖ (Honneth 2009: 179). The social critic´s identity reflects a context 
model which draws on a socially shared cognitive repertoire based on morality and 
values. It controls discursive moves expressive of moral values such as bravery, honesty 
and political principles like democracy of American people, as opposed to politicians´ 
corruption and other cultures and people lack of civility. Some even connect national 
sentiments with the pride of belonging to a dominant state by praising the US global 
supremacy and military power, as illustrated in example (56) below.   
(56)  But the war in Iraq is about a lot more than just Iraq. It's about America's power 
and influence in the world, indeed, our future. What happens in Washington - 
even something as mundane as a nonbinding congressional resolution - 
reverberates across the globe. It's time we fully recognize that. (Peter Brookes, 
New York Post) 
In spite of the variety of approaches in discursive construction of context, there are 
certainly some common features within the American experts‘ corpus. This is probably 
not only the political discourse legitimating foreign policy decision but also a discourse 
maintained at a privileged circle which only belongs to the world most powerful 
decision makers and their public as a supportive body and as main targets for an identity 
politics kind of discourse.       
 
6.3.2.2.  Identity constructions in the contexts of Arab FP experts  
Table 6.8, below, displays the findings from the analysis of the contextual constructions 
of the self as the central identity enacted by the Arab arguers in their debates on the Iraq 
issue. The identities have been also examined in terms of how they established 
contextual relationships and roles between participants in the communicative event 
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under study. Three types of identities were discerned within the data corpus, the 
professional, the social and the national. Despite this variety, it was quite surprising to 
observe that neither identity is predominantly represented, as it has been the case in the 
American corpus. Indeed, the most recurring types of identity enacted by the arguers do 
not even reach half of the corpus, with the national being the identity most signaled 
(43.3%) followed by the political critic and the social critic made prominent in 40%  
each, along with the FP analyst identity. Equally significant is the fact that almost no 
Arab arguer seems to enact an identity underscoring their power position or hinting to a 
ruler role, even though some of them are then-current politicians -based on findings 
from op-ed pieces´ bylines- and certainly active decision makers in their respective 
states. 
                            
 
Self identity  Specific Self  % 
Professional  FP analyst 36.6 
Political critic 40 
Social  War victim 20 
Social critic  40 
National  Arab/Patriot  43.3 
Anti-American  
   Table 6.8. Arguers´ constructions of Self identities in the Arab corpus  
 
Despite the fact that there is a variety of contextualized selves identified throughout the 
Arab corpus, there is a significant pattern in the realization of this context category. 
Indeed, in about 60% of the discussions Arab arguers tend to construe a particular self, 
which they make prominent and distinguishable throughout the whole op-ed contextual 
construction. By this single identity creation, the arguers do not alternate between 
identities (such is the case for most American arguers), but rather stick to one 
discernible identity which brings about the control of other aspects in their contextual 
constructions.   
 
Arab arguers‘ performance of a national identity is surprisingly less significant, as only 
43.3% construe themselves particularly as members of their ―imagined community‖ and 
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do so, in some cases, in less visible modes. The enactment of a national self is realized 
in two (technically) different but sometimes overlapping manners: first, by appealing to 
Arabism as the source of pan-nationalist sentiments inspired by the self-perception as 
belonging to the Arab nation and second, by drawing on Anti-American attitudes and 
beliefs which come to form a sort of a socially shared cognition among people and 
(societies) exhibiting hostility to Americanism. These two forms of collective identities, 
based on socially-shared beliefs, equally exhibit processes of ―othering‖ as it is common 
in national identities. However, while Arabism, as a kind of nationalism, focuses on 
belonging to a nation and its values (and the demarcation from the ―other‖ remains 
implicit); Anti-Americanism is based on defining the self in opposition to the ―other‖. 
The two different ideologies hinge on a kind of self definition that seems to most 
successfully connect the arguers to the collective identity, the one they seem to 
contextualize in their interaction within an international communicative situation such 
as the one imposed by issuing an op-ed piece. In the contexts constructed by the Arab 
arguers, Arabism and Anti-Americanism seem to coexist or even feed each other to 
form one national identity, as ―anti-Americanism is the ideology of enmity when 
wielded by nationalists seeking to strengthen their identity‖ (Tidwell 2007: 273). The 
enactment of a context based on these nationalistic identities obviously creates a 
polarized position towards Americans, and upholds the way these arguers position 
Arabs and Americans in this conflict.  
 
Those op-ed discussions construing the national identity as belonging to the Arab nation 
or as the resisting the American policies and actions tend to signal this identity trait 
drawing on a pan-nationalism. Within decades of political turmoil that has 
disestablished the Arab states and the nature of the relationships maintained between 
them, Arabism has suffered a severe crisis and is typically referred to as a ―mistaken 
identity‖ (Kramer, 1992). However, the Arab identity seems to submerge in this corpus 
as a pertinent kind of national definition, one that delineates the self against others. 
These arguers, indeed, build a case for their nationalism by acts of differentiation from 
Americans, which makes this type of identity construction a relational one. This is 
perhaps judged by the arguers as the most adequate contextual construction for 
international debates. In example (57) Nicola Nasser in a typical polarization between 
the position of Americans with that of the Arabs, signals his own identity through his 
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alignment with Arabism as the unifying sentiment of Arab people, especially by 
qualifying any aggression against Iraq as an aggression towards all Arabs.  
 
(57)  For Americans, it is the usual political power struggle. For Arabs, it is playing 
American politics with Iraqi blood for oil. (Nicola Nassar, Yemen Observer)   
 
Two similar examples from other op-ed pieces, (58) and (59), show how the arguers 
attempt to enact a Pan-Arab identity through semantic content featuring Arabs or Iraqis 
and Muslims as enduring the same condition of discrimination. This construction of 
sameness with their peer nationals and difference from their constructed other reinforces 
the construction of the self as part of this ―us‖ group (Arabs) 
 
 
(58)  Can Iraqis, Arabs or Muslims be blamed if the Security Council or its major 
players are accused of racism and discrimination? (Zuheir Kseibati, Dar Al 
Hayat) 
 
(59)  How do frustrated Iraqis and Arabs make sense of ―this‖ Democratic 
alternative? Large majorities of Arabs want U.S. troops to leave Iraq sooner 
rather than later.  (Nicola Nassar, Yemen Observer) 
 
The national identity enacted by the arguers in the corpus is mostly based on pan- 
nationalism, except for one case where the arguer is Iraqi and makes his national 
identity prominent by explicit reference to the suffering of his fellow citizens and his 
colonized nation. Construing an Arab identity by drawing on a pan-nationalism declared 
in crisis turns out to be a peculiar way of contextualizing self in discourse. It shows that 
in the cognition of these arguers this identity membership still feed their mental models 
despite the disparity between Arab nations´ conditions and their official political and 
foreign policies orientations, including their positions from the US policies in Iraq. 
These political conditions are too complex and diverse to be simplified into a 
recognizable socially shared cognition across the various states forming the Arab world. 
For instance, Saudi Arabia has officially reconciled its relations with the US after the 
crisis resulting from the 9/11 terrorists attack. The bilateral and diplomatic relationships 
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between the Saudi Arabia and the US contain more consensus than conflict around vital 
issues such as the US military interventions in the Middle East.  
 
It is probably hard to draw any conclusions on the reasons why these arguers choose 
this self in defining the context of their op-ed discussions, but the findings pointing to a 
considerable amount of Arab identity enactment indicate the kinds of cognitive content 
controlling this particular construction. They illustrate constructions hinting to models 
defining the self within the socially shared cognition of Arabism (pan nationalism), 
rather than on the particular national identity of each arguer (nationalism).  In any case, 
it is the choice they make when constructing context for an international communicative 
situation and in relation to an international audience. This choice may be revealing in 
that the arguers may find in this kind of self their more coherent definition of self, while 
other national selves may seem more vulnerable, more divided by too different political 
positions which are hard to identify with or probably overtly admit. In addition, most of 
these arguers work under the vigilance of authoritarian states, which undertake domestic 
policies based on a strategy of ―omni-balancing‖, that is, a save facing strategy by 
which they attempt to maintain their cooperation with the US in FP issues and opening 
up for opposing to the US interventions at domestic public spaces. Hence, it may be the 
case that choosing an Arab national identity presents an only choice in an institutional 
context that puts obstacles to freedom, mainly when it comes to opinion and find in 
their pan-Arabism in spite of its weakened condition a political ideology as a form of 
self definition in an international environment.     
 
Arguers drawing on anti-Americanism tend to signal their identities by exhibiting 
discontent and opposition to the American political values, particularly those officially 
declared by the US as its fundamental foreign policy principles. They juxtapose devices 
such as ―we‖ and ―our‖ with ―them‖ and ―their‖ which makes this national Self created 
particularly as a polarization strategy, serving at the same time to contrast participants 
actions for moral evaluation.  Indeed, their reference to freedom and democracy points 
to their enactment of Anti-American self, as it is charged with resistance to the meaning 
of these notions. Examples (60) and (61) typify an identity construction underlining 
their anti-American self, performed throughout each of the two the op-ed, but 
particularly signaled by means of these discursive moves 
198 
 
 
(60)  The US army invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and carried out an ill-famed policy 
based on fuelling sectarian and ethnic sedition in the region and across the world 
under the pretext of disseminating democracy and freedom principles!  
 
(61)  The Americans aren´t to train, but to control, Americans will not allow Iraq to 
survive only if it conforms to their expectations. Otherwise, they will encourage 
it to self destruct.  
 
The assertion in this extract from the op-ed written by columnist Agha in Syria Times 
contributes to the arguer´s self definition as advocate of anti-imperialism, which is the 
position taken in defiance to the US policies in the world. Anti-imperialism organizes 
its members around identifying themselves as against expanding states, those finding 
their prosperity in other peoples´ territories. It certainly activates them their 
nationalisms as much as their instinctive sense of self-protection from these expanding 
states. The Anti-American identity, thus, comes about as part of a national identity as 
―there is nothing better than an enemy to strengthen their identity (Tindwell 2007: 273).  
Furthermore, most constructions of an anti-American self are signaled by expressing 
resentment of American policies characterized –in their views- with its favoritism to 
Israel. Indeed, the reference to Israel probably corroborates a contextualization biased 
by models controlled by Anti-Americanism. For instance, in their criticism to the US 
actions in Iraq, many arguers blame Israel for being the cause of these actions. While 
the relevance of Israel may be a debatable issue, it clearly signal a identity delineated as 
anti-American, as one not only rejecting certain US policies, but also repudiating their 
essence and speculating on the real intentions behind them while adhering at the same 
time to the widely-spread conspiracy theories. Example (62) shows a case where the 
arguer, through discourse content, contextualizes himself as an anti-American.    
 
(62)  Bush has vowed to carry out his evangelical mission to enrich Raytheon and the 
other weapons manufacturers within the American military industrial complex 
and to ensure the fulfillment of Eretz Israel as Zionist demagogues envision it to 
be. (Hassan Al Haifi, Yemen Times) 
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An anti American self is also constructed by acts of challenge to the US policies. 
Showing challenge or defiance to the US is detected in those discourse moves 
performed as warning, threat or similar expressive acts, by alluding to retaliation against 
the US actions. These types of moves signal in a clear way the kind of identity featured 
in the arguer´s context models. The extract in example (63) typifies a discursive 
realization of the Anti-American self, where, after a fact-based content on the military 
actions implemented by the US, the arguer warns from reprisal by asserting (in a form 
of a wishful thinking) that resistance will defeat Americans, while enacting all together 
an anti-American identity.  
  
(63)  Resistance can still make the American think again. (Galal Nassar, Al Ahram) 
 
Turning to other kinds of identity construction in the Arab corpus, the professional 
political critic and the social critic identity come in the second most enacted identity 
position, as they are each made prominent in 40% of the corpus. In the next position 
comes the policy analyst identity performed by 36.6% of the arguers. This professional 
identity type shares many features with that of the political critic and most arguers tend 
to blend the two identities in one. This is probably due to their professional versatility 
that encourages them naturally to adhere to both. Political critics may come from 
different professional backgrounds, and are typically journalists trained in evaluating 
domestic or foreign policies and the degree of their efficiency. Analysts, on the other 
hand, are political scientists, experts in policy planning, conflict resolution and the 
technical assessment of political issues based on rational and value-neutral judgment. 
The two professional profiles sometimes overlap in the data, but they may be 
distinguished by the fact that political critics engage in a more elaborate level of policy 
analysis than the supposedly unbiased and objective assessment of the policy analyst. 
 
Those 40% of Arab arguers, thus, who perform the political critic identity, take policy 
analysis a step further by passing judgment on the performances and competencies of 
relevant policy players. The political critic identity was identified thanks to three 
conditions. First, the discourse is relatively technical, in the sense that it follows policy 
analysis standards which is decision making-oriented, including problem recognition, 
goal prioritization and option assessments techniques (Hudson, 2005: 2), with a 
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substantial use of facts and references from accredited sources. Second, assessment is 
oriented towards policy instruments such as military actions and political postures, so 
judgment goes to decision makers and those responsible for those policies. Third, and 
this point is very much linked to the previous point, no generalizations are detected in 
discourse, as actions are framed as implemented by individuals rather by nations. In this 
case, the critic abstains from referring to Americans in general and refers to actors in 
their proper names and functions. This is illustrated in the following op-ed extract:  
 
(64)  The Republican US president had to do something to rescue his legacy and the 
long-term credibility of his party on the one hand, and to respond to the public 
demand to disengage from the Iraq quagmire on the other. But the Baker-
Hamilton document offered a set of bipartisan policy recommendations that 
could not wholly satisfy both objectives, while the new Democrat Congress 
could hardly place itself at the service of Republican success. 
 
In virtually all cases, the arguers perform the political critic identity by enacting also a 
policy analyst identity. They do so by switching between a traditional policy analysis 
style, featuring value- neutral and scientific modeling approaches based on the theories 
of objectivism and instrumental rationality, and more contemporary approaches to 
policy analysis that define the role of the analyst as part of ―a process of deliberation 
which weighs beliefs, principles, and actions under conditions of multiple frames for the 
interpretation and evaluation of the world‖ (Dryzek, 1993: 214). These professional 
identities are contextualized not only by a discourse style, such as drawing on causal-
relationship- based conclusions, using referenced facts, but also through the assessment 
of specific political actions and actors instead of connecting morality to policies, as is 
typically the case for those enacting an anti-American/nationalistic self. Furthermore, 
they tend to focus on American politicians and their deeds and abstain from referring to 
them as American in general terms. In the following example (65), Baroud highlights 
his professional identity through the discursive choices of a highly technical analysis of 
the political situation in the US, reporting polls and research findings over the effects of 
the policies in most American political and public settings, reinforces his contextual 
realization of his identity by advancing a prediction of the consequences of the policy. 
The extract shows that he enacts a policy analyst self by drawing conclusions based on 
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professional analytic tools, while engaging in some ethical judgment of the actions that 
highlights his political critic self.   
   
(65)  Considering these views, one can only predict that the Petraeus' report in 
September 2007, (…), will accentuate the duration of the anticipated war. An 
additional 10 years to suppress an "insurgency" is too long for a nation that is 
already growing weary from war.  Many more will likely die if the Congress 
doesn't act forcefully to carry out the wishes of the American people and respect 
the sanctity of the lives of Iraqis and their own.(Ramzy Baroud, Arab News)  
 
As the example shows, the arguer points to the consequences from the point of view of 
Americans and their interests, given that the term ―nation‖ refers here to the American 
people. This means that the arguer undertakes his professional role of the critic/analyst 
as if serving the benefit of Americans. This choice, indeed, may probably be motivated 
by his goal to persuade American audiences to act in favor of troops´ withdrawal from 
Iraq. Nevertheless, it also clearly points to this hybrid professional identity with which 
the arguer attempts to achieve its critical and persuasive goals through a sophisticated 
construction that may qualify him for an internationally accredited contribution on the 
Iraq issue.  
 
In the meantime, 36.6% of the arguers in the same corpus have opted for policy analyst 
as the only relevant self in their discussions. These arguers typically signal this choice 
implicitly by maintaining a highly professional, scientific and objective profile. Indeed, 
these arguers go about in the op-ed with a report-like kind of discourse, usually 
featuring a technical assessment of the conflict and some recommendations on the best 
resolution options and channels, while their opinion remains value-neutral and virtually 
free from moral judgment. Hence by abstaining from using any kind of evaluative 
language, they also contextualize their talk outside any national space whether 
geographical or social. This is typified in example (66) from the contribution of the 
Iraqi political expert, ex-deputy at the Iraqi Governing Council, Safa Hussein, who 
contrasts policy approaches based on their expediency in a nonaligned manner.  
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(66)  This approach clashes with the principle of counter-insurgency. A wiser 
approach might be to perform extensive clearing operations. (Safa Hussein, 
Syria Times)  
 
Enacting these kinds of identities is quite surprising in the case of those directly 
involved in the conflict, as in the above mentioned example, first as an Iraqi and then as 
a politician. The construction may be indicated by other contextual categories obviously 
such as goals. Indeed, this identity type is the reflection of the traditional model of 
foreign policy professional, adhering to the ―value-free investigation of causal 
relationships according to a fixed set of rules‖ (Dryzek, 1993: 213) and hardly is 
adopted by more contemporary and 21
st
 century analysts. The arguer possibly attempts 
to enact an identity that most guarantees his impartiality and the appearance of 
detachment he intends to contextually cast on himself as a participant.   
 
Now, those arguers performing particularly or exclusively a social kind of identity are 
those contextualizing the social critic identity (40%) and those highlighting a war victim 
self. The two identities share common features and may, indeed, be categorized under 
the same group, since they focus on the criticism of social phenomena and the 
assessment of human nature from an ethical perspective.  
 
Some of them even create a mundane, universal kind self at the same time with which 
they attempt to challenge the politicians represented as malevolent and manipulative. 
This construction powerfully activates a collective kind of identity, one that features all 
other participants in the communications as approving and acting in a synergic and 
cooperative manner. Performing this identity also makes prominent the participant‘s 
role in the communicative event. This role is driven by the aim to resist, oppose and 
protest against the dominant power and ideologies. In the following example (67), 
Najah Ali, columnist from Iraq, expresses his protest against the US liberation to the 
Iraq, by reminding the audience of the crimes the US committed against Iraqis in the 
past, which prove their falsehearted intentions.  
(67)    Driven by a burning desire to end dictatorship, many Iraqis had even forgotten 
or tried to overlook the crimes the U.S. had committed against them.  They knew 
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the U.S. was a major ally of Saddam Hussein‘s dictatorship during his war with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Najah Ali, Azzaman) 
However, arguers construing the victim identity generally move back and forth from 
this victim profile to the social critic, or to the nationalist and Arabist. They emphasize 
the suffering and losses the Iraqis endure in the war, but also the deceitful mission of 
Americans as the liberators from dictatorship. Some of them are Iraqis, and others are 
Arabs from different nationalities, but they all enact a victim status, which they 
highlight by a narrative on the Americans as a common enemy and violator of their 
dignity and security and lands and wealth. They mostly accuse the US of provoking 
division and fomenting sectarianism and terrorism. This type of discursive moves 
illustrated in example (68), expressing the arguer´s exasperation from the fate of Iraqis 
after the US occupation, points to a contextual construction featuring a victim identity.  
(68)   Now we're a model country, a living example of tragedy and despair. Now we 
offer encouragement to the most depraved of governments and opposition 
groups. (…)  Three years of occupation have stripped Iraq of welfare and 
security, social fabric and infrastructure. Laws have been supplanted by orders 
from Paul Bremer. (Mohamad Hassen Al Khalesi, Al Ahram)  
    
This identity construction also may possibly chose to fulfill a specific function in the 
discourse as it highlights the American´s infringement of accepted behavior, and 
perhaps as a threat to the world‖ as the one betrayed, manipulated by the US or by some 
politician in the attempt perhaps to create the world as an ally to the Iraqi cause.   
 
The results from the analysis of discursive construction of context in the two op-ed 
corpora revealed the different approaches with which the two cultural groups construct 
setting and participants´ identities in discourse and hints to the dissimilarity of the 
makeup of their context models. While American arguers alternate between different 
types of identity, but mostly highlight their Americanism, the majority of Arab arguers 
attempt to contextualize one identity, which is why no identity is particularly extended 
throughout the corpora. A major difference between the two cultural groups is that 
American arguers enact their professional identities by emphasizing their decision 
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making, while Arab arguers do not foreground any decision-maker self, despite the fact 
that some are actual politicians. Even though in both cultures, the two groups of arguers 
are experts in FP who equally engaged in the enterprise of op-ed writing as an 
instrument for opinion change, the institutional requirements and more importantly their 
positions as foreign policy experts and the amount of power they each hold in 
influencing international relations and shaping world policies makes them stand on 
unequal grounds and hence make their discourses along with their contexts constructed 
in disparate ways.  
 
By examining content which explicitly and implicitly signals the kind of identity 
activated, it has been quite interesting to observe that arguers´ context models in the two 
cultural groups seem to equally draw on a wide array of identities. These identities may 
be reduced in fact to fit under fewer and broader categories which are:  the professional, 
the social and the national identity. Table 6.9 contrasts findings on the identities enacted 
in the two corpora 
  
Self American  Arab 
Institutional/professional  Decision maker *N/A 
policy analyst Policy analyst 
Policy critic   Policy critic 
war correspondent *N/A 
Social  Social critic  Social critic  
*N/A War victim 
National  Patriotic Patriotic  
war combatant *N/A 
Table 6.9.  Contrasting identities construction in the two corpora  
 
As indicated in the table, there is a notable difference among the two groups in the way 
their constructions of self are realized. In fact, being a participant at a newspaper´s 
opinion column on FP issues, as it is the discourse identity that may be chiefly 
interpreted from the communicative situation, does not outstand as the main kind of Self 
these arguers seem to enact in their contexts. American arguers mostly activate their 
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professional and institutional self along with their national one, while Arab arguers put 
more emphasis on their social identities both as critics and victims of the war. Most 
arguers, however, alternate between various kinds of identities in the same op-ed text 
and generally tend to mark out some types of self-identity which are recurrent all over 
each cultural group corpus. 
 
6. 3. 3. Discursive constructions of purpose in actions  
This section reports the findings from the analysis of purposeful actions- those which go 
with some purpose- expressed in the critical discussions standpoints or sub standpoints. 
Purpose and action constitute two schematic categories in the arguers´ context models 
and they have been examined in the same discursive constructions. This is due to the 
fact that these two categories are regarded to be interrelated as the expressions of goals 
lie in the very representation of social actions.  
 
The idea of focusing on actions and goals in standpoints is based on the assumption that 
standpoints are the most crucial moves in argumentative discussions, the ones in which 
arguers create a position to develop for defense. The results from the analysis of the 
purposeful actions in the corpora illustrate the difference between the two expert 
groups´ approaches in realizing actions and goals in their discourses. Their modes of 
realizations are examined according to the systematic inventory- proposed by van 
Leeuwen (2008) (see Chapter 3) of the ways in which action can be represented in 
English.  
 
A common feature characterizing the purposeful actions examined in the standpoints of 
the two corpora is that they are both predominantly American actions. The results 
indicate that the majority of American experts (93.3 percent) and the Arab experts (86.6 
percent) similarly advance argumentative positions involving American actors and their 
actions. Most of the actions in the two standpoint corpora are of the instrumental type. 
Instrumental actions are those which represent people as interchangeable with objects, 
for instance through verbs like ―use‖, ―provide‖, ―offer‖ and so on. Instrumentalization 
makes the other social actors who may be involved in the action appear as mere 
―objects‖, hence as if they are part of processes or organizational resources. This type of 
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action construction is commonly used in bureaucratic texts and serves to legitimate or 
delegitimate practices by references to their goals, uses and effects (Van Leeuwen 2008: 
113). Below are examples from the instrumental actions of American standpoints (69) 
and from the Arab one in (70). 
 
(69)  We have to think past Iraq and above partisan politics, folding actions in Iraq 
into a strategy to protect broader U.S. interests throughout the region. (Wesley 
Clark, USA Today) 
  
(70)  US has an opportunity to turn the withdrawal into a device whose consequences 
can be used to frighten (Raghida Degham, Dar Al Hayat)  
 
Nevertheless, there are some noticeable differences between the two experts´ groups in 
the realizations of these actions which are, very probably, affected by their respective 
context models constructions. A large amount of the actions represented in the 
American corpus are activated in around 70 percent as opposed to less than thirty 
percent objectivated actions. They are also agentialized which means that ―they are 
represented as brought about by human agency‖ (van Leeuwen 2008: 66). Accordingly, 
they emerge as performed by people in control of the situation and who are capable of 
influencing the situations owing to their powerful positions. Furthermore, they are 
represented as dynamic and are assigned the role of predicator/process in the verbal 
group of a non-embedded clause as in the following examples:  
 
(71)  We did give the Iraqis a chance to build a rule of law democracy. (Ralph Peters, 
USA Today) 
(72)  We worked to limit that authority to one year. (Byrd and Clinton, Daily News) 
 
(73)  The US ramped up its operations to stop Shia from cleansing Sunnis. (Barry 
Posen, Boston Globe) 
 
The Arab experts´ corpus, on the contrary, contains more deactivated actions through 
the use of more objectivations (58 percent) even though in most of the cases agency is 
preserved and can easily be recognized from the surrounding textual content. As one 
207 
 
may observe in the examples below, despite the fact the actions in (74) and (75) are 
both nominalized, they construct two different contexts around them. 
 
(74) The US invasion has sparked a dirty Sectarian war (Hadi Marai, Azzaman) 
 
(75)  The new security plan is an attempt to contain Iraqis´ fury (Akram Abdulrazzaq, 
Azzaman)  
 
Actions such as ―invasion‖ are a moralized type of action, where morality and ethics are 
brought to the construction by the very lexical choice, which evokes here ―intrusion‖ 
and ―harm‖. This type of moralized realizations is a powerful legitimation or 
delegitimation tool in discursive constructions and of course in this case ―invasion‖ 
activates a model of unjust and immoral values. To label the actions by its official name 
such as ―Security plan‖ or ―Insurgency policy‖ construes them within a sort of ―neutral‖ 
model; hence no moral judgment is to be activated with the actions. Still, these actions 
are being delegitimated by a different means, namely what Van Leeuwen identifies as 
―theoretical legitimation‖. In example (75), the theoretical delegitimation is enacted by 
means of a ―definition‖. The security plan as an action is defined by in terms of another, 
moralized activity: that of ―attempting to contain fury‖, which means that the security 
plan is being redefined in order to challenge its established meaning or goal and 
reconstruct a different model for it.  
 
American experts do the same but in their turn they do it to legitimate ―their‖ actions as 
in examples (76) and (77):  
  
(76)  There is one choice which protects America‘s security and that is to stand and 
fight and win. (Joseph Lieberman, Washington Post) 
 
(77)  Our entire strategy has been to fight one side then the other to try to prevent 
sectarian violence. (Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post) 
 
The nominalized action in (76) is constructed as an object, a ―choice‖. It is then 
theoretically legitimated by means of an explanation. In (77), the action is similarly 
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legitimated theoretically by definition. All of the above mentioned realizations indicate 
constructions of contexts which assist legitimation. Whether moralized or rationalized, 
the context serves to lead the audience towards validated actions with immaculate goals 
in the case of American experts or to challenge these actions and denounce them in the 
case of the Arab ones.    
 
Objectivated actions of American actors in the Arab corpus refer mostly to the US 
military actions in Iraq and are realized by nouns such as ―security plan‖, ―invasion‖ 
and ―occupation‖. All of these actions fall under the scope of the US foreign policy in 
Iraq as a whole, and their objectivation makes them abstract. By means of abstraction, 
actions get away from the micro-level that makes them up and get constructed as macro 
actions, as in example 74 and 75 above. 
 
The construction of actions as macro actions renders them more generalized by 
abstracting them away from the specific actions and therefore, allows them to be 
classified and labeled (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 69). By opting to use macro actions, the 
micro context is extended, in van Dijk´ s terms (2010: 228) to a macro context and the 
construction may most likely include, at least implicitly, the micro actions making up 
the macro ones. It is probable that the very construction of the macro context is a 
sufficient condition for the activation and implicit inclusion of sub parts (micro actions) 
in the context models. This conclusion of course should not be arbitrarily advanced and 
has to have some foundations. Van Leeuwen argues that generalizations are not possible 
to recognize in isolated actions and that the level of abstraction may not be determined 
unless we examine different realizations of the same actions within one text or in 
comparing texts (2008: 69). Hence, let us examine the following examples from the 
Arab corpus: 
 
(78)  The security policy would enable the US to extend its influence. From Darfur to 
West Africa and from East Timor to the Gulf, and perhaps even control China's 
oil needs.  
(79)  It is part of the American policy which aims at deepening divisions.  
(Examples from Galal Nassar, Al Ahram) 
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As one may note, actions such as ―Security policy‖ and ―American policy‖ are 
objectivated and abstracted to ultimately construct a context of the same macro action. 
Indeed, by examining the realizations of ―policy‖ as an action across the corpus, one 
may presume that each time a specific aspect of it is distilled. In fact, it does not matter 
what micro actions belong to this macro one action named ―policy‖ as long as they all 
have the same quality: control and hegemony. This is what van Leeuwen calls 
―distillation‖ (van Leeuwen, 2008: 69). Distillations not only highlight some aspect of 
an action at the expense of others, they also realize purposes through the quality 
highlighted (like in example 78) and legitimations or delegitimation through the 
evaluative associations which they cling to the term that establish the reference to the 
action (van Leeuwen, 2008: 70).  By constructing the American policy in Iraq in this 
mode, Arab experts probably intend to define a context featuring not only the current 
communicative situation of the single critical discussion, namely of the specific events 
instantiating the debate about Iraq, but also at the same time more global information 
about the US actions in the Middle East. Therefore, by linking the micro actions to the 
global actions, Arab experts see any US action in Iraq as a realization or a contribution 
to American social structures. Here and based on Giddens´ understanding, ―structures‖ 
refer to ―the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to 
exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them ―systemic form‖ 
(Giddens, 1984: 17).  In the Arab experts´ mental models American macro actions are at 
the heart of their action constructions. This multi-level representation of social 
situations is made possible by means of the cognitive interface between social structures 
and discourse.  
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, actions are examined along and 
concurrently with their purposes. The aim is to look at actions and goals, as they are 
significant schematic categories in context models and basic feeds in models 
construction. Again based on van Leeuwen´ s valuable framework, the purposes of 
social practices have been analyzed to see how they are construed in the context models 
of both expert groups´ standpoints. The analysis of purpose constructions involves 
classifying the purposes of the social actions into one of three types: The first is the 
goal- oriented where actions are constructed ―in people‖. The second is the means- 
oriented which constructs purposes ―in action‖ and actions are presented as a means to 
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an end. The third is the effect-oriented which construction emphasizes the outcome of 
actions. The table below summarizes the results from this analysis as following.  
 
 
Purpose American Arab 
Goal-oriented  30% 13.3% 
Means-oriented  36.6% 70% 
Effective 33.3% 16.6% 
 Table 6.10. Contrasted construction of purposes in experts´ standpoints  
 
Table 6.10 illustrates the ways purposes are constructed in the two expert groups‘ 
standpoints. These constructions differ considerably in contextualizing the Iraq war 
participants´ goals. While American experts seem to carry out the construction of the 
three types of participants´ purposes almost equally, Arabs opt for constructing 
purposes through the means-oriented type in seventy percent of the cases, hence 
avoiding the overt verbalization of human agency. A closer look at these constructions 
should help explain these groups´ choices and the possible motivations behind them.    
 
Despite the variety which American experts seem to display, however, the purposes 
they construct belong predominantly to American participants whether allies or 
opponents and delineate in most cases their visions of the ideal solution to the Iraq war. 
Hence, to ―succeed‖, ―win‖, ―stop violence‖ or ―fight‖ all articulate the ultimate goal of 
a warfare protagonist, that of victory.  In these constructions agency is explicitly and 
implicitly realized or at least preserved in almost the entire corpus. In thirty percent of 
the constructions, purposes are to validate intentional goal-oriented actions. This entails 
that the actors are ―discursively empowered as intentional agents- as people who can 
decide, and then succeed in, changing the world‖ (van Leeuwen 2008: 127). 
Intentionality and command on the situation is equally maintained in the mean-oriented 
constructions since agency is preserved explicitly in example 80 or implicitly 81 in the 
purposeful actions coded as circumstance of means, such as in the following instances:  
 
(80)  Democrats support our enemies by undercutting our troops (Ralph Peters, New 
York Post) 
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(81)  Our entire strategy has been to fight one side then the other to try to prevent 
sectarian violence. (Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post) 
 
 
In example (80), the purpose is fulfilled by means of an action whose agents are present 
and explicit, in example (81), though the purpose is of an objectivated action; agency of 
American is recognized and substantiated by means of the deictic expression ―our‖. 
Consequently, in the models which American experts seem to construct in standpoints, 
participants (whether self or other) are in control of the event situation (the war) and 
their actions possess articulate goals. Most importantly, even though actions belong to 
some specific players other than the arguers, their goals are constructed as the property 
of all Americans. Purposes here are moralized by linking them to values such as 
success, protection and security. Morality may be recognized in these values which 
American foreign policy experts seem to draw on in order to legitimate the US policies. 
They enact, therefore, a sort of ―communicative action‖ in Habermas sense, and 
coordinate (fellow Americans´) actions and individual (or joint) goals on the basis of a 
shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. These 
moralized goals construed as common sense, belong to what once formed part of a 
discourse on American national interests and international role and has now become 
well established reservoir of American values.    
 
In the Arab experts´ constructions, 90% of the purposes are the articulation the US 
endeavors in Iraq. Indeed, whether they are referred to as policies, strategies, or military 
occupations, the purposeful actions are closely tied to the US foreign policy enterprise 
mainly in the Middle East. For this reason, the purposes are associated to American 
actors even though actions are highly objectivated (as concluded above in action 
constructions). It is quite surprising that Arab experts construe their context models of 
Americans as intentional and powerful social actors only in 13.3 % of the cases. Their 
preference to build purposes as mean-oriented (in 70 % of purposes constructions) 
indicates that their attention is placed on actions rather than on human actors (see 
example 82).  This action- based model may rely on a need to challenge these actions´ 
functions or even more their very existence, probably through the designation of 
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purposes themselves.  In the Arab experts‘ construction of Americans´ actions, goals 
seem to take an uppermost position and serve as delegitimation strategy. That could 
explain the very frequent use of moralization in the purposes such as ―delude voters‖, 
―deepen divisions‖ to neutralize values‖. In all these realizations, a quality is distilled 
from the action and linked to a discourse of values. For instance, ―delude‖ connotes a 
discourse of ethical values in which politicians´ actions are represented as violating 
instead of respecting the trust of their voters (example 83).  
   
(82)  The current order in Iraq has contributed to opening Sectarian wounds. (Amr 
Elchobaky, Al Ahram)   
 
(83)  The security plan is a ploy to delude US voters. (Abdul Rahman Al Rashed, 
Asharq Al Awsat)  
 
  
Delegitimating the US actions in the construction of purposes is realized by various 
means. Apart from presenting purposes as moralized actions (as in example 2), Arab 
experts often objectivate the purposes themselves as in example (84) and (85) and this 
in turn makes the purpose be classified and labeled by way of nominalization. These US 
purposes seem to be part of a natural disposition or character in the US a nation rather 
than a specific, contextually -bound goal. In example (84), ―oil‖ is an ultimate 
generalized purpose and is not realized with any verbal construction that may explain its 
use or limits. Oil seems to be sufficient for Arab experts (and enough informative) when 
constructing the US goals in their context models. More examples could illustrate the 
same idea (85).  
 
(84)  It is playing electoral politics with Iraqi blood for oil. (Nicola Nassar, Yemen 
Times)  
 
(85)  All the American misadventures of the Bush administration are actually for the 
love of Israel. (Hassan Haifi, Yemen Times)   
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Contrasting the findings from the analysis of the two experts‘ group corpora has helped 
to see a certain pattern in their respective constructions of participants´ actions and 
goals in context models. American experts‘ context models feature activated actions 
produced almost exclusively by intentional and controlling American agents. 
Additionally, actions and purposes in this corpus are moralized, connected to warfare 
values and norms such as victory and success. This must be very probably a 
legitimation strategy of making their purposes seem to be those of all Americans and 
offered for their own good. Arab experts´ models, however, are extended to macro 
contexts through the heavy use of abstracted actions, thus linking the micro actions of 
the American participants as main social players to their (American) macro actions, 
which are in fact, the expression of broader and more long-lasting actions.     
 
6. 4. Summary  
 
This chapter has presented the findings on the analysis of the discursive constructions of 
the Iraq issue performed by foreign policy experts in the American and Arab op-ed 
pieces issued in mass circulation newspapers. Two main discursive construction areas 
were examined: the selection of topics and the enactment of context. The arguers´ 
choices in the selections of discussion topics were contrasted. The analysis of the op-ed 
pieces macro-semantic structures along with examination of the pragmatic dimension of 
the topic selections revealed the difference in the topical trends characterizing each op-
ed corpus and indicated the kinds of disagreement spaces from which these topics were 
selected. American arguers focused on the same disagreement space in the debate- 
withdraw or stay in Iraq- goes hand in hand with the national consensus among opinion 
leaders on the urgency to find a solution to the Iraq problem. The topics were highly 
deliberative and denoted the group‘s power and eagerness for actions as typical for 
decision makers. This finding was confirmed by a clear trend in stasis, as the group 
mostly approached the issue from translative action- oriented perspective. The Arab 
experts´ selections of topics pointed to a different direction. The variety of disagreement 
spaces from which they drew showed the lack of a common vision in their debate on the 
Iraq situation. Their topics were dispersed along different concerns characterized by an 
emphasis on protest. This explains the epideictic and judicial stances they tended to take 
by bringing the issues from a qualitative stasis value perspective to urge for the war 
214 
 
accountability. Drawing on Van Dijk´ s framework for context models (2008), the 
analysis of context construction explored two major schematic categories constituting 
the arguers´ constructed models. These were setting (space) and, participants with a 
special focus on the constructions of self and its roles and relations with participants and 
finally and drawing on the framework of van Leeuwen (2008) purposeful actions were 
analyzed in the main standpoints. The results revealed the different approaches with 
which the two cultural groups constructed setting and participants´ identities in 
discourse and showed difference in the structure of the two groups´ context models. 
While American arguers switched between different types of identity, but mostly 
highlighted their Americanism, Arab arguers mainly attempted to contextualize one 
identity. Furthermore, American arguers enacted their professional identities by 
emphasizing their decision making character, whereas Arab arguers did not forefront 
their decision-maker self, as this might not seem to be relevant for the setting and goals 
imposed by the international debate situation. They seemed aware of their roles and 
positions as resistant groups to the dominating power. The systematic analysis of the 
topic selection and the contextual schematic categories revealed the ideologically biased 
constructions characteristic for each of cultural group of arguers and denoted the 
differences in their power positions in the debate controlled by their diametrically 
opposed positions as political actors in the international arena.   
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CHAPTER 7:  MANEUVERING AND IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGIES IN OP-ED 
PIECES 
 
7. 1.   Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the analysis of ideologies in the argumentative 
strategies of the op-ed discourses in the two cultural groups. Drawing on the notion of 
strategic maneuvering put forward by Pragma-dialectics, the analysis aimed to identify 
the ways with which the arguers survive the challenge they have in persuading their 
audience while being reasonable. The strategic maneuvers were identified and evaluated 
in the four dialectical stages and the results are presented following this introduction. 
Besides, in the final section of this chapter, results are reported on the analysis of the 
strategic derailments, namely, the fallacious moves which violate the dialectical rules 
for critical discussion proposed by pragma-dialectics.   
Based on the pragma-dialectical model, each of the four critical stages (confrontation, 
opening, argumentative, concluding) identified in the process of a difference of opinion 
resolution is characterized by a specific dialectical aim. And since arguers generally 
want to accomplish this aim to their best advantage, they can be expected to make 
strategic moves that best serve their interests (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999: 484). 
The study of this type of strategic practices may be very insightful to how ideological 
aims and power positions shape or constrain policy experts´ argumentative discourses.   
  
7. 2. The Confrontation Stage  
This section presents the results dealing with the strategies adopted by the arguers when 
exposing the nature of the dispute. The focus goes to the confrontation stage, the 
dialectical stage in which the arguers identify the issues at the origin of the conflict, 
advance their standpoints and contextualize their positions. In this stage, the strategic 
moves identified made it possible to determine the kinds of rhetorical aims arguers have 
and the ideological motivations behind them. Findings show that American and Arab 
arguers have very different confrontational strategies due in part to major differences in 
216 
 
their general rhetorical aims deduced from the kinds of oratory each group tends to 
adopt. Before exploring in detail the confrontational strategic patterns for each cultural 
group, it is essential to refer to the disagreement spaces from which the positions were 
selected in order to better explain how the strategic patterns were developed.    
In chapter 6, the disagreement spaces representing the margins of the conflicting 
positions were identified. In this section, these spaces have been examined again to see 
how the arguers´ confrontations are built from them. Indeed, the arguers have to make a 
number of strategic choices related to the general on-going public debate, namely place 
their views within the space they believe they belong to, decide on how to frame it 
against other virtual standpoints, including possible counter-positions, before adducing 
it to the audience. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 display the main disagreement spaces from which 
the standpoints have been advanced in both the American and the Arab data.  The 
findings show that ―withdrawing troops from Iraq‖, as the overriding disagreement 
space in the American corpus is shared by only 20% of the Arab arguers. This space 
indicates the deliberative nature of the positions, as they involve making a political 
decision. The rest of spaces and mainly the majority of the Arab topics tend to draw on 
different spaces, related to morality and justice.  
  Top 3 spaces American % 
1 Withdrawal from Iraq 73.3 
2 Decision makers behavior  16.6 
3 War legitimacy 6.6 
   Table 7.1. Top 3 disagreement spaces in the American corpus 
 
Top 3 spaces Arab % 
1 The US actions in Iraq  (morality) 46.6 
2 The US agenda in Iraq 23.3 
3 Withdrawal from Iraq   20 
Table 7.2. Top 3 disagreement spaces in the Arab corpus 
 
The disagreement spaces here do not only point to the positions adopted by the arguers, 
but they also indicate the nature of the dispute. Indeed, the prevailing space concerned 
with the troops´ withdrawal designate a deliberative kind of debate, in which the dispute 
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focuses on either the expediency or the harmfulness of the proposed policy. Whether the 
proposal was equitable or not, a secondary consideration in this type of oratory even 
though in most cases American arguers did integrate other oratory types for a more 
persuasive effect. In the same way, the majority of Arab arguers who picked positions 
from a morally-based disagreement space seemed to show more concern for honor and 
justice than for future actions. Indeed, most of these confrontations were geared towards 
opening up a sort of ―legal cases‖ against the US. The two approaches differ in their 
intended aims and this difference in orientation certainly affects the strategic maneuvers 
adopted in confrontation. In the next sub-section, the findings on the strategic 
maneuvers identified in each cultural group confrontations are displayed and discussed 
against the backdrop of the nature of the disagreement space from which the arguers 
have selected their positions. The presentational devices by which strategies are 
maneuvered are also discussed.  
 
7. 2. 1. Confrontational strategies in the American corpus   
As indicated in table 7.1, the majority of arguers (73.3%) in the American corpus draw 
on the same disagreement space in advancing their positions over the most practical 
policy to adopt in Iraq. This is the same space under which conflicting views on what to 
do in Iraq were discussed, either by defending staying or leaving Iraq or by proposing 
different types of action. Two different strategic maneuvers related to this disagreement 
space were identified. These were maneuvering by polarization and maneuvering by 
shifting the topic. In the first case, the arguers choose to present their positions by 
polarizing them with those of their opponents. This involves using moves which 
highlight a situation of disagreement in the debate and explicitly point to opposing 
views. The second kind of maneuvering, topic shifting, consists of starting 
confrontation on a topic and then moving from there to a different disagreement space. 
A third confrontational strategy was identified in the corpus within positions selected 
from various disagreement spaces, including those related to the politicians 
accountability and also to the withdrawal of troops from Iraq.      
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Polarizing   
Most of the arguers setting about a position related to the topic of withdrawal from Iraq 
introduce their own views by means of polarization. Standard dictionary definitions of 
polarization emphasize the simultaneous presence of opposing or conflicting principles, 
tendencies or points of view. Indeed, these arguers introduce the disagreement in the 
debate as originating from two extreme positions rather than multiple differences. 
Furthermore, these opponents´ views are often situated as irrational or extreme and 
balanced with moves emphasizing the credibility of the arguers. It is also somewhat 
surprising that, in the majority of these confrontations, reference to opponents´ position 
is not followed by any refutation-based rhetorical strategy explaining the reason why 
the counter position is not valid in their views. A possible explanation for this strategy 
might be that the arguers aim to reduce the disagreement to a binary space by 
exaggerating one opponents´ view and ignoring other alternative differences of opinion. 
By polarizing opponents´ views, the arguers seem to accomplish two goals: weakening 
and disqualifying counter positions from being considered as valid positions and 
establishing their own credibility by means of discrediting opponents´. The latter goal 
may be recognized as an appeal to ethos, commonly used by arguers in this dialectical 
stage to establish credibility with the audience (Rhetoricae 2003). The recurrent 
polarizing maneuvering, a common confrontational practice among arguers in this 
corpus, may give insight into their group shared cognitions such as the kinds of 
common dispositions behind their discursive behaviors. The different functions of 
polarization are explored below in a number of revealing confrontational cases. In 
example (1) below, Kimberly Kagan initiates her debate with polarizing the opposing 
views with her own by means of dissociation.    
(1) In Washington perception is often mistaken for reality. And as Congress 
prepares for a fresh debate on Iraq, the perception many members have is that 
the new strategy has already failed. This isn't an accurate reflection of what is 
happening on the ground, as I saw during my visit to Iraq in May. (Kimberly 
Kagan, Wall Street Journal) 
In this kind of polarization, the arguer does not seem to refute any counter argument or 
show predisposition to argue against any opposing views. Polarization here, realized 
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only at a confrontational stage, indicates that the arguer uses the maneuver for a 
different purpose rather than engaging in argumentation against opponents´ claims. 
Indeed, using the term ―perception‖ and ―reflection‖ seems to be aimed at discrediting 
opponents´ positions by representing them as subjective positions rather than well-
founded views or positions. They are represented as mere perception as opposed to her 
factual knowledge reality implied from her reference to her visit to Iraq. By this strategy 
the arguer equally dissociates herself from her opponents by making a parallelism 
between her own advantage and her opponents´ defect. The strategy risks derailment, 
even though it is widely adopted, as it can turn into the ad hominem fallacy recognized 
as the attack to the person rather than to the argument. This maneuver seems to be 
exploited by a great number of arguers where polarization is employed to discredit their 
opponents´ positions and suggest their untrustworthiness. Example (2) is an extract 
from the confrontation advanced by Michael Totten in which he strategically maneuvers 
confrontation by polarizing his own positions with his opponents (those calling for 
withdrawal). The arguer dissociates himself from his opponents and frames their 
positions as a mere act of ―bickering‖ which implies a state of unreasonable petty 
dispute, removed from the ―real‖ event.  
(2)  While American politicians bicker among themselves from eight time zones 
away about whether the Surge led by Gen. David Petraeus is working or not, I 
turned to Iraq to see for myself. (Michael Totten, Daily News) 
The arguer, here, does not engage in refuting his opponents‘ positions, but rather frame 
them from this confrontation as worthless of arguing against. Indeed, the discussion 
argumentative core does not consist of refutation of counter-arguments, but rather 
focuses on proving that the Surge was working well based on factual evidence, 
presented as warranty to his defense to staying in Iraq and continuing the fight there. 
The confrontational maneuver strengthens one´s position by weakening an opposing 
position. Furthermore, this move attempts to build the disagreement as binary, i.e. as 
representing two opposing poles rather than several. Example (3) further shows how 
Brent Scowcroft expresses his disagreement with the report on Iraq presented by the 
Iraq Study Group (ISG) on the situation of the war. In Spite of the fact that he 
recognizes the rigor and professionalism of his opponents (a strategy referred to as 
accommodation of counter views), he defines their position as a call for withdrawal and 
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a ―dishonest‖ move (in the intention of blaming Iraqis for failure), while, in fact, the 
ISG recommends considering several alternative options to solve the Iraq issue (see ISG 
report summary in Baker & Hamilton 2006).    
(3)  The report accomplished a great deal. It brought together some of America‘s 
best minds across party lines, and it outlined with clarity and precision the key 
factors at issue in Iraq. However, (…) the report implies that we would have no 
choice but to withdraw and then blame our withdrawal on Iraqi failure. (Brent 
Scowcroft, New York Times)  
Another example of maneuvering with counter-positions and presenting them as invalid 
claims is advanced by Peter Brookes in a confrontational move wrapped up into a series 
of presuppositions. The arguer presents the decision to withdraw troops as ―surrender‖ 
and a declaration of ―defeat‖ hence an act of cowardice.   
(4)  Congress will finally deliver on the president's request for emergency war 
spending for Iraq and Afghanistan - after more than 80 days (yes, 80 days) of 
needless dithering with our national security. (…) it includes a completely 
arbitrary timetable for surrender in . . . er, I mean, withdrawal from Iraq. Sure, 
Congress has the constitutional power to declare "war," but since when does it 
have the right to declare "defeat"? (Peter Brookes, New York Post)  
Polarizing, therefore, seems to fulfill a number of rhetorical aims. As seen in most of 
the above mentioned examples, one of the aims is to strengthen the arguers´positions by 
attacking the authority and integrity of opponents and contrasting them with their own 
credibility. Another aim identified from this maneuvering strategy and may be 
obviously interpreted from the ways opponents´ views are generally reported. Polarized 
views are only referred to in negative terms but they are in many cases distorted. The 
misrepresentation of opponents´ positions is generally identified as a fallacious move 
producing what is referred to as a strawman fallacy. The fallacy may be detected in 
example (3) where the arguer falsely interprets the ISG position as a declaration of 
defeat. In the next example of polarized confrontations (5), Tony Snow brings up his 
opponents´ accusation to the US administration of being responsible for terror, but he 
does not show any disposition to reply to it. Here Mr. Snow merely rectifies the 
opponents‘ claims and by saying ―period‖, he seems to decide there is no more 
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discussion to hold on the issue,. By this type of polarization, the arguer clearly does not 
aim at solving any disagreement on the issue mentioned, and even seems to exhibit his 
prerogative by claiming there is no room for more discussion, hence, derailing the 
maneuver, as it violates the second rule of critical discussion, burden of proof (see 
Chapter 4 on the rules for a critical discussion).  
(5)    The most astonishing argument is the claim that the United States (or the Bush 
administration) is responsible for this terror wave. Terrorists are responsible for 
terror, period.  (Tony Snow, USA Today)  
 
Risking the maneuvers´ derailment into a fallacy does not seem to be an obstacle, 
misrepresenting the opponents´ views for the aim of polarizing them against one´s 
position seems to be a widely accepted move, judging from the high occurrences of this 
practice in confrontations. A possible explanation for this might be that the activity type 
of op-ed argumentation gives room for such strategic maneuvers to become common 
practice. Indeed, the preconditions for maneuvering generally set by the institutional 
rules and conventions in which the arguers operate do not seem to place constraints on 
such fallacious moves. This is definitely due to the lack of any explicit formal or 
informal institutional restrictions or official conditions on how the arguers should 
formulate their opponents´ views in the first place. However, the maneuver turns out to 
have more consequences than the ones outwardly perceived. Polarizing positions makes 
the disagreement space a two-dimensional kind of space and presented to audience as a 
choice between two options rather than contemplating more alternatives. The strategy 
reduces the disagreement to a more recognizable and manageable issue, by simplifying 
it for the audience. This increases the chance for persuading audience on one option 
against another rather than have to persuade them against many options or complex 
positions. Indeed, polarizing makes an ―extremely diversified public coalesced into two 
or more highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal 
solidarity in those beliefs which the persuader considers salient‖ (King and Anderson 
1971: 244). Polarizing political views in the US has a long and established tradition 
given that the variety of political and moral value systems, ranging from traditional to 
progressive, from absolutist to relativistic, have often been reduced and categorized as 
falling either under liberal or conservative groups. Using this strategy in opinion pieces 
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may ostensibly be oriented towards producing the usual effect of political campaigns 
and discourses, which appeals to the solidarity and commitment of the group adherents 
based on sharing the same moral or political values.  
 
Shifting the Topic   
Confrontational maneuvering by topic shifts has also been identified in a significant 
number of American op-ed pieces. In this kind of maneuvering, confrontation initiates 
on a topic selected from a certain disagreement space and then moves on to another 
topic that seems to better serve the interest and goals of the arguers. In most cases, 
confrontation apparently draws on a topic selected from a small-scale disagreement 
space, but shifts (usually in a smooth manner) to a higher scale, more polemic 
disagreement space. Indeed, in most shifting the topics cases, the arguers tend to set off 
the debate from a previously settled disagreement, such as the issue of Islamic terrorism 
and the US leadership on the matter of fighting it (widely shared and accepted views 
among the American public), to later move to the controversial debate on troop 
withdrawal. This strategic maneuver is discussed in the examples below illustrated, by 
pointing to the ideological significance of these moves.   
In example (6) Ralph Peters opens his discussion reporting some cruel terrorist attacks 
in Iraq, which powerfully relate to the kinds of images drawn upon in debates on 
terrorism linked to a larger space on the legitimacy of the war on Iraq and the very 
essence of the US interventions in ―rogue‖ states. The arguer exploits the space to bring 
another issue to the table, namely that of the same predominant disagreement space of 
troops´ withdrawal, this time from a different angle and seemingly differentiating it 
from the deliberative debate over the decisions to make in Iraq. 
(6)  Two days ago, al Qaeda detonated four massive truck bombs in three Iraqi 
villages, killing at least 250 civilians (perhaps as many as 500) and wounding 
many more. The bombings were a sign of al Qaeda's frustration, desperation and 
fear. The victims were ethnic Kurd Yazidis, (…) the reason for those dramatic 
bombings was that al Qaeda needs to portray Iraq as a continuing failure of U.S. 
policy. Those dead and maimed Yazidis were just props: The intended audience 
was Congress.  (Ralph Peters, New York Post)  
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This kind of confrontational maneuver serves to initiate discussion from the topic of 
terrorism – related to war legitimacy disagreement space- and then shift to the topic 
related to the deliberation on whether to retreat or not from Iraq. Hence, by starting 
from a topic of shared agreement, the arguer seems to build a tension-free confrontation 
and engage in a concurring discussion on Al Qaeda´s terrorism. The maneuver 
obviously is a case of strategic maneuvering at the level of audience adaptation typically 
aimed at securing communion with the audience (van Eemeren 2010: 108) before 
getting to the actual disagreement space from which the position is taken. Even though 
the strategy seems to undertake a positive function as it mitigates the difference of 
opinion, it may be identified as manipulative, as it distracts audience from the arguer´s 
intended position. Furthermore, confrontation is initiated from the assumption of a 
common threat of terrorists´ attacks, hence implies the inevitable obligation of 
Americans to fight. This kind of maneuver very probably functions as a smokescreen to 
the actual positions to defend in the discussion and may have crucial consequences on 
the audience processing and even reactions toward these standpoints.  
A similar strategic maneuver by topic shift is illustrated in example (7) which seems to 
be ideologically biased by the arguer´s aim of wining the debate to his favor. After an 
extensive description of some terrorists attacks in Iraq, Mr. Krauthammer advances a 
position consisting of refuting some opponents´ views claiming that the US provoked a 
civil war instead of establishing democracy. The arguer makes a strategic move by 
means of a series of erotema (rhetorical questions) the first is the exact wording of the 
counter-argument and the next one is a re-formulation of this view (which very 
probably derails and produces a straw man fallacy). He uses this strategy of topic shift 
by placing his position within a different disagreement space, namely that of 
intervention and war legitimacy while in fact, the global speech act may be interpreted 
as part of the national debate on troops´ withdrawal from Iraq. 
 (7)  Tens of thousands of Iraqis have died, the overwhelming majority of them killed 
by Sunni insurgents, Baathist dead-enders and their al-Qaeda allies who carry on 
the Saddamist pogroms (…). Iraqis were given their freedom, and yet many have 
chosen civil war. (…) We gave them a civil war? Why? Because we failed to 
prevent it? (…) Thousands of brave American soldiers have died trying to 
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counter, put down and prevent civil strife. (…) we've been doing everything we 
can to bring reconciliation. (Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post)  
Indeed, the analysis revealed that the maneuvering by shifting topic served to 
foreground the threat of terrorism and the duty to fight against Al Qaeda in order to 
prepare favorably for the actual position defending the policies adopted in Iraq and 
eventually staying to accomplish the mission. This position is framed within the US 
global leadership and its mission of fighting terrorism as a major international threat, 
and shifted from the space of the deliberation over withdrawal from Iraq which evokes 
the mismanagement of the war and the public condemnation to it. Hence, by blaming 
Iraqis and Arabs for failure, the arguer recreates solidarity and consensus against others 
(here Iraqis) and implicitly absolves the Bush Administration from criticism. 
Furthermore, he shifts the attention away from the controversial issue of withdrawal and 
seems to initiate a discussion on the US mission and fight of terrorism, while, indeed, he 
advances (implicitly) a position against withdrawal. Confronting the audience on the 
basis of the accommodated topic of national values and virtues, rather than bringing up 
the responsibility of a political group, is a confrontational strategic maneuver aimed at 
avoiding the tension produced by the highly controversial topic of withdrawal. 
Nevertheless, it proves to be a case of manipulation, as the arguer´s basic goals and 
intention become hard to infer from the discursive construction of a misleading 
confrontational situation in which the issue is defined in complex and evasive way.        
 
Objections to opponents´ positions  
Around a quarter of the arguers choose to frame their confrontation departing from a 
counter-position of some opponents. Indeed, 24% of them advance argumentation as a 
reaction and resort hence, to refutation strategies. This strategy, widely used in mixed 
discussions where the participants hold a face to face argumentation and may easily 
intervene, points, in the case of op-ed pieces´ non-mixed argumentation, to the explicit 
reference to disagreement and the disposition to exploit an existent discussion and 
expand it. This strategy is different from the cases of polarized views in the sense that 
arguers identify opposing views and commit to refute them within all discussion stages. 
In the all the objection cases inspected, the arguers show consistency when confronting 
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counter-arguments in the sense that they attempt to report the difference of opinion in a 
relatively ―objective‖ or fair way, clearly stating their opponents´ views instead of 
hastily refer to them as ―impression‖ or perception as is the case for polarizers. This 
does not mean that they do not harshly criticize them, a task they tend to reserve for the 
argumentation stage.   
Confrontational maneuvering at the level of presentation 
The presentational devices below displayed indicate the ways through which polarizing 
and topic shifting have been rhetorically accomplished in the confrontation stage. In 
practice, the strategic moves realized at three levels, topic selection, audience adaptation 
and the selection of presentational devices work together to produce the maneuvers 
aimed at. Table 7.3 below displays the top 5 presentational maneuverings in 
confrontations, headed by proposition, apostrophe and enargia, and illustrated with 
examples. 
Table 7.3.  Maneuvering strategies at the presentational level in the American corpus 
Presentational 
Device 
Device characteristics Functions Example  % 
Propositio  provides a summary of 
the issues, or concisely 
puts forth the charges or 
accusation 
defining the origin 
of difference 
The mission in Iraq is spiraling to 
failure. American voters have sent a 
clear message: bring our troops home, 
but don´t lose.  (W. Clark, USA 
Today) 
46.6% 
Apostrophe  directly address 
audience 
evoke an 
emotional 
response 
Keep in mind (…)   (Clifford D. May 
Houston Chronicle)   
33.3 
Enargia   vivid, lively 
description. of an action 
inherently moving 
evoke an 
emotional 
response 
A female Sunni suicide bomber blew 
herself up amid students who were 
ready to sit for exams, killing 40 (T. 
Friedman, New York Times)  
23.3 
Erotema/ 
Rhetorical 
Questions  
any question asked for a 
purpose other than to 
obtain the information 
the question asks.  
affirm or deny a 
point strongly   
expressing 
wonder, 
indignation, 
sarcasm, etc. 
Sure, Congress has the constitutional 
power to declare "war," but since when 
does it have the right to declare 
"defeat"? (P. Brookes, New York Post) 
 
20 
Metaphor comparison made by 
referring to one thing as 
another 
various effects/ 
deviations  
When a lame duck, in his 45th month of 
a failing foreign war and occupation 
bides his time with warning .(referring 
to G.W. Bush) (C. Hines, Houston 
Chronicle) 
13.3 
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It is, certainly, essential for arguers in such activity type argumentation to contextualize 
their positions within the debate and make it clearer for the audience to join the debate. 
The considerable use of propositio demonstrates that the arguers actually find it 
optimum to contextualize their claims for their audience by formulating the 
disagreement in a way that aligns the audience with their own position. Despite the fact 
that this rhetorical device is not commonly recognized for producing bias such as those 
devices appealing to emotions for instance, the choice for wording gives the arguers the 
opportunity to handle and present events the way that suits their interests by 
downplaying, exaggerating, highlighting or simply formulating the disagreement in 
their own terms. The remaining devices employed in the corpus, are equally significant 
as most are accomplished for emotional effect. A substantial amount of maneuvers have 
indeed been performed to appeal to the audience, namely through apostrophe 
(addressing the audience), enargia, (vivid description of events), and erotema 
(rhetorical questions). An extract from Ralph Peter´s confrontation illustrates, in 
example (8) below, a case of a strategic move, maneuvered by the use of different 
presentational devices, probably aiming at having the maximum emotional effect on 
audience. The arguer talks directly to his addressees (apostrophe), states a potential 
doubt they may cast on his claim (prolepsis) and formulate it in the form of a question 
to shed verisimilitude on the interaction he is having with his antagonists and come 
across as close to them.   
(8)  Wait a minute, you say: What about all those recent deadly bombings? (Ralph 
Peter, New York Post)  
By involving the audience more directly into the discussion, these devices (among 
others) make explicit the dialogical nature of the interaction but also are supposed to 
produce positive reception of the positions in questions.   
 
7. 2. 2. Confrontational strategies in the Arab corpus   
The results from the analysis of confrontational moves in the Arab op-ed corpus 
indicated a different trend in the maneuvers adopted by the arguers. Indeed, these 
arguers do not draw on one major disagreement space as is the case for American 
arguers, who probably for practical reasons focus on one issue since they work under 
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the pressure and urgency of coming up with a solution to the Iraq deteriorating situation 
and the impending failure threatening it. Arab arguers exploit around three disagreement 
spaces the smallest of which is the same major space of in the American corpus. This 
means that Arab arguers identify further points of disagreement which they even 
estimate worthier to debate than troops´ withdrawal.  
However, the most revealing finding from the analysis is that most confrontations are 
objection-based. This means that argumentation is advanced in reaction to some 
opposing claims and the very standpoint should be considered as a countermove to these 
opponents´ positions, which are considered as fundamental moves (see Amjarso 2010). 
In this case, the discussion (op-ed piece) should be inspected in light of a more extended 
argumentative exchange and taking into consideration the original discussions against 
which the current objections are advanced. This condition should put the op-ed piece in 
a context of a mixed discussion, which generally involve at least two active parties in 
the argumentative interaction. Based on these assumptions and in line with the pragma-
dialectical model, the arguer seems to adopt the protagonist role to reject the same 
position for which he had presumably assumed an antagonist role in a previous 
discussion. Such a strategic maneuvering indicates a high level of engagement or 
involvement if we might call it so, into the wider international debate taking place 
among the most influential opinion leaders in the world and may also be considered an 
attempt made by the Arab arguers to take part in such a selective and hard to access 
international public debate.  
More than three quarters of confrontations (76.6%) were identified as countermoves, i.e. 
consisting of challenging fundamental moves from previous discussions. Almost all 
these confrontations, (but one) were objections to American claims. These 
countermoves are advanced to fulfill one of the two following functions: maneuverings 
to express dissent, as the moves represent deep disagreement with the presumably 
established views of their opponents, and maneuvering to present strategic advice which 
consist of contesting some proposed policy decision in order to prove its inexpediency.  
Table 7.4 displays the means by which the two main strategic maneuvers of objections 
were realized in confrontation. An example for each of these realizations is also 
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provided to indicate the manner with which the objection, whether coming out as 
dissent out as strategic advice is maneuvered. 
Maneuvering  
Functions  
Means Example  
 
 
Dissent   
Accusation of distorting the 
truth 
This is a distorted simplification (Tariq 
Alhomeyed, Asharq Al Awsat) 
Accusation of inconsistency Washington was less ambiguous… (Galal 
Nassar, Al Ahram)  
Dissonance Who are the real cold blooded killers? (Hassan 
Al Haifi, Yemen Times)  
Labeling  He uses this legend to compare wars. (Jihad Al 
Khazen, Dar Al Hayat) 
Shielded (presented as experts´ 
position)  
Political analysts believe….(Marwan Kabalan, 
Gulf News) 
Strategic advice Disagreement only with 
premises 
Strategy for exit does not require timetables or 
bowing to Iran and Syria. (Raghida Dergham, 
Dar Al Hayat) 
Accommodating counter-views 
Recognizing their merit  
The (ISG) report is serious, sound and non-
partisan and reflects a clear awareness of its 
mission. (Hassan Nafaa, Al Masry Al Youm) 
Table 7.4. Major functions and linguistic means of realization of the strategic 
maneuvers of objection in the Arab corpus 
 
These maneuverings are discussed below from the examples illustrating each of the 
kinds of countermoves employed by the arguers at the confrontation stage of their 
discussions.   
 
Maneuvering as the expression of dissent 
As indicated in table 7.4, Arab arguers maneuver strategically in confrontation with the 
aim of expressing dissent from their opponents´ positions. Dissent is a term used to refer 
to the kinds of objection strategies that designate a ―deep disagreement‖ (Fogelin 2005) 
typically arising from the lack of common grounds between the arguers. The term 
dissent is originally used in legal context by those members of a jury who express their 
non-conformity with jury decision or a rejection to compliance. Results show that 
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around 70% of the objection-based confrontations are identified as maneuvers 
functioning as dissent. Dissent or deep disagreement may not be surprising in a 
discussion involving different cultures and mainly holding belligerent relationships. 
Objections against the positions, policies or arguments of American opponents not only 
reflect criticism and disagreement with their political actions, but also resistance to the 
compliance by their decisions and rejection to their values, since conflicts of interest 
and cultural differences provoke dissent and cognitive breaks (Kraus 2012). These 
maneuvers showing dissent from American positions in the Iraq war were realized by 
different strategic modes. The most frequently employed moves come out as an 
accusation to opponents for distorting some truth. Below, example (9) illustrates a 
confrontation maneuvered as an accusation, where Musa Keilani regards President Bush 
political behavior illusory and hiding his true intentions regarding the adjustments to 
make to his policy in Iraq 
 (9)  President G. W. Bush intends to keep in place the existing military strategy and 
troop levels there after the mid-September report from General Petraeus and 
Ambassador R. Crocker, but will do a few maneuverings in order to give 
impression that he is taking congressional pressure seriously. (Musa Keilani, 
Jordan Times)  
Even if the opponent‘s positions are represented as ―maneuverings‖ performed to 
deceive the public, these may be regarded as actual views and positions. In fact, during 
that period, as the Democrat majority Congress started to create pressure on the Bush 
administration, the President frequently responded by affirming his willingness to fulfill 
their wishes. The arguer here questions the truth of this position asserting that they are 
deceiving positions meant to manipulate the American people for political purposes. 
This accusation of distorting the truth here is obviously meant to demonstrate to the 
American audience the dishonesty of their president.  
A similar case of objection-based maneuver showing dissent is the one illustrated in 
example (10) below. Galal Nassar in his confrontation refers to the Bush Administration 
official positions on the plans the US has in Iraq as producing confusion and as being 
contradictory and his maneuver comes as follows. The strategic moves defining the 
opponents‘ views and advancing objection to them are realized to prove the opponent‘s 
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argument as inconsistent, hence pointing to the shaky grounds of its premises. 
Inconsistency typically occurs when multiple statements which contradict one another 
are given.  
(10)  The US administration feigned outrage when J Carter said (…) that some people 
in Washington wanted the troops to stay in Iraq for 10 years (…) Washington 
was less ambiguous about its goals when it first attacked Iraq. (Galal Nassar, Al 
Ahram) 
These moves focus on the ambiguity of the position of the Bush Administration and 
point to the inconsistency in its arguments. Inconsistency is regarded fallacious, as at 
least one of its premises proves to be false and so is the case for the Administration 
talking about departure while having planned to remain in Iraq at least for 10 years. This 
confrontational maneuver is meant to reveal that Bush was lying to his people and that 
he was merely pretending to endorse their wishes for ending the war. Furthermore, the 
strategic maneuver is efficiently adapted to the audience, by referring to an American 
authority as a source for the advanced claim (Jimmy Carter) and by framing the issue 
from the perspective of the American interest and building his case against Bush and his 
integrity and not against America as a whole. 
Other cases of countermoves advanced to express dissent from the American 
opponents‘ views emphasize the existence of some inconsistency by means of 
dissociation. By dissociating their own positions (or condition) from their opponents‘, 
some arguers attempt to establish a distinction between two states of affairs which 
apparently are widely regarded as being one.   
(11)  Quite often Mr. George W. Bush uses the phrase ―cold blooded killers‖ to 
denote the insurgents, he is supposedly challenging in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
just anywhere else in the world (...) who are the real cold blooded killers? 
(Hassan Al Haifi, Yemen Times)  
The example shows that maneuver consists of challenging the claim Bush makes about 
insurgents by dissociating the fake and unjust definition cast by Bush from the real 
definition of the term. This dissociation realized at the confrontational stage prepared 
for the refutation strategies adopted in argumentative stages. Indeed, dissociation may 
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enhance dialectical reasonableness because at the basis of dissociation there are two 
speech acts, distinction and definition (van Rees 2007: 1) 
Labeling is another means of showing dissent in objections. The arguers in these kinds 
of confrontational maneuvers report the views they reject and then cast a label on them 
to show their deep discontent and oppositions to all of their aspects. By describing 
someone or something in a word or short phrase, extreme overgeneralization occurs. 
The opponents‘ views are typically summarized into a unique term which acts as a 
definition of its characteristics and sometimes as a form of stereotyping. Labeling in this 
corpus indicates a deep resentment to the opponents‘ views, as the move, by default, 
reduces a state of affair into one concept and gives the positions an evaluative tagging. 
In example (12), Jihad el Khazen introduces his opponents‘ arguments by labeling them 
―a legend‖ in order to knock them down more forcefully in the argumentation stage 
after pigeonholing them at confrontation as a deviant behavior.         
(12)  The war cabal in the American Administration has been promoting the idea that 
the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq will lead to massacres and 
genocides as was the case in Vietnam. It is normal that President George Bush 
uses this legend to compare the two wars. (Jihad Al Khazen, Dar Al Hayat)    
 
Maneuvering to provide strategic advice 
Arguers maneuvering for strategic advice in confrontation equally rely on objections to 
opponents‘ arguments and build their argumentation based on refuting these views. In 
these cases, objections are directed to an opponents‘ argument to reject some of its parts 
(premises or the conclusion), but not the entire position. The maneuver suggests that in 
spite of the disagreement the arguers presuppose some shared common ground as point 
of departure, as opposed to the deep disaccord expressed in dissent objections. Below, 
example (13) indicates confrontational maneuvering by objections to American 
positions, or discourse, (probably referring to politicians and elites) for their 
oversimplification of the task of democratization which led, in his views to the 
mishandling of this mission.  
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(13)  The American discourse contains disturbing oversimplification (...) where all 
that is required is the removal of a ruler and the emancipation of a group from 
the chains of suppression. (Tariq Alhomeyed, Ashaq Al Awsat)    
Another example of maneuvering with objection for strategic advice is found in 
Raghida Dergham‘s confrontation. The arguer points to the weaknesses in the 
arguments of the opposing views, namely those considering withdrawal from Iraq a 
defeat for the US.  
 
(14)  The Americans - Republicans, Democrats and independents - should not fall in 
love with the Baker-Hamilton Report as if it represents salvation from upon 
high, since most of its recommendations are, in fact, nonsense and fakery. There 
will be no honorable US withdrawal if bargaining and deals are concluded with 
countries the US has classified as sponsors of terrorism, and there is no room for 
a gradual withdrawal from Iraq. (…) it is possible to render the withdrawal 
useful, so that the US can re-occupy the driver's seat. (Raghida Dergham, Dar Al 
Hayat)  
 
Ms. Dergham here objects firmly the proposal made by the Iraq Study Group (ISG) in 
which they recommended cooperation and negotiation with regional players. She rejects 
their argument for the US need to work with Iraq neighboring states to solve the issue of 
violence. Despite the fact that her rejection seems to be directed to ISG group, the 
countermove is a reaction to those campaigning against withdrawal in general. She 
demonstrates through confrontation, as well as in the remaining parts of her discussion, 
a great affinity with the core aspects of the issue shared with her opponents, as in 
―countries the US has classified as sponsors of terrorism‖ and ―re-occupy the driver´s 
seat‖ which both highlight US interests. By doing so, she shows communion with the 
US position in general and advances her position as one serving the benefit and interest 
of America as a global leader.   
   
Presentational devices in Confrontation 
The strategic maneuvers advancing objections in most of the op-ed confrontation were 
formulated in a variety of ways, most of them pointing to a rhetorical strategy referred 
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to as apodioxis. Apodioxis consists of rejecting of someone or something (such as the 
adversary's argument) as being impertinent, needless, absurd, false, or wicked 
(Rhetoricae 2003). In many op-ed discussions, arguers seem to address American and 
international audience for persuasion and at the same time they identify their opponents 
from the American background. This is a challenging goal for these arguers. It makes it 
crucial for them to set the boundaries between the hostile relationship maintained with 
their opponents and the relationships of communion constructed with their audience. 
This explains perhaps why there is an extensive use of pathos among the different 
presentational devices and the tendency even to combine many of them probably for 
more effect. Indeed, in the attempt to reflect their rejections of American opponents´ 
positions, Arab arguers have the challenging task to maneuver strategically in 
confrontation by defining the issue of disagreement in a way that could likely favor 
their own positions. Arguers usually attempt to show confrontation for their debate 
using presentational devices which they judge most effective to prepare for audience 
best reception of the issue under discussion. Findings show that Arab arguers highly 
draw on rhetorical resources, more indeed that the arguers in the American corpus, as 
indicated in Table 7.5 below:  
Presentational 
Device 
Device characteristics Function  Example  % 
Propositio  provides a brief summary of 
the issues, or concisely puts 
forth the charges or 
accusation 
formulate the 
disagreement  
President Bush told US war veterans 
that if the American troops were 
withdrawn from Iraq before the ―job is 
done‖ the country will experience the 
same collapse that followed when 
Washington abandoned its military 
intervention in Vietnam  ( AlHarithi, 
Arab News)  
60 
Erotema / 
Rhetorical 
Questions  
affirm or deny a point 
strongly by asking it as a 
question. Has an emotional 
dimension 
expressing 
wonder, 
indignation, 
sarcasm, etc. 
Are two year enough? (A. Alrashed, 
Asharq Al Awsat)  
50 
Exuscitatio  stirring others by one's own 
vehement feeling (sometimes 
by means of a rhetorical 
question)  
exciting anger Who wants to live the fairytales of US 
liberation? (M. Khalesi, Al Ahram)  
43.3 
Metaphor comparison made by 
referring to one thing as 
another 
various 
effects/ 
deviations 
Study is available day and night. The 
invitation is open to the ―university of 
terrorism‖ in Iraq (Z. Kseibati, Dar Al 
Hayat)  
43.3 
Anaphora  Repetition of the same word 
or group of words at the 
beginning of successive 
clauses, sentences, or lines. 
strategy of 
amplification 
and emphasis  
Who wants his country to turn into 
another Iraq? Who wants his nations to 
suffer the fate of Iraqis (also erotema) 
(M Khalesi, Al Ahram)  
20 
 Table 7.5.  Maneuvering strategies at the presentational level in the Arab corpus 
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The findings presented in Table 7.5 designate the variety of devices used for this 
purpose in the Arab data set. Maneuvering by propositio is the most widely employed 
strategy (in around 60% of the corpus) of defining the disagreement and advancing 
standpoints. With propositio, the counter- arguments objected against were defined by 
the arguers mostly in negative terms as this is typically used to enhance ones´ chances 
for presenting ones´ views as more expedient and more acceptable. Furthermore, the 
high frequency of erotema (rhetorical questions) is significant, as these forms of 
addressing the audience are employed by Arab arguers here to provoke the audience 
reaction and stimulate emotional effects. They also tend to instigate sympathy by these 
devices of pathos, and frame them as an expression of indignation or protest, which they 
typically try to extend to other various discussion stages.   
 
The discussion of the findings from the contrastive study of maneuvering strategies at 
the confrontation stage has outlined the different approaches with which the two groups 
perform confrontation in this argumentation on the Iraq war, more specifically how they 
recognize their difference of opinion and externalize it. The disparate maneuvers of the 
American and Arab arguers, indeed, seem to indicate the different rhetorical goals 
pursued by the arguers in this dialectical stage as well as the discursive dispositions they 
hold vis-à-vis the debate on Iraq and its participants. American arguers in this corpus 
displayed more hard-hitting strategies for advancing their standpoints, using 
problematic strategies such as polarizing the disagreement and shifting the topic. It is 
true that at the confrontation, ―a speaker or writer will select or exclude in an attempt to 
dictate how the confrontation is defined‖ (Tindale, 2006: 449), but the means used by 
these arguers have derailing and arrogant features which probably draw on the political 
power positions enjoyed by this influential group and an established discursive culture 
sustaining their practices. Arab arguers on the other hand, performed more guarded 
maneuvers even though objecting to and challenging the opponents´ positions turned 
out to be the trend. Indeed, whether maneuvers were meant to express dissent or to 
present a strategic piece of advice, the definition of disagreement follows a rhetorical 
strategy of objection which is generally maintained all through the discussion stages. 
Findings on presentational strategies also showed the effort made by these arguers to 
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define opposing positions in way that they should not be interfere with the intricate 
constructions of their audiences.        
 
7. 3. The opening stage  
Findings from the analysis of the op-ed openings display a further contrast between the 
ideologically biased strategic maneuverings realized in each cultural group. Two main 
strategic choices were the focus of the current analysis: (i) the distribution of 
participants´ dialectical roles in the discussion, specifically the discursive construction 
of antagonists (presumably the audience) and (ii) the assumptions externalized as 
starting points establishing agreement on the discussion rules. Generally speaking, the 
opening is the dialectical stage in which the discussion participants decide to resolve 
their difference of opinion hence they determine their points of departure and agree 
upon the rules of the discussion (van Eemeren et al., 2002: 25). Equally important in 
this stage is the kind of roles assigned by the arguers to their ―constructed antagonist‖ or 
imagined audience. The op-ed pieces present a case of a non-mixed discussion (proper 
to written argumentations) where the arguer/author takes the protagonist role by default 
and implicitly or explicitly assigns role of the antagonists to his (or the institution´s) 
imagined audiences and sometimes even to his debate opponents. This situation gives 
the arguer the (relative) freedom of adjusting the position of audience and opponents the 
way that best suits his/her aims. The two subsections below contrast the results from the 
analysis of roles distribution and the use of starting points and assumption in the two 
op-ed discussions groups.   
 
7. 3. 1. Distribution of dialectical roles  
The analysis results revealed that both American and Arab arguers equally exploited 
this opportunity of dialectical roles distribution in order to create a more favorable 
setting for their discussion, by including or excluding their opponents and by carefully 
delineating the role of their antagonist public in the debate. However, arguers from the 
two cultural groups maneuvered differently with participants´ roles in the discussions. 
Two kinds of participants´ maneuverings were explored, that of positioning the 
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audience (being the main antagonists) and that of the roles granted to opponents in the 
debate.  
 
Antagonists: The Audience  
While American arguers seem to be more inclined to either harmonize with their 
audience or manipulate their positions, the Arab arguers, by contrast, highly 
accommodate their views to their audience. Maneuvering by adapting to the audience 
preferences or values seems to be of highest priority for the majority of Arab arguers in 
the corpus. This is probably due to the fact that their constructed audiences are generally 
identified as American or international and there is certainly a pressing need to make up 
for the consensus that is missing with this targeted audience. Figure 7.1, below, 
indicates the ways the audiences are positioned in the discourse and the type of 
antagonism assigned to them in the discussion, namely either a position of doubt or the 
position of opponent, the one holding a counter-position. Certainly, a position of mere 
doubt is assumed to be easier, in theory, to persuade than a counter-position. This may 
probably explain the reason why there is a high amount of manipulations of the kinds of 
roles assigned to antagonists. This finding is further discussed below.    
 
 
Figure 7.1.  How audiences are positioned in the debate in the American and Arab 
corpora 
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American and Arab arguers alike construct their respective audiences as allies. 
However, the percentage seems to be lower for the American corpus due to the 
detection of cases of manipulations. Indeed, as indicated in Figure 7.1, 40% of the 
arguers do present their audiences as in total agreement with their positions, while 
actually the issues picked up for discussion prove to be of high controversy. Through 
polarizing their views with those of their opponents´ and presupposing their own 
righteousness with no proof (violating the burden of proof rule for critical discussion), 
some arguers attempt to ignore any possible disagreement with the audience. They 
presume the audience to completely agree with them through presupposition 
constructions. This may probably be an efficient persuasive strategy for some audience, 
but also may be offensive for others who becoming aware of this maneuvering would 
feel probably excluded from the discussion. In example (15), Joseph Lieberman makes a 
move which is a case in point of the manipulation of audience antagonism, shifting the 
assumed disagreement on the persistence of troops in Iraq to frame it as if it were a 
political fight limited to Congressmen, and not a public controversy in which the 
American citizens were indeed involved through political campaigns, petitions for 
withdrawal and many other forms of political actions.  
(15)  Congress thus faces a choice in the weeks and months ahead. Will we allow our 
actions to be driven by the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq or by the 
unchanging political and ideological positions long ago staked out in 
Washington? (Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street Journal)  
 
The fact that this kind of manipulation is widely employed by the American arguers is 
probably due to the freedom granted to arguers within this activity type (being a non-
mixed type of discussion in which the protagonist/author is the only one advancing 
argumentation) to define their imagined audience the way they wish to, even though 
Arab arguers in our corpus do not seem to be willing to exploit this freedom. A more 
plausible explanation might be that the kind of aims the arguers have and the 
ideological positions they draw on motivate the performance of such strategies. Indeed, 
since the majority of American arguers have to deliberate over a policy decision, they 
seem to find it imperative to knock down any opposing views by any possible means. 
238 
 
That is why they tend to black out any alternative solutions and even reduce the 
disagreement to two unbalanced positions. Rather than arguing against their opposing 
position, they tend to ignore it and only engage in presenting the advantages of their 
own position, constructing their antagonists as exclusively taking positions of doubt and 
ignoring the eventuality of their opposition. The Arab arguers, on the other hand, pursue 
different strategies. Most of them recognize the opposing views as the ones to be refuted 
by means of argumentation; hence they respond to the implicit burden of proof assumed 
from this situation. In this case, they tend to carefully differentiate these opponents from 
their audience with whom they tend to create communion by explicitly adapting to their 
values and by other rhetorical means such as establishing shared assumptions (discussed 
below in sub-section on Starting points). In example (16), Hussein Shobokshi attempts 
to explicitly and clearly identify his opponents and accuse them of crimes (through a 
judicial oratory type). He, at the same time, differentiates them from his antagonists, the 
American public, whom are explicitly invited to position themselves as the addressees 
in this discussion, by means of a rhetorical strategy referred to as encomium which 
consists of ―praising a person or thing‖ (Rhetoricae, 2003) 
(16)  Because America is still a country that is governed by institutional ethics and 
rules and regulations– although the current administration has been endeavoring 
to neutralize many of these – anti-war voices have a powerful, resounding return 
even within the deep-rooted Republican Party itself. (Hussein Shobokshi, 
Asharq Al Awsat) 
 
Some other arguers condemning the US intervention in Iraq take Americans in general 
as opponents. They attack their position as being unfair and led by greed, and take as 
antagonists the international community, in a position of doubt, to defend their claims 
and charges against the US as a nation. By excluding the Americans as potential 
audience through the use of rhetorical devices related to vituperation (blame), the arguer 
implicitly invites the non-American audience to take up the role of antagonists and to be 
the judge on the standpoints advanced, 
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 7. 3. 2. Assumptions and starting points 
The findings on the analysis of strategic maneuverings with assumptions revealed the 
difference between the two groups of experts in their approaches to how starting points 
should be established in the op-ed pieces. Starting points in the opening stage serve the 
purpose of establishing basic assumptions which generally consist of reminding 
participants of the ideas which are agreed upon by everyone. This is explicitly done in 
some (institutionally-based) activity types featuring a mixed discussion where the 
starting points consist of norms parties must abide by in the process of their resolution 
of their difference of opinion. In the case of our op-ed activity type, and being a non-
mixed (written) argumentation, the author generally makes explicit the difference 
between his/her assumptions and the issues to be argued for or against. From these 
decisions, the externalized starting points were determined and results yielded insights 
on the arguers´ respective shared assumptions and shared beliefs and provided us with a 
route to the makeup of their ideologies. Findings show that American and Arab arguers 
set very different starting points in their respective argumentative discussions. This 
discovery comes as no surprise indeed, as the two groups participate in the debate with 
very different power positions and very different perspectives and interests, hence may 
be expected to adopt opposed ideologically charged argumentative and discursive 
strategies. Results from the analysis of the assumptions put forward by American and 
Arab arguers are discussed below. These results are illustrated by some representative 
examples from the opening stages in the two corpora.  
 
7. 3. 2. 1. Assumptions as starting points in American corpus 
There are seven kinds of recurring assertions identified as the assumptions established 
as starting points in the American data corpus. The main and most widely established 
assumption focuses on recognizing the challenges facing the US in its mission of 
reconstructing Iraq and establishing its democracy. As indicated in Table 7.6 below, 
80% of the arguers explicitly take the complicated situation in Iraq- the challenge 
Americans face and the urgent need to make the right decision to solve the issue- as 
their starting points in their argumentations. The extensive use of this assumption as a 
starting point indicates the experts´ agreement on how critical and urgent the situation in 
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Iraq was and how important their contribution was to the on-going debate. Indeed, 
regardless of the nature of their discussion, namely whether the arguers call for or 
against withdrawal (deliberative) or engage in critical assessments of policies and 
actions (epideictic or judicial), the mission in Iraq is equally judged as undergoing a 
critical moment. Example (17) and (18) are an illustration:  
(17)  The calamity in Iraq has hogtied the Bush administration, inviting disarray, if not 
instability, in neighboring countries. (Wesley Clark, USA Today)  
(18)  By the time President Bush gets around to cooking up his next plan for Iraq and 
telling us about it in the new year, the U.S. military death toll in the conflict will 
quite possibly have topped 3,000.(Cragg Hines, Houston Chronicle)  
 
 
Table 7.6. Top 7 assumptions and starting points in the American op-ed opening stages 
 
Other ideas are presented with lower frequency, but may still be highly significant, as 
they represent assumptions shared within more than a half of the op-ed openings. 
American arguers explicitly reaffirm their assumptions and agreement on the US noble 
mission in the world, its right to protect its interests and the threat of terrorism to 
Americans and the world. Detecting a high level of consensus in assumptions 
established by the arguers reinforces our identification of the kinds of beliefs shared and 
uncontested among the American FP experts debating in the media. Aside from 
Ranking  Assumptions % 
1
st
  There are challenges in the Iraq mission 80 
2
nd
  US has a noble mission   56.6 
3
rd
  Terrorism in Iraq is a threat to the US/world  46.6 
4
th
  The US has to protect its interests  36.6 
5
th
 Bush mismanaged the war 36.6 
6
th
  There is a civil war in Iraq  33.3 
7
th
  Credibility in the debate is a norm 30 
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recognizing the challenges to the US mission in Iraq, assumptions ranking 2
nd
, 3
rd
, and 
4
th
 are concerned with ascertaining agreement on issues related to war legitimacy. A 
very significant common point about these assumptions is that most of them are 
generally used as the very premises supportive of the claims advanced (see topoi in 
argumentation stage section). Since they are shared by a relatively high number of 
arguers (either as starting points or premises), they may reveal (at least part of) the 
content of a shared political cognition and belief system among American policy 
experts. Maneuvering strategically with these very beliefs framed as facts makes a good 
share of the arguers´ endoxa emerge and the structures of their political ideologies 
become more prominent. Indeed, for these arguers, the beliefs about the global war on 
terror, its legitimacy and its ongoing project come out as common ground or as beliefs 
that have previously withstood debate and argument, and now serve as the groundwork 
for their public debate on foreign policy. Underlying these very assumptions the 
principles and justification for the US interventionism in other states remains not only 
unquestioned but seems to be internalized by all the experts in this corpus. American 
arguers seem to underpin the foundations for the Iraq mission among them despite the 
grave situation in order to resolve their disagreement on the procedural details of the 
solutions to the Iraq crisis. 
 
7. 3. 2. 2. Assumptions as starting points in the Arab corpus 
A large number of assumptions were identified as starting points in the Arab arguers´ 
corpus. Table 7.7 displays a selection of these (various) assumptions and shows the 
relatively low frequency of each assumption in the corpus.  
The results from the analysis of the opening strategic maneuvers summarized in Table 
7.7 provide a modest evidence of consensus on assumptions among Arab arguers. 
Indeed, the corpus contains a variety of assumptions advanced as starting points, but 
shows no clear pattern in the kinds of beliefs put forward by this group as common 
ground. 
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Ranking  Assumptions  % 
1
st
 The US mission in Iraq is a total failure/US power questioned   33.3 
2
nd
 Iraq heading to disaster  30 
3
rd
 Presumptions on President Bush character  26.6 
4
th
 War is illegitimate 23.3 
5
th
 Iraqis welcomed the US democratization project 20 
6
th
  Decision to remove Saddam was right  16.6 
7
th
 The US policies are controlled by Israel 13.3 
8
th
 Americans positively characterized (practical, rational, etc.) 10 
8
th
 American perspectives on interests (war costly) 10 
        Table 7.7.  Assumptions and starting points in the Arab op-ed opening stages 
 
The most frequently established starting point is the US failure causing skepticism on its 
status as global superpower, as shown in example (19):   
(19)  Both interventions (in Vietnam and Iraq) were misjudged and based on an 
unrealistic faith in the absolute supremacy of America‘s military might (…) have 
ended in humiliation for Washington. (Mohamad F. Alharthi, Arab News) 
 
With almost the same frequency, assumptions on the pending disaster in Iraq come in 
the second position. References to the US endeavor and the Iraq situation rely on 
sarcastically and metaphorically worded expressions such as ―quagmire‖, ―adventure‖ 
and catastrophe‖. The frequent use of enargia (vivid description) and anaphora 
(repetitions of lexis) on war atrocities are maneuvered rhetorically with the attempt to 
transmit the pain endured by the Iraqi victims to the audience. Example (20) illustrates a 
discussion opening in which the emphasis is placed on the description of the Iraqi 
disaster.  
(20)  Three years of occupation have turned Iraq into scattered cantons, divided the 
nation into sects and clans, squandered national wealth, dismembered the state, 
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and turned the country into an arena for terror and vengeance. Three years of 
occupation have stripped Iraq of welfare and security, social fabric and 
infrastructure. Laws have been supplanted by orders from Paul Bremer. 
(Mohammad Hassan Al Khalesi, Al Ahram)  
Furthermore, the same assumption was detected in metaphorical expressions like 
―reached the worst impasse‖ and ―waiting for grace‖ to represent a gloomy outlook on 
the war and to establish it as shared with the audience. The 3
rd
 kind of assumption 
revolves around Bush and benefits from his reputation (within the international 
community) as a stupid president. Around 26.6% of the op-ed takes this assumption as 
shared even when targeting American arguers, possibly hoping that this ―truth‖ would 
avail their estimation and views on the US policies in Iraq and convince American 
citizens to take action to their nations. War illegitimacy, established as a starting point 
in 23.3% op-ed pieces, manifest itself in explicit reference to failure in finding weapons 
of mass destruction and the lack of proof of the link between terrorism and Iraq. In 
some presuppositions such ―Bush adventure‖ the same assumption was also identified. 
Around 20% of the op-ed emphasize the Iraqis´ enthusiasm for democracy and equally 
hint at the Arab endorsement of the egalitarian principles. This point along with 
propositions expressing approval of the Saddam´s removal are regarded strategic 
maneuvers chosen to shorten the cultural and consensual distance with their audience 
and to come across as resolution-friendly debaters with claims worth to consider. The 
fact that most of these maneuvers are externalized (in explicit propositions) further 
sustains this explanation. However, the overriding trend in this corpus, the low 
frequencies of these starting points, indicates a low level of agreement and also different 
rhetorical strategies. This phenomenon may probably denote the intricacy for Arab 
experts to decide which common ground to establish with a supposedly divergent-
position audience other than trying to adapt to some universal human principles lost in 
the armed conflict and in its US-dominated international debate.    
 
7. 4. The Argumentative Stage  
The analysis of the argumentative stage in op-ed discussions reveals the extent to which 
this stage offers a substantial space for arguers to achieve their ideologically inclined 
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aims through maneuvering strategies. The results from the empirical analysis of the data 
have sustained the observation of some strategic patterns pertinent to each cultural 
group. In the following subsections, findings are reported on the three levels of 
maneuvering: the constructions of the lines of arguments, the adaptation to audience and 
the use of presentational devices.  Two dimensions were explored in the construction of 
the lines of argument, the first is related to how arguers located their arguments, realized 
by means of loci and the second looked at how arguers built their arguments, a task 
brought about by topoi. These findings correlate with a discussion on the sociocognitive 
backdrop of these maneuvering decisions and their consequences on discourse.      
Before getting to the arguments internal construction, an initial operation was carried 
out in the two corpora in which the main arguments advanced were identified and 
classified into the same semantic area or subject. Contrasting the main arguments with 
similar subjects in the two data groups has yielded interesting insights on the divergent 
manners with which the same argument subject was handled by the two groups of 
arguers. Table 7.8 below illustrates how three of the most frequent argument subjects in 
the data are articulated into actual arguments by the different arguers groups.  
Arguments subject  American Arab 
War situation  There is progress There is a disaster  
US goals in Iraq US has a moral duty in Iraq  US has a hidden agenda in 
Iraq 
War Accountability  Arabs are an obstacle to 
victory 
The US is responsible for 
crimes 
Politicians are 
manipulative  
The US provoked civil war  
Table 7.8. Top three argument subjects and the arguments generated from them in the 
two groups   
 
It is hardly surprising that arguers from ideologically and culturally conflicting positions 
make opposing claims about the same issue. Indeed, as indicated in Table 7.8 above, the 
top three claims advanced around the same issue seem to completely diverge. For 
instance, when arguing about the US goals in Iraq, a high portion of the American 
arguers claim the US has a moral duty towards Iraqis and should stay in Iraq to 
accomplish it, while the Arab arguers assert that the US has a hidden agenda in Iraq and 
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is pursuing imperialistic policies there. These most frequent claims in the data are 
further explored to see what types of loci (or lines of arguments) were used in the 
argumentation advanced to support them. 
 
7. 4. 1. Locating argument, loci or lines of arguments  
 
Loci, or the process of developing arguments, are categories that help the arguer outline 
the relationship among ideas, hence make also an attempt to transfer acceptability. Five 
types of common loci are identified in both corpora to have been used by arguers in 
supporting their claims and these are: arguments based on facts (past or future), 
relationships of cause/effect or antecedent/consequence, testimony such as the use of 
authority opinion, witnesses or documents, analogy and finally the locus of definition.  
Before getting to a more detailed account on the findings from the analysis of the lines 
of arguments relevant to each data corpus, an overview is presented below displaying 
the different ways arguers in the two groups have anchored or located their main 
arguments. The loci identified are related to the most frequent arguments or in most 
cases sub-standpoints and revealed the kinds of patterns characterizing the means used 
in the creation of those recurrent positions. The main arguments advanced, mainly those 
featuring complex structures were categorized based on related semantic themes. The 
findings reveal the focus on the two main themes in the arguments: the US 
policies/actions in Iraq and the US mission and goals there.  
Figure 7.2 below displays the distribution of loci in the corpora in relation to the most 
frequent claims advanced by the two groups of arguers on the US policies in Iraq. In 
both cases, Americans and Arabs use their claims in order to support standpoints 
legitimating or delegitimating the US policy in Iraq and both make use of a variety of 
loci to give shape to these claims. However, while the American arguers mainly draw 
on facts and relationships when they advance the claims that there is progress and that 
the situation is favorable for staying the course, the Arab arguers seem to count more on 
definitions and testimony in arguing that Iraq is heading towards a catastrophe.   
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Figure 7.2 Contrasting American and Arab loci the claims related to the policies in Iraq  
 
The following example (21) below illustrates a claim related to the condition of the 
policies in Iraq advanced by think tank Clifford May from the American corpus. The 
example is part of a series of arguments advanced in support of his standpoint calling 
for staying in Iraq. The arguer establishes a relationship of antecedent/consequence to 
connect the premises (antecedent) to the unexpressed conclusion (there is progress). The 
conclusion may be inferred from the syllogistic reasoning that allows the enthymeme to 
be supplied from common knowledge.    
 
(21)  Dramatic achievements are being made at the provincial level. Just a few weeks 
ago, traditional, tribal leaders in Diyala province signed an American-brokered 
peace agreement. They are now working with each other as well as with U.S. 
military forces against al-Qaeda, our common enemy.(Clifford May, Houston 
Chronicle)  
 
By means of this locus, the arguer seems to invite one to consider events or 
consequences that follow given actions or conditions. Arguments based on the loci of 
relationships and mainly antecedent/consequence locus is closely associated with a form 
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of reasoning based on implied premises, referred to as the ―enthymeme. This locus is a 
bit different from cause/effect in that the consequences, the peace agreement and 
cooperation with Iraqis, seem to naturally flow from the earlier conditions, namely what 
successfully was achieved in Iraq. The next example (22) presents a case from 
arguments advanced by Arab arguers to affirm the disaster in Iraq. Arguing that the 
persistence in Iraq is an act of terrorism, Jihad Al Khazen first uses the locus of 
definition by identifying the Bush administration persistence and defense of staying in 
Iraq as an act of terrorism against his own soldiers. Then, he reinforces this conclusion 
with a premise built from the locus of testimony, relying on an argument from 
(American) authority.  
 
(22)  As long as victory over international terrorism is impossible, the only 
justification for the persistence of a condition in which American soldiers are 
killed daily is terrorism in itself. This does not only represent my opinion. In 
fact, Admiral Michael Mullen, who was chosen by George Bush to be chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in Congress that there is no military solution in 
Iraq and the only way out is national reconciliation.(Jihad Al Khazen, Dar Al 
Hayat)  
 
The next graph (Figure 7.3) contrasts findings on the loci related to the second most 
frequently advanced claims on the US goals in Iraq. When tackling this issue, most 
American arguers make the claim that the US has a moral and noble duty towards Iraq 
and use this claim in most cases to legitimate the positions calling to stay the course in 
Iraq and warning against troops´ withdrawal. Most of the Arab arguers on the other 
hand, advancing argumentation on the US mission, claim that the US has a hidden 
agenda in Iraq serving its imperialistic goals.  
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Figure 7.3 American and Arab loci in the claims related to the US goals and mission   
 
These two main claims are structured as follow: when discussing the US agenda in Iraq, 
American arguers rely almost exclusively on the locus of relationship, in 77% of the 
cases, in order to defend the claim that the US has an honorable duty to accomplish in 
Iraq. Indeed, the analysis shows a high level of ―cause and effect‖ and 
―antecedent/consequences‖ types of conclusion drawing. Antecedent/consequences, 
being the locus most frequently used in the cases examined, typically generate 
enthymeme and highly relies on implied premises. These implied premises draw on 
given ―knowledge‖ and on supposedly shared assumptions. In the American corpus, the 
arguers claiming that the US has a moral duty frequently build their argumentation on 
supposedly accepted premises which mostly remain unexpressed. These claims, in fact, 
come as sub-arguments to higher level arguments in the discussion structures and are 
mostly employed to support the dissuasion of taking any political actions leading to the 
withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Example (23) below, illustrates the use of this kind of 
locus, where Tony Snow claims that despite the terrorists´ threat in Iraq, the US actions 
succeeded in turning the events against them. The supportive premise, the US has a 
noble mission, remains unexpressed. In fact, along the argumentative discussion, 
progress and accomplishment presupposes a mission with honorable goals    
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(23)  More than anything, al-Qaeda wants the United States to leave Iraq and hand 
victory to the terrorists. Recent military action has inflicted serious damage on 
al-Qaeda in Iraq and has inspired a growing number of Iraqis to fight al-Qaeda. 
 
Their Arab counterparts, on the other hand, build their claims on a variety of other 
common loci. Their claim that the US has a hidden agenda is established more on 
testimony (80%), followed by definitions (50%) then facts (42%). By drawing 
predominantly on testimony, arguers seem to be concerned with warranting their claims 
with solid sources, namely citing American authorities and referencing from official 
documents. This fact is probably due to their awareness that their positions may come 
across as highly contentious and harsh and risk immediate dismissal by the American or 
international audience whom they are supposedly addressing. In example (24), Hassan 
Tahsin advances his standpoint in the discussion on the US hidden agendas in Iraq 
which, for him, explain the reason why Bush administration refuses to withdraw troops 
after four years of occupation. The arguer goes beyond the typical speculations on the 
US imperialistic intentions and warrants his claim by reference to the bill draft of the oil 
law to be passed in Iraq. This document along with reports from the watchdog 
organization functions as a means for establishing acceptability of the claim by the 
locus of testimony.  
(24)  The draft bill of the oil law contains such draconian provisions as prohibiting 
any Iraqi company to undertake excavations for oil and natural gas while, on the 
contrary, Washington will have the right to decide which foreign company can 
operate in Iraq. (…) According to Platform, an oil industry watchdog, ―The law 
is permissive. All of Iraq‘s unexploited and as yet unknown reserves, which 
could amount to between 100 billion and 200 billion barrels, would go to foreign 
companies‖. (Hassan Tahsin, Arab News)  
The reference to a legal document (or even to its draft) ensures more solid grounds for 
the claim, as testimony is widely recognized as very effective and represents ―safe and 
sound‖ lines of arguments which the audience are given the opportunity to check upon. 
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7. 4. 2. Strategic maneuvering in the American corpus 
7.4.2.1. The lines of argument 
This section presents the results of the constructions of the lines of arguments analysis. 
Data was examined to identify the main arguments advanced in relation to the most 
important disagreement space (within which up to ¾ of the discussions were held). This 
disagreement space is mainly deliberative, as it involves negotiating decisions about 
actions and policies to take in Iraq. The following table presents a list of the most 
frequent arguments, or also referred to as claims, in the American discussions. These are 
listed from highest to lowest and grouped under main or sub-claims.  
Main claim   Sub-claim  loci communes  
There is progress  The is a difference (past/present) 
Security plan is efficient 
Circumstances/ fact  
Testimony 
Analogy 
The good  
There is a mission to 
accomplish 
Security is a priority 
The US is responsible for  Political 
reconciliation in Iraq 
The US forces are rebuilding Iraq 
Advantageous 
The good 
Withdrawal is a mistake  It means defeat 
It will produce catastrophes 
It emboldens enemies/means their victory 
Allies feel abandoned  
Relationship 
Circumstances  
disadvantageous  
Terrorism is still a threat Al Qaeda is the major enemy  
Al Qaeda provokes civil war 
Relationship 
Circumstance  
Arabs are an obstacle to 
victory 
They are socially degraded  Circumstances/facts 
plan needs more troops Troop size is key to success  relationship 
The war is over  The US has no roles any more 
 Bush misleads the people/incompetent 
Parties play political games over Iraq  
Relationship  
 Table 7.9. Main arguments advanced in the American discussions (argumentation 
stage)   
As indicated in Table 7.9, there are around seven recurrent arguments across the corpus 
supporting different standpoints related to the topic of withdrawal. Arguments 
defending the decision of the Bush administration on staying in Iraq and carrying on the 
military plan initiated by General Petraeus in the beginning of year 2007 come first on 
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this list. Those arguments listed towards the end belong to the positions calling for 
withdrawal. Despite the existence of opposite positions in this list, the arguments turn 
out to be connected with a common notion: victory. Achieving victory seems to be the 
overarching purpose of the political deliberation on policy decisions. Indeed, this goal 
turns out to be the most recurrent implicit premise reconstructed along the corpora. To 
illustrate this finding, two examples from different positions on troops´ withdrawal are 
discussed below. Example (25) is part of a discussion in which O´Hanlon and Pollack 
argue against withdrawal by advancing a main claim asserting the effectiveness of 
Petraeus security plan. They advance a series of arguments, among which the claim that 
terrorists were eradicated from big cities in Iraq, which they support by means of two 
types of loci, that of comparison, and  of circumstances.  
(25)   Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of 
Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor. (O´Hanlon 
and Pollack, New York Times)  
By linking the past fact to the present situation (circumstances) through comparison, the 
arguers locate their claim within the ―possible‖, namely success. The ―possible‖ is a 
locus related to the deliberative kind of speech concerned with demonstrating the 
viability of a state of affair which leads to perceiving the advantages of the proposal. 
What is implicitly premised as the possible, here and in many similar arguments is 
unmistakably success.     
A significant number of opposite positions, namely those calling for ending the war are 
also premised with the implicit assumption of achieving success. In example (26), the 
arguers put forward a critical view to the Bush administration and its decision to stay 
the course in Iraq. The reconstruction of the argument made it possible to add the 
unexpressed premise to the conclusion that there is no progress. This premise is ―if there 
is no progress, there is no success‖.  
(26)  (...) little was done to rebuild the city. Instead, the leading parties maintained 
their predatory practices, scrambling to take advantage of available public 
resources, contracts, or jobs. (...) The public sector as a whole is rife with 
corruption -- instance of mammoth-sized projects that have delivered virtually 
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nothing are legion -- malfeasance and partisan hiring. (Malley & Harling, Boston 
Globe) 
Through the description of the conditions of the Iraqi political culture, the arguers in the 
above example, attempt to transfer the acceptability of their claim by means of the locus 
of precedent/consequence, in which the ―consequence‖ is the conclusion to the 
argument, namely the military plan failure. Hence the arguments against Bush policies 
also premise their conclusions on a presumed victory, which is in case it is not attainted 
the call to withdrawal is due. The unexpressed premise in this reasoning (syllogistic in 
its essence) is the assumption that the US is in Iraq to achieve success. Indeed, all the 
op-ed pieces in the corpus calling for withdrawal do not put into question the ethical 
principles of waging a war. The US integrity on this matter is presumed, and no premise 
could be reconstructed as hinting at the immorality of occupation. They all presume that 
fighting is meant to accomplish a mission and that victory is the ultimate goal to achieve 
it. The notion of victory representing the most recurring unexpressed premise in this 
corpus seems to be the goal most shared by these foreign policy experts. The widely 
shared premise may also be interpreted as a distinctive component in this group shared 
cognition. The mental models from which they probably build their argumentation draw 
on success as a goal set by the axioms of war to become also the main goal in the 
communicative exchange in which they engage.    
Now, close attention is paid to the top three arguments found in more than 2/3 of the 
American corpus where findings displayed in Table 7.10 show the high level of 
argument constructions using the loci of circumstances and relationship. In spite of the 
fact that in the third most frequent argument there is a considerable use of testimony 
mainly by reference to witnesses on the battlefield, the use of this locus happens to be 
relatively low. The locus of testimony includes resorting to authority and witnesses 
among other testifying instruments. But the arguers here perhaps find their own 
authority and expertise to be sufficient certifying means for their argument and do not 
need hence to have recourse to testimony to locate their arguments. Most arguments, 
indeed, are located by means of circumstances, mainly ―facts‖ from the on-going 
political scenes negotiating the Iraq fate and by the locus of relationship, either by 
establishing the consequence from some antecedent or the effect from a certain cause.      
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Sub-standpoint/  
Argument 
Loci communes 
Circumstances  Relation Testimony Analogy Definition 
There is progress 67 70 10 6.6 0 
US has a duty in Iraq 16.6 77 6.6 0 0 
Withdrawal  is a mistake  43 60 30 3.3 3.3 
Table 7.10.  Top 3 standpoints or main arguments in the American corpus 
 
The use of some specific locus powerfully indicates the kind of function to be attained 
by the argumentative move. Indeed, the extensive use of arguments schemes based on 
relationship and circumstances may denote the American arguers‘ keenness on 
pragmatic arguments (see Perelman & Tyteca Olbrecht, 1969: 18). Pragmatic arguments 
are practical in orientation, justifying actions that are thought to facilitate the 
achievement of goals, hence they are mainly decision-oriented whether deliberative or 
normative (legal). This is the kind of argument scheme used by the great majority of op-
ed pieces in this corpus. The loci they employ emphasize a logical reasoning and 
generate pragmatic arguments which are not only decision-oriented but also benefit-
directed.  
 
The following sub-section presents results from the categorization of arguments based 
on their constructions and the functions they perform. Based on the above reported and 
discussed results on how arguments were constructed, the strategic maneuvers 
performed by the American arguers in the argumentation stages of their discussion were 
then identified.  
 
The irreparable and the gain-loss maneuvers 
The main loci communes used in the corpora, namely those of circumstances and 
relationship, were categorized according to the functions they performed in relation to 
the main standpoints. This operation revealed the higher-level loci by which the 
arguments were interconnected. The overall argumentation constructions in this critical 
stage seem to gear in most part the maneuvering strategies of the American arguers in 
254 
 
the corpus. Indeed, arguers maneuver strategically at the level of topical potential by 
either connecting their arguments by the locus of the irreparable or by framing them in 
terms of gains or losses.  
The nearly 75% of the op-ed pieces advancing a call to take action in respect to Iraq 
(see results in Chapter 6, Table 6.1) construct pragmatic-based arguments which are 
benefit-oriented. Most of these benefit-oriented arguments, which are arguments 
―seeking to motivate the acquisition of a belief because of the benefits possibly 
generated by holding that belief‖ (Jordan, 2006: 93), maintain that the actions proposed 
are profitable. Their assumptions on benefit take two different paths. First, the path 
most pursued is the locus of the irreparable with up to 40% of the arguments structured 
on the irreversible character of some aim to be achieved. The second, established in 
more than 1/3 of the corpus, chooses to maneuver by framing the benefits as achieving 
gains or as avoiding losses. Table 7.11 displays findings on the distribution of these 
strategies within the American corpus. It specifies the loci most frequently exploited the 
maneuvers they signal and the general goal they leave evidence of.  
 
Loci communes Maneuvers   Goals % 
Circumstances/ Relationship The irreparable Plea for action  40 
Gain-loss Plea for action  36.6 
Testimony Certification Legitimating  13.3 
Others (analogy, definition, etc.)    Various  Prediction/self 
exoneration 
10 
Table 7.11. Strategic maneuvers indicated by the loci communes and the goals they 
signal in the American corpus 
 
The table shows a clear trend in the American corpus in the strategic maneuvers 
employed in the argumentative stages. More than 75% of the op-ed pieces are directed 
to the pursuit of political action and seek to influence the audience´ reflection over the 
most convenient policy in Iraq. To achieve this goal, a sizeable number of maneuvers in 
the argumentative stages exploit the locus of the irreparable, or the ―preferable‖ as 
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referred to by Perleman and Tyteca-Olbrecht (1969). This strategy establishes a 
situation or a state of affair as having a greater value than something else. Indeed, there 
are a number of issues qualified as valuable and irreparable across the data and these are 
primarily security, victory and glory.   
Security is qualified in some op-ed pieces as irreparable by calling attention to its 
threats. Security threats such as terrorism and enemies play an essential role in making 
the action proposed necessary and urgent. In fact, establishing security in Iraq and the 
Middle East is understood to be one of the main goals to achieve from the war on terror 
declared in 2002 by the Bush Administration. The policies are set to accomplish a 
mission which should bring about security for Americans, their allies or probably the 
whole world, according to this framing. In example (27) below, think tank Kimberly 
Kagan describes the progress accomplished in Iraq and the ―clearing‖ carried out in its 
different regions in order to secure it. Despite that the security mentioned here is 
established in Iraq, the reference is to signify security for troops and hence also for 
Americans.  
(27)  For the first time, U.S. forces are working systematically throughout central Iraq 
to secure Baghdad by clearing its rural "belts" and its interior, so that the enemy 
cannot move from one safe haven to another. (Kimberly Kagan, Wall Street 
Journal)  
 
Establishing security in Iraq means defeating the enemy and succeeding in beating and 
eliminating Islamic terrorists, being a major threat to the US since 9/11. Indeed, since 
the terrorist attack in the US, Americans have considered their security endangered by 
the threat of terrorism, which succeeded in reaching the shores of their country and in 
spreading fear among them. Whether in the War on Terror Campaign (initiated right 
after 9/11) or in the Operation Iraqi Freedom (dubbed by the US during the invasion in 
2003) extensive political discourse made national security an imperative in foreign 
policy and the protection of Americans has become one of the most important aims. 
Security is made even more invaluable as threatened and made vulnerable by terrorism. 
This heightened value is made prominent by the locus of the irreparable, which use calls 
attention to the unique and precarious nature of some object or state of affairs, and 
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stresses the timeliness of our relationship to it‖ (Cox, 1982: 229). In this respect, the 
threatened security becomes irreplaceable and so the actions that should be taken to 
protect it. 
 
The quest to victory is an essential premise in most of the arguments structures across 
the corpus. Argumentation is located from the principle of victory as the expected 
outcome of war. Victory is very often represented as irreparable by making its 
achievement conditioned by the opportune actions to be taken. By using this locus, the 
arguers place value on the timeliness of the relationship to it (Cox, 1982) and point to 
success as irrecoverable if fight were abandoned. Indeed, some of the arguers calling to 
stay the course in Iraq and urging to give General Petraeus the chance to continue his 
newly implemented security plan advance the claims on the urgency of sending more 
troops and not surrendering to the enemies and the threat. Values like courage, honor 
and humanity are drawn upon to emphasize the urgency to act to achieve success. 
Withdrawal for many arguers is unacceptable and is equated with surrender and defeat. 
In example (28), Joe Lieberman forwards a main standpoint in which he asserts that 
there is only one choice in Iraq. This choice is to keep fighting in order to succeed. He 
attempts to challenge his opponents claiming that the US should retreat from the Iraq 
Civil war and insists on the necessity to persevere with the fight against terrorism 
mission. Reminding the audience of the initial goal of the war is meant to redirect their 
attention to the need for victory 
(28)  Just as Petraeus and his troops are working to empower and unite Iraqi 
moderates by establishing basic security, al-Qaeda is trying to divide and 
conquer with spectacular acts of butchery. That is why the suggestion that we 
can fight al-Qaeda but stay out of Iraq's "civil war" is specious, since the very 
crux of al-Qaeda's strategy in Iraq has been to try to provoke civil war. (Joseph 
Lieberman, Washington Post)  
Another concept characterized as irreparable in the corpus is that of glory. In both an 
implicit and an explicit mode, this notion is placed in the heart of the reasons why 
certain actions should be taken. The locus of the irreparable in the notion of glory 
allows the military and political actions to derive their eligibility and to center the focus 
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on the ―mission‖ to accomplish to preserve glory. Indeed, having a mission to complete 
activates a series of values which are at the core of the US foreign policy agenda (See 
Chapter 5, section 5. 4. 2. 1). These values are the US international leadership and its 
responsibility for promoting its more important political values, namely freedom and 
democracy, for the benefit of Americans and the international community (US 
Department mission statement 2007). Leadership and global governance represent 
qualities that are unique to the US. This uniqueness needs to be preserved and 
maintained while the US is facing the challenge of failure and the persistence of 
violence in Iraq. Bob Kerrey in example (29) below argues for the necessity to keep 
fighting by refuting his opponents´ criticism to carrying on a failing war. He attempts to 
knock down the claim that invading Iraq has led to more terrorism by maneuvering with 
the assumption on the US mission to spread democracies around the world.  
(29)  Those who argue that radical Islamic terrorism has arrived in Iraq because of the 
U.S.-led invasion are right. But they are right because radical Islam opposes 
democracy in Iraq. If our purpose had been to substitute a dictator who was more 
cooperative and supportive of the West, these groups wouldn't have lasted a 
week. (Bob Kerrey, Wall Street Journal)  
 
By this maneuver, the US role as a global leader is highlighted. The actions of enemies 
are juxtaposed with the US values while the audience is implicitly reminded of the 
unique and privileged role of the US in leading on such crucial issues as intervening in 
troubled states, removing dictators, establishing others or promoting democracy instead. 
The nobleness of the US intentions, it seems, made it choose a harder path instead for 
opting for sustaining a dictator, Kerrey claims. This, thus, makes leadership and all the 
related political values as irreparable, as requiring the urgent and efficient action to 
preserve them and to maintain them. Glory is presumed by arguers whether calling to 
stay or leave Iraq and the ―noble goal of advancing a future of freedom, security, and 
prosperity for the benefit of the American people and the entire world‖ (US Department 
of State 2007: 4) seems to be a common irreparable locus in proposals for saving Iraq 
from disaster. 
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As far as the gain-loss framing, the maneuvers exploited in around 36.6% of the corpus 
draw on one of two scenarios which either highlights the positive (gains) or negative 
(losses) aspects of the issue. The first scenario invites the audience to contemplate the 
gains accomplished from the policy initiated by Petraeus. They emphasize the 
outstanding quality of the new commander in chief and his team and the efficiency of 
his plans. Some also describe in detail the outcomes of these plans and their effects on 
the Iraqis as indicative of the payoff for the effort made. Example (30) illustrates this 
kind of framing in which Mr. Yon enumerates the gains while calling audience to wait 
for Petraeus final report due in September 2007.   
(30) I, like everyone else, will have to wait for September's report from Gen. Petraeus 
before making more definitive judgments. But I know for certain that three 
things are different in Iraq now from any other time I've seen it. (Michael Yon, 
Daily News)  
The arguer, then, develops this standpoint into three sub-points each devoted to one of 
the gains mentioned to suggest to the audience that success and benefit are approaching 
and that abstaining from calling to withdrawal would compensate all the waiting they 
would have to endure. The second scenario, on the other hand, brings the audience to 
think about the consequences of not making the right decision. This framing emphasizes 
the losses to be suffered if the proposed action is not taken. Arguers using this kind of 
frame attempt either to persuade the audience that staying has the momentous benefit of 
avoiding losses or dissuade them to adhere with the withdrawal decision. In both cases, 
the drastic losses are at the heart of the arguments and most moves are maneuvered 
around warning from the disaster (as opposed to listing the gains). The extract from 
Scowcroft´s op-ed pieces, example (31), indicates a strategic maneuvering by loss 
framing.  
(31)  An American withdrawal (…) would be a strategic defeat for American 
interests, with potentially catastrophic consequences both in the region and 
beyond. Our opponents would be hugely emboldened, our friends deeply 
demoralized. (Brent Scowcroft, New York Times)  
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The arguer´s argumentation schemes, which follow his standpoint, are built, as one may 
observe, from the structure of the standpoint itself on a loss framing, by warning 
Americans from the damage to be suffered in case withdrawal is undertaken. In 
psychology, choosing gain-loss strategies for persuasion has a framing effect (See 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Fredericks, 2002) that contributes to 
cognitive bias. This effect probably affects the processing of the op-ed opinion and its 
results in public opinion change. But what is mainly important here is that this widely 
adopted strategy in the corpus leads to the reflection on the role of emotional appeals in 
political discourse in general and mainly the function performed by the use of fear by 
US politicians in promoting their foreign policy campaign (see McMahon, 
forthcoming).  
The remaining part of the corpus (23.3%) contained a variety of loci which indicated 
different types of strategic maneuvers and different ideological goals. Almost half of 
this part features the locus of testimony (in 13.3%) which employs arguments from 
authority or facts relying on documents. These lines of arguments were hence 
categorized as maneuvers by certification. Most of these strategies were, indeed, used 
for legitimation purposes mainly in cases rejecting some opponents´ arguments about 
the legitimacy of some policy actions or behavior. These maneuverings are typically 
generated within judicial or epideictic kinds of argumentation, where the arguers engage 
in defending a (past or present) action in order to acquit or legitimize it. Columnist 
Parker, for instance, in example (32) refutes her opponents´ claim that some US soldiers 
acted brutally in Iraq. She contends that soldiers should not be blamed for killing while 
they endure the stress of dealing with terrorists 
(32)  But did the Marines kill in cold blood? (…) quoting the late Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Jr. who served as an infantryman in the Civil War and 
described war as an ―incommunicable experience‖ (…) second-guessing how 
Marines should act under hostile fire before the facts are known is not only 
unfair, but dishonors the immense courage required to survive in the midst of 
such an incommunicable experience. (Kathleen Parker, Chicago Tribune)  
By means of certification and some other means of locating arguments arguers attempt 
to license policies adopted in Iraq and defend their integrity. Other lines of arguments 
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with lower frequency were identified in some op-ed pieces located through a number of 
loci, namely, analogy, definition, etc, to perform various strategies, namely self-
exoneration (exonerate themselves or whom they defend from charges or blame) and 
predictions (simply forecast the outcomes of some political action and with no any 
directive force in argumentation). 
 
7.4.2.2. Topoi or building the arguments 
The second dimension concerned with examining the construction of arguments in the 
current corpora is that of the topoi, the argument parts which play a ―guarantee 
function‖ for arguments (De Pater 1968), as they provide arguers with the common 
ground needed to connect their premises with their conclusion or claim. The premises 
functioning as topoi in the American main arguments are reported in Table 7.12 below. 
These topoi are ranked based on their frequency throughout the corpus; hence the 
percentages may indicate the patterns of common grounds upon which these arguers 
attempt to guarantee their arguments.  
 
Topoi % 
1. The US has a noble mission in Iraq 70 
2. The US fights for its national security 56.6 
3. The US is the greatest power on earth  40 
4. Arabs are inept people (eg. See op-ed 15 ―old rivalries‖ 23.3 
5. Arabs (Iraqis) are violent (op-ed16 our troop in the 
middle of a fight between religious factions 
23.3 
6. Radical Islamists (started) declared the war on the US  20 
Table 7.12 The top 6 topoi used in the American op-ed corpus 
 
 
From the list of the top 6 topoi used in the American corpus, displayed in Table 7.12 
above, one may observe that the topoi evolve around the attributes of either the US (as a 
nation at war) or Arabs (mostly as the object of war). The most frequent topoi or 
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premises used to justify arguments are based on the belief in the US integrity (70%), its 
right to self-defense (56.6%) and its grandiosity (40%). These premises are used both 
explicitly and implicitly. In the first case, the assumption on the war moral foundations 
is expressed in different ways, generally by linking the US ―mission‖ to morally loaded 
lexis on American values namely, freedom, democracy, help, assist, rescue, protect 
(among others) all pointing to the belief in the humanitarian endeavor  undertaken by 
the US in Iraq. In the second case, the implicit topoi, which sometimes rely on 
enthymemes (unexpressed premise, mainly in syllogism), are reconstructed from 
arguments based on premises describing the achievements of the US soldiers or praising 
their valor and accordingly hinting at the ―noble‖ character of their mission. Example 
(33) illustrates an argument supported implicitly by the topos that the US is doing a 
humanitarian act in Iraq, namely that of liberating people from dictatorships and 
establishing democracy instead. Ralph Peters in this extract argues that Iraqis did not 
appreciate the opportunity offered to them and they opted for violence. The argument is 
also supported by the topos that Arabs are inept to embrace modernity and basic human 
values.    
  
(33) Yet, for all our errors, we did give the Iraqis a unique chance to build a rule-of-
law democracy. They preferred to indulge in old hatreds, confessional violence, 
ethnic bigotry and a culture of corruption. It appears that the cynics were right: 
Arab societies can't support democracy as we know it. And people get the 
government they deserve. (Ralph Peters, USA Today) 
 
This topos, as is the case for all the remaining topoi, is typically used as a premise to 
support a certain claim, most of them go about legitimizing not only the war itself 
(assumed in those cases as inevitable), but the decision to stay in Iraq after four years of 
invasion. They are used also to fight against any decision of withdrawal which is seen 
as a harmful move for the US interests in the Middle East and as a world leader in 
general.  
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7. 4. 3. Strategic maneuvering in the Arab corpus 
7.4.3.1. The lines of argument  
Strategic maneuvers performed in the Arab corpus indicate a certain pattern which is 
definitely different from that of the American corpus´ strategies. The same analytic 
procedures were applied, namely reconstructing the argumentative structures supporting 
the main standpoints and grouping them into their relevant disagreement spaces. The 
most frequent positions advanced in 70% of the corpus revolve around two 
disagreement spaces (see Chapter 6, Table 6.2), that of the US accountability and that of 
its agenda in Iraq. These disagreement spaces are mainly epideictic and also judicial, as 
they involve criticizing opponents´ actions and point to their violations. The following 
table presents a list of the most frequent arguments, or as also referred to as claims, in 
the Arab discussions. These are listed from highest to lowest and grouped under main or 
sub-claims.  
 
Main claim   Sub-claim  loci communes  
The Us is responsible for the 
disaster    
The war mismanagement caused the carnage in 
Iraq 
The US forces provoked civil war 
The US does not do anything to save Iraqis 
The US forces commit crimes against civilians 
The Bush administration is criminal   
Testimony  
Definition  
Circumstances/facts 
 
The US has hidden agenda in 
Iraq 
Bush administration has imperialistic plans  
The US invaded Iraq for oil 
The US is not going to retreat from Iraq 
The US strategies are to control and not to 
protect 
 
Testimony 
Definition  
facts 
There are alternative 
solutions to save Iraq 
Americans can act to save Iraqis and rectify the 
mistake 
The UN has to assist in ending the war.  
  
 Testimony  
Relationship (cause 
effect) 
Iraq is heading towards 
catastrophe  
 
The situation  is grave  
The current strategy is going to fail  
Facts 
Predictions   
  Table 7.13.  Main arguments advanced in the Arab argumentation stage discussions  
 
263 
 
Table 7.13 indicates the different and most recurring arguments supporting the main 
standpoints related to four main topics across the Arab op-ed corpus. These arguments 
have been developed by a variety of loci communes, with a clear inclination towards 
testimony and definition. Indeed, the two most recurring groups of arguments were 
essentially premised by arguments from authority or documents and by definitions. 
Building a line of argument based on definition involves ―inviting one to consider the 
larger group to which something belongs, often as a way of referring to the similarities 
or differences it has with other members of that group‖ (Rhetoricae, 2003). Both types 
of loci have been mainly exploited in the context of the arguers objecting to some 
opponents´ claims or those pleading that the US is imperialistic. In the case of 
arguments constructed from an objection-based standpoint, the lines of argument pursue 
a general strategy of apodioxis by which the arguer rejects an opponent´s claim as 
―being impertinent, needless, absurd or false‖ (Rhetoricae, 2003). In the case of the 
conjectures, the lines of arguments are developed from accusations and attempts to 
expose the ―real‖ nature of the US policies. As indicated in Table 7.14 below, the three 
most recurring arguments in the corpus basically show that arguers draw on the most 
qualifying types of evidence, testimony, in locating the evidence for their claims, with 
up to 80% of the cases in the arguments involving accusations to G. W. Bush of abusive 
actions and goals in Iraq.  
 
Sub-standpoint/ Argument Loci comunes 
 Testimony  Definition  Facts Relation Analogy 
The US responsible for crimes 60 63 33 13.3 3.3 
US has a hidden agenda 80 50 42 16.6 6.6 
There is a disaster 70 46.6 53.3 30 10 
Table 7.14 Top three standpoints or main arguments in the Arab corpus  
Furthermore, there is an extensive use of the locus of definitions to refute opponents´ 
arguments on crimes and to redefine them in their own way.  The arguments seem to be 
driven by the goal to challenge the established truths and attempt to either prove them 
wrong or to redefine them. A high number of arguers also turn to the locus of 
circumstances, more specifically drawing on standard news coverage taken from. To 
264 
 
support these goals, arguers in the Arab corpus seem to choose from two paths when 
constructing their lines of arguments: the first is certification realized by means of 
testimony and the second is reframing, assisted by the locus of definition. Certification 
and reframing turn out to be the main strategic maneuvers opted for in this corpus.  
 
Strategically maneuvering by certification    
Most Arab arguers in our corpus maneuver strategically at the level of topical potential 
by certification. This means that the arguments take as warranty accredited sources 
which may be examined and verified by the audience. The arguers advance a variety of 
arguments and premise them with some certified medium, such as authority, witnesses 
or some credited sources like legal or official documents. The maneuver by certification 
is made strategic by using testimony from American or internationally recognized 
sources. This strategy is maneuvered at the level of audience adaptation by citing the 
kinds of sources they more probably give credence to. However, certification may also 
reveal a necessary maneuver for Arab arguers who have the challenge of voicing their 
accusations and pleas within a hard-to-reach international debate on such contested 
issue as the war in Iraq. Maneuvering by certified sources is probably a strategy adopted 
to enhance the chance of acceptance to their claims. Even more, premising their 
accusations of the US malevolence and imperialism from American sources seems to be 
the only feasible way to address international and mainly American audience for 
persuasion. In example (34), Mr. Baroud argues against the Bush administration claims 
of progress in Iraq, asserting that the American people are to pay a high price for the 
mismanaged war and reminding them that polls confirm his views on the inefficiency of 
the administration and the urgency to act against it.   
(34)  (…) an Associated Press-Ipsos poll, conducted 9-11 July, 2007, shows that the 
American public approval of the Congress performance is as low as it was in 
June 2006 before Democrats took over both the House and the Senate. (Ramzy 
Baroud, Arab News) 
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The arguer uses a verifiable means of supporting his claim, namely one of the most 
prestigious and accredited American research companies: the Ipsos. Following the locus 
of the testimony in locating one´s arguments represents a more efficient way for Arab 
arguers to support their claims which in some cases go against the mainstream elite 
opinion in the US. Promoting opinions against President Bush and his team for the 
purpose of influencing public opinion to remove him or even perhaps of bringing him to 
justice does not seem an easy mission mainly for a non-American and even more for an 
Arab. Opponents to Bush (at least in 2007) seemed to be content with merely calling to 
stop his mismanaged policies and asking him to retreat and no actual political 
impugnation was carried out by the opposition against him. Indeed, after President Bush 
announced his Surge strategy in January 2007, dubbed ―The New Way Forward‖ and 
for which he asked the deployment of more soldiers and more funding, the decision was 
immediately challenged by Democrats who massively campaigned to gain public 
opinion against this decision. However, this opposition was identified by many critics to 
be simply a kind of political posturing, since no real measures (within the Democrats-
majority Congress) were taken to prevent Bush from implementing his plans, but 
instead, he was allowed to put his policies to actions (See interview to Nancy Pelosi 
Speaker of the US House of Representatives in Sawyer 2007). Hence, in spite of the 
high unpopularity of Bush, the accusations advanced against him by the Arab op-ed 
authors may strike as being highly sharp or even ill-grounded for Americans, as they 
may seem to be an attack to the whole nation and its foreign policies. This is probably 
why the arguers strategically maneuver by certification from American sources, which 
may equally be considered topical potential maneuvering and maneuvering at the level 
of audience adaption, in order to nail down their claims and increase their positive 
reception.  
The next example (35) is taken from an op-ed piece written by Hussein Shobokshi in 
which he harshly criticizes the occupation and the Bush administration policies in Iraq 
supported by the neoconservatives as he claims. He calls American people to rectify the 
mistake and save their country and values by acting against Bush. In the extract below, 
he supports this claim by drawing on the actions of an American politician and his 
threats to Bush. 
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(35)  Here is veteran Senator Chuck Hagel, of Nebraska, the heart of conservative 
America, strongly objected to President Bush's policy and in an unprecedented 
step warned the man, regardless of his position and background that if situations 
remained the same in Iraq, he would demand Congress remove the president 
from office. (Hussein Shobokshi, Asharq Al Awsat)  
In similar cases, where the arguers advance accusations and blames against the 
American politicians and at the same time attempt to win the hearts of American 
audience and encourage them to change the course of action in Iraq, there is substantial 
use of certification. In the extract below (36), columnist Jihad El Khazen accuses 
President Bush of manipulating Americans and violating their basic rights for the sake 
of his imperialistic intentions. He highlights the violations perpetrated to Americans 
instead of spelling out, as most typically done, the atrocities committed in the battlefield 
by Bush´s policies. Supporting the accusations of crime by these arguments developed 
from testimony may be considered an attempt the arguer makes in order to get his voice 
heard among American audience and possibly make some effect on their political 
decisions.    
(36)  It [The Bush administration] pursues the politics of fear and warns the 
Americans of real and fabricated threats to hold up civil rights accumulated 
almost over two and a half centuries… Thus, we have seen the enactment of 
several laws such as the Patriot Act followed by the eavesdropping acts and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); all of which give the 
administration the right to disregard the laws and courts in watching the people 
of the United States and the suspects abroad, in addition to tapping the citizens' 
phones and scrutinizing their bank accounts. I have even read about an executive 
order issued on 17/7/2007 that 'blocks property of certain people who undermine 
efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq'. I see in 
this order a breach of the first amendment of the Constitution and of the 
American's right to peaceful opposition and to the freedom of speech. (Jihad Al 
Khazen, Dar Al Hayat)  
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By this strategic maneuvering, performed through certification of an argument on 
Bush´s fraud, the arguer adapts to the American audience for a double effect. The first is 
meant to convince the audience that the policies in Iraq are mostly damaging for them, 
hence raise their awareness on their own benefit from opposing to Bush. The second 
effect is using evidence from sources they identify with such as the acts of Congress 
(Patriot Act) which make the veracity of the claim authenticated.    
 
Strategic maneuvering by reframing the argument  
The second most exploited locus in developing the lines of arguments in the Arab 
corpus is definition. Arguments located by this kind of locus are in some cases 
generated from the refutation-based confrontation and in other cases advanced as a 
disclosure of some hidden fact. Indeed, in order to rebut their opponents´ views, arguers 
generally attempt (with different means) to recreate the situation so as to change the 
perspective from which this should be regarded and prove the counter views wrong. By 
defining the views or actions of their opponents, they reinforce their own positions and 
make prominent by dissociating them from the refuted claims. As for arguments 
revealing hidden agendas and aiming at exposing the ―real‖ intentions, arguers attempt 
to elucidate the actions of their opponents in a way that most possibly influences the 
inferences that the audience would make. The locus of definition plays an important role 
in both cases by producing a line of argument essentially maneuvered by a reframing 
strategy, which involves changing the frame of reference by looking at the situation 
from a different point of view.   
Almost all the Arab arguers who advance objection-based standpoints have opponents 
from an American setting. These arguers engage in attacking the claims of some 
political decision makers so as to ascribe deceptiveness to them. Such standpoints 
typically follow a kind of argument scheme that involves exposing, determining and 
qualifying the ill-grounded nature of these claims. The following examples (37, 38, and 
39) below listed, are extracted from arguments advanced by Mr. Agha in support of his 
objections to the Bush administration´s declaration that the US seeks to establish peace 
in the Middle East through political actions. He calls ironically these actions ―pax 
Americana‖, and develops argumentation to define this term.  
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(37) The killers of innocent people in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon can never be 
peace advocates. (Mohamed Agha, Syria Times)  
(38) It is certain that when Bush talks about peace he means preparing for war. 
(Mohamed Agha, Syria Times) 
(39) The recent tour of the Middle East by Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates and their meetings with some Arab foreign ministers and leaders was part 
of the American policy which aims at deepening divisions and pouring more oil 
on the already troubled region (Mohamed Agha, Syria Times)   
As the above mentioned examples indicate, the components of the arguments on ―pax 
Americana‖ are developed from definition schemes. It seems that the arguer wants to 
assign a new meaning to this concept historically used in the post American civil war 
era and later in the 20
th
 C post World Wars to designate the peace established among 
great powers. The stipulative definition, namely that of ―assigning a new meaning to an 
old word‖ (Hurley, 2007: 87), certainly aims at challenging the established and widely 
accepted perception of American foreign policies. In example (37), the assertion is a 
premise created from definition by negation to support the argument that the American 
politicians are hypocrites. The assertion contains an implicit definition which comes in 
the form of presupposition (killers of innocent) to support the reframing effect 
strategically produced within this maneuver. In example (38), the arguer presents an 
interpretation of President Bush´s use of the term peace. He advances clarification of the 
intended meaning of peace by (re)defining it as a preparation for war. This is a strategic 
maneuver aiming at reframing the political tactics performed by Bush in order to 
expound them as false front. The maneuver consists in ―shifting the issue away from its 
conventional ‗location‘ within one set of shared assumptions and reconstruing it within 
a different set of knowledges (Macgilchrist, 2007:  80). Example (39) illustrates an 
argument built from the definition of the political acts performed by US politicians, Ms 
Rice and Mr. Gates, by identifying them as belonging to the American foreign policy in 
the region which he characterizes as oppressive. By means of this categorization, the 
arguer attempts to strategically reframe these politicians´ acts (traveling in the Middle 
East to call for peace) and induce the audience to filter their perceptions of them in 
different ways. Reframing consist essentially of ―making some aspects of our multi-
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dimensional reality more noticeable than other aspects (Kuypers, 2009: 181), and 
reflects a need to challenge the meaning established by the dominant ideology and to 
attempt to adjust it. Furthermore, these kinds of maneuvers respond to the arguer´s aim 
to denounce and condemn and at the same time reveal the allegedly wicked intentions of 
their opponents, in most similar cases viewed as oppressors. Hence, in the next 
example, Nicola Nasser, advances his opinion on the Democrats´ position on the Iraq 
war and their political campaign to end the war. Mr. Nasser argues that the Democrats´ 
proposal, widely named ―the alternative solution to the Iraq war‖, is a political ploy. He 
questions its claimed difference from the Republican position and attempts to redefine it 
for the audience as a ―deceptive‖ political game.  
 (40)  Is this so-called alternative essentially different from the Republicans‘ strategy? 
On the unity of Iraq, oil, long-term US military presence, civil war and the 
―benchmarks‖ set for the new Iraqi rulers both alternatives are essentially the 
same. (Nicola Nasser, Yemen Observer) 
The assertion following the confrontational rhetorical question represents one of the 
main arguments supporting the main standpoint advanced by the arguer. This standpoint 
rests on the claim that both Republicans and Democrats are ―playing American politics 
with Iraqi blood for oil‖. It is essentially sustained by definition-based lines of 
argumentation aimed at reframing the political posturing of supposedly ―alternative‖ 
solution to the policies of the Bush team in Iraq and providing insight on its ―actual‖ 
meaning and effect. The locus of definition is further supported by other loci, mainly by 
circumstances (facts), so as to reinforce the claim with more powerful premises. 
Definitions play the role of redirecting the audience attention to the categories under 
which the denounced actions should be classified. The arguer seems to exploit the 
strategic maneuver to support his accusations by assisting the audience in categorizing 
the acts of the Democratic politicians and in characterizing them as malevolent and as 
equally harmful for the Iraqi people as the Republicans´ endorsed policies.       
 
7.4.3.2. Topoi in the Arab data corpus 
A closer look at the reconstructed structures of the main and sub standpoints in the 
current corpus revealed the kinds of premises most frequently utilized and adopted as 
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proofs in support of the conclusions drawn as claims. Table 7.15 displays the frequency 
of the seven most recurring premises identified as topoi in the corpus. The propositions 
focus on the US and possibly indicate the kinds of the socially shared beliefs drawn 
upon in discussions on Iraq or international politics in general. Next, some examples 
from the top 5 topoi are discussed.  
 
Topic content % 
1. The US is responsible for the massacres in Iraq 63.3 
2. The US is imperialistic 56.6 
3. The war is illegitimate and based on lies 15 
4. The US forces (intentionally) provoked Sectarianism 13 
5. The US acts for Israelis and their interests in the Middle East 12 
6. The US destroyed the Iraqi social fabric 9 
7. The American are naïve and ignorant  2 
Table 7.15.  Top 7 topoi in the Arab data corpus.   
As indicated in Table 7.15, Topos number one, the most frequently employed premise 
to support the conclusions of the claims, points to the belief in the US responsibility for 
the massacres in Iraq, based on the ―truth‖ proposition (from a syllogistic argument) 
that ―invaders and colonizers are responsible for war crime‖. The premise, occurring in 
63.3% of the corpus, may overlap with other topoi (4, 6 and 7), as it covers in fact a 
number of related (propositions) beliefs on the US mischievous actions/plans in Iraq 
and in the Middle East in general. These beliefs which are widely shared in the Arab 
societies and even considered as uncontested facts have typically depicted the US 
international policies as ruthless and ambitious and aimed at securing its control-related 
interests. For more than a decade and with the US involvement in the Middle East 
issues, the country has been awed and hated for its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and the Gulf war and for its invasion to Iraq. The other topoi overlapping with Topos 1 
postulate similar ―truths‖ which may, in most cases, be identified as sub-types, as they 
conceive the US foreign policies in the same manner as being untrustworthy and 
abusive. In example (41), topos 1 is used to support the refutation-based claim that 
withdrawal from Iraq will not cause a massacre. 
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(41)  A million Iraqi have been killed because of war, either directly or because of the 
war. The American withdrawal cannot lead to the massacre of such a number of 
people or more. The warning of genocide is part of the frightening policy 
pursued by the Bush administration. (Jihad Al Khazen, Dar Al Hayat)  
The extract illustrates more than one argument, as after advancing the main standpoint 
(a refutation of a warning of genocide issue by Bush) a supporting sub argument is 
advanced claiming that Bush´s warning is just a manipulative political strategy. The 
premise that the war is guilty of the killing presumes that the US invasion and 
occupation is responsible for the crimes but does not say so explicitly. The arguer seems 
to refrain from stating agency and from being explicit about his accusation to the US by 
makes use of the word war. This can be interpreted as a strategic move of caution, given 
that his targeted audiences are American people whom he assigns the role of judge and 
strategically maneuver all over the discussion to adapt to their values and appeal to their 
ethical judgments. Despite his recourse to the negative ready-mades on American, the 
arguer, as many others seems to run an overall strategy as attempt to bring Bush to 
charge and to hold him responsible for war crimes through the mediation of his 
compatriots.   
The same topos has equally served as support of some prominent maneuvering 
strategies. The maneuvering realized at the level of presentational devices in the 
following example relies on the support of topos 1 reconstructed as an unexpressed 
premise. 
(42)  It is estimated that some 5000 car bombs have so far been used (…) all this 
happens and we are under the custody of the world´s mightiest power which still 
has to boost its troops in order to pacify Baghdad which it occupied four year 
ago. (Akram Abdulrazzaq, Azzaman)  
This is a sub-argument supporting a main standpoint asserting that the US security plan 
is a fake plan. The arguer maneuvers using sarcasm and the implicit proposition that 
―the US is implicated in the killing of Iraqis‖. The ironic being-under-the-custody-of-
the-mightiest move indicates an underlying proposition postulating that the US has 
actual control over the situation and terrorism would not be possible to take place 
without its permission.   
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Topos 5, the belief that the US foreign policies are imperialistic is generally regarded as 
common ground in Arab societies. Such premise includes assumptions that the US 
maintains aggressive behavior against small nations and attempts to control their 
resources for its own benefits. This topos found in 56.6% was generally made explicit 
and in some few cases reconstructed from unexpressed premises. Propositions referring 
to oil, control and the US bilateral relations with some states such as Iran, Syria, Russia 
and China hint at the common beliefs on the US pursuit of global hegemony and 
strategic control. The argument in the following example is supported by this topos.  
(43)  Although Washington will never admit it, its troops are in Iraq because of oil. 
Oil is at the heart of the political and social struggles across the region. Iraq has 
the world's second largest oil reserves, which is why the Americans keep 
pushing Nuri Al-Maliki's government to pass a new oil law. (Galal Nassar, Al 
Ahram) 
The second and third propositions in the above example, identified as the supporting 
premises for the claim that the troops are in Iraq for oil, show a common employed 
―fact‖ to explain the reason for the US intervention in Iraq. This belief goes against all 
the reasons presented by the US foreign policy makers for their martial endeavour. It 
clashes ideologically with all the postulates of humanitarian mission and is even at odds 
with the fight against terrorism.       
The next topos concerns the belief that sectarianism is a US-made phenomenon in Iraq. 
This belief underlies and supports most of the claims on the US guilt of war crime and 
is also used by those arguers calling the international community´s attention to the US 
hidden agenda in Iraq. Very frequently, the arguers refer to the US forces actions or to 
Paul Bremer´s reconstruction plan as an indication of the US hand in terrorism. 
Presidential Envoy to Iraq Bremer started a policy, infamously dubbed in the Arab 
media as the ―ratio system‖, that consisted of dissolving Iraq‘s military and security 
structures and rebuilding them on ethnic-sectarian basis. This was widely accused of not 
only causing the dismantlement of the state and its capacity for national self-defense, 
but more importantly of initiating a political process based on sectarianism. The rise of 
violence and sectarian conflicts in 2006 and the belief (internationally shared world 
over) that Iraq was in a state of civil war was typically rejected based on the conviction 
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that sectarianism was caused by the US reconstruction plan led by Mr. Bremer and 
designed by the US government. Below, example (44) illustrates this topos.  
(44)  The outbreak of sectarian strife in Iraq would give the occupation authorities 
more options and time. Civil war is what the occupation authorities and local 
collaborators want. (Mohammad H. Al Khalesi, Al Ahram)   
 
The extract is taken from an op-ed piece that keeps using this premise with the same 
exact wording to back up his claims coordinated in support of the main standpoint 
warning the international community (audience) that terrorism is provoked by the US as 
part of war strategy and apparently for some strategic reason. The two propositions 
could be easily reconstructed as implicitly linked by ―because‖ as an indicator of 
consequence and also of the relationship established between the premise and the 
conclusion. The same accusation of guilt directed to the US may be appreciated in the 
following example as built on the same topos. 
(45)  The Iraqis should have realized that the American way of bulldozing the past 
entirely was not just a tactical error but a crime against Ira and its people.  
 
Finally, and occupying the 5
th
 position among the most commonly used topoi is the 
belief in the US policies´ link with the Israeli interests in the region. This is by far the 
most established consensus among the Arab public opinion consisting of the belief in 
the power exerted by the pro-Israeli lobbies (see Anwar, 1998; Gustafson, 2005) in 
shaping foreign policy decisions in the Middle East. Indeed, studies show that around 
75% of Arabs across different states believe that the protection of Israel´s interests is 
number one US objectives in the Middle East, while more than 80% think it is the 
control of oil resources (See Telhami, 2006). Pointing to Israel as an instigator of the 
US policies in Iraq is illustrated in the next example: 
(46)  Surely,  Mr. Bush is not hoping that the excessive use of the term "cold blooded" 
killers would be sufficient enough to exonerate him or his Israeli friends for all 
the thousands of civilians, who have lost their lives "for the love of Israel" over 
the years that Mr. Bush has vowed to carry out his evangelical mission to enrich 
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Raytheon and the other weapons manufacturers within the American military 
industrial complex and to ensure the fulfillment of Eretz Israel as Zionist 
demagogues envision it to be. (Hassan Al Haifi, Yemen Times)  
 
This quite lengthy argument is brought here to illustrate more than the Israel-link-with-
the-US-policies topos. The premises building up the argument may be reconstructed as 
beliefs linked to topos 1 (US responsible of war crime), topos 2 (US imperialistic 
ambitions) and topos 3 (illegitimacy of the Iraq war). The argument is put forward to 
refute and condemn Bush´s reference to ―freedom fighters‖ according to the arguers as 
―cold blooded killers‖ and accuse him (making careful reference always to him as a 
person) not as a US national. Accusing him to plot in the Middle East for the benefit of 
Israel and some US companies presuming the war has illegitimate foundations and no 
other reason than imperialistic and hegemonic purposes.   
 
7.4. 4. Strategic maneuvering with presentational devices  
The analysis of the maneuvers strategically performed at the level of presentational 
devices in the argumentative stages of the two data corpora gave way to the 
identification of a variety of rhetorical strategies and figures which may possibly 
indicate the ideologically biased experts´ cognitions, namely their different aims and 
their roles as participants in the debate influenced by their power positions in the 
international arena in regards to the Iraq warfare. The presentational devices were 
classified in two categories: 1) development and arrangement, enclosing the devices 
employed to build up the reasoning process (logos), 2) form and effect, related to the 
way ideas are presented and includes schemes, tropes and figures of pathos. In the first 
category explored, strategic moves in the two corpora were maneuvered by a large 
variety of rhetorical figures especially those of opposition, division and including 
modes of discourses such as definition and narrative. The figures most frequently 
employed in the argumentation stages are illustrated in the next graph in which the two 
corpora strategic maneuvers are contrasted.  
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Figure 7.4. Contrasting the American and Arab arguers‘ use of presentational devices  
 
The graph highlights the differences between the two groups of arguers´ uses of figures 
and indicates the reasoning figures mostly exploited, namely those of opposition 
(contrarium) and those related to commonplaces (vituperation). The results show that 
American arguers mainly draw on 7 rhetorical figures of arrangement headed by 
contrarium, while Arab arguers mainly make use of 6 figures and focus on vituperation 
as ―a composition expository of attendant evils‖ (Rhetoricae, 2003), hence bring into 
play figures related to divisions, comparison and the discourse mode of definition.  
As for the presentational maneuvers performed at the level of form and effect, the two 
corpora draw on a variety of rhetorical resources in order to increase the persuasive 
effect of their claims and make extensive use of tropes and schemes. Tropes, or the 
―artful deviation from the ordinary or principal signification of a word‖ (Rhetoricae 
2003), are exploited in around 64% of the American op-ed argumentative stages and in 
73% of the Arab ones. These tropes range from changing the reference of one thing to 
anther, such as in metaphor, to wordplay, substitutions and semantic inversions, such as 
rhetorical questions. The use of rhetorical schemes is equally significant in the two 
corpora. Indeed, the schemes, or the ―artful deviation from the ordinary arrangement of 
words‖ (Rhetoricae, 2003), most frequently employed in the maneuvers of both groups 
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of arguers are figures of balance, figures of repetition and figures of pathos. The two 
categories of arrangement and form that enable the strategic maneuvers performed in 
the argumentation stages are further explored and discussed below of each of the two 
op-ed corpora.   
  
7. 4. 4. 1. Arrangement and form strategies in the American corpus 
The American arguers in the op-ed corpus highly rely on the figure of contrarium also 
known as antitheton, which consists of juxtaposing opposing statements in such a way 
as to prove the one from the other (Rhetoricae, 2003). Indeed, around 80% of the 
arguments are maneuvered by this figure which turns out to be closely related to the 
locus of relationship. Relationship, the locus most frequently used by these arguers, 
strategically brings into play the polarization highlighted in their confrontations and 
assists the maneuvers realized by the locus of the irreparable or the gain- loss frames.  
The American arguers´ extensive use of contrarium may indicate their keenness to 
make prominent their own proposal by contrasting it with an opposite course of action. 
For instance, their defense of staying the course in Iraq is systematically juxtaposed 
with its antithesis, withdrawal. The antithesis is generally framed by means of 
counterfactuals to highlight a vulnerable scenario that would put American interests at 
risk. This rhetorical strategy is mainly applied in the gain-loss maneuverings, not only 
in the cases where the losses are made prominent, but also in those framed by gains. 
Furthermore, the power of contrarium lies in bringing together opposite values, such as 
bravery against cowardice or efficiency against incompetence. There is a significant use 
of contrarium in arguments against troops´ withdrawal where the representation of the 
enemy as an incarnation of evil is juxtaposed with the soldiers and their commander in 
chief Petraeus´ demonstration of courage and efficiency. Example (47) illustrates a very 
frequent move strategically maneuvered with contrarium. Tony Snow argues that Al 
Qaeda is still a major threat and sets its brutal actions and intentions (hence values) 
against the American noble actions and goals in Iraq which may implicitly be inferred 
from the use of ―inspired Iraqis‖.  
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(47)  Al-Qaeda doesn't have the strength it had six years ago, but it remains 
committed to killing Americans. It also wants to find a safe haven, (...).  It wants 
to topple Iraq's emerging democracy and establish a base of operations in a land 
with vast oil reserves. More than anything, al-Qaeda wants the United States to 
leave Iraq and hand victory to the terrorists. But it will not succeed. Recent 
military action has inflicted serious damage on al-Qaeda in Iraq and has inspired 
a growing number of Iraqis to fight al-Qaeda. (Tony Snow, USA Today) 
The passage displays a general rhetorical strategy based on opposition where the evil 
actions of the enemy are juxtaposed with the US military successful accomplishments. 
This rhetorical arrangement is reinforced by the use of figures of balance, namely 
antithesis, in the first proposition, and climax in the following statements enumerating 
Al Qaeda´ s intentions. By disposing the enemy´ s actions in an order of increasing 
gravity, the arguer underpins the antagonism between ―them‖ and ―us‖ implicitly 
invoking opposing values and natures and strengthens hence his argument on the US 
obligation to continue the fight.  
Other cases using figures of opposition are manifest in arguments based on syncrisis 
that consists, similar to contrarium, in comparing and contrasting two entities, but in 
parallel clauses or structures. The arguers maneuver with this figure (identified in 
around the ¼ of the corpus) in contrasting past with the present situation Iraq to prove 
the change and progress achieved and to support their dissuasion to the decision of 
troops´ withdrawal. In the next extract, example (48), columnist and think tank expert 
Michael Yon attempts to dissuade his audience from calling to withdrawal and to 
convince them of the efficiency of the new strategy put to work by Petraeus by 
correlating the past challenging conditions faced by the US forces with the present 
promising situation achieved by the Commander.  
(48)  Al Qaeda is in Iraq, intentionally inflaming sectarian hostilities, deliberately 
pushing for full scale civil war. (...) As Al Qaeda is now being chased out of 
regions it once held without serious challenge, their tactics are tinged with 
desperation. (Michael Yon, Daily News)  
These arguers also maneuver strategically with figures of definition and in equal 
percentage with paromologia (in almost 50% of the corpus). Paromologia consists of 
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admitting a weaker point in order to make a stronger one (Rhetoricae, 2003) and 
reinforces the adaptation-to-the audience level of strategic maneuvering by feigning 
humbleness. By means of this maneuver, the arguer attempts to put an argument into 
perspective by showing his/her awareness of the faults that may be attributed to it and 
make prominent its strength. The maneuver may enhance thus the arguers´ credibility 
and the degree of their persuasiveness to the audience. In example (49), the argument is 
part of a discussion advanced by Bob Kerrey against some opponents´ criticism to the 
US military intervention in Iraq. Kerrey invites the audience to reconsider the 
accusations of the Bush administration‘s mismanagement of the war by an argument 
strategically maneuvered by paromologia. He presupposes his admission of the 
mistakes and mismanagement of the war, to conclude that they are insignificant if 
judged against the danger of the enemy.  
(49)  No matter how incompetent the Bush administration and no matter how poorly 
they chose their words to describe themselves and their political opponents, Iraq 
was a larger security risk after Sept 11 than it was before. And no matter how 
much we might want to turn the clock back and either avoid the invasion itself or 
the blunders that followed, we cannot. The war to overthrow Saddam Hussein is 
over. What remains is a war to overthrow the government of Iraq. (Bob Kerrey, 
Wall Street Journal)  
Argumentation in the American op-ed is also maneuvered by other figures of reasoning 
such as apophasis, employed in almost the 1/3 of the corpus. The use of apophasis 
indicates a reasoning process that aims at reinforcing one´s claim by discarding 
alternative options. In a deliberative kind of argumentation, the figure offers the 
opportunity to the arguer to assess the opponents´ proposals then reject them as invalid 
options, making his/her claim the most compelling decision to make. The argumentative 
rhetorical arrangements above described are maneuvered by recurring kinds of tropes 
and schemes in the corpus. Very frequently, indeed, the references to the enemy are 
realized by metaphors, such as ―beasts‖ and ―butchers‖, while Iraq is very commonly 
referred to as the terrorists´ ―safe haven‖ or as the ―theater‖ in the fight against 
terrorism. Furthermore, figures of balance, such as parallelism and antithesis are 
maneuvered with in around 30% of the corpus in structures such as ―terrorism will fail 
and democracy will prevail‖ (producing rhyme) or ―the world is worried about highly 
279 
 
enriched uranium, but the real danger is the highly enriched Islam‖ (T. Friedman, New 
York Times) which is a case of antanaclasis, consisting of repeating the same words to 
produce different meaning.  
 
7. 4. 4. 2. Arrangement and form strategies in the Arab corpus 
The strategic maneuverings performed by the Arab arguers in the argumentation stages 
focus on the vituperation-related figures as their main presentational resources. 
Vituperation is a composition exposing the vices of specific individuals (different from 
commonplaces which focus on general vices and types of people). In almost 70% of the 
corpus, vituperation-based arrangements of arguments are employed to sustain the 
maneuverings strategically used to reframe the view on the Iraq situation or to 
characterize the actions of the American decision-makers. The arguers exploit a wide 
array of related figures, mainly those useful for refutation and redefinition such as the 
figures of amplification (climax) and figures related to the locus of definition and 
division. Division is very close to definition as it is used to clarify the significance of 
some entity by describing a whole and its constituent parts, or the parts that make up a 
whole (Rhetoricae 2003). Example (50) below, is one of the arguments advanced by 
Tariq Alhomeyed to sustain his main standpoint that Iraq needs a strong army in order 
to survive. In this argument, he asserts that Americans erred in their approach to the Iraq 
liberation and that democracy should not have been introduced they way they did. 
(50)  Democracy does not fall out of the sky above and is not genetically inherited nor 
will it grow without cultivation. Democracy is a practice and forces protect 
democratic action according to the belief that a unified country and guaranteed 
rights are the only key to stability. (Tariq Alhomeyed, Asharq Al Awsat)  
 
The extract is connected to a series of refutation-based arguments attacking the claim 
advanced by Americans regarding their democracy assistance mission. The argument 
aims at clarifying our understanding of the concept of democracy by means of definition 
in order to reframe democracy and to expose his opponents´ alleged misunderstanding 
of it.    
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The arguments aimed at vituperation are generally maneuvered with figures such as 
categoria (opening the secret wickedness of the adversary), apodioxis (rejecting 
opponents´ claim for being absurd and wicked), and metastasis (denying and turning 
back the opponents´ argument used against one). Example (51) is an extract from the 
discussion of Najah Ali, who advances argumentation deploring the fate of Iraqis and 
postulating that the US is responsible for the disaster in Iraq. The extract starts with one 
of the sub-standpoints (the US had oppressed Iraqis in the past), and is followed by a 
maneuver with categoria in an argument from historical facts to prove the wrong doings 
of the US  
(51)  Driven by the burning desire to end dictatorship, many Iraqis had even forgotten 
or tried to overlook the crimes the US had committed against them. (…) Many 
Iraqis tried not to remember the large-scale deprivation, poverty, isolation, 
malnourishment and social disaster the US-supported UN trade sanctions had 
caused. (Najah Ali, Azzaman)  
Another example of categoria-based maneuvering is taken from Gallal Nasser´ s 
discussion and it illustrates an argument constructed from the locus of circumstances 
(deducing future facts from past facts) and engages in revealing the ―secret‖ strategic 
interests of the US guaranteed thanks to its occupation of Iraq. This argument is part of 
the evidence advanced to support the main claim that the US has hostile rather than 
good intentions in Iraq and to accuse of the politicians of manipulating public opinion 
by discussing withdrawal while the whole US endeavor is aimed at permanent control 
and exploitation, he argues.     
(52)   The occupation of Iraq would give the US control over the Caspian Sea, the site 
of much of Iran´ s oil. It would enable the US to extend its influence from Darfur 
to West Africa and from East Timor to the Gulf, and perhaps even control 
China´ s oil needs. The US has a grand plan, and central to that plan is the 
protection of Israel´ s security. The latter has been one of Washington´ s top 
priorities for 60 years. (Gallal Nasser, Al Ahram) 
The rhetorical figure of apodioxis is illustrated in the following extract, example (49), in 
which Mohammad Alharthi rejects President Bush´ s comparison of the withdrawal 
from Iraq with the disaster in Vietnam and declares his argument to be an act of 
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manipulation by qualifying it as a display of ignorance or a deliberate attempt to distort 
the truth. The arguer attempts to prove the analogy as invalid through facts but also 
through vituperation and attacking the US actions and interventions as:  
(53)  (…) misjudged and based on an unrealistic faith in the absolute supremacy of 
America´ s military might. (Mohammad Alharthi, Arab News) 
Strategically maneuvering by the figure of metastasis is frequently used in the Arab 
corpora especially in the op-ed pieces advancing objection to American positions or 
claims. The figure consists of rejecting a claim, generally incrimination, and turning it 
back to the adversary in the form of accusation. Example (54) below is extracted from 
the discussion of Hassan Al Haifi advanced as a reaction to reference of President Bush 
to the insurgents in Iraq as the ―cold blooded killers‖. In this extract, the arguer uses the 
same reference ―cold blooded killer‖ to strategically maneuver the argument that Bush 
is a cold blood killer. The moves illustrate the rhetorical figures of both categoria, 
(referring to historical events showing evil deeds and intentions) and metastasis in order 
to convey an overall vituperation-based rhetorical strategy.  
(54)  One only needs to look at Human Rights Watch, UN Human Rights and 
Amnesty International reports for the hundred of violations of international laws 
and conventions concerning the treatment of civilians free and under occupation 
that Americans and Israeli forces have inflicted over the last decades, just to get 
a sense of who the real cold blooded killers are these days. (Hassan Al Haifi, 
Yemen Times)  
The arguer seems to endorse the Iraqi resistance and their arguments in their fight 
against occupation and considers Bush´ s reference to insurgents as an attack, which he 
turns back by arguments proving the adversary to be the one having the vice and not the 
insurgents.   
Almost 80% of the arguers make extensive use of rhetorical figures generated from 
vituperation structures with maneuverings oriented to the adaptation to audience. Such 
moves, indeed, are maneuvered strategically to create communion with the addressed 
audience and to produce the intended persuasive effects in them. In these cases, the 
targeted audience is carefully constructed no matter whether the discussion was 
intended as a harsh blame or as a revelation of secrete intentions. In this respect, 
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accusation of mischievousness is not directed to a nation (the US) or people 
(Americans), but rather to individuals (politicians) who are clearly delineated. The 
arguers make frequent use of conciliatio as their chief presentational strategic 
maneuvering. Conciliatio is a strategy by which an opponent´ s argument is exploited 
for one´ s own benefit or even to approve and praise the virtues of the audience 
(Rhetoricae, 2003). The Arab arguers maneuver strategically with conciliatio, as they 
are their primary audience and the ones intended to persuade. They find in them their 
actual judge and the key in the resolution of their conflict with their opponents and more 
probably have hopes in their political power as voters. Indeed, the harsh criticism to 
politicians is paired with praise to America which is referred to as ―system with 
fundamental moral rules‖ and a ―country that is governed by institutional ethics‖. 
American people are in some instance referred to as ―rational Americans‖ mainly those 
opposing the Bush administration policies. They are also depicted as victims of these 
policies, a strategy meant to incite the American audience interest by invoking the US 
political infringements going against them, such as ―Americans right to peaceful 
opposition and to the freedom of speech‖, or ―Americans are losing faith in both 
parties‖. The conciliatio maneuvers used by these arguers generally attempt to echo the 
critical voices coming from America or to eulogize the American political and cultural 
values. This kind of strategic maneuvering is indeed powerful because it points to the 
effort made by the arguer to identify not only the views and preferences of the audience, 
but also their values and exploit them to support his/her own presumably different 
positions.  
In support of the vituperation maneuverings put into play as presentational strategies, a 
number of tropes and schemes were identified to be typically exploited in arguments 
with similar rhetorical goals. For instance, arguments accusing the US of plotting 
greedily in Iraq to exploit its wealth and to control its resources and strategic location 
characteristically make use of erotema as a main maneuvering strategy. Erotema or 
rhetorical questions seem to serve the purpose of questioning the adversary acts and in 
many cases casting irony on the US official discourse which claims humanitarian values 
and noble intentions in Iraq. This kind of questions, which are normally used in the 
confrontational stage to give the standpoint a rhetorical character, are employed here 
within the argumentative stages in support of the arguments´ schemes forwarded as 
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warrantees of the claim on the falsity US discourse. Some rhetorical questions come in 
the form of epiplexis, i.e. as questions asked to express grief or to inveigh (Rhetoricae, 
2003) and make strong appeal, similar to the erotema to emotions. The maneuvers are 
aimed at adding momentum to the accusations of deceptiveness and manipulation of the 
adversary. They are strategically geared to the audience and may serve as a means to 
involve them in the investigative endeavor on the secret actions of the US in the Middle 
East. A selection of some of the affirmations on the US duplicity presented as questions 
is listed below in these examples. 
(55)  Why wait (and not leave Iraq) if Petraeus views are already well known? (Ramzi 
Baroud, Arab News)  
(56) Will the temptation of the Iraqi oil entice the US to come up with fresh thoughts 
on the matter of military bases? (Galal Nassar, Al Ahram) 
(57) How could they (terrorists) sneak through so many check points and road blocks 
US and Iraqi troops have set up in Baghdad? (Akram Abdulrazzaq, Azzaman) 
The Arab arguers also perform their strategic maneuvering by means of other tropes 
such as metaphors and simile. They often highlight their criticism to the main tokens of 
the US mission, namely democracy and freedom through exaggeration. The US mission 
in Iraq is metaphorically referred to as the ―quagmire‖, ―nightmare‖, ―farce‖ or 
―mirage‖ or even as being a ―heavenly ordained messianic mission‖. The US promises 
of rebuilding Iraq and establishing democracy are ironically invoked as plans to create a 
―democratic oasis‖ and Iraq as a ―ghost‖. The US in one case is referred to as ―Satan‖ 
and its actions and policies characterized as oppressive and deceptive are compared in 
other cases to those of a ―Shylock‖ (wicked Shakespearean character). The Arab corpus 
displays also a considerable use of schemes which are headed by parallelism and 
anaphora. Anaphora as a figure of repetition creates a desired effects for vituperations 
and for accusations and blame. The emphatic effects it produces increases the emotional 
affect the arguers seek to produce and the clamor of indignation they intend to convey 
to their audience.   
The two groups´ different approaches in the use of rhetorical figures seem to go hand in 
hand with their overall strategic maneuverings in the argumentation stage. This means 
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that their maneuvering at the three levels, namely topical potential, audience adaptation 
and presentational devices, is generally coordinated. 
7. 5.  The Concluding Stage  
Reconstruction of the concluding stages of the critical discussions under study yielded 
significant insights into the maneuverings strategically performed by the two groups of 
arguers in their attempt to make conclusions on the way their difference of opinion is 
resolved. In this critical stage, the discussion parties ideally evaluate the resolution 
process of the initial difference of opinion and determine its outcome. The results 
reported below give an account of the way the strategic maneuverings are performed in 
each corpus at three levels: the topical potential, the adaptation to the audience and the 
use of presentational devices.  
 
Before getting to these results, a preliminary inspection of the ways concluding stages 
were formulated is discussed below. Since in this type of activity (op-ed argumentation) 
there are no formal or official rules of how to determine the outcome of the resolution 
process undertaken throughout the discussion, the arguer, as the only protagonist seems 
to have a relative freedom in this endeavor. This is perhaps due to conventional 
practices in the non-mixed types of discussion where the author commonly evaluates 
the resolution process and strategically assumes the expediency and even success of his 
defense. Ideally, the resolution outcome is to be determined by the two parties involved 
in the argumentative interaction, in our case, the op-ed author and the audience, who 
both determine whether the defense of the standpoint put forward by the arguer stands 
against doubt or criticism. In practice, and in the context of the op-ed discussions, the 
audience decision can be roughly determined through research on media reception or 
public opinion (supported by internet platforms research in the recent decade). The 
concluding stage in op-ed pieces may be regarded as incomplete, as the real judgment is 
yet to be advanced by the real antagonists. However, this single-sided judgment on the 
outcomes of the resolution remains equally significant, as it involves the expression of 
the protagonist´s decision on his/her own advanced argumentation. The way this 
dialectical stage is exploited is revealing of the protagonist attitudes as well and the 
roles taken up. The approaches taken in the concluding stage may indicate the 
ideologically-biased aims and agendas of the arguers. Table 7.16, below, displays the 
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results of the examination carried out on the approaches with which the discussions are 
concluded. 
 
Concluding choices  American  Arab 
Attitudes expressed 43.3% 50% 
Standpoint(s) reiterated 33.3% 30% 
Conclusion left unexpressed 13.3% 10% 
Main standpoint expressed 10% 10% 
Table 7.16 Resolution outcomes in the American and Arab arguers´ discussions 
 
The findings show parallel patterns in the corpora on the ways the arguers decide to 
resolve the difference of opinion and to determine the outcome of their discussion. 
Indeed, the same approaches have been adopted by both groups of arguers with slightly 
different frequencies though. Indeed, around half of the concluding stages in both 
corpora are devoted to expressing attitudes on the course of event in Iraq. The arguers´ 
choices to express their personal attitudes on the war may be evaluated in different ways 
according to the oratory type established in each discussion. In deliberative (decision-
oriented) discussions, expressing attitudes seems to be aimed at adding force to the 
decision defended which typically follows a rationalization path. The externalization of 
attitudes, in the final stage, may function as an interpretation of the arguer´s policy 
decision but with more evaluative and affective terms that would be easier for the 
audience to process and remember. By contrast, in epideictic or judicial discussions, 
inherently based on the assessment of human behavior, the expression of attitudes may 
be interpreted as the reiteration of the main standpoints advanced for debate.    
Around 30% of the concluding stages in both groups focus on the reiteration of their 
main standpoints. In some cases, the standpoints are made even more prominent and 
explicit than it is done in the confrontation stages, while in other cases mere paraphrase 
is advanced. In both cases, the choice seems to aim at reminding the audience of the 
position adopted and guarantee its adequate assimilation. Finally, the resolution 
outcome is left unexpressed in fewer cases (13% and 10%) resulting in the implicitness 
(absence) of the concluding stage. The arguers making this choice decide not to exploit 
the dialectical goals offered by this stage for the use of influential rhetorical tools such 
as those appealing to emotions or ethics to reinforce the acceptance of their positions. 
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They probably hope to leave the decision for audience or may judge the difference of 
opinion as already resolved within the argumentative stage.     
The similarity found in the approaches adopted by the two cultural groups in regards to 
the dialectical opportunities of the stage were somehow unexpected. If not a mere 
coincidence, they certainly may lead to the assumption that they are due to constraints 
required by the op-ed argumentation activity type and its conventions and rules. This 
means that it may be common practice that FP op-ed resolution outcomes are sometimes 
left unexpressed, used to reinforce a claim, but more commonly to make prominent their 
personal voice in the discussion.  
 
7. 5. 1. Strategic maneuvers in American concluding stages 
The analysis of the three-level-strategic maneuvers carried out for the American op-ed 
corpus has revealed the kinds of rhetorical aims possibly motivated by these arguers´ 
ideologically-biased cognition, as well as their professional goals mainly their 
persuasive ability to shape public debate. The first level of strategic maneuvering 
explored was the one related to the topical potential, i.e. the sides of the issue focused 
on. Table 7.17, below, displays the findings on the themes selected for closure and their 
frequency throughout the corpus. As indicated in the table, there are five maneuvering 
strategies chosen at the level of topical potential in the concluding stage, from which 
―commitment to the cause‖ and ―blaming politicians‖ take the top 1 position.   
 Topical choices in Concluding maneuverings Occurrence
s     
Percentag
e % 
Stressing commitment to the cause/ duty to fight 10 33.3 
Blaming politicians for wrong deeds 10 33.3 
Reminding of the risks/warming from the enemy 9 30 
Focusing on victory as the ultimate goal for 
Americans 
7 30 
Calling for troop respect 5 16.6 
Table 7.17. Frequency of themes selected for closure in the American corpus 
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Emphasizing the American commitment to its global role in the world and mainly its 
duty to fight against terrorism is a theme chosen by 1/3 of the arguers to strategically 
maneuver in the closure of the critical discussion. With an equal percentage, others 
focus on blaming politicians for their inefficiency or manipulation. The rest of the 
corpus is divided between warnings from the enemy, reminding of the ultimate reward 
and calling to respect the troops in the battlefield. Showing commitment to the fight, 
evoking enemies and boosting morale to seal victory have much in common. They are 
based on values and attempt to fix attention on future achievements and directly or 
indirectly venerate martial principles. They activate a number of culturally-shared 
images on national threats and the morally-loaded logic of the duty to fight. Being one 
of the reasons for declaring the war on Iraq, terrorism is at the heart of the US national 
debates and one of the main target goals to achieve from the war mission. This is 
somehow surprising, as four years after the invasion, the American public opinion 
reflected the bipartisan ideological divide over Iraq (Pew Research Center, 2007).  
While news on the escalating violence and the Democrats´ criticism of the war 
mismanagement increased skepticism over the reasons for war, Republicans and Bush 
supporters maintained the same eagerness to promote core the US values and sustain its 
leadership. Not only does the preponderance of value-based strategic maneuverings in 
these op-ed concluding stages demonstrate a clear pattern, but it also goes against the 
assumptions over the American people divide (at least in this sample). It shows that the 
level of consistency with the Bush administration´ s core principles is very high among 
opinion leaders, since over 90% of the types of maneuvers chosen for concluding the 
op-ed pieces are geared towards the very core goals of the war in Iraq even in the 
positions critical to Bush and those calling for troops´ withdrawal. There is almost 
absolute agreement among policy experts, whether sustaining the fight or urging for 
abandoning it, on the righteousness of the American mission and its commitment to 
leadership in international policies. Furthermore, the initial reasons for the US 
intervention in Iraq seem unshakable and serve as common ground in the debate. No 
matter how different political goals and the party-ideology they may be defending, these 
arguers happen to be on the same wave when it comes to the belief in the US 
responsibility in the world as a role model and its duty to carry out policies that would 
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protect American interests, assist the world emancipation, as its foreign policy 
bipartisan creed says.  
Maneuvering with commitment to the American cause, in promoting its values and 
protecting its people from enemies is illustrated below in example (58) extracted from 
the concluding stage of Joseph Liebermann´ s op-ed piece. After the appeal he launched 
-in the argumentation stage- to his colleagues in Congress for moral and financial 
support to Petraeus to continue the fight in Iraq, he makes, here, a special emphasis on 
the common national values and interests in Iraq using the inclusive ―we‖ to create 
communion with his actual antagonists (the audience) and to reinforce their sense of 
solidarity and unity, hence their approval of his appeal.    
(58)  We are at a critical moment in Iraq--at the beginning of a key battle, in the midst 
of a war that is irretrievably bound up in an even bigger, global struggle against 
the totalitarian ideology of radical Islamism. However tired, however frustrated, 
however angry we may feel, we must remember that our forces in Iraq carry 
America's cause--the cause of freedom--which we abandon at our peril.(Joseph 
Lieberman, Wall Street Journal)    
By means of this kind of maneuver, many arguers take the opportunity to remind the 
audience of the overarching goals for the US endeavor in Iraq. The maneuver is 
strategic because it is rhetorically based on ethical appeal and makes the moral values of 
commitment and responsibility override any other conditions. The maneuver is an 
illustration of the ideologically-driven kind of discursive strategies widely used in the 
official American foreign policy discourse. It explicitly draws on patriotism as a crucial 
evidence with which American demonstrate their loyalty their political values and their 
pride of their international position as world leader. This strategy may also be 
appreciated in the following example extracted from Bob Kerrey´ s concluding stage 
where the reiteration of his main standpoints legitimating intervention in Iraq is 
underpinned with emphasis on the national commitment to the American cause.  
(59)  We must not allow terrorist sanctuaries to develop any place on earth. Whether 
these fighters are finding refuge in Syria, Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere, we cannot 
afford diplomatic or political excuses to prevent us from using military force to 
eliminate them. (Bob Kerrey, Wall Street Journal) 
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Maneuvering with commitment, as in Kerrey´s concluding stage, creates a dilemma-
based situation. Dilemmas are rhetorical figures of divisions that present a state of affair 
as being of two options and moral values implicitly frame their alternative as the lack of 
morality, or other negatively viewed postures, such as cowardice and surrender. This 
maneuver generates in most cases from an argumentation structure based on the locus of 
the irreparable and the valuable that needs action because of threats. The irreparable is 
usually the ―right‖ alternative in these dilemma-framed maneuvers mainly in the 
deliberative discussion, since the target goal (fighting) is associated with a cherished 
common property (or value) that has to be protected and safeguarded from threat and no 
other choice may be qualified as equally right.  
Fixing attention on victory goes hand in hand with the appeal to moral values and to the 
commitment to them. The maneuvering consists of reminding the audience of the final 
prize and make them focus on the collective reward to earn after the struggle. 
Visualizing victory helps ease all the sufferings and gives strength to continue the fight.   
Reminding the audience of the enemy is a maneuver strategically used to sustain the 
argument of the irreparable. Invoking threats and danger serves to incite for urgent 
action. It also creates dilemma in most cases, as the rhetorical move frames the threats 
as pending (rhetorically referred to as ominatio) and action as inevitable. It also 
characterizes opponents´ positions (even implicitly) as irresponsible and unpatriotic (in 
the case of not acting to protect Americans from terrorists). Example (60), taken from 
Ralph Peters´ discussion concluding stage, illustrates the threat maneuvering 
strategically put to use to incite the audience‘s to act in favor of staying in Iraq and to 
appeal to the national and communal commitment to fighting terrorism. This 
commitment is even presented as the only choice to make (―like or not‖) and no other 
option may be contemplated within this moral framing of the situation.  
(60)  And, like it or not, we have a moral responsibility as well as practical interests in 
refusing to surrender to the butchers in Iraq. (Ralph Peters, New York Post)  
The move may also be characterized as fully-fledge, as the maneuvering is coordinated 
at its three levels: evoking the enemy as topical potential is adapted to the audience 
through appeal to national value and is presented with a strong trope by the use of the 
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metaphor ―butchers‖. The strategy indicates the underlying ideological assumptions of 
the authors which make up a significant part of the foreign policy makers´ shared 
cognition in the US. A group shared cognition that takes for granted the supremacy of 
the US and the justice of its international policies and naturally constitutes the common 
ground for its discourse.  
The three different levels of strategic maneuvering are brought together in the major 
part of the corpus for more persuasive effects. Hence the adaptation to the audience and 
the presentational devices are generally put to use, as in the other critical stages, in order 
to obtain the effect intended from the ethical appeals to values, to common threats 
(enemies) and to mission targets (victory as the best reward). Table below 7.18 indicates 
the findings from the analysis of the maneuvering geared towards the audience as an 
attempt to adapt to their preferences, views or values.  
Table 7.18. Concluding maneuvering geared towards the audience in American corpus 
 
On top of the list, the appeal to common and national values is used in 33.3% of the 
corpus and indicates the degree of importance of these values to American audience, as 
the arguers assume they are sufficient reasons for stirring their approval. In the second 
position and in around 20% of the corpus, the arguer construes the audience as the 
actual decision makers, mainly through the use of the inclusive ―we‖, which frames the 
interaction as if it were actually taking place within a face-to face public debate. While 
involving the audience in political decision making relies on democratic principles, the 
current strategy may create some positive effect on the audience; however, the 
interactive-role granted to them remains unfortunately fake and analytically regarded as 
a common political scheme to create pressure and achieve popular consent.   
Audience adaptation in Concluding maneuverings Occurrences Percent % 
Appealing to values as national/common  10 33.3 
Construing Americans as decision-makers/participants 6 20 
Construing Americans as fighters in the war 5 16.6 
Stressing the sacrifice and bravery of the troops 5. 16.6 
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7. 5. 2. Strategic maneuvers in Arab concluding stages 
The results from the analysis of the strategic maneuvers carried out in the Arab op-ed 
corpus signals the arguers´ pessimistic view on the war situation and their low faith in 
the conflict resolution. Indeed, despite their variety, the strategic maneuverings 
performed at the topical potential level either carry forward the accusatory claims 
against the Bush Administration or America in general or advance warnings from 
pending catastrophe in Iraq. Maneuvering at the level of topical potential involves that 
―arguers select materials from those available according to what they believe best 
advances their interests‖ (Tindale, 2006: 451). Table 7.19 below, displays the findings 
on the topics selected for closure and indicates the top five maneuvering strategies 
identified in the concluding stage.  
 
Topical choices  Percent 
% 
Affirming the US responsible for disaster/crimes 43.3 
Warning from eminent catastrophe 33.3 
Providing an Iraqi/Arab perspective about the situation 33.3 
Asserting the US is obstacle to the war solution 20 
Calling the US to redeem itself 20 
  Table 7.19.  Most frequent topics chosen for concluding maneuverings in Arab corpus 
The concluding stages in this op-ed corpus display diverse strategies with which the 
Arab arguers use the dialectical prospect offered by the stage to conclude the discussion 
to their own favor. Despite the difference in strategies, most topics point to a common 
concern: the involvement of the US in Iraq. The US involvement and military 
intervention seem to complicate the situation and the debate at the same time for most 
arguers, hence reaching agreement on this issue would help reaching the resolution 
outcome aimed at in the debate/critical discussions. With the exception of a few arguers 
expressing approval of the US intervention in Iraq (in two op-ed pieces), the majority 
manifest their protest against the American (or the Bush Administration) policies or in 
the least remain skeptical of the vowed policies achievements and apprehensive about 
their consequences. In Table 7.20.below, the strategic patterns of the maneuvers enacted 
292 
 
to adapt to the audience needs and/or values are displayed. These strategies along with 
their presentational dimension are discussed and illustrated with examples below.  
Table 7.20. The main strategies for adapting to audience in Arab concluding 
maneuverings 
 
The effort to adapt to the audience seems to be a strategic choice for many arguers in 
this corpus. This is confirmed with the high level of strategic maneuvers realized 
explicitly to forefront the audiences and locate them at the center of the difference of 
opinion outcome. As shown in the results from the opening stage analysis, most Arab 
arguers assign the role of antagonist to American audience or to international 
community audiences often explicitly. The task seems challenging for this group, given 
the low ideological affinity existing between them and their targeted audiences and the 
relationship of antagonism they have presumably maintained, mainly with Americans, 
since the terrorists attacks in 2001. Nonetheless, results point to consistency along the 
corpus in the effort made by the arguers to find compromise between their goals and 
their audiences‘ reference points.  
The analysis also revealed an extensive and elaborate use of presentational devices in 
the maneuvering strategies both as figures (schemes) and tropes. The rhetorical 
strategies most frequently adopted in the four-stage discussions are vituperation and 
categoria (opening secret wickedness of adversaries), as around 70% of the corpus is 
blame-based oratory. The same line is maintained along the concluding stage, along 
with the effort to make the boundaries clear between declared opponents and the 
audience. Blame is coupled in many cases with figures of pathos for more dramatic 
effect, where emotions such as shame, disbelief and indignation are made even more 
Audience adaptation in Concluding maneuverings Percent % 
Framing Americans/international community as victims 43.3 
Framing intentional community as moral judges  40 
Framing the proposals as beneficial to Americans  33.3 
Praising American values  33.3 
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prominent in this stage than any other critical stage of the discussions. Table 7.21 
displays the results from the frequency counts of the presentational devices in the 
corpus. These figures are illustrated within the discussion of examples coming up in the 
section along with Table 7.21.  
 
Presentational Devices  in Concluding maneuverings Percent % 
Tropes (metaphors-irony-hyperbole) 33.3 
Figures of pathos (pathopoeia, cataplexis, deesis, ominatio)   33.3 
Figures of order and repetition (parallelism, syncrisis, anaphora)  20 
Figures of reasoning 20 
Table 7.21.  Main presentational devices in the concluding maneuverings in the Arab 
corpus  
The analysis of the concluding stages of this corpus has led to the observation that the 
three levels of strategic maneuverings are intertwined, which may indicate that there is 
convergence in the maneuverings. The convergent strategic maneuvers have been 
located among the moves performed to add force to the main positions, adapt to the 
targeted audience and rhetorically intensify the effects. Convergence serves as a 
criterion for assessing argumentative effectiveness, according to Pragma-dialectics, as 
by fusing the three dimensions of topic selection, audience adaptation, and device 
presentation, the argumentation has more than just strategically maneuvered, it has 
―displayed a genuine rhetorical strategy‖(van Eemeren & Houtlousser, 2000). Such 
conclusion may not be possibly drawn within the scope of this study, as it obviously 
requires an extensive inspection of the maneuvers with convergence in every critical 
stage of all discussions in the whole corpus. The next section discusses some 
concluding maneuvering strategies and identifies the strategic levels realized in them.  
 
Those arguers attempting to hold the US accountable for crime in Iraq typically opt for 
reiterating these denunciatory claims in their concluding stages. Maneuvering by 
reiterating ones´ standpoints in the vituperation-oriented op-ed discussion may be 
interpreted as an act of challenge to the dominant power and a manifestation of 
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resistance to its hegemony. Hence, around 44% of the arguers insist on bringing the US 
to justice and find it most favorable to emphasize the judicial side of the issue rather 
than reflect on the right policy decision for Americans to make (as some do). For these 
arguers, the audience recognition of the US responsibility for crime in Iraq seems to be 
the expedient solution to the Iraq conflict as well as the condition for resolving their 
presumed difference of opinion with their audience (international community). Indeed, 
these types of maneuverings tend to adapt their concluding moves to international 
audiences and assign them the role of judge while making frequent use of figures of 
pathos such as, deesis and cataplexis and ominatio. The two examples below illustrate 
the choice of this topical potential which consists of a reiteration of standpoints 
advanced as accusation of the US of malevolence. In example (61) Hadi Marai,, turning 
to international community for assistance,  repeats his standpoint with high emphasis 
using anaphora. Gallal Nassar, in example (62), discloses the real intentions behind 
building a wall in Iraq and balances them against the official reasons presented by the 
US which are to ―protect‖ Iraqis from terrorists.  
(61)  It is the occupation that is reason for our miseries. It is the occupation which 
plunged us into this vicious circle of sectarian infighting. (Hadi Marai, Azzaman) 
 (62)   Al Adhamiyah (building a wall in Al Adhamiyah area) is part of the US drive to 
restrain, not protect the Iraqis. The quest is likely to fail as it did repeatedly in 
the past. The days of the occupation are numbered. (Galal Nassar, Jordan Times)   
 
The maneuver is coupled with a mix of ominatio (prophesy of pending evil) and 
cataplexis (threatening or prophesying payback for ill doing). The use of cataplexis may 
be interpreted from the argumentative stage content with the arguer´s repeated reference 
to resistant groups in Iraq, while apostrophe (addressing speech directly to audience) 
reinforces the communion constructed between the arguer and his audience as a strategy 
by which he seems to distance them from his opponent (the US).  
Over 30% of the concluding stages advance warnings about the eminent disaster in Iraq 
and call (sometimes indirectly) for action to stop it. Most of these types of 
maneuverings either address American people to plead them to act against President 
Bush or turn to the international community for assistance against American 
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occupation. This difference is of course crucial for maneuvering strategies and involves 
different approaches to the adaptation-to- audience strategies and also different 
presentational devices. In the American audience-orientated concluding moves, 
maneuvering with the audience values focuses on praise and hope, while those moves 
adapting to international audience tend to use more threat or grief-based moves against 
Americans. These moves are mainly maneuvered with figures of pathos and tropes such 
as cataplexis (prophesying payback for ill doing), deesis (vehement expression of desire 
or indignation/as in ―for God´s sake‖) or aporia (expression of one´s inability to 
believe).     
With the same percentage, other concluding strategies are dedicated to highlighting the 
arguers´ stances by expressing their attitudes towards the Iraq events and policies. The 
moves give emphasis to attitudes that delineate the Arab perspective as victims of the 
US policies. Finally, two strategies with equal frequencies 20% each contemplate some 
future solutions. One group places blame on the US for war atrocities and for being the 
main barrier for conflict resolution, inferring that the extensive rhetoric on democracy 
are a cover for strategic control in the region, the other makes an explicit call for 
Americans to politically act against their leaders and to redress the blunder committed. 
Table 7.22 below displays an example for each of the most frequent strategic 
maneuvering and specifically those featuring convergence at the three levels: topical 
potential, adaptation to audience and presentational devices.  
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Topical choices  Example  Adaptation to audience  Presentational 
device 
Affirming the US 
responsible for 
crime 
It beggars belief that a great country such 
as US which proclaim that it is driven by 
the noble principles of democracy and 
justice could be prompted by sheer greed 
to launch a war against a people who had 
been reeling under an oppressive regime 
Praising American 
values 
Aporia/metapho
r 
(greed)  
So for the love of God, who are the real 
cold blooded killers of our times? 
 
warring international 
community (framing as 
victims of Bush) 
Erotema 
(rhetorical 
question)/ 
Deesis /aporia  
Warning from 
eminent catastrophe 
 Many more will likely die if the 
Congress doesn't act forcefully to carry 
out the wishes of the American people 
and respect the sanctity of the lives of 
Iraqis and their own. 
creating communion 
with Americans  
(framed as victims) 
appeal to human values  
Ominatio 
(prophesy of 
evil)  
Providing an 
Iraqi/Arab 
perspective  
For Americans it is the usual political 
power struggle. For Arabs, it is playing 
American politics with Iraqi blood.   
intentional community 
as moral judges 
Syncrisis (figure 
of parallelism)  
Asserting US 
obstacle for 
solution 
It is Pax Americana which runs counter 
to the international community‘s call for 
establishing a just and comprehensive 
peace in the Mideast 
International audience 
as victim of US 
manipulations 
Sarcasm (with 
periphrasis in 
―Pax 
Americana‖)  
Calling the US to 
redeem itself 
The US should be awakened and return 
to its core values of freedom, justice and 
equity and become again a source of 
enlightenment to the world   
Praising American 
values   
Encomium as 
figure of speech 
of praise 
Table 7.22. Strategic maneuvers examples in Arab corpus concluding stage 
 
The results from the analysis of the concluding maneuvers in the Arab corpus have 
shown the tendency to accentuate all levels of strategic maneuvers for more rhetorical 
and persuasive effects. Convergent maneuvers in this corpus, indeed, come forth more 
unmistakably in this very concluding stage to add more momentum to the rhetorical 
strategy adopted all through the argumentative discussions. However, their efficiency 
remains hard to measure, at least within the scope of this empirical study, and may 
probably need the analyst´s assessment of convergence be supported with the 
measurement of audience reception. 
 
7.6.  Derailment of strategic maneuvering: fallacies 
This section reports the findings on the fallacious moves performed by arguers in the 
two cultural groups. Based on the Pragma-dialectical account of fallacies, these 
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fallacious moves are regarded as derailing strategic maneuvering realized by the arguers 
while attempting to keep balance between his/her dialectical and rhetorical aims. 
Maneuvering derailments are believed to frustrate the resolution process which is 
regarded as an ultimate goal for advancing argumentation. The moves violating one of 
the 10 rules for critical discussion were categorized as fallacious and the consequences 
of their deviation from the dialectical aims at each of the four critical stages identified 
and examined. The results from the analysis and categorization of fallacies are 
illustrated in Table 7.23 and Table 7.24, below, displaying a count of the maneuvering 
derailments in the two data corpora and of the kind of dialectical rule they violate.   
 
As indicated in Table 7.23., the cases of fallacious moves in the American corpus were 
located mainly in the arguers´ violations of three rules for critical discussion: freedom, 
argument schemes and validity. Arguers observe the freedom rule if they do not prevent 
each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints. The rule 
also applied in the non-mixed (written) discussion and consists of the arguer´s respect to 
the existence of doubt or objection towards the standpoint he/she advances.  
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Table 7.23. Strategic maneuvering derailments in the American corpus 
 
Cases of Rule 1 violation were found in around 1/3 of the American corpus derailing 
generally in their confrontational strategic maneuvers by committing the Ad hominem 
fallacy. This fallacy occurred in 26.6% of the corpora mainly in the confrontation stage 
and involved cases in which arguers seemed to discredit their antagonists´ position of 
doubt or objection. To resolve the difference of opinion, arguers should ―cooperate on 
the externalization of that difference‖ (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 136) and 
should not assume the invalidity of opposing views without proper argumentation 
against them. In most of these fallacious moves, arguers act as if the opponent attacked 
Discussion Rule Fallacy                                Occurrence/ percentage Total % 
Rule 1 Freedom     
Ad hominem 8 26.6  
Ad miserecordiam 2 6.6  
    33.3 
Rule 2 Shifting the burden Ad ignorantiam 0 0  
 Shifting the burden 0 0  
    0 
 
Rule 3 Standpoint  
 
Straw man  
 
5 
 
16.6 
 
    16.6 
 
Rule 4 Relevance 
 
Ad verecundiam 
 
1 
 
3.3 
 
 Tu quoque 2 6.6  
 Ignoratio elenchi /Red herring 2 6.6  
    16.6 
 
Rule 5 Unexpressed Premise 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
Rule 6 Starting point 
 
Complex question 
 
4 
 
13.3 
 
    13.3 
 
Rule 7 Argument Scheme 
 
Hasty generalization 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 Ad consequentiam 1 3.3  
 Non causa pro causa 1 3.3  
 Slippery slope  1 3.3  
 Weak analogy 4 13.3  
    23.3 
 
Rule 8 Validity 
 
False dichotomy 
 
7 
 
23.3 
 
 Formal fallacies 2 6.6  
 Begging the question 0 0  
    30 
 
Rule 9 Closure 
 
Ad ignorantiam 
 
0 
 
0 
 
    0 
 
Rule 10  Usage 
 
Ambiguity  
 
0 
 
0 
 
    0 
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were not any participant in the current argumentative discussion, and pretending the 
counterview only belongs to ―external‖ views rather than part of the audience´s 
positions. This may be observed in cases of ad hominem fallacies typically used in 
confrontation stages and in references to the opponents´ views. Moves like ―Hope is 
dwindling, no honest observer can conclude otherwise‖ (Ralph Peters) or ―Of all the 
accounts on the current situation, this is by far the most stupid‖ (Krauthammer), which 
in fact represent two opposing positions about the situation in Iraq, are strategically 
maneuvered to polarize ones´ position against the opponents´ and to enhance one´s 
authority and credibility (appeal to ethos) by attacking that of others. The maneuvers 
derailment lies in the fact that the arguers here attack the credibility of the opponents 
rather than their arguments. The maneuver fails to assess the opponent´s claim on its 
merit, making the move irrelevant by referring to virtues and morality (hence the fallacy 
is also known as the fallacy of virtue) and representing opponents as dishonest and 
untrustworthy people.  
Even though most cases of violations of Rule1 were determined as ad hominem 
fallacies, one case of derailment represented a peculiar manner of obstructing the debate 
and the flow of communication between participants. The derailment happens when the 
author mentions some opponents´ views but shuts down any prospective doubt to be 
Example (63) is a strategic move in which Tony Snow recognizes the existence of 
arguments going against Bush policies, mainly those blaming the policy for provoking 
violence in Iraq. His confrontation with these opposing views goes like this:  
(63)  The most astonishing argument is that the United States (or the Bush 
administration) is responsible for the terror wave. Terrorists are responsible for 
terror period. (Tony Snow, USA Today)  
By this move, Mr. Snow clear bans counter arguments from being advanced. The 
violation of the freedom rule is also an apparent manipulative move in which the 
counter-argument is framed as coming from outsiders. Indeed, by using ―the United 
States‖ the counter-argument is attributed to non-Americans, or non-patriots who are 
against the US interventions and policies. The move denotes a defensive reaction some 
politicians typically adopt against criticism to foreign policies by attacking the 
opponents as Anti American. By this move the arguer prevents a counterargument from 
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qualifying as a claim worth refuting and the term ―period‖ categorically leaves it out of 
the debate.  
These cases of strategic maneuvering aimed dialectically at defining the origin of the 
difference of opinion or the distribution of discussion roles (confrontation or opening) 
generally derail when the arguers ridicules antagonists´ views, manipulates them 
(attribute them to outsiders) or misleads when distributing the discussion roles, 
assuming that the audience share his/her position while in practice opposing views are 
undeniable among public opinion. This derailing strategy is used as a smokescreen to 
make the audience perceive confrontational topics of high disagreement as agreed-upon 
issues and displace disagreement outside the debate sphere.   
American arguers in the op-ed corpus also violate the argument schemes, mainly by 
committing the fallacy of the weak analogy. Indeed, 23% of the arguers make erroneous 
constructions of arguments´ structures producing as a consequence inacceptable 
schemes. The derailment is more prominent in cases where various analogy-based 
arguments are tied together to form the structure of a whole discussion. An argument 
establishes a weak analogy if the comparison on which it rests is shaky or unclear. In 
the corpus, weak analogies occurred mainly within the attempt to explain concepts, 
actions or situations by associating them by similarity to previous or culturally more 
accessible situations. Most of the derailing maneuvers are due inappropriate analogy in 
which the arguers evoke certain characteristics which have no relevance to the intended 
situation, such as the comparison of two historical events. In the following example (64) 
a strategic maneuver supporting the argument on the peculiarity of the Iraqi case of 
violence attempts to blame ―sectarian‖ Iraqis for the persistent violence by making a 
hypothetical comparison between current situation Iraq and the Christian conflict in 17
th
 
Century Europe. This analogy based on a counterfactual may not stand the scheme test 
and it is prone to criticism. Its premises are questionable since the two conflicts have 
very different circumstances, the most obvious ones are that the conflict in Iraq was not 
a religious strife, as the analogy suggests, since it is a struggle for power, in spite of the 
sectarian divide, nor did the Christian conflict follow from any act of invasion or 
occupation.       
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(64)  And the role of American soldiers in an intra-Islamic conflict is impossible to 
plausibly articulate. (Imagine, for instance, that a small Islamic army had been 
plunked down in Europe during the Protestant-Catholic strife of the 16th and 
17th centuries. Its mission would have been about as clear as ours in Iraq today.) 
(Harold Meyerson, Washington Post)  
 
These types of derailments are generally related to maneuverings realized in the 
argumentation stage, where the lines of arguments are established and generally 
structured in connection to the main claim. Weak analogies may go unperceived 
because they are informal kinds of fallacies which are neither true nor false but may be 
misleading if the audience knows little about the compared entities. In foreign policy 
decision making, lessons learnt from the past are usually taken up when reasoning about 
current decision. While analogies from history is supposed to be a common practice in 
decision making, this kind of reasoning presents a real problem due to the risk of weak 
premises to support the intended comparison. In fact, ―no two historical events are 
identical and that the future is more than a linear extension of the past‖ (Record 1998: 
1). 
The third type of strategic maneuvering derailment characterizing a great part of the 
American corpus (30%) is the one violating the validity rule. This rule requires the 
arguments to be logically valid, that is, their conclusion should be logically entailed by 
the premises. Most of the derailments indeed, occur in establishing false dichotomies. 
Also known a false dilemma, a false dichotomy is a fallacy that involves a situation in 
which limited alternatives are considered, when in fact there is at least one additional 
option. A substantial number of arguments supporting a decision (in deliberative 
argumentations) develop as the only alternative to an eminent disaster. The strategy is 
commonly employed by politicians, mainly in times of crisis or crucial during policy 
deliberations, to reduce the attention of the public and limit their perspective in order 
enhance the chance of the assimilation of their own proposals. The false dilemma 
strategies may be detected in most of the against-withdrawal-decision op-ed pieces as 
overall strategy developed in the line of arguments (see findings on the confrontation 
and argumentation stage analyses). However, when it comes to local argumentative 
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maneuvers, the false dilemma moves were detected mostly at the single argument level 
more often used in the concluding stage. The following example (65) describes a case of 
resolution outcome maneuvering provoking a false dilemma. Ralph Peter calls for the 
American public to support staying the course in Iraq, by asserting that there is no 
alternative other than a disastrous withdrawal which would, in his views, produce 
massacres and undermine national security.   
(65)  I hate the long-mismanaged mess in Iraq. I wish there were a sensible, decent 
way to get out that wouldn't undercut our security and produce massive innocent 
casualties. But there isn't. (Ralph Peters, New York Post)  
This ―either this or that‖ reasoning suggests that there is no other solution than the one 
advanced by the arguer. It also represents a common practice that it is hardly believable 
in a an age of more public access to political information and resources, where citizens 
are supposedly knowledgeable about the on-going debate on national issues and aware 
of the variety of alternatives proposed as solution to the Iraq problem. Furthermore, the 
findings revealed that the mostly widely read newspapers scored high in false dilemma 
and ad hominem fallacies, which means that these derailment are committed by the 
most eminent opinion leaders. This discovery opens up questions on the kind of 
institutional preconditions for strategic maneuvering in these papers, which seem 
unrestrictive of certain kinds of (ideally) unacceptable maneuvers and render them 
conventional practice.   
In the Arab corpus, the cases of strategic maneuvering derailments were mainly 
identified as cases of violations of the rule of relevance, the rule of argument scheme 
and the validity rule. Most violations to the relevance rule in the corpus occur in 26.6% 
of corpus and are mainly related to the conclusions drawn irrelevantly from the 
premises (occurring in the argumentation stage), while some of the derailments may 
also occur in confrontational strategies with the tu quoque or the appeal to hypocrisy 
regarding the opponent´s position, (identified in 2 American op-ed pieces).  
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Table 7.24. Strategic maneuvering derailments in the Arab corpus 
 
As shown in Table 7. 24, up to 20% of the Arab arguers draw irrelevant conclusion and 
commit the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi known as the arguments whose premises have 
no direct relation with the claim at issue. The following derailing move is an example:  
(66) Said (referring to an Iraqi politician in 1950s) explained that Iraq was composed 
of various ethnicities and doctrines and how different it was from Egypt, a 
country with a homogeneous population and cohesive government. What Said's 
Discussion Rule Fallacy                    Occurrence/ percentage Total % 
Rule 1 Freedom     
Ad hominem 1 3.3  
Ad miserecordiam 0 0  
    3.3 
 
Rule 2 Shifting the burden 
 
Ad ignorantiam 
   
 Shifting the burden 0 0  
    0 
 
Rule 3 Standpoint  
 
Straw man 
 
0 
 
0 
 
    0 
 
Rule 4 Relevance 
 
Ad verecundiam 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 Tu quoque 2 0  
 Ignoratio elenchi /Red herring 2 26.6  
    26.6 
 
Rule 5 Unexpressed Premise 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
Rule 6 Starting point 
 
Complex question 
 
0 
 
0 
 
    0 
 
Rule 7 Argument Scheme 
 
Hasty generalization 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 Ad consequentiam 1 3.3  
 Non causa pro causa 1 3.3  
 Slippery slope  2 3.3  
 Weak analogy 1 13.3  
    20 
 
Rule 8 Validity 
 
False dichotomy 
 
3 
 
10 
 
 Formal fallacies 0 0  
 Begging the question 2 6.6  
    16.6 
 
Rule 9 Closure 
 
Ad ignorantiam 
 
2 
 
0 
 
    6.6 
 
Rule 10  Usage 
 
Ambiguity  
 
0 
 
2 
 
    6.6 
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words suggested was that Iraq needs a strongman to keep it together, someone 
like Al-Hajjaj, or Saddam. (Mustapha El Feki, Al Masry Al Youm)  
The claim made here is that Iraq needs on strong ruler to be able to function as a state 
(basing this conclusion on the premise that ―all various ethnicity and doctrine state 
needs a dictator‖). The problem does not only lie in the fact that this syllogism may not 
be acceptable, because the unexpressed premise does not hold as a true, but also because 
the author uses this argument to support his main standpoint in favor of democracy. A 
standpoint stating that ―a unified democratic country must be created‖ would not 
possibly be supported by a sub-argument claiming that dictatorship is the best option for 
Iraq, as this move is invalid because it advances contradictory arguments (illogical 
presumption fallacies). The strategic maneuvering in this example derails committing 
various fallacies, but it mainly violates the rule of relevance as it adapts an argument 
purporting to establish a particular conclusion and directs it to prove a different 
conclusion 
Violations of the argument scheme rule were identified in 20% of the corpus realized in 
relation to different kinds of argument schemes hence resulting in different fallacious 
moves. The identified violations are derailments generating different kinds of fallacies 
such as the Non causa pro causa fallacy (6.6%), hasty generalization, ad 
consequentiam, slippery slopes and weak analogy.  
Finally, some cases of validity rule violations were identified in 16.6% op-ed pieces in 
the Arab corpus, where the most prominent fallacy is the false dichotomy (10%) and 
begging the question (6.6%). Begging the question is a type of circular reasoning that 
involves drawing a conclusion that is included in the premises. A number of other 
fallacies are also identified and classified as violations of other rules for critical 
discussion that as the closure rule related in the concluding stage found in 6.6% of the 
discussions and exclusively related in ad ignorantiam or appeal to ignorance (asserting 
a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false or vice versa). The move, 
below, illustrates an example of derailment produced by circular reasoning (begging the 
question fallacy). The arguer asserts there are three things, but advances two, while the 
third is the same as second, but put in slightly different terms. 
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(67)   Here are three things that need to be done: First, a unified democratic country 
must be created, (…) Second, pluralism must be recognized, (…). Third, (...) 
pluralism is the only way forward. (Mustapha El Feki, Al MAsry Al Youm)  
The analysis and evaluation of arguments allowed the location of the maneuverings 
causing strategic derailments. This was carried out following the interactional-based 
Pragma-dialectics approach to fallacies, that gives insight into the kind of obstacles 
arguers –as protagonists- (intentionally or not) put forward against the resolution of 
their conflicts with their antagonists. Ideological structures probably play a significant 
role in motivating the use these kinds of maneuvers, as they emerge unmistakably with 
cases of abuse of the dialectical aims and show the arguers´ keenness to win the 
discussion at any cost.   
The cases of manipulations are probably made more prominent in some kinds of 
derailments/fallacies more than others. Indeed, maneuvering with ad hominem, false 
dichotomy and false analogies are generally interpreted as confusing, manipulative and 
deceiving. However, the same ideological structures seem equally dominant in the 
strategic maneuvering usage even in cases regarded as effective. From an analytical 
perspective, derailments in strategic maneuvering are generally easier to classify as acts 
of manipulation than the effective cases of maneuvering, as they can serve as material 
proofs for manipulations. They are, indeed, widely interpreted as misleading (false 
dichotomy), arrogant (ad hominem), confusing (arguments from ignorance) and they are 
regarded as deceptive moves. In practice, however, and in the context of the 
―international‖ debate on such a contested issue as the Iraq war, the violations of the 
rules for critical discussion within the strategic maneuvering may not be the only 
adequate criteria for evaluating argumentation taking place in a large and global public 
space. The role of the ideological structure underlying the shared cognitions of experts 
group in each culture may be a more powerful factor in determining the kinds of 
derailments that could be committed. The rules for critical discussion may of course 
remain ideally and universally relevant cross-culturally, while deciding whether the 
maneuvers are derailments or not (in case of informal fallacies where arguments are not 
judged as valid but rather as cogent) rests on the analysts knowledge of not only the 
political situations, actors and policies but also on his/her awareness of the ideological 
force underlying this very ―knowledge‖.  
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7.7.  Summary 
This chapter presented the findings from our critical analysis of the ideologically driven 
maneuvering strategies performed by the American and the Arab FP experts in their op-
ed debate on the Iraq war. The analysis followed the Pragma-dialectical method and 
exploited its notion of strategic maneuvering to determine the kinds of moves that 
indicated the arguers´ effort to reconcile between their dialectical and persuasive goals. 
Our data analysis and interpretation have taken into account the role played by the 
institutions within which these op-ed pieces were produced as an attempt to reach a 
well-grounded understanding of the rules and conventions constraining the participants´ 
strategic maneuverings (See Chapter 5). This step is regarded crucial within Pragma-
dialectics and also in CDA in dealing with strategies involving such abstract 
phenomenon as ideology and in meeting the challenge of linking the cognitive backdrop 
to the discursive practices. Strategic maneuverings, as ideologically-prone discourse 
moves, were examined in the four stages guided by the ideal model of a critical 
discussion and also inspected in cases of derailment and occurrences of fallacies. The 
results showed the different approaches with which the two groups of FP experts 
maneuvered and in handling and pursing their rhetorical goals. Across the four stages, 
their manifested strategies pointed to their predispositions for manifesting opposing 
ideological positions and perspectives on the Iraq situations and the kinds of solutions to 
be brought about.  
In the confrontational stage, American experts tended to polarize their views with one 
opposing view which they framed as invalid, reducing options for their audiences. 
Others chose topics of shared agreement in their confrontation from which they shifted 
to a more controversial issue. The topic shifting maneuvering often functioned as a 
smokescreen used to obscure the real position and to presume agreement rather than 
engage in the defense of an acknowledged difference of opinion. Arab arguers, in turn, 
typically maneuvered to express their dissent and to make their discontent prominent or 
attempt to advance some strategic advice to American or international decision makers. 
Both groups rhetorically maneuvered using propositio, a presentational device that 
lexically influenced the account on the disagreement to their favor.  
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In the opening stage, both groups take the audiences as allies even though in the 
American corpus a number of manipulative ways of assigning roles to antagonists was 
detected in which arguers heavily presupposed agreement and ignored the audiences´ 
avowed oppositions on polemical issues. As for establishing starting points, Americans 
worked with the consensus over the US mission in Iraq and took as common ground its 
legitimacy, fixing explicit agreement on the gravity of the situation, while the Arab 
group´s dispersed starting points indicated the challenge they faced in deciding what 
common ground to set up with international and heterogeneous audience. Most of the 
starting points focused on the misfortune of Iraqis and attempted to call into question 
the power of the US, while other resorted to other audience-oriented strategies such as 
making reference to the notorious reputation of George Bush (for instance as being 
―stupid‖) to be able to pave the way for argumentation against his policies.  
In the argumentation stage, two points were found to be in focus when identifying the 
maneuvering strategies: the process of locating arguments through loci and the kinds of 
topoi drawn upon to support them. The same claim themes were inspected and 
contrasted in the two corpora. Findings showed that while the American experts heavily 
drew conclusions based on the loci of relationship or circumstance in delineating the US 
policies and mission in Iraq, the Arab experts relied on the avail of testimony and of 
definitions in developing their arguments. The loci of relationship (for instance 
cause/effect) generally rely on common assumptions and implicit premises and the 
frequency of their use among American arguers showed the affluence of the cognitive 
resources they socially shared with their audiences. Arab arguers not only needed 
testimony as the most reliable warranty for arguments but also arguments from 
American authority and documents to overcome the challenge of conjecturing 
accusatory claims against the mainstream´s logic. The two groups of arguers adopted 
different maneuvering strategies while using these different loci. However, Arab experts 
tended to stick to certification in order to allow their dissenting positions to be accepted 
along with their general rhetorical strategy of vituperation, most American arguers 
maneuvered with the irreparable or the gain and loss loci. Those maneuvering with the 
irreparable tended to call attention to the urgency of defending national assets by 
referring to security threats, victory as a target and global leadership as the 
representation of glory. The gains or losses loci attempted either to make the audience 
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visualize a bright future gained with perseverance and commitment to American values 
or to warn them from the disastrous consequences of the erroneous policy decisions. In 
both cases, arguers proved to be consistent in their presentational maneuvers in the use 
of contrarium to contrast their views with some opposite scenarios framed as interests-
threatening situations. These lines of arguments relied heavily on the ideologically 
loaded topoi, namely American humanitarianism and global leadership and 
exceptionalism. Arab experts tended to draw on the commonly shared assumptions in 
third world countries on the US double-standard policies and its arrogance.  
 In the concluding stage, the preliminary inspection of maneuvers found similar patterns 
in two corpora in their approaches to the discussions´ closures. Most arguers expressed 
personal attitudes   on the war, reiterated their standpoints or, with lower frequencies, 
left the outcome resolution unexpressed. Differences, however, were noted in the kinds 
of maneuvering strategies adopted by each group. American experts stressed 
commitment to the American cause, namely its fight to terrorism and leadership in the 
spread of democracy. Others placed blamed politicians for their inefficiency and 
emphasized the timeliness of their proposal by reminding American of risks, enemies or 
more positively of rewarding victory. Their adaptation to the audience consisted of 
explicitly involving them in the decision making process by implicitly drawing on the 
principles of democracy and the importance of the public opinion in shaping the 
nations´ foreign policies. Arab experts underscored accountability as an essential 
element to settle war conflicts. They either affirmed that the US was responsible for war 
crime or an obstacle to any solutions. Some others warned from an imminent disaster 
and called for American people/international community for arbitration. This explained 
the maneuvers made at the level of audience adaptation which were made prominent by 
framing the audience as victims of the US policies and manipulations, making the 
proposals seem to be advanced for their benefits or by praising them for their admirable 
moral values.  
Finally, the cases of strategic maneuvering derailments were presented and discussed 
for each group of experts. The evaluation of strategic moves was carried out based on 
the rules for critical discussion proposed by Pragma-dialectics. The violations of certain 
rules were consistent with the kinds of ideological disposition of each cultural group 
and its power position within the international debate. American arguers more often 
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violated the freedom rule and in some case prevented antagonists from their right to 
doubt. Most derailments in this corpus consisted of committing ad hominem fallacies- 
attack the opponents´ person instead of the argument- weak analogies or creating false 
dilemmas. These kinds of derailments pointed to the experts´ tendency to the use 
arrogance and manipulative means in framing controversial issues. Arab arguers´ 
maneuvering derailments were equally noticeable and more related violating the rules of 
relevance and the argument schemes. They showed predisposition to draw irrelevant 
conclusions committing the fallacies of ignoratio elenchi and red herring indicative of 
the inconsistency between their goals and the premise they attempted to draw upon.  
The notion of strategic maneuvering has opened up for a systematic analysis of the 
ideological structures underlying the argumentative discourse of FP experts in the two 
cultures in conflicts. Indeed, across the four stages of the critical discussions under 
study, the maneuvers were identified within the discourse moves which made prominent 
arguers´ effort to reconcile between their dialectical goals with their rhetorical goals. 
These maneuvers provided for the interpretation of the arguers‘ motives put forward 
through different dialectical moves, such as their briefing on the disagreement, their 
assignment of roles to the discussion participants, their development of the lines of 
arguments and the decision they make on the outcome of the difference of opinion 
resolution. The dialectical goals helped along the characterization of the experts´ 
rhetorical moves and the ideological structures underlying them.  
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CHAPTER 8   CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This cross-cultural critical study of the discursive practices of the FP experts in 
American and Arab op-ed pieces attempted to understand how these practices were 
shaped by the differences in the power positions of nations-states within the 
international system and in their ideological perspectives. More specifically, it sought to 
critically examine the ideological structures underlying the experts´ discursive choices 
and their argumentative strategies when discussing the Iraq war. The thesis addressed 
the following research questions. The first was concerned with how the FP experts in 
the two cultures discursively constructed the debate on Iraq and what ideological 
structures underlay their discursive decisions in relation to their topic selection and 
context construction. The second question focused on how ideologies manifested in the 
argumentative strategies used in the op-ed pieces.  
 
The study adopted a CDS stance in the analysis of FP op-ed pieces. The socio-cognitive 
approach proposed by van Dijk and his theories on ideology (1998a) and context 
models (2008) were the major theoretical foundation for the study. The study endorsed 
analytic tools and theoretical insights from argumentation theory and more particularly 
from Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004) as the main 
methodological guide for investigation. Pragma-dialectics offered a number of analytic 
tools for the critical inspection of the op-ed discourse, namely the reconstruction of 
discourse and the arrangement of argumentative moves and structures based on the 
critical discussion model and on the specification of critical stages organizing the 
discourse units. These have been fundamental analytic steps in the tackling of the 
different research questions and dimensions pursued in this study. The three analytic 
parts of the thesis were divided as follows. The first part, chapter 5, examined the 
macro-context of FP op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type. The second part, 
chapter 6, reported the findings from the analysis of discursive decisions made by the 
arguers in the two corpora in terms of their selections of topics and their discursive 
construction of context and purposeful actions. The final part, chapter 7, focused on the 
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argumentative strategies in the two corpora and reported the analysis carried out on the 
strategic maneuvering performed in the four stages of the critical discussions. It also 
devoted considerable attention to cases of fallacious moves in discourse.  
The analysis of the FP experts´ mindsets and ideological frameworks has shown that 
they form the institutional preconditions for the strategic maneuvering in their 
argumentative discourse. Following the Pragma-dialectical method guidelines for 
contextual inspections and its parameters for identifying strategic functions of 
argumentative moves, the institutional constraints were explored. First, the FP op-ed 
institutional point was determined in relation with the diverse professional backgrounds 
of active participants in the discourse and their different predispositions towards the 
purpose of mobilizing public opinion for policy decision addressed within FP debates in 
op-ed pieces. Then the op-ed pieces as an activity type were characterized based on the 
ideal model of critical discussion. Following the four focal points of critical discussions, 
the initial situation is prompted by the institution goals mediated by an authoritative 
arguer, the procedural and material starting points are party codified rules related to FP 
knowledge and international conventions, the argumentative means stem from the 
authors´ expertise, and the outcome of the discussion is checked through research 
methods on public opinion. The final focus of the chapter was the nations´ policy 
orientations constraining strategic maneuverings in the two cultural groups. The policy 
orientations of the US and the Arab nations were explored and their role in creating the 
preconditions for strategic maneuvering in each culture was substantiated with examples 
from the cultural groups´ corpora.  
 
In the American context, the section argued that FP experts´ mindsets shaped by their 
institutional practices constrained their performance of strategic maneuverings through 
three main FP notions: interventionism, leadership and self-defense. These notions, 
generally translated into actual policies, were found to be based on core political values 
that constitute the set of constraints governing the FP experts´ argumentative practices. 
The belief in the universality of the US values and in the US leadership and 
responsibility for promoting these political values in the world as a guarantee for peace 
and security has been strengthened by strong nationalism. These beliefs have 
312 
 
legitimated the use of military power as policy instruments and encouraged the US 
interventionist policies and the discursive practices developed to sustain them.  In fact, 
these assumptions shaping the institutional and decision making conventions in the 
foreign policy discipline define the decision makers´ sense of mission regardless of the 
political ideology they endorse (Chollet and Lindberg 2008). The analysis has revealed 
that these mindsets overlap with the specific aims and conventions of political 
institutions and constrain the strategic maneuvering in FP debates. This characterization 
of the American macro-context was coupled with analysis of institutionally constrained 
maneuvering cases from the American corpus.   
 
As far as the Arab context is concerned, the exploration of the institutional conventions 
in the Arab nations as preconditions for strategic maneuvering was carried out along 
with analysis of cases of institutionally constrained strategic moves performed by Arab 
arguers in the corpus, in the commitments they drew upon with audience and the 
starting points they chose to establish in their discussions. The Arab FP op-ed pieces 
were found to be constrained by three political conditions. First, the op-ed specific 
institutional aims derived from ―Omni-balancing‖ policies, which are political strategies 
practiced by most authoritarian state leaders in the Arab region. This condition has 
created a macro-contextual institutional aim for op-ed pieces discourse. Second, the 
English edition newspapers allowed most state leaders to use experts as their 
spokesmen. The international public space of the op-ed piece is exploited as a policy 
instrument for diplomacy and political communication in times of crises and conflict. 
Third, the promotion of national values and sentiments is institutionally encouraged in 
the international communicative contexts, as mechanisms of self-positioning and means 
to show resistance and conceal the actual policy orientations of cooperation with the US 
undertaken by states leaders. With these mindsets FP experts strategically maneuvered 
in their op-ed pieces. The institutional conventions in each cultural context shape 
differently the main reserve for the experts´ maneuvering strategies with audiences´ 
commitments and the preconditions for establishing their starting points in the op-ed 
pieces.  
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The findings from the analysis of discursive constructions of the Iraq War in the op-ed 
pieces presented in Chapter 6 showed two main dimensions: topic selection and context. 
The examination of topic selection choices started with the analysis of macro-semantic 
structures in the op-ed pieces along with examination of the pragmatic dimension of the 
topic selections. Findings revealed the difference in the topical trends in each op-ed 
corpus and the disagreement spaces from which these topics were selected. American 
arguers advanced positions from the same disagreement space and focused attention in 
the debate on withdrawal from Iraq whereas Arabs evoked a variety of disagreement 
spaces which showed a lack of consensus between them in the debate on Iraq. American 
choices matched well with common national consensus of the experts´ community 
focusing on the urgency of solution. Their highly deliberative topics denoted their 
power and decision makers´ stances, confirmed by a clear trend in stasis forwarding 
their action-oriented perspective. The Arab experts´ topics on the other hand, were 
based on protest but scattered along different concerns. They mainly adopted epideictic 
and judicial oratory from a qualitative stasis to call for holding the US accountable for 
the disaster in Iraq.  
 
Drawing on Van Dijk´s framework for context models (2008), context construction 
analysis focused on two schematic categories of context models: setting (space) and, 
participants‘ identities, roles and relations. The results revealed the different approaches 
with which the two cultural groups construct setting and participants´ identities in 
discourse and hinted at the differences in the structural bases from which the two groups 
constructed context models. Indeed, American experts tended to switch between 
different types of identity, while preserving their recognizable national identity of 
Americanism. They also made prominent their professional identities through a decision 
makers´ stance. Arab experts on the other hand, tended to contextualize one identity and 
abstained from showing any decision-maker self (given the fact that they were decision 
makers in their cultural contexts), and enacted their roles as resistant groups to the 
dominating power acting, therefore, in accordance with the setting and goals imposed 
by the international debate situation. The final section of the chapter focused on the 
purposeful actions discursively constructed in the main standpoints. These discursive 
constructions were analyzed based on the theoretical framework proposed by van 
Leeuwen (2008). The systematic analysis of the topic selection and the contextual 
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schematic categories revealed the ideologically biased constructions characteristic for 
each of cultural group of arguers and denotes the differences in their power positions in 
the debate controlled by their diametrically opposed positions as political actors in the 
international arena.  
  
Chapter 7 reported the results from the critical study of the maneuvering strategies 
performed by the two FP experts´ groups in their op-ed pieces and their underlying 
ideologically dimensions. The strategic maneuverings performed by American and Arab 
FP experts were examined in the four stages distinguished in the ideal model of 
a critical discussion and also evaluated according to the rules for critical discussion to 
uncover fallacious moves. Findings indicated that in the four stages, each group of 
experts manifested different strategic maneuverings which underscored their opposing 
ideological positions towards on the Iraq war and their different perspectives on the 
stakes related to the international crisis.  
 
The analysis of the maneuvering in the confrontational stage revealed how American 
experts polarized their views with one opponent or shifted topics to avoid conflict while 
Arab experts expressed their dissent or advanced some strategic advice to American or 
international decision makers. In the opening stage, the two groups of experts chose a 
position of doubt for their audiences rather than disagreement. American experts tended 
to ignore existing disagreement and such maneuvering was considered manipulative. 
Americans relied on the commitment of audience to the US mission in Iraq and on the 
agreement on the magnitude of the situation as their starting points. The Arab experts‘ 
maneuvering, in contrast, showed the challenging task of finding common ground with 
international audience and some resorted to audience-adaptation strategies in order to 
enhance their argumentative appeals.  
 
The findings showed that in the argumentation stage the American experts tended to 
develop arguments based on the loci of relationship or circumstance in describing the 
US mission in Iraq, whereas the Arab experts drew more often on testimony and 
definitions in their arguments. This was explained by the fact that the American arguers´ 
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rich cognitive reserve which they socially shared with their audiences opened up for 
their use of the implicit premises within the loci of relationship. The Arab arguers in 
turn pursued the most reliable warranty for arguments, testimony, mainly arguments 
from American authority to substantiate their accusations and to make up for the lack of 
common ground. The two groups of arguers adopted different maneuvering strategies 
while using these different loci. Most American arguers maneuvered with the 
irreparable or the gain and loss loci by either appealing to the audience to act quickly to  
protect national interest or by arousing audience excitement for futures achievement or 
raise their awareness on the disastrous consequences of adopting flawed policy 
decisions. Conversely, Arab experts maneuvered by certification from sources trusted 
by their targeted audiences in order to enhance the chance for their dissented voices to 
be heard while adopting a general rhetorical strategy of vituperation and harsh criticism 
American experts developed these lines of arguments while drawing on the 
ideologically biased topoi of American humanitarianism and global leadership. The 
Arab experts, in contrast, relied on the culturally-shared beliefs of the US abuses and 
arrogance in the international arena.   
 
In the concluding stage, experts in the two cultural groups concluded the outcome of 
their discussions with disparate manners. American experts focused on commitment to 
the American cause, and their explicitly involved the audience  in the decision making 
process Arab experts warned from the eminence of more disastrous consequences and 
for called for American people/international community for arbitration.  
 
The results from the analysis of the strategic maneuvering derailments were presented in 
the final section of the chapter. The evaluation of argumentation in the two corpora 
followed the norms established by the rules for critical discussion proposed by Pragma-
dialectics. Findings confirmed that the cases of derailments were consistent with the 
kinds of ideologies engrained in the practices of each cultural group and enhanced by its 
world power position. The strategic maneuvering of American experts derailed by 
committing ad hominem fallacies- attack the opponents´ person instead of the argument- 
and by establishing weak analogies or creating false dilemmas. These findings conform 
316 
 
to the use of arrogance and manipulative means detected in as strategic trend used by 
this group in framing controversial issues. The strategic maneuvering of Arab arguers 
derailed when violating the rules of relevance and the argument schemes. Their repeated 
fallacious moves in drawing irrelevant conclusions (ignoratio elenchi and red herring) 
indicated the blatant inconsistency between their goals and their premises.  
 
The findings from the three analytic parts offered a quite extended insight into the 
ideologically-biased discursive and argumentative practices of two groups of opinion 
leaders in two nations at ―war‖. Their different strategic maneuverings and their 
discursive constructions of the debate delineated not only their different perspectives 
and priorities, but also their antagonistic interests and the role of their world power 
positions and institutional political cultures in shaping the debate on Iraq.    
 
The thesis has dedicated special attention to the argumentative dimension of the 
discourse of foreign policy experts in the American and the Arab cultures and attempted 
to elucidate the ideological foundations of the approaches adopted by the two cultural 
groups of experts to defend their positions along their interests on Iraq through a public 
debate of global reach. This endeavor attempted to make the following contributions. 
First, from a discursive research perspective, this work joins the everlasting 
commitment of CDS scholars to inter-disciplinarity and more particularly to the call to 
arms to benefit from theoretical and methodological insights of argumentation theory 
for the analysis of argumentative discourse (See Fairclough & Fairclough 2012; Ihnen 
& Richardson 2011; Zagar 2010). Second, the thesis has centered on the socio-cognitive 
dimension of the experts´ discourse and attempted to bring Pragma-dialectics along with 
the exploration of ideologies despite some presumed theoretical barriers between van 
Dijk´s sociocognitive approach and van Eemeren´s Pragma-dialectics, which are 
probably due to different research interests rather than different conceptual 
understanding (see Chapter 3 section 3.3.4). Third, analysis of op-ed pieces as an 
argumentative activity type followed the guidance of Pragma-dialectics while 
attempting to place special emphasis on maneuvering constraints of higher level in the 
macro-context of foreign policy. Indeed, while the seemingly little saliency of the 
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institutional constraints for maneuvering in op-ed pieces presented great opportunities 
for the arguers to maneuver at their wish, the foreign policy orientations and core 
political principles reigning in each culture seemed to set the boundaries for 
argumentative moves.  
 
To my knowledge, the present research is the first in CDS to attempt to critically 
investigate argumentation in the discourse of FP experts from a cross-cultural 
perspective and, as such, several limitations deserve comment. First, the study focused 
on op-ed pieces and did not include other media channels where FP experts usually 
operate more visibly. The op-ed piece hence as an argumentative activity type offered 
little access for research to the constraints and preconditions for participants´ strategic 
maneuvering. Empirical investigation of how this influential social group manages 
discussions and strategically maneuvers within more accessible activity type situations 
such as broadcast debates is an important next step. Second, the contextual construction 
strategies uncovered in this work did not devote attention to participants´ knowledge, 
despite the fact that it is a central category in mental models schemas and a crucial 
element of the group social cognition. Discursive construction of knowledge may very 
powerfully signal the speaker´s ideology and indicate the underlying socially shared 
belief system upon which this knowledge is drawn. Promising results may be obtained 
from critical analysis focusing on contextual constructions of knowledge in discourse. 
More importantly, insight from argumentative theory on how to systematically locate 
knowledge in discourse should offer invaluable support for such an endeavor. 
Furthermore, the critical analysis of the FP experts´ construction of knowledge in 
discourse may be linked to the strategic maneuvering they perform both at a macro and 
micro-levels. Since the principal function of context models is ―to produce discourse in 
such a way that is optimally appropriate in the social situation‖ (van Dijk, 2009: 7), 
their manifestation in discourse should not only point toward the discourse participants´ 
understanding of a given state of affairs but also explain the reason behind their 
strategic maneuvers. An integration of the socio-cognitive dimension into the analysis 
of discourse participants´ strategic maneuvering may render the researcher´s 
interpretation more expedient.  
318 
 
The practices of FP experts and the impact of their discourses on the development and 
the shaping of international relations definitely require more attention from CDS 
scholars. Research is needed, indeed, on the discourse and the argumentative strategies 
used by this group of opinion leaders in order to implement vital decisions which dictate 
the world order, shape nations-states relationships and the lives of ordinary people. 
Critically examining the belief systems controlling these kinds of discourses is still a 
challenge for CDS.  
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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE STRUCTURES IN OPINION ARTICLES: A CROSS-
CULTURAL STUDY 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The present thesis is a cross-cultural study of the discourses of foreign policy (FP) 
experts in op-ed pieces discussing the war in Iraq. It explores the underlying ideologies 
guiding the discursive practices of two FP expert groups from two nations involved in 
the armed conflict. The study draws upon the stances of Critical Discourse Studies 
(CDS) and Pragma-dialectics and analyzes the discourses of American and Arab op-ed 
pieces and aims to unveil the ideological structures constraining the discursive 
constructions of the Iraq war as well as the argumentative strategies used in the 
discussions of the policies in Iraq. Ideology in this kind of political discourse has been 
critically approached from a sociocognitive perspective to CDS as ―the basis of the 
social representations shared by members of a group‖ (van Dijk 1998a: 8). The 
sociocognitive approach emphasizes the role of cognition in the study of ideology and 
the belief in the cognitive interface mediating discourse and society. The systematic 
analysis of the argumentative strategies in the op-ed pieces is based on the method of 
Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004) and its notion of strategic 
maneuvering. This work aims to bring more attention to the discourse of FP experts as 
influential social groups and main actors in international relations and to better 
understand the role of their ideologies in the communicative processes they undertake in 
media of global circulation.  
  
 
II. Objectives  
The main aim of the present cross-cultural study is to examine and contrast the 
ideological structures underlying the discourses of the FP experts in the American and 
Arab op-ed pieces dealing with the Iraq war during the period referred to as ―the Surge‖ 
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(from late 2006 to September 2007). This project hopes to explore the ideologically 
constrained backdrop of the discursive practices of these FP experts and opinion leaders 
in two cultures at war.  The critical analyses of the discursive and the argumentative 
strategies of these experts in each culture aim to unveil their underlying ideological 
structures. Research is prompted by two research questions. The first is concerned with 
the strategic choices that FP experts in the two cultures make in their discursive 
construction of the debate on Iraq, in terms of their selections of topics and construction 
of context in discourse. The second seeks to explore the argumentative moves in the op-
ed pieces that indicate ideologically driven decisions.  
 
To answer these questions, the study takes the stance of CDA and integrates the van 
Dijk´ s sociocognitive approach with Pragma-dialectics. The thesis draws on the 
theories advanced by van Dijk on the concept of ideology and its manifestation in the 
discourse of the powerful elite and their role in reproducing dominance or resistance. 
The systematic method of Pragma-dialectics, as proposed by van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (2004), assists in the analysis and the evaluation of argumentative 
strategies and the characterization of op-ed discourse as an argumentative activity type. 
The study mainly draws on the notion of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren, 2010) 
which may be regarded as a resourceful analytic tool for the study of ideologies in 
argumentative discourse. It also focuses on the constraints created by context, mainly 
ideologically ingrained practices, that shape the argumentative and discursive choices 
made by the FP op-ed authors.  
The first research question related to the discursive constructions of the debate on Iraq 
focused on three aspects: the arguers´ selections of topics, their definition of context and 
their construction of purpose in actions, the latter draws on the framework of van 
Leeuwen (2008). The second research question concerned with the ideological 
strategies underlying the experts´ argumentative practice focused on the strategic 
maneuverings performed by FP experts in each culture in light of their respective group-
shared cognitions. Examining the discursive constructions and the argumentative 
maneuvers should expose the strategic choices of the experts and the ideological 
foundation of their social cognition.  
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III. Results  
The results from the analysis of the discourses of the two groups of FP experts are 
presented in three different chapters: five, six and seven. Chapter five has reported the 
findings from the analysis of the FP experts´ mindsets and their ideological frameworks. 
Based on Pragma-dialectics and its tools for examining the discourse activity type the 
strategic functions of argumentative moves and the institutional constraints have been 
explored. First, the FP op-ed institutional point has been determined in relation with the 
professional backgrounds of the different participants their purposes of mobilizing 
public opinion for policy decision addressed within FP debates in op-ed pieces. Then 
the op-ed pieces as an activity type have been characterized based on the ideal model of 
critical discussion. Following the four focal points of critical discussions, the initial 
situation has been prompted by the institution goals mediated by an authoritative arguer, 
the procedural and material starting points have been party codified rules related to FP 
knowledge and international conventions, the argumentative means stemmed from the 
authors´ expertise, and the outcome of the discussion was the object of research 
methods on public opinion. The final focus of the chapter has been the nations´ policy 
orientations constraining strategic maneuverings in the two cultural groups. The policy 
orientations of the US and the Arab nations have been explored and their role in 
creating the preconditions for strategic maneuvering in each culture has been 
substantiated with examples from the cultural groups´ corpora.  
Chapter 6 presents the findings from the analysis of discursive constructions of the Iraq 
War in the op-ed pieces. The results are related to 1) topic selection (semantic macro-
structures, oratory types and stasis) 2) context (setting and participants‘ identity) and 3) 
the construction of purpose in actions, based on the theoretical framework proposed by 
van Leeuwen (2008).  The analysis of semantic macro-structures in the op-ed pieces 
reveals the difference in the topical trends in each op-ed corpus and points to different 
disagreement spaces in each cultural group. American arguers advance positions from 
the same disagreement space and focus attention in the debate on withdrawal from Iraq.  
Their topics match well with common national consensus and with their need of the 
experts´ assistance in finding solutions. Their highly deliberative topics denote their 
power and decision makers´ stances, confirmed by a clear trend in stasis forwarding 
their action-oriented perspective. The Arab experts, on the other hand, select their topics 
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from a variety of disagreement spaces and show a lack of consensus among them in the 
debate on Iraq. Their choice of oratory and stasis indicate their concern with protest and 
their interest in holding the US accountable for the disaster in Iraq.  
 
The results from the analysis of the construction of context focus on two schematic 
categories of context models: setting (space) and, participants‘ identities, roles and 
relations (based on Van Dijk´s (2008) framework for context models). The results 
reveal major differences in the way each cultural group construct setting and 
participants´ identities in discourse and in the structural bases from which the two 
groups construct context models. The American experts alternate between different 
types of identity, but make their national identity and their professional identities more 
prominent. The Arab experts, on the other hand, tend to contextualize one identity and 
show no decision-maker self (despite the fact that they are decision makers in their 
respective states), and enact their roles as resistant groups to the dominating power 
acting. They seem to take into account the international dimension of the 
communicative setting. The final section of the chapter deals with the contextual 
construction of purpose in actions. Focusing on the main standpoints, these discursive 
constructions have been analyzed based on the theoretical framework proposed by van 
Leeuwen (2008). The findings reveal that American experts construct activated actions 
produced almost exclusively by intentional and controlling American agents. The 
moralized actions and purposes in this corpus reflect a legitimation strategy, as they are 
connected to warfare values and the protection of common national interest. The Arab 
experts, however, make extensive use of abstracted actions which are mainly concerned 
with Americans. Their moralization in the construction of Americans´ actions and 
purposes reflect a delegitimation strategy 
 
 
Chapter seven presents the findings from the analysis of the ideologically driven 
maneuvering strategies performed by the American and the Arab FP experts in their 
debate on the Iraq war. Strategic maneuverings have been examined in the four stages 
guided by the ideal model of a critical discussion while paying attention to the cases of 
derailment recognized as fallacies. The results show the differences between the two 
groups of FP experts in maintaining the balance between their dialectical goals and their 
345 
 
rhetorical goals. In the confrontational stage, the American experts tend to either 
polarize against their opponents´ views or to use a topic shifting strategy as a 
smokescreen to hide their actual positions. The Arab arguers maneuver to express their 
dissent or attempt to advance some strategic advice to American or international 
decision makers. In the opening stage, the American arguers work with the national 
consensus on the legitimacy of the US mission in Iraq and focus on the seriousness of 
the situation. The Arab experts, on the other hand, maneuver with different starting 
points which indicate the challenge they face in establishing consensus within an 
international and heterogeneous debate context. A major part of these starting points 
focus on the misfortune of Iraqis and attempt to call into question the power of the US.  
In the argumentation stage, findings show that while the American experts heavily draw 
conclusions based on the loci of relationship or circumstance in describing the US 
policies in Iraq, the Arab experts rely on testimony and definitions in developing their 
arguments. The loci of relationship are generally based on common assumptions and 
implicit premises and the frequency of their use among American arguers confirms the 
high level of common ground socially shared with their audiences. Most of the 
American arguers maneuver with the irreparable or the gain and loss loci. The loci of 
the irreparable indicate the arguers´ emphasis on the urgency of defending national 
interests through reference to threats, victory and global leadership. The gains or losses 
loci attempt either to depict rewards to commitment to American values or to warn the 
audience from the devastating costs of using the wrong policies. These lines of 
arguments rely heavily on the ideologically loaded topoi, namely American 
humanitarianism, global leadership and exceptionalism.  
The Arab arguers, however, make use of testimony, arguments from (American) 
authority and documents in the accusatory strategies they use against their opponents. 
Indeed, the extensive use of these certification loci supports their dissenting positions 
and their general rhetorical strategy of vituperation. These experts tend to draw on topoi 
which are commonly shared assumptions in third world countries namely, the claim that 
the US is arrogance and that it employs double-standard policies.  
In the concluding stage, most of the arguers in the two groups express personal attitudes 
on the war, reiterate their standpoints or, with lower frequencies, leave the outcome 
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resolution unexpressed. However, there are noteworthy maneuvering strategies which 
distinguish the two groups. The American experts stress their commitment to the 
American cause and urge their audience to make the ―right‖ decision by reminding them 
of risks, enemies or a rewarding victory. The Arab experts underscore accountability as 
an essential element to settle war conflicts. They either affirm that the US is responsible 
for war crime or is an obstacle to any solution. Some others warn from an imminent 
disaster and call Americans or the international community for arbitration.  
The last section of Chapter 7 devotes attention to fallacies. It presents and discusses 
some cases of strategic maneuvering derailments performed by each group of experts. 
The strategic moves have been evaluated based on the rules for critical discussion 
proposed by Pragma-dialectics. The strategic moves violating the rules of critical 
discussion match with the kinds of ideological disposition of each cultural group and its 
power position within the international debate. American arguers are found to commit 
more violations of the freedom rules with ad hominem or false dilemmas fallacies. This 
signals their arrogance and their manipulative means when framing controversial issues. 
Maneuvering derails in the Arab corpus through violations of the rules of relevance and 
the argument schemes. The fallacies of ignoratio elenchi and red herring indicate the 
contradiction between their goals and the premises they attempt to draw upon.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
This thesis aims to study the discursive strategies of opinion leaders in the field of FP. 
This project attempts to elucidate the discursive practices of the FP experts in American 
and Arab op-ed pieces discussing the war in Iraq. More specifically, this cross-cultural 
study seeks to critically examine the ideological structures underlying the experts´ 
discursive choices and their argumentative strategies presumably shaped by their 
respective power positions within the international system and their ideological 
perspectives towards the Iraq conflict. The study adopts the stance of CDA, more 
specifically the socio-cognitive approach proposed by van Dijk (1998a; 2008), and 
employed the analytic tools and theoretical insights of Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 
& Grootendorst 2004) as the main methodological guide for investigation. Results are 
presented and discussed on the analysis of 1) the macro-context of FP op-ed pieces as 
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an argumentative activity type, 2) the arguers‘ selections of topics and their construction 
of context and purposeful actions, and 3) the argumentative strategic maneuverings 
performed in the four stages of the op-ed pieces.  
The systematic analysis of the topic selection and the contextual schematic categories 
reveals the ideologically biased constructions characteristic in each group of arguers and 
denotes the differences in their power positions within the debate which were controlled 
by their opposed positions as political actors in the international arena. The analysis of 
strategic maneuvering consists in identifying the discourse moves which make 
prominent the arguers´ effort to reconcile between their dialectical goals with their 
rhetorical goals. These maneuvers shed light on the arguers‘ motives throughout 
different dialectical stages and the ideological structures underlying them.  
 
There are several avenues to extend this study. Particular interest should be paid in CDS 
to these groups of opinion leaders in matters related to international relation and FP and 
to their discursive practices in different media channels. Furthermore, more critical 
inspection is needed of the structures knowledge employed within the discursive 
construction of context. Participants´ construction of knowledge should signal their 
underlying socially-shared belief systems and their ideological foundations in each 
culture. The integration of methods from argumentation theory with the sociocognitive 
approach could reinforce the analysis and the interpretation of the various discursive 
strategies used by FP experts and opinion leaders in their debates aimed at influencing 
the course of events around the world.  
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RESUMEN DE LA TESIS  
ESTRUCTURAS DEL DISCURSO IDEOLÓGICO  EN LOS ARTICULOS DE 
OPINIÓN: ESTUDIO CULTURAL COMPARATIVO 
 
I. INTRODUCCIÓN 
La presente investigación analiza críticamente las estructuras ideológicas del discurso 
de los expertos en política exterior  sobre el tema de la guerra de Irak. El análisis se 
centra en comparar el uso de las estrategias discursivas utilizadas por los expertos en los 
artículos de opinion publicados en prensa estadounidense y árabe durante el periodo 
denominado ―The Surge‖ (desde finales de 2006 hasta Septiembre 2007). El estudio 
está basado en el marco del Análisis Crítico del Discurso (ACD) y las teorías de la 
argumentación y pretende alcanzar dos objetivos. En primer lugar, intenta examinar la 
construcción del contexto en el discurso de los artículos de opinión, entendiendo éstos 
como una producción controlada por los modelos mentales o contextuales de los 
expertos. Los modelos contextuales representan la interfaz cognitiva entre discurso y 
sociedad (van Dijk 2000). En segundo lugar, el estudio trata de identificar las ideologías 
que subyacen a las estrategias de argumentación usadas por los expertos y que juegan 
un papel importante en el desempeño de la labor de debatir y tomar decisiones en temas 
de guerra. 
El método analítico combina herramientas del ACD, concretamente el enfoque 
sociocognitivo propuesto por van Dijk (1998, 2008), con las de la teoría pragma- 
dialéctica de van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004) y también las de la retórica clásica 
para investigar sesenta artículos de opinión de circulación internacional (treinta artículos 
de prensa estadounidense y treinta de prensa árabe). El análisis se enfoca en lo 
siguiente: 1) la selección de temas y la construcción discursiva de características 
contextuales tales como escenario (especialmente del lugar) y las identidades de los 
participantes en la situación comunicativa, 2) las maniobras estratégicas de 
argumentación que los expertos suelen emplear para mantener el equilibrio entre sus 
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objetivos dialécticos de razón y sus objetivos retóricos de persuasión. Como se verá más 
abajo, los resultados muestran patrones recurrentes en las prácticas discursivas de  cada 
grupo de expertos en política exterior y revelan que sus estrategias están 
ideológicamente sesgadas y determinadas por la posición de poder de sus respectivas 
naciones y sus posturas en el conflicto armado en Irak. 
 
II. SÍNTESIS: OBJETIVOS Y RESULTADOS 
Las decisiones y acciones en política exterior que implican guerra y paz no solamente 
afectan a los intereses comunes de una nación, también pueden cambiar el destino de 
terceros países. En este sentido, la contribución de los expertos en política exterior, y, 
más concretamente, sus prácticas comunicativas, juegan un papel importante. Las 
disposiciones políticas de estos agentes emergen del escenario cognitivo de sus 
prácticas profesionales, es decir, de  su ―cognición social compartida‖, como sus 
valores, actitudes, creencias, identidades colectivas, cogniciones políticas (objetivos y 
valores) e ideologías. Estas posturas se reflejan en sus artículos de opinión y, de manera 
más específica, en las prácticas argumentativas que utilizan para justificar, legitimar, 
autorizar y condenar políticas, y sobre todo, para poner en práctica decisiones políticas 
que pueden tener consecuencias trascendentales. Esta tesis está motivada por el interés 
en el poder del discurso argumentativo de los expertos en política exterior y en su base 
sociocognitiva como indicadora de sus agendas políticas e ideológicas. 
El discurso de los expertos políticos se ha estudiado en ACD como parte del discurso 
político de la élite (Van Dijk, 1993; 1995), pero se ha investigado poco sobre cómo sus 
procesos de razonamiento están condicionados por su cultura e ideología. El enfoque de 
ACD ha estado siempre interesado en examinar los discursos de los actores sociales 
poderosos, tal como muestran los trabajos en el ámbito del discurso político en distintos 
escenarios institucionales, tanto a nivel nacional (véase Chilton, 2004; Chilton & 
Schäffner, 2002; Van Dijk 2002; Wodak 2009) como internacional (Chilton, 1995; 
1996, Mussolf, 2004). No obstante, se ha prestado poca atención al discurso 
argumentativo de los actores de la política exterior (a excepción de Fairclough & 
Fairclough 2012). Los líderes de opinión en general merecen más atención porque 
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interpretan y divulgan mensajes políticos para el público con motivo de ayudarle a 
entender asuntos políticos complejos. Sin embargo, en el ámbito de asuntos exteriores, 
estos líderes de opinión actúan según sus propios objetivos políticos, aunque en algunos 
casos su ―trabajo ideológico‖ no siempre se percibe fácilmente, y, por tanto, puede tener 
un gran efecto. 
Las tres partes analíticas en esta tesis están divididas de la siguiente manera. La primera 
parte, Capitulo 5, examina el escenario mental con el cual los expertos en política 
exterior operan y el macro-contexto de los artículos de opinión de política exterior como 
tipo de actividad argumentativa. La segunda parte, Capítulo 6, expone los resultados del 
análisis de las decisiones discursivas tomadas por los expertos en las dos culturas en 
cuanto a su selección de temas y sus construcciones discursivas del contexto así como 
del propósito de las acciones. La última parte, Capítulo 7, examina las estrategias 
argumentativas en los dos grupos de expertos y presenta los resultados del análisis de 
sus respectivas maniobras estratégicas realizadas en las cuatro etapas de las discusiones 
críticas. Además, el capítulo se centra en las violaciones de las normas dialécticas en las 
maniobras y en las falacias que éstas producen en el discurso. 
El resultado del análisis del escenario mental de los expertos en política exterior y sus 
marcos ideológicos muestra que estos últimos forman las precondiciones institucionales 
que facilitan el uso de las maniobras estratégicas en el discurso argumentativo. Las 
restricciones institucionales se examinaron según las directrices del método de Pragma-
dialéctica, especialmente, la inspección del contexto y sus parámetros, con el fin de 
identificar las funciones estratégicas de los movimientos discursivos. En primer lugar, 
se determinó el objetivo institucional de los artículos de opinión escritos sobre política 
exterior con relación a la intención de los participantes de movilizar a la opinión pública 
para la toma de decisiones políticas. 
Los artículos de opinión se analizaron de acuerdo con el modelo ideal de la discusión 
crítica propuesta por el método Pragma-dialéctico. La última parte de este capítulo se 
centró en la orientación política de las dos naciones y en las restricciones que provocan 
en las maniobras estratégicas de argumentación empleadas por los expertos de cada 
cultura. Estas orientaciones políticas y sus efectos sobre el discurso argumentativo se 
ilustraron mediante el análisis de ejemplos relevantes del corpus.   
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Los resultados del análisis de las construcciones discursivas de la guerra de Iraq en los 
artículos de opinión presentados en el capítulo 6 se dividen en dos partes: resultados 
sobre la selección de temas y resultados sobre el contexto. La investigación sobre la 
selección de los temas a debatir comenzó con el análisis de las estructuras macro- 
semánticas en los artículos y ha mostrado tanto diferencias en las tendencias de cada 
grupo de expertos en elegir los temas como diferencias en los espacios de disentimiento. 
Los expertos norteamericanos presentan argumentos desde el mismo espacio de 
disentimiento y centran el debate nacional en la retirada de las tropas de Irak, mientras 
los expertos árabes evocan una variedad de espacios de disentimiento, lo cual indica su 
falta de consenso respecto a su participación en el debate internacional sobre Irak. 
El análisis de las construcciones del contexto recurre al marco teórico propuesto por van 
Dijk (2008) y se centra en dos categorías esquemáticas de los modelos de contexto: el 
escenario (concretamente, el espacio) y las identidades de los participantes. Los 
resultados muestran los diferentes enfoques adoptados por cada grupo de expertos en 
sus construcciones del contexto, e indican diferencias en las bases estructurales a partir 
de las cuales se desarrollan las construcciones del contexto. De hecho, los expertos 
norteamericanos tienden a alternar entre varios tipos de identidad si bien mantienen su 
reconocida identidad nacional basada en el ―Americanismo‖. Manifiestan  también su 
identidad profesional como agentes a cargo de la toma de decisiones. Los expertos 
árabes en cambio, tienden a contextualizar una sola identidad y evitan mostrar una 
postura de responsables de la toma de decisiones a pesar de que en su región son en la 
práctica agentes influyentes en materia de política exterior. Escogen desempeñar el 
papel de la resistencia frente al poder dominante y actúan de acuerdo con el escenario y 
los objetivos dictados por el espacio público dedicado al debate internacional sobre Irak. 
La última parte del capítulo presenta los resultados del análisis de las construcciones 
discursivas del propósito que subyace a las acciones. Este análisis está basado en el 
marco teórico de van Leeuwen (2008) y se centra en las posturas principales del texto 
argumentativo. 
El capítulo 7 presenta los resultados obtenidos del análisis crítico de las maniobras 
estratégicas llevadas a cabo por los dos grupos de expertos en sus artículos de opinión y 
revela el sesgo en sus dimensiones ideológicas. Estas estrategias se examinaron 
atendiendo a las cuatro etapas propuestas por el modelo ideal de la discusión crítica y a 
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sus normas establecidas con el fin de desvelar los movimientos discursivos que 
producen falacias. Los resultados indican que cada grupo manifiesta maniobras distintas 
en la exposición de sus posturas ideológicas enfrentadas respecto a la guerra de Irak y 
en sus posiciones mantenidas respecto a este conflicto internacional. 
Se destaca, en estos resultados, el uso de las estrategias de confrontación. Mientras los 
expertos norteamericanos tienden a polarizar sus posturas contra sus oponentes o a 
cambiar de tema para evitar un posible enfrentamiento con su audiencia, los expertos 
árabes expresan su disentimiento o proponen consejos estratégicos a los responsables 
norteamericanos o internacionales. En la etapa argumentativa de la discusión crítica, los 
resultados indican que el hecho de que los expertos estadounidenses tiendan a 
desarrollar argumentos con referencia a los lugares (loci) de relación o circunstancia 
pone de manifiesto que comparten un amplio conjunto de recursos cognitivos  con su 
audiencia, lo cual facilita el uso extenso de premisas implícitas. Además, estas líneas de 
argumentos se basan en los tópicos (o topoi) empleados para promover el liderazgo 
internacional estadounidense y su presunto humanitarismo. Los expertos árabes, en 
cambio, hacen uso de los lugares (loci) más fiables para sostener sus argumentos. Sus 
líneas argumentativas dependen sobre todo de referencias al uso de las autoridades 
estadounidense para validar sus acusaciones y para compensar la falta de intereses 
comunes con sus lectores (la comunidad internacional). 
La evaluación de las maniobras y de los casos de su descarrilamiento, que se resumen 
en la última parte del capítulo 7, ha seguido las normas de la discusión critica 
establecidas por Pragma-dialéctica. Los resultados confirman que los casos de 
descarrilamiento están en consonancia con los tipos de ideologías arraigadas en las 
prácticas discursivas y sociales de cada grupo. Las maniobras de los expertos 
norteamericanos descarrilan con las falacias de ad hominem, -atacar a las personas en 
vez de atacar su argumento- y las de crear dilemas y analogías falsas. Podría decirse que 
estas maniobras señalan la arrogancia de los expertos  para respaldar sus recursos 
manipulativos  orientados en sus estratagemas a crear controversia en el debate político. 
Asimismo, se ha visto que las estrategias de los expertos árabes violan las normas de 
relevancia y del esquema del argumento, sobre todo al sacar conclusiones irrelevantes 
de tipo ignoratio elenchi y pista falsa, las cuales indican las incongruencias evidentes 
entre sus objetivos y el uso de las premisas. 
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III. CONCLUSIÓN 
La tesis ha dedicado especial atención a la dimensión argumentativa en los artículos de 
opinión de los expertos en política exterior en los EEUU y en los países árabes y ha 
intentado desvelar los fundamentos ideológicos utilizados por cada grupo de expertos 
para defender sus posturas y sus intereses en Irak como parte de un debate público de 
magnitud internacional. El análisis de los artículos ha adoptado el marco teórico del 
ACD y del método y las herramientas analíticas de Pragma-dialéctica. De este modo, el 
estudio ha intentado, además, fomentar el interés en la investigación del discurso 
político internacional desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar.  
 
